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IN
reading lately the Memoirs^ Letters, and Remains of
Alexis De Tocqueville, who has speculated so profoundly
on the causes and consequences of national character, I was
much struck with the following
:
&quot; The ages in which metaphysics have been most cultivated, have
in general been those in which men have been most raised above
themselves. Indeed, though I care little for the study, I have always
been struck by the influence which it has exercised over the things
which seem least connected with it, and even over society in general.
I do not think that any statesmen ought to be indifferent as to
whether the prevailing metaphysical opinions be materialistic or
not. Condillac, I have no doubt, drove many people into material
ism, who had never read his book ; for abstract ideas, relating to
human nature, penetrate at last, I know not how, into public
morals.&quot;
Had De Tocqueville s studies run in that direction, it would
not have been difficult for him to unfold the causes of the phe
nomena which he has so carefully noted. These phenomena
are three in number. First, a taste for philosophic specula
tion is a mark of an elevated age. It is the sign of a time
which believes that there is as much above the surface of the
earth, and beneath it, as there is on it; and is seeking suc
cessfully or unsuccessfully to gauge the height of the heavens,
in order to draw down influences from it ; or to penetrate the
ground in the hope of discovering mines from which unseen
wealth may be dug. The age which comprised Socrates,iv PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.
Plato, and Aristotle, in Greece ; the age of Cicero in Eome ;
the seventeenth century in France, England, and Holland;
the last part of the eighteenth and the first part of the nine
teenth centuries in Scotland and in Germany, have been the
peculiarly philosophic ages of these countries, and have been
the times of deepest and brightest thought in all departments
of literature and science. Whatever may be said against the
age in which we live, it is clear that it is one in which the
deepest speculative questions are discussed ; and it is char
acterized by high literary attainment and boundless scientific
and political enthusiasm. The second fact noticed is, that
metaphysics exercise a mighty influence on the things least
connected with them, in fact over society in general. This
can be accountedTor. Men s deep and abiding convictions,
religious, ethical, and philosophic, when they have
such, or the restlessness gendered in hearts emptied of all
credences, and with pretended satisfactions rushing in on
every side to fill the vacuum, exert a far greater power over
them and their age, than outward circumstances or floating
impulses. De Tocqueville recommends statesmen carefully
to watch the philosophy of their day, which is always sowing
seed to produce fruit for good or for evil in the age that fol
lows. I may add that the friends of religion should also
guard those springs out of which the strea2is~of action flow.
For De Tocqueville tells us, thirdly, that a materialistic phi
losophy penetrates into public, and I may add private, morals ;
and this among persons who never looked into a work on
metaphysics. He refers specially to the Sensational philoso-
phy of France, which exercised so fatal an influence on
French character and politics, in the latter half of last
century, giving a direction to public sentiment which culmi
nated in the mad excesses of the French Revolution, and
then sank into the stagnant indifference of the first Empire.
When we look from this point, we see that we have dark
days and fearful conflicts before us in France and in England
:
for we have a prevailing philosophy of quite as earthward a
character and tendency as that of Condillac and the Encyclo-PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION. V
prcdists
; with qualities fitted to stimulate a wild enthusiasm ;
entertained by earnest and able men eager to propagate their
opinions, supporting each other in important literary organs,
and at the present moment buoyed up by the hopes of victory.
Happily we have in this country (it is different, I fear, under
the new Empire in France) many forces unfortunately
unconnected and distracted to meet this, both in the high-
toned philosophy which still lingers among us, and in a fer
vent religion widely spread, and fitted, I think, to keep the
materialistic psychology from attaining to so great a sway as
it reached in last century, and may still reach in this, on the
continent. But the contest in England is a very serious one
the religious public being quite unaware of its importance,
and not likely to be aroused till they see the practical effects,
when it is too late to avert them. Thinking men, however,
feel that they have a part to act in this crisis. I introduce
my readers to one of the skirmishes of the great warfare.
In May, 1865, Mr. Mill published an Examination of
Sir William Hamilton s Philosophy, in which he unfolds
principles fitted, as I think, to undermine fundamental truth.
In the beginning of the following year, I published this work
as a reply. In the third edition of his work, published in
1867, Mr. Mill replied to his critics, including myself. I
place in Appendix II. to this edition my answer to Mr. Mill s
strictures. The combatants are now brought to very close
quarters. We now see clearly what are the questions at
issue. The Appendix may be regarded as forming a sort
of resume of the whole controversy, not so far as it relates to
Hamilton, but as it bears on what is far more important,
the fundamental truth which Mr. Mill has assailed.CONTENTS.
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INTRODUCTION SIR W. HAMILTON AND MR. MILL.
rany
one competent to offer an opinion on such
i subject were asked, Who are the most influen
tial philosophic thinkers of Britain, in this the third
quarter of the nineteenth century? he would at
once and unhesitatingly name Sir William Hamilton
and Mr. John Stuart Mill. For the last twenty or
thirty years the former has had great authority in
Scotland, and considerable power in Oxford and
among the Dissenting colleges of England; has
been much admired in the United States of Amer
ica ; has been favorably known in France, and heard
of even in Germany, where few British metaphysi
cians attain a name. Mr, Mill has qualities which
specially recommend him to the English mind, and
of late years he has got a firm hold of the rising
thought of Oxford and Cambridge, where young
minds, in the recoil from the attempt to impose the
mediaeval forms upon them, have taken refuge in8 INTEODUCTION.
the Empiricism and Utilitarianism so lucidly ex
pounded by him; while writers bred at the great
English Universities have, in certain portions of the
London press, been constantly and apparently sys
tematically quoting him, or referring to him, as pos
sibly the only philosopher known to them, or at
least appreciated by them. It should be added that
he is known in France as the English representa
tive of their own Positive School; and his clear
logical expositions have been esteemed by not a
few in Germany, anxious to escape from the inex
tricable toils of Kant and Fichte, Schelling and
Hegel.
These two men are alike in the greatness of their
intellectual power, and in the range of their attain
ments. But they differ widely in their peculiar
mental endowments and predilections, in the man
ner in which they have been trained, and the
influences under which their opinions have been
formed. Hamilton is known to have received a
thoroughly complete collegiate education in classics
and philosophy ; to have afterwards had his logical
powers sharpened by the study of law, and his ex
tensive information widened by his researches when
Professor of History ; while his pursuits were made
finally to centre in mental science by his appoint
ment as Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the
University of Edinburgh. Eeceiving his early col
lege training in Glasgow, where the influence of
Eeid was predominant, he retained through life aHAMILTON AND MILL. 9
profound reverence for the common-sense philoso
pher. Completing his academic education at Ox
ford, he fell under the sway of Aristotle, and found
in him much that was congenial to his own intel
lectual nature, and was led to study his philosophy
not only in his own writings, but in the pages of
his commentators, and in the modification of his
logic constructed by the schoolmen. In the course
of his multifarious reading .he could not but fall in
with constant references to Emmanuel Kant as a
profound thinker, and, as he entered upon the study
of his works, could not but be impressed with the
vast logical power of the German metaphysician.
These three, Reid, Aristotle, and Kant, are the men
who have exercised the greatest influence on the
studies and the thoughts of the Scottish philosopher.
But in his vast and rare reading he delighted to
find truth scattered like gold dust in the pages of
forgotten writers of all ages and countries, and,
rejoicing in the discovery, he often magnified its
value as he hastened to bring it forth to the public
view in an age and country which seemed to him
greatly deficient in scholarship.
His intellectual features stand out very promi
nently. A discerning eye might have seen from
the beginning that his independent and impetuous
mind would impel him to follow a course of his
own
; and that, while probably destined to lead, he
would not be led certainly would not be driven
by others. He is evidently moved by a strong10 INTRODUCTION.
internal appetency to master all learning, and he
spent his life in accumulating stores which, after all,
fell immeasurably beneath his high ambition. Along
with this he has a masterly capacity of retention
and power of arrangement. His skill in seizing the
opinions of the men of all ages and countries : the
ancient Greeks, the philosophic fathers of the
Church, the schoolmen, the thinkers of the age of
the Kevival of Letters, such as Scaliger, and of
the continental metaphysicians from the days of
Descartes to about the year 1830, has never been
equalled by any British philosopher. His powers of
logical analysis, generalization, and distribution are
scarcely surpassed by those of Aristotle or Thomas
Aquinas or Kant. I have to add, that while he has
also superior powers of observation, he has, like most
metaphysicians, often overridden and overwhelmed
them by logical processes, and hastened by dissec
tion, division, and criticism to construct prematurely
a completed system of philosophy such as is to
be built up, only as systems of physical science are
formed, by the careful inductions of successive in
quirers conducting their work through successive
ages. In this respect he has imbibed the spirit of
Kant, and has not followed the examples set by the
more cautious school of Reid and Stewart.
His manner and style are very decided and very
marked. Any man of sharp discernment could
easily recognize him at a great distance, and detect
him under the most rigid incognito. To some earsHAMILTON AND MILL. 11
his nomenclature may sound uncouth and crabbed,
being coined out of the Greek or borrowed from the
Germans; but these persons forget that chemistry
and geology and anatomy have all been obliged to
create a new terminology, in order to embody the
distinctions which they have established. Hamilton
is certainly without the power of poetical or orator
ical amplification for which Brown and Chalmers of
the same University were distinguished ; and he is
deficient in the aptness of illustration in which such
writers as Paley and Whately excel ; still his man
ner of writing has attractions of its own. His
phraseology, if at times it sounds technical or pe
dantic, is always carefully explained and defined,
and is ever scholarlike in its derivation and artic
ulate in its meaning. His style is never loose, never
tedious, never dull
; it is always clear, always terse,
always masculine, and at times it is sententious,
clinching, and apothegmatic. In reading his works,
the reader need entertain no fear of being led into
a Scotch mist, or being met by a fog from the
German Ocean. Not unfrequently dogmatic, at
times oracular, resolute in holding by his opinions
when attacked, and on certain occasions, as in his
assaults on Luther, Brown, Whately, and De Mor
gan, giving way to undue severity and passion, he is
ever open, manly, and sincere. He uses a sharp
chisel and strikes his hammer with a decided blow,
and his ideas commonly stand out before us like a
clean cut statue standing firmly on its pedestal be-12 INTRODUCTION.
tween us and a clear sky. Indeed, we might with
justice describe his style as not only accurate, but
even beautiful in a sense, from its compression, its
compactness, its vigor, and its point. His thoughts,
weighty and solid as metal, are ever made to shine
with a metallic lustre. At the places at which his
speculations are the most abstract and his words the
baldest, he often surprises us by an apt quotation
from an old and forgotten author
; or a sudden light
is thrown upon the present topic by rays coming
from a hundred points. If we have not the flowers
or the riches, we are at the same time without the
sultriness of a tropical climate
; and in the arctic re
gion to which he carries us, if the atmosphere feels
cold at times, it is always healthy and bracing, and
the lights in the sky have a bright and scintillating
lustre.
Mr. Mill s characteristics are of a different kind.
It is understood that he received no collegiate
education
; but it is clear that he has been instruct
ed with care, and I should suppose upon a system,
in the various branches even of academic learning.
If not so technically erudite as Hamilton, it is
evident that he is well acquainted with the various
departments of physical science ; that he is exten
sively read in all historical and social questions ;
and that he is competently conversant with the
opinions of philosophers and logicians in different
ages. His thinking has many of the qualities of
a self-educated man : that is, it is fresh and indepen-HAMILTON AND MILL. 13
dent, but, at the same time, it is often exclusive and
angular, in consequence of its not being rubbed and
polished and adjusted by being placed alongside of
the philosophic and religious wisdom of the great
and good men of the past. Taught to think for
himself from his boyhood, he has prepared opinions
on all subjects ; he has published many of these in
his writings, and has evidently many more to ad
vance in due time, as circumstances may seem to
require, and the world is able to bear them. He
received, I rather think, his first intellectual im
pulse from his own father, of whom he always
speaks with profound reverence, a circumstance
creditable alike to the father and the son. But Mr.
James Mill, though a clear and independent, was by
no means (so I think) a comprehensive or profound
thinker. The title of his philosophical work, Anal
ysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind, indi
cates its character and its contents ; it is an analysis
of the operations of the mind into as few elements
as possible, and preceded by no careful observation
of the nature and peculiarities of the mental phe
nomena which he seeks to decompose. One so
trained could not but have his attention drawn to
the speculations of Dr. Thomas Brown, who, largely
following the Sensational School of France, had
shown his ingenuity in deriving the complex phe
nomena of the mind from a few ultimate laws. Like
the older Mr. Mill (in this respect unlike Dr.
Brown), the younger Mr. Mill delights to trace ideasX
14 INTEODUCTION.
to sensations ; like Brown and James Mill, he rep
resents all our mental states as
&quot;
feelings/ and like
them he generates our ideas by means of sugges
tion or association.
These are evidently Mr. Mill s immediate prede
cessors in psychology. In historical speculation he
was early seized with an admiration of the general
principles of the philosophy of M. Auguste Comte,
who was becoming known to a select few at the
time when the character of the young Englishman
was being formed; and M. Littre claims Mr. John
Mill as the first who gave
&quot; a public adhesion to the
method of the positive philosophy.&quot; Not that he
has followed the founder of the Positive School in
every respect ; in particular, he has been prevented
by his adherence to his&quot; father s metaphysics from
following M. Comte in his denunciations of ah
1
a1&amp;gt;
tempts to study the human mind by consciousness.
But he was led by the influence of this teacher to
regard it as impossible for the mind to rise to first
or final causes, or to know the nature of things;
and to adopt his favorite method of procedure,
which is by deduction from an hypothesis, which he
endeavors to show explains all the phenomena.
Though a fairly informed man in the history of
philosophy, he has attached himself to a school
which thinks it has entirely outstripped the past;
and so he has no sympathy with, and no apprecia
tion of, the profound thoughts of the men of former
times : these are supposed to belong to the theo-HAMILTON AND MILL. 15
logical or metaphysical ages, which have forever
passed away in favor of the positive era which has
now dawned upon our world. Bred thus in a rev
olutionary school of opinion, his predilections are
in all things in favor of those who are given to
change, and against those who think that there is
immutable truth, or who imagine that they have
discovered it. His expressed admiration of Cole
ridge may seem to contradict this statement, but it
does so only in appearance, for he has no partiality
for any of the favorite principles of that defender of
transcendental reason
; it is clear that he delights in
him chiefly because his speculations have been aci&amp;gt;-
ing as a solvent to melt down the crystallized philo
sophical and theological opinions of England. The
school of Comte has hitherto had no analyst of the
mind (the founder of it was a phrenologist, and
studied the mind through the brain) ; and Mr. Mill
may be regarded as, for the present, the recognized
metaphysician of the school, and will hold this place
till he is superseded by the more comprehensive
system, and the bolder speculative grasp of Mr.
Herbert Spencer.
With an original clearness of intellectual appre
hension, his whole training has disposed him towards
distinct enunciations and practical results. Engaged
for many years in a public office, he has acquired
habits which enable him to understand the business
of life and the condition of society. He is partic
ularly fitted to excel in the exposition of those16 INTRODUCTION.
media axiomata upon which, according to Bacon,
&quot;depend the business and fortune of mankind.&quot;
With an English love of the concrete, he has a
French skill in reducing a complex subject into
simple elements, and a French clearness of expres
sion. He is ever able to bring out his views in
admirable order, and his thoughts lie in his style
like pebbles at the bottom of a transparent stream,
so that we see their shape and color without no
ticing the medium through which we view them.
I have to adcl, that in his love of the clear, and his
desire to translate the abstract into the concrete, he
often misses the deepest properties of the objects
examined by him
; and he seems to me far better
fitted to co-ordinate the facts of social science than
to deal with the first principles of fundamental
philosophy. As to his spirit, there are evidences of
a keen fire, of enthusiasm, perhaps of passion, burn
ing within, but the surface is ever still and ever
green.
These two eminent men, whose systems evidently
stood all along so widely apart from each other,
have now been brought into violent collision by the
publication of Mill s Examination of Sir William
Hamilton s Philosophy. Such a collision was inev
itable. Hamilton was the ablest and most learned,
I do not think the wisest or most consistent, de
fender of intuitive or a priori truth in our country
in the past age. It was felt to be absolutely neces
sary, in these circumstances, by the British sectionHAMILTON AND MILL. 17
of the school of M. Comte, that the fundamental
positions of Hamilton should be removed out of the
way of the advancing deductive empiricism. I
rejoice that the attack has been made by Mr. Mill
himself, so that we see all that can be advanced by
the acutest representative of the experiential or
sensational philosophy in our age and country. It
is to be hoped that the formidable assault will be
met by some disciple of Hamilton who has caught
the spirit and who understands the system of his
master. As the* result, the student of philosophy
will be in circumstances to decide what he should
receive with gratitude, and what he should refuse
or reject with regret, in the philosophy of the last
of the great Scottish metaphysicians.
In the title of his work, Mr. Mill announces it as
an examination of
&quot; the principal philosophical ques
tions discussed in his writings;&quot; and in his intro
ductory remarks he declares, &quot;My subject, therefore,
is not Sir W. Hamilton, but the questions which Sir
W. Hamilton discussed.&quot; It is this circumstance
which niakes the work so important in the view of
the students of mental science generally, and which
has induced me to review it. In examining his
opponent, Mr. Mill has taken the opportunity of
developing his own philosophic system, and has put
us in a position to judge of its principles and re
sults. It is true that we had the germs of that
system embedded in his treatise on Logic, and ger
minating there. No doubt he is continually telling18 INTRODUCTION*
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us in that work that he avoids metaphysics, but
there is a metaphysical system underlying and run
ning throughout all the deeper discussions. He re
fers, and evidently adheres to a large extent, to a
sensational theory of the origin of our ideas in
his chapter,
&quot; Of the Things denoted by Names ;
&quot;







and he has exposed with a special zest the errors of
the a priori school in his book on
&quot;
Fallacies.&quot; He
has thus been preparing those who have studied his
logic for accepting his metaphysics. In these cir
cumstances I rejoice that in his recent work he has
furnished us with the means of thoroughly esti
mating his theory of the mind, of which we had
only hints and glimpses in his logical treatise. It
is this theory which I profess to examine in this
volume.
In performing this special task it is not necessary
to enter into the controversy between Mill and
Hamilton. For more important questions than the
merits of the individuals have been started.. I cer
tainly do not feel that it is a duty devolving on me
to offer a defence of the philosophy of Hamilton.






tion,&quot; in an appendix to the fourth edition of my
work on the Method of the Divine Government, I
have been opposing certain of his favorite principles.
I offered my strictures with excessive reluctance, asHAMILTON AND MILL. 19
feeling a profound reverence for the vast erudition
and logical power of the Edinburgh professor, and
cherishing a lively gratitude for the services he had
rendered to philosophy in refuting old and widely-
received errors and establishing important truth.
I advanced my criticisms while he was yet alive,
and I have continued them in articles in reviews,
and in my work on The Intuitions of the Mind, while
his reputation was at its greatest height, and his
disciples were indignant at any attempt to dispute
the infallibility of their master.
Hamilton, as it appears to me, was never able to
weld into a consistent whole the realistic matter he
got from Keid with the subjective forms he took
from Kant. In his review of M. Cousin, he took up
a negative position, which did not leave him free to
follow thoroughly the positive revelations of con
sciousness. In his Discussions he developed a the
ory of causation which prevented him from rising
from the phenomena of the world to a belief in the
existence of Deity ; and he expounded a doctrine
as to the relativity of knowledge which makes us
perceive objects under forms, and with additions im
posed by the perceiving mind, which landed him
avowedly in a system of nescience. Kant is claimed,
with some truth, by M. Littre as in fact a precursor
of the school of Comte. I have felt all along that
Hamilton adopted principles from the Critical Phi
losophy which made it impossible for him to stand
up for the trustworthiness of our faculties and the20 INTRODUCTION. .
reality of things, which yet as a follower of Keid he
seemed to be establishing. I declared openly and
repeatedly, and in a number of places, that the ad
missions he made would sooner or later be followed
to their logical consequences ; that without meaning
it, he was preparing the way for a nihilist philos
ophy; and that it would be seen that he had not
left himself ground from which successfully to repel
the attacks of scepticism. When Dr. Mansel pub
lished his famous Bampton Lectures, On the Limits
of Religious Thought, notwithstanding my great
reverence for his erudition, his acuteness, and his
high character, I immediately opposed his applica
tion of Hamilton s doctrine of the unconditioned to
our knowledge of God and of good and evil, which I
represented as being fraught with disastrous logical
consequences. As having anticipated Mr. Mill in
many of his objections to Hamilton s philosophy,
and having advanced others against doctrines which
Mr. Mill applauds and turns to his own uses, and
believing it to be impossible to defend fundamental
truth from the positions assumed by Hamilton, I
feel that it is not for me to propose to defend the
philosophy of the Scottish metaphysician from the
assaults of Mr. Mill.
1
At the same time, I cannot give my adherence to
many of the objections which have been taken by
his new opponent. Notwithstanding incongruities
1 1 have placed in an Appendix to tions I have taken to Sir William
this volume a summary of the objec- Hamilton s Philosophy.HAMILTON AND MILL. 21
in some parts of his system, he has furnished more
valuable contributions to speculative philosophy
than any other British writer in this century. No
man has ever done more in clearing the literature
of philosophy of commonplace mistakes, of thefts
and impostures. He has shown that it is dangerous
to quote without consulting the original, or to adopt
without examination the common traditions in phi
losophy ; that those who borrow at second-hand will
be detected, and that those who steal without ac
knowledgment will sooner or later be exposed. He
seems to experience a delight in stripping modern
authors of their borrowed feathers, and pursuing sto
len goods from one literary thief to another, and
giving them back to their original owner. More
than any other Englishman, Scotchman, or Irishman,
for the last two centuries, he has wiped away .the
reproach from British philosophy that it is narrow
and insular. For years past ordinary authors have
seemed learned, and for years to come will seem
learned, by drawing from his stores. In incidental
discussions, in foot-notes, and notes on foot-notes, he
has scattered nuts which it will take many a scholar
many a day to gather and to crack. It will be long
before the rays which shine from him will be so
scattered and diffused through philosophic literature,
as the sunbeams are through the atmosphere,
that they shall become common property, and men
will cease to distinguish the focus from which they
have come. By his admirable powers of division22 INTEODUCTION.
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and subdivision he has placed the philosophic sys
tems of various ages and countries into appropriate
compartments, which enable us at once to see the
form and the nature of each. Mr. Mill regrets that
he
&quot; did not write the history of philosophy.&quot; I am
not sure whether the Scottish professor had all the
qualifications necessary for such a work; whether,
in particular, he could always enter sympathetically
into the spirit of the times in which the philosopher
lived, and whether he could have given us an easy
and continuous narrative. But every student should
be grateful to him for what he has actually per
formed; for arranging under proper heads, and stat
ing, always with admirable brevity, and commonly
with unimpeachable accuracy, the opinions of philos
ophers, ancient and modern, on most of the topics
of speculative interest which still continue to be ag
itated. Looking to his original contributions to phi
losophy, his defence of the principles of common
sense is characterized at once by extensive learning,
by unsurpassed logical acumen and consummate
judgment. His immediate theory of sense-percep
tion, if it does not remove all difficulties, appears to
me to be more consistent than any other with the
facts both of psychology and of physiology. His
logic is too Kantian in its manner and spirit, and
will require to be carefully sifted; but I believe it is
the most important addition made in our day to the
analytic of the laws of thought. I am persuaded
that his distribution of the mental faculties, given inHAMILTON AND MILL. 23
the second volume of his Metaphysics, is upon the
whole the best we yet have, and any one who would
improve it must make extensive use of it. Nor is it
to be forgotten that he has introduced fresh topics
into British philosophy, and has always thrown light
upon them even when he has not succeeded in set
tling them.
I am sure Mr. Mill means to be a just critic of his
rival. But from having attached himself to a nar
row and exclusive school of philosophy and of his
tory, he is scarcely capable of comprehending, he is
certainly utterly incapable of appreciating, some of
Hamilton s profounder discussions. It could be shown
that not a few of the alleged inconsistencies ofHam
ilton arise from misapprehensions on the part of his
critic. I have observed that some of the supposed
contradictions are merely verbal, and originate in his
using a phrase in its usual acceptation, perhaps to a
promiscuous class in one place, and employing it in
a more technical sense after explanation in another.
Nor is it to be forgotten that the writings published
by himself appeared in the form of articles in re
views, and of notes and appendices to works edited
by him; and that his Lectures, which contain his
complete system, though carefully edited by Profes
sors Mansel and Yeitch, had not the advantage of
being reduced to thorough consistency by himself.
It has to be added, that, being willing to take a
thought that struck him as true or important from
any quarter, he was not always able to join the ma-24 INTEODUCTION.
terials he had gathered into a harmonious structure.
Hence his philosophy takes the appearance of a
squared and diamonded mosaic, in which it is not al
ways easy to discover the unity of the plan. But I
verily believe that Hamilton had after all a complete
system, which, with some hiatuses and incongruities,
and some fatal errors adopted from Kant, is, as a
whole, consistent, and contains valuable truth. His
critic, from his training and sectarian predilections,
is incapacitated for forming a due estimate of many
of his higher excellences, and everywhere examines
him from his own standpoint, which is very narrow,
and by his own experiential system, which is lament
ably defective. But I leave the work of defending
Hamilton to his pupils and disciples, and I rejoice to
believe that in many points, and these very impor
tant ones, their defence will be triumphantly suc
cessful.
In that curious retribution which we often discov
er in the affairs of this world, we find that those who
are severe in judging others, may come in the end
to be severely judged themselves.
1 The late Sir W.
Hamilton was often harsh, at times I think unjust
(not intentionally) in his censures on those who had
1 Have we an illustration of this in are examined from the standpoint of
the manner in which Plato, who is M. Comte, Mr. Mill, and Professor
supposed to have treated the Sophists Bain ! Is there no living Archer But-
with injustice, is himself treated in his ler among British scholars to defend
turn by Mr. Grote, in his Plato and Plato s high aspirations, and to show
the other Companions of Socrates 1 The that he had glimpses of great verities
exposition of the Search Dialogues in which have never disclosed themselves
that able and learned work is admira- to the view of the ancient Sophists or
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possession of the philosophic ear of the country at
the time when he was forcing himself into public
notice in opposition to the spirit of the age. In say
ing so, I do not refer so much to his able and manly,
though not altogether successful, criticism of M.
Cousin, or to his non-recognition of any special merit
in Mr. James Mill (of which his son complains), so
much as to the censorious manner in which he refers
to Dr. Brown and Archbishop Whately, who, if not
very profound or erudite, were certainly fresh, acute,
and honest thinkers. He has now been repaid for
all this in his own coin, by one who has a great ad
miration of Whately, and who has sprung from the
school of Brown and Mill, and who writes as if he
had public wrongs to avenge, and. an accumulation
of accepted errors to scatter. The time will come,
I doubt not, when the avenger may himself have to
suffer for the excess of punishment he has inflicted.
But I beg to say that this is not the spirit in which I
have written this review. I have really no pleasure
in exposing the inconsistencies, the misunderstand
ings, and mistakes, to be found in Mr. Mill s Exami
nation., or any of his other works. Acuter minds,
or more pugnacious spirits, or earnest souls irritated
as they see the evils which must arise from the prev
alence of a philosophy which undermines funda
mental truth, will, I suspect, rejoice to do this, and
may be tempted to do it in excess. But I have no
personal antipathies to gratify, no wrongs to avenge.
The deepest feeling which I entertain towards Mr.26 INTEODUCTION.
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Mill is that of admiration of his talents, and grati
tude for the clear exposition which he has given of
many important principles.
1 My aim in this work is
simply to defend a portion of primary truth which
has been assailed by an acute thinker who has ex
tensive influence in England.
Some of his admirers claim for Mr, Mill, that he is
the genuine philosophical descendant of Locke. I
acknowledge that in some respects he resembles our
great English metaphysician. He is like him in his
clearness of thought and diction. Both are careful
to avoid, as far as possible, abstruse arguments and
technical phrases. Both have a name in other de
partments as well as mental philosophy, Locke
having thought profoundly on political questions,
and Mr. Mill having given us one of the best works
we have on political economy. Both have written
on toleration or liberty, and defended views in ad
vance of those generally entertained in their own
times. I am inclined further to admit that Mr. Mill
has quite as much influence in our day in England
as Locke had in his. But with these points of like
ness there are important points of difference. Locke
had an originality, a shrewdness, a sagacity, and a
high-principled wisdom and caution which have not
been equalled by the later speculator. Locke avows
1 Simply to illustrate this, I may corresponding professors in Cork and
mention that the part of his Logic Galway, has a place in the examina-
which treats of induction has a place tion for the Bachelor s and Master s
in my college classes, and on my rec- degree in the Queen s University in
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extreme enough views in opposing the doctrines of
professed metaphysicians, but he is saved by his
crowning sense, and his religious convictions, ac
quired in Puritan times, from taking up positions
adverse to the sound sense of mankind. Vehement
enough in opposing a doctrine of innate ideas sup
posed to be held by philosophers, and laboring in
vain to derive all our ideas from sensation and re
flection, we do not find him falling back on such ex
treme positions as those of Mr. Mill, when he en
deavors to draw our higher ideas out of sensation by
means of association, and maintains that we can
know nothing of mind except that it is a series of
sensations, aware of itself, or of matter, except that
it is a possibility of sensations. I believe that Locke
abandoned, without knowing it, some important fun
damental truths
; but he resolutely held by many
others, as that man has high faculties working on the
original materials, and that in particular he has an
intuitive knowledge
&quot; which is irresistible, and, like
bright sunshine, forces itself immediately to be per
ceived, as soon as ever the mind turns its view that
way, and leaves no room for hesitation, doubt, or ex
amination, but the mind is presently filled with the
clear light of it.&quot; (Essay, B. iv. c. 2.) Mr. J. S. Mill
is the successor and the living representative of an
important British school, but it is that of Hobbes, of
Hartley, of Priestley, of David Hume, and of James
Mill. I have studiously left Thomas Brown out of
this list, because, while adopting much from Hume,28 INTRODUCTION.
he carefully separates from him on the subject of in
tuition, maintaining that we have original and irre
sistible beliefs in our personal identity, and in causa
tion. It will be seen as we advance how close the
philosophy of Mr. J. S. Mill comes to that of Hume.
I rather think Mr. Mill is scarcely aware himself of
the extent of the resemblance, as he seems to have
wrought out his conclusions from data supplied him
to some extent by Brown, but to a greater extent
by Mr. James Mill, both of whom drew much from
the Treatise of Human Nature. But even on the
supposition that Mr. Mill is the Locke of the nine
teenth century, it would be necessary to examine
and correct his views. For while the Essay on the
Human Understanding evolved much truth, and ex
ercised, upon the whole, a healthy influence, it con
tained very grave defects and errors, which issued in
very serious consequences both in France and in this
country ; in the former landing speculation in a mis
erable sensationalism, and in the latter originating
the wire-drawn attempts to fashion all our ideas out
of one or two primitive sources by means of associ
ation. I have already intimated that I believe the
errors of Mr. Mill to be far more numerous and fun
damental than those of Locke
; and should his sen
sational and nescient system come to be adopted,at
will be followed, both in theory and in practice, with
far more fatal results than any that ensued from
the combined idealistic and realistic philosophy ex
pounded in Locke s great work.HAMILTON AND MILL. 29
Among a considerable portion even of the read
ing and thinking people of England, there is a
strong aversion to all professedly metaphysical spec
ulation, which they regard as a net of sophistry
spread out to catch them. But in avoiding an
avowed and elaborate discussion of fundamental
truth, it often happens that they are taken in by a
plausible smartness, which is really metaphysics, but
bad metaphysics, treating every profound subject
in a superficial way. In this respect some of our
countrymen act very much like those excessively
cautious and suspicious persons to be met with in
the world, who are so afraid of everybody cheating
them, that they become the dupes of those more de
signing schemers who are ever warning them against
the dishonesty of others. There are readers of
Hobbes, who, on perceiving how free he is from
mysticism, and how readily he seems to explain all
our ideas by sensation, and all our actions by selfish
ness, are tempted to think that this man who speaks
so clearly and dogmatically must be speaking truly.
They are about as wise as the excessively far-sighted
individuals who so easily account for ah
1
extraordi
nary actions on the simple principle that ah
1 mankind
are fools, or rogues, or madmen ! The Englishman
is thus often led astray by a deception which pre
tends to be simplicity itself. I abhor as much as
any man the introduction of metaphysics into the
discussion of commonplace or practical subjects.
But there is another error, quite as common, and to30 ^TEODUGTION.
be equally dreaded, and that is the introduction of
superficial metaphysics furtively, by those who would
gain your confidence by telling you that they avoid
metaphysics. If we are to have metaphysics, let
them avow that they are metaphysics, and let the
investigation be conducted scientifically and system
atically. By all means let us have clear metaphys
ics, just as we would wish to have clear mathematr
ics and clear physics. But clearness to the extent
of transparency is of no value, provided it be at&amp;gt;-
tained, as in the case of the French sensational
school, only by omitting all that is high or deep in
man s nature. I certainly do not look on Mr. Mill
as a superficial writer. On the contrary, on subjects
on which he has not been led to follow Mr. James
Mill or M. Comte, his thoughts are commonly as solid
and weighty as they are clearly expressed. But,
speaking exclusively of his philosophy of first prin
ciples, I believe he is getting so ready an acceptance
among many for his metaphysical theories, mainly
because, like Hobbes and Condillac, he possesses a
delusive simplicity which does not account for, but
simply overlooks, the distinguishing properties of
our mental nature.CHAPTER II.
THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
M
COUSIN brings it as a charge against Locke,
that in his Essay on the Human Understand
ing, he treats of the origin of ideas before inquir
ing into their nature. Locke thus announces his
method :
&quot; 1st. I shall inquire into the original of
those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to
call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to
himself he has in his mind, and the ways whereby
the understanding comes to be furnished with them.&quot;
(Introd. s. 3.) Upon this, his French critic remarks
that there are here u two radical errors in regard to
method: 1st. Locke treats of the origin of ideas
before having sufficiently studied these ideas. 2dly.
He does more, he not only puts the question of the
origin of ideas before that of the inventory of ideas,
but he entirely neglects this last question.&quot; (Lec
tures on Locke, ii.) M. Cousin seems to lay down an
important principle here, and to be so far justified in
blaming the English philosopher for neglecting
it.
In order to be able to settle the very difficult ques
tion of the origin of our ideas, we must begin, and, I
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believe, end, with a careful inspection of their pre
cise nature. In the very passage in which Locke
proclaims his mode of procedure, he speaks of in
quiring into the original of those ideas which a man
&quot;
observes, and is conscious to himself.&quot; The obser
vation by consciousness should certainly precede any
attempt to furnish a theoretical decomposition of
ideas. I am convinced that in the construction of
his theory, that all our ideas are derived from sensa
tion and reflection, Locke did not patiently and com
prehensively contemplate all that is in certain of the
deepest and most characteristic ideas of the human
mind. I do not ground this charge so much on the
fact that he treats, in the First Book, of the Origin
of Ideas, before coming, in the Second Book, to dis
cuss the Nature of Ideas, as on the circumstance that
in the Second Book he is obliged to overlook some
of the profoundest properties of our ideas, in order
to make them fit into his preconceived system. But
we find Mr. Mill justifying Locke, and condemning
Cousin.
&quot; I accept the question as M. Cousin states
it, and I contend that no attempt to determine what
are the direct revelations of consciousness can be
successful or entitled to regard, unless preceded by
what M. Cousin says ought to follow it, an inqui
ry into the origin of our acquired
ideas.&quot; (Exam.
p. 145.)
Mr. Mill at this place examines Sir W. Hamilton s
constant appeals to consciousness. Sir William would
often settle by consciousness alone questions which ITHE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 33
suspect must be solved by a more complicated and
difficult process. It is thus, for instance, that is,
by an appeal to consciousness, that he would de
termine that we know immediately an external or
material world. In language often of terrible se
verity, he charges Brown, and nearly all philoso
phers, with disregarding consciousness :
&quot; But it
is thus manifestly the common interest of every
scheme of philosophy to preserve intact the in
tegrity of consciousness. Almost every scheme of
philosophy is only another mode in which this
integrity has been violated.&quot; (Metaphysics, vol. i.
p. 283.) Mr. Mill shows successfully (as I think)
that the question between Hamilton and his oppo
nents is often not one of the testimony of conscious
ness, but of the interpretation of consciousness:
&quot;We have it not in our power to ascertain, by
any direct process, what consciousness told us at
the time when its revelations were in their prim
itive purity. It only offers itself to our inspection
as it exists now, when these original revelations
are overlaid and buried under a mountainous heap
of acquired notions and perceptions.&quot; (pp. 145,
146.) Mr. Mill, then goes on to explain his own
method, which he calls the Psychological: &quot;And
here emerges the distinction between two differ
ent methods of studying the problems of meta
physics, forming the radical difference between
the two great schools into which metaphysicians
are fundamentally divided. One of these I shall
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call for distinction the Introspective method, the
other the Psychological.&quot; He rejects the Intro
spective method :
&quot;
Introspection can show us a
present belief or conviction, attended with a great
er or less difficulty in accommodating the thoughts
to a different view of the subject; but that this
belief or conviction or knowledge. If we call it so,
is intuitive, no mere introspection can ever show.&quot;
He therefore resorts to the other method :
&quot;
Being
unable to examine the actual contents of our con
sciousness until our earliest, which are necessarily
our most firmly knit associations, those which are
most intimately interwoven with the original data
of consciousness, are fully formed, we cannot study
the original elements of mind in the facts of our
present consciousness. Those original elements can
only come to light as residual phenomena, by a
previous study of the modes of generation of the
mental facts which are confessedly not original,
a study sufficiently thorough to enable us to apply
its results to the convictions, beliefs, or supposed
intuitions which seem to be original, and deter
mine whether some of them may not have been
generated in the same modes, so early as to have
become inseparable from our consciousness before
the time at which memory commences. This mode
of ascertaining the original elements of mind I call
Psychological, as distinguished from the simply
Introspective mode.&quot; (pp. 147, 148.) These quota
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of the two methods, and of his reasons for rejecting
the one and adopting the other.
I have long been of opinion, and I have en
deavored to show elsewhere/ that Sir William Ham




He avows that he employs the phrase in two dis
tinct senses or applications. First, he has a gen
eral consciousness, discussed largely in the first
volume of his Metaphysics. This he tells us can
not be defined (vol.
i. p. 158);
&quot;but it comprehends
all the modifications, all the phenomena of the
thinking subject.&quot; (p. 183.) &quot;Knowledge and belief
are both contained under consciousness.&quot; (p. 191.)
Again,
u consciousness is co-extensive with our cog
nitive faculties;&quot; &quot;our special faculties of knowl
edge are ,only modifications of consciousness.&quot; (p.
207.) He shows that consciousness implies discrim
ination, judgment, and memory, (pp. 202-206.) This
is wide enough ; still he imposes a limit, for con
sciousness &quot;is an immediate, not a mediate knowl
edge.&quot; (p. 202.) Already, as it seems to me, in
consistencies are beginning to creep in
; for whereas
he had before told us that consciousness includes
&quot;all the phenomena of the thinking subject,&quot; now
he so modifies it as to exclude
&quot; mediate knowl
edge,&quot; which is surely a modification of the think
ing subject. Throughout these passages he uses the
phrase in the wide, loose sense given to the German
1
Particularly in a review of Hamilton s Metaphysics in the Dublin University
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Bewusstsein by the school of Wolf. He stoutly main*
tains, what no one will deny, that this general con
sciousness is not a special faculty; but when he
comes to draw out a list of mental powers, in the
second volume of his Metaphysics, he turns to the
Scottish use of the phrase, and he includes among
them a special faculty which he calls consciousness,
but to which, for distinction s sake, he prefixes self,
and designates it self-consciousness It is the office
of this special faculty to
&quot; afford us a knowledge of
the phenomena of our minds.&quot; (vol.
ii. p. 192.) It is
an inevitable result of using the phrases in such am
biguous senses, that we are ever in danger of pass
ing inadvertently from the one meaning to the
other, and making affirmations in one sense which
hold good only in another. Hamilton is ever ap
pealing to consciousness, as Locke did to idea, as
Brown did to suggestion, and as Mr. Mill does to
association, but without our being always sure that
the various affirmations are made in the same sense
of the term. His appeal to consciousness, both in
establishing some of his own positions and in sum
marily setting aside those of his opponents, is often
far too rapid and dogmatic. He represents the prin
ciples of common sense as being emphatically
&quot; facts
of consciousness,&quot; whereas they are not so any more
specially than our acquired and derived beliefs,
which are equally under consciousness. In fact,
these principles are not before the consciousness as
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course before the consciousness (though not more
so than any other mental exercise), but not the
principles themselves, which are derived from the
individual exercises by a reflex process of abstrac
tion and generalization. Consciousness cannot de
cide directly which of our convictions are intuitive.
Consciousness reveals only the present state of
mind, and it cannot say whether it is original or
derived. That state is probably a very complex
one, and may embrace secondary beliefs mixed up
with the primary ones
; and if we are to separate
these and fix on the true primitive convictions, we
must subject the whole to a process of analysis.
Again, consciousness can reveal to us only the sin
gular, only the present state as an individual per
ception ; but in psychology, as in every other science,
we are in search of the principle, and if we would
gather the law out of the particulars, we must gen
eralize. In order, then, to the discovery even of an
K intuitive principle,&quot; there must be what Bacon calls
&quot;the necessary rejections and exclusions,&quot; or what
Dr. Whewell calls the
&quot;
decomposition of facts,&quot; and
then the co-ordination of the facts into a law by
induction. In order, then, to the construction of
metaphysics, more is required than a simple exer
cise of consciousness or introspection ; there is need
of discursive processes to work the facts into a sci
ence.
1 It is of the utmost moment to remove these
1 I may be permitted to mention that ary rules in The Intuitions of the Mind,
I have fully wrought out these caution- Part First.38 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
misapprehensions out of the way, as Mr. Mill, with
his usual acuteness, has taken advantage of them
;
and after he has shown that introspection cannot
do everything, he leaves upon us the impression that
it can do nothing.
But consciousness, after all, is the main instru
ment in determining what are first principles. Let
us endeavor to ascertain its precise province. The
method followed by Mr. Mill in his psychology (and
also in his political economy) is evidently what he
calls the deductive, and which he represents in his
Logic (B. hi. chap. xi. sect, i.) as consisting of three
operations
:
&quot; The first one of direct induction
; the
second of ratiocination; and the third of verifica
tion.&quot; Now, of these three steps the first and the
third are, properly speaking, inductive
; they depend
entirely on observed facts. In physical science the
agent of observation is the senses, aided, it may be,
by artificial instruments, and corrected by careful
methods as enjoined by modern accuracy. In men
tal science the observing agent is consciousness.
We bend back the mental eye, and observe what is
passing within as it passes. As this is often a very
difficult and delicate operation, more particularly
when thought is rapid and feeling intense, we must
resort to other operations, but in which conscious
ness is still the main instrument. We must by
memory bring up the past as much as possible in its
entirety, and notice all that is in it. Not only so ;
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observations, we must look to external quarters ; we
must gather what are the convictions of other men
from their deeds, ever passing under our notice, and
as recorded in history ; and from their conversation
and their writings, as the expression of human
thought and sentiment. This may not be introspec
tion in the narrow sense of the term
; still it is in
spection of the soul of man, and it may be referred
in a general way to self-consciousness, for it is by
what we feel within ourselves that we are enabled
upon evidence to comprehend the experience of
others.
But let it be observed that consciousness, under
stood in this enlarged sense, has to take the first
step, and the final step in the process. It has to ob
serve and gather the original facts which suggest
the law. It has again to collect and notice the veri
fying facts which establish the law. In comparison
with these, the intermediate step, the ratiocination,
is a subordinate and a dependent one. If the com
mencing and closing inductions are conducted im
properly, the reasoning which issues from them or
leads to them will only bind the blunders more
closely together. Thus, if in the original observa
tions part of the light has been obstructed, conse
quential deductions will only widen the shadow,
as the mistake of a wrong datum is only increased
by multiplying it. We see this strikingly illustrated
in most of our rational systems of philosophy, as
for instance, in that of Spinoza, who began with an40 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
ill-observed account of substance, and ended in the
bogs of a horrid pantheism. Again, if in the final
observations the facts are mutilated in order to fit
them into an ingenious hypothesis, the error is
thereby confirmed, and the system-builders feel
themselves justified in adhering the more resolutely
to a creation of their own minds. We see this ex
hibited in the history of most of those systems of
empiricism which, as Bacon characterizes them, leap
and fly at once from particular facts to universal
principles, which are supposed to explain all the
phenomena, and can easily get instances quoted to
support them, found by
&quot; a vague and ill-built
&quot; ob
servation.
In conducting this work of observation by con
sciousness, there is a constant temptation to over
sight, to hasty conclusions and distorted representa
tions. In physical investigation there is less room
for conscious or unconscious deception, as modern
research insists on having the phenomena weighed
or measured in some way
: that we cannot apply
such a corrective to the alleged facts of conscious
ness, constitutes
^ one of the disadvantages under
which psychology labors. No doubt, we have im
mediate access at once to the facts as being in our
minds, and this seems to entitle every man to be
a metaphysician ; but, from the impossibility of em
ploying a numerical test, there is room for great
looseness in the observation and inaccuracy in the
statement, and these issue in augmented errors inTHE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 41
the results reached by deduction. In these circum
stances, there is great need in mental science of in
tellectual shrewdness, to keep us from mistaking one
fact for another, and still greater need of high
moral qualities, such as a spirit of self-restraint and
caution, of integrity and candor. In particular,
great pains must be adopted to guard against taking a
part, and overlooking and rejecting the rest, because
it may not fit into a preconceived theory to which
the individual may have committed himself. In
order to secure this we must as it were go round
the mental phenomena and view them on all sides,
and in all their aspects, both in our own minds and
in those of others. We must mark then- various
properties, adding none and subtracting none, les
sening none and magnifying none, disguising none
and correcting none, but making each stand out in
its own form, in its proper action, and with its
natural accompaniments. We ought, as Hamilton
expresses it, to exhibit each &quot;in its individual in
tegrity, neither distorted nor mutilated, and in its
relative place, whether of pre-eminence or subordi
nation.&quot; (Appendix to Eeids Works, p. 747.) Till
Ihis careful and candid observation has been com
pleted, we are not at liberty to begin to analyze or
theorize. When we venture on these processes, all
we can do is to dissect the concrete, to generalize
the individual, or find out the producing cause. But
the errors will only multiply upon us in these steps if
we have not commenced with accurate observations.,
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Sir W. Hamilton says,
&quot;
Philosophy is wholly de
pendent on consciousness.&quot; (Reid s Works, p. 746.)
This is going too far, as philosophy cannot be con
structed without discursive processes. But Mr. Mill
has committed a far more serious error, when he
says that &quot;Locke was therefore right in believing
that the origin of our ideas is the main stress of the
problem of mental science, and the subject which
must first be considered in forming the theory of
the mind.&quot; (p. 147.) M. Cousin seems to me to be
altogether right when he lays it down as a rule, that
in psychology we must begin with a painstaking
inquiry into the actual nature of our ideas. Mr.
Mill has thus reversed the order of things, placing
that which is first last, and that which is last first,
putting the theory of ideas before the observation
of the ideas, which evidently holds out great temp
tations to him to determine their nature by his
theory.
Not that we are precluded from making an in
quiry into the origin of ideas. This is a very fair
subject of investigation, provided always that we
acknowledge its difficulties and its uncertainties, and
proceed in a cautious manner and in the proper
method. But even here the main agent must be
consciousness, in the sense which has been ex
plained, that is, as giving us directly a knowledge
of our own mental operations, and indirectly an
acquaintance with those of others. In order to the
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have two objects, or classes of objects, to look at.
We have, first, to consider the ideas or convictions
which we would seek to account for, and, secondly,
the elements into which we would resolve them.
The first of these operations must be done by con
sciousness exclusively. Even in the other and more
complicated and perplexing inquiry, introspection
must be the main agent. No doubt it is possible
that some light may be thrown on the origin of cer
tain ideas by the brain and nerves, and in this phys
iological investigation the instruments must be the
eye and the microscope. But no unconscious action
can account for conscious ideas. The attempt to
explain ideas must always proceed by deriving the
more complex from the simpler mental phenomena.
But in the determination of the precise nature of
the simpler mental affections, we are again thrown
back on consciousness. Suppose that the attempt
be, as in the school of Mr. Mill, to get our ideas
from sensations, and associations of sensation, we
must begin to determine what sensations are, and
what the laws of association are, by the internal
sense. I am quite willing to adopt Mr. Mill s psy
chological method, but only on the condition that
we take introspection as our main instrument of
observation.
Mr. Mill tells us that
&quot; the proof that any of the
alleged Universal Beliefs or principles of Common
Sense are affirmations of consciousness, supposes two
things, that the beliefs exist, and that they can-44 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
not possibly have been acquired.&quot; (p. 147.) I have
no objection to accept these two conditions, with an
explanation of the one and a correction of the
other.
As to the first rule, there are some points which
consciousness can settle at once. It lets us know
what is our present idea or conviction. This is alto
gether competent to it, this in fact is its office
; its
revelations carry their own evidence with them, and
from them there is no appeal. This is admitted by
Mr. Mill :
&quot;
Introspection can show a present belief
or conviction.&quot; &quot;If consciousness tells me that I
have a certain thought or sensation, I assuredly
have that thought or sensation.&quot; (p. 141.) Now, in
the mature mind there are a vast number and
variety of ideas and convictions. We have percep
tions, apprehensions, and beliefs, about matter and
mind, about time and space, about things changing
and things abiding, about the near and the remote,
the past and the future, about activity and efficiency,
about priority and succession, about cause and effect,
about right and wrong, eternity and immensity.
Now, it is the office of consciousness to reveal all
that is in these ideas, and psychology should begin
with attending to its revelations. Mr. Mill refers
particularly to the alleged universal beliefs. The
word
&quot;
belief&quot; is unfortunately a very vague one,
and may stand for a number of very different men
tal affections. When I am speaking of first or in
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conviction of the existence of an object not now
present, and thus I distinguish &quot;primitive
faith&quot;
from &quot;primitive knowledge,&quot; in which the object is
present. But however wide we may make the ap
plication of the phrase, it does not embrace all that
is before consciousness. Thus we are capable of
immediate knowledge ; we have such in every ex
ercise of self-consciousness, and I maintain also in
all perception through the senses. The mind, also,
is ever pronouncing judgments, declaring, for in
stance, that things agree, or that they differ, or that
this change indicates a cause. We have not only
intellectual operations, we form moral perceptions,
and pronounce moral judgments, as when we
decide that kindness is a virtue and cruelty a sin.
If we would construct a science of psychology, we
must survey carefully these apprehensions, beliefs,
and decisions. If we would establish or dis-establish
any metaphysical point, we must view, firstly and
finally, and all throughout, what is in the mind s
notion and conviction. Or if, what is more to our
present review, we would resolve any idea into sim
pler elements, we must determine all that is in the
idea by a searching introspection. Consciousness
has thus not only to settle that certain ideas or
beliefs, or convictions
&quot;exist,&quot; but ascertain for us
all that is in them. Now, it has been repeatedly
brought as a charge against the school to which Mr.
Mill belongs, that, so far as the deeper notions and
beliefs of the mind are concerned, they have never46 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
carefully observed, weighed; and measured the
phenomenon which they seek to explain by means
of such elements as sensations. I believe that this
accusation is just, and I hope to substantiate it in
the course of this review.
Mr. Mill s second rule of proof can be admitted
only with a restriction. I allow that it is not so
easy a matter as Sir W. Hamilton imagines to de
termine what is a first principle ; and that this can
not be done by an immediate introspection. But is it
not demanding too much to require that we are not
to accept any beliefs as universal till it has been
shown &quot;that they cannot possibly have been ac
quired&quot; ? The burden of proof seems rather to lie
on those who maintain they are acquired. Were
any man of science to affirm that hydrogen is not
an element, chemists would be quite prepared to
listen to him, but they would insist, as a condition
of their giving a positive assent, that he should de
compose the substance, and until this is accom
plished they would continue to regard hydrogen as
at least provisionally an elementary body. On a
like principle, we should be quite ready to attend to
Mr. Mill when he maintains that he can resolve our
idea of moral -good into simpler elements, but until
he brings forward his components, and shows them
to be quite sufficient to produce the result, we may
surely be allowed to hold that our sense of duty is
an ultimate principle.
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from one side to another, I think it better to avow
broadly that the question is not to be settled by
possibilities or impossibilities, by may ~be or cannot
be, but by the ordinary rules of evidence. On the
one hand, persons are not to be allowed to imagine
that they have resolved an alleged fundamental idea
into something else, unless they can explain all that
is in the idea by means of some principle competent
to produce the idea with all its peculiarities. On
the other hand, we are not to assume a conviction
to be ultimate till it has been tried by clear and
sufficient tests. Such tests, I believe, can be had.
Almost all philosophers have appealed to them. We
shall find Mr. Mill implicitly admitting them. We
shall be able, I hope, to reach a precise expression
of them as we advance. Following these general
principles, the following rules of proof may help at
once to guide and guard inquiry
:
I. No one is to be allowed to imagine that he has
made a successful resolution into simpler elements, of
an idea, belief, or conviction, unless he can explain
all that is in the mentalphenomenon. It is necessary
to enunciate this rule, from the circumstance that it
has so often been violated. Hobbes, and the sensa
tional school of France, were able to derive all our
ideas from sensation, simply by refusing to look at
and to weigh such ideas as those which we have of
substance and power, moral good and infinity, so
different from mere sensitive affections. It has been48 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
shown again and again against Hume, that all our
ideas are not copies of impressions, that we have
convictions of the existence of things, of personal
identity, and of power, which cannot be traced to
impressions, whatever be the meaning attached to
that vague phrase. I am convinced Mr. Mill has
been guilty of like oversights, when he would draw
all our ideas, even those we have of mind and body,
extension, personal identity, causation, and moral
obligation, from sensations, and associations of sen
sations : he can appear to himself and his admirers
to be successful, solely by not noticing the charac
teristic qualities of these profound and peculiar
ideas. In these dissections, this school of mental
anatomists destroys the life, and then declares that
it never existed. Mr. Mill defines mind as a series
of sensations : we shall see that the phenomenon to
be explained is the consciousness of self; that even
in sensation we are conscious of self. He describes
our conviction of personal identity as a series of
sensations, with the mind being aware of itself as a
series : I shall show that we know in consciousness
a present self and in memory a past self, and that
in comparing the two we declare them to be the
same. He makes body the possibility of sensations :
it will be proven, that in his hypothetical explana
tion, he utterly fails to render any account of that
idea of externality which we attach to matter. He
resolves our idea of extension into length of time,
and length of time he makes identical with a seriesTHE METHOD uJ&amp;gt; INVESTIGATION. 49
of muscular sensations : it will not be difficult to
establish the essential difference of the three phenom
ena which are thus confounded. In treating of
ethical questions, he shows that we might be led to
do good by motives derived from pleasure and pain
:
but he has failed to account for the very peculiar











It has been resolutely maintained by the pro-
foundest philosophers of all ages, that there are
certain convictions in the mind which have the
characters of self-evidence and necessity. These
constitute the
&quot; residual phenomena/ which cannot
be explained by a gathered experience, and to ac
count for which we must call in a new cause. We
know, or believe, or judge so and so, on the bare
contemplation of the objects ; we must do so, we can
not do otherwise. Mr. Mill has looked at this men
tal phenomenon, and has endeavored to account
for it in accordance with his general theory by two
principles, which it can be shown miss, and utterly
fail to account for, the peculiarities of our convic
tion. We may here look at these for a moment, as
illustrating the importance of our rule, reserving the
more thorough discussion of them to future chapters.
It is alleged by the whole school, that our belief
in certain general principles, supposed to be ulti





is a very uncertain one, and
may cover a number of very different mental ac-
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tions and affections. Everything that has been
within our consciousness, all that we have seen or
felt, may be said in a vague general sense to have
fallen under experience. In this sense our intuitions
of sense and consciousness, our original beliefs and
primitive judgments, all come within our expe
rience. But thus understood, experience can ex
plain nothing, can be the cause of nothing. The
thing experienced may, but not the experience,
that is, the mere consciousness or feeling. As to
the thing experienced, it should not be called ex
perience ; and as to what it may produce, we must
determine this by looking at the nature of the thing,
and not at our experience of it. But there is a
sense, and this a very important one, in which ex
perience can furnish us with a principle, and this
may be mistaken for an intuitive one. Thus we
have observed, not once, or twice, or thrice, or ten
times, but a hundred, a thousand times, that our
friends have been in the habit of speaking the truth,
and we expect them to do so in time to come as
they have done in time past. There have been met
aphysicians who regarded our trust in testimony as
an original instinct of our nature. But it is surely
quite competent for persons to attempt to show that
the conviction can be explained by an early, a
lengthened, and a uniform observation
; and they
may be allowed to be successful when they have
proven that the experience is capable of producing
the conviction entertained. Let it be observed, thatTHE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 51
when thus employed experience means an induction
of instances to establish a general rule or law. And
I take this opportunity of stating, that when I have
occasion to refer to this powder of experience, I call
it a gathered experience, to distinguish it from a mere
individual feeling. I admit freely that a gathered
experience can generate a strong conviction, such as
the trust we put in testimony, and our belief in the
uniformity, or rather uniformities, of nature
; that is,
it will account for all the marks of our convictions
on these subjects, for their gradual formation, for
their extent and their limits, as when we allow
that our friends may at tunes commit mistakes in
their testimony, or that there may have been mirac
ulous occurrences in the midst of the regularities
of nature. But then, it is said that there are, and I
hope to show that there are, convictions of a very
different nature, which are as strong in early youth,
and in early stages of society, as in later life and in
more advanced communities, and which allow of no
limitation or exception. As examples, we may give
mathematical axioms, as that two straight lines can
not enclose a space, and moral maxims, as that in
gratitude for favors deserves reprobation. Our con
victions of this description spring up on the bare
contemplation of the objects, and need not a wide
collection of instances
; and their necessity and uni
versality cannot be accounted for by a gathered ex
perience. The school to which Mr. Mill belongs
explains the phenomena only by failing to distin-52 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
guish between two sorts of convictions, and neglect
ing to mark the characteristics of those which an
nounce themselves as self-evident, necessary, and
universal.
But Mr. Mill has another principle, by which he
thinks he can explain the necessity and the unlimit
ed expectation ; this is the law of the association of
ideas. When we have often thought of two things
together, the idea of the one comes invariably, in
the end necessarily, to call up the other. Thus Mar-
tinus Scriblerus, having never seen a lord mayor
without his fur gown and gold chain, could never
think of a lord mayor without also thinking of his
appendages. But here again Mr. Mill has missed
the characteristic of the mental phenomenon.
ee If
we find it impossible by any trial to separate two
ideas, we have all the feeling of necessity the mind
is capable
of.&quot; (p. 264.) But this is to confound two
things which are very different, the association of
two ideas, so that the one calls up the other, with
the judgment, which declares that the two things
are necessarily related. When he heard the lord
mayor named, Martin could not but think of his
gown and chain; but he did not therefore decide
that the mayor and his wig had always been to
gether, that they would always be together, that it
had never been otherwise, and could not be other
wise. The laws of association may account for the
rise of one idea along with another, or immediately
after another, but they do not come near explainingTHE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 53
the self-evidence and necessity of certain cognitions,
beliefs, and judgments which may rise on the
contemplation of single objects perceived for the
first time, or on the immediate comparison of two
objects.
II. In resolving an alleged fundamental idea or
conviction into certain elements, we must assume only
known elements, and we must not ascribe to them
more than can be shown to be in them. To illustrate
what I mean : It is quite competent to any one to
attempt to explain chemical action by mechanical
causes, or vital action by mechanical and chemical
forces. But if he understand the problem which he
hopes to solve, and grapple with it fairly, he must
not give to mechanical action, or mechanical and
chemical action combined, more than is in them.
The whole attempt would be denounced as a mere
pretence if he gave a chemical affinity to the me
chanical power, or a power of assimilation and ab
sorption to the mechanical and chemical action.
Now we are surely entitled to impose a like restric
tion upon the analyst of the human mind. It is
perfectly competent to him to attempt to resolve
such convictions as those of identity, causation, and
moral good into any other principle. But we can
require of him to specify the principle, to prove that
it actually works in the mind, to unfold its nature
and its laws, and to show from its ascertained action
that it is quite sufficient to produce the conviction.54 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
In particular, he must not be allowed, when he starts
with an element, to add new properties to suit his
purpose as he goes along. Or if he does so, he must
formally announce the introduction of the new
power, specify its nature, and honestly avow it to be
a new element.
This is a rule which has been habitually neglected
by that school of metaphysicians who delight to
reduce all the operations of the mind to a very few
principles. Locke succeeded, to his own satisfaction,
in deriving all our ideas from sensation and reflec
tion, but it has been shown by distinguished philos
ophers, British and Continental, that in accounting
thus for such ideas as substance, and time, and
power, he changed, without perceiving it, the sensa
tions and reflex perceptions into something entirely
different. It can be proven that Mr. Mill is ever
falling into a like error. The operation by which
he derives all our ideas and beliefs from a few ele
ments, is a sort of jugglery, in which he alters the
elements without its being discovered
; and it may
be added, that in the product which he shows, he
has not the real phenomenon which he professes to
have explained.
The main elements which he employs are sensa
tions and associations of sensation. But he works
up sensations into convictions of mind and body, of
space and time, of personality and personal identity,
of infinity and obligation to do good, which are not
contained in the nature of sensations, and whichTHE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 55
could be imparted to them only by a new power
superinduced, which power would require to have a
place allotted to it in his system, and its laws enun
ciated, and its significance estimated. Again, it will
be shown that Mr. Mill has made an unwarrantable
use and application of the laws of association. These
are the laws of the succession of our ideas, and
nothing more. Give us two ideas, and place these
two ideas together in the mind, and association will
tend to bring them up once more in union. But it
is not the office of association to give us the ideas
which must first be furnished to it. We shall see
that Mr. Mill is forever giving to association a
power, which does not belong to it, of generating
new ideas by an operation in which we see sensa
tions go in, and a lofty idea coming out, solely by
the idea being surreptitiously introduced, without
any person being expected to notice it. The pro
cess carried on by this whole school of analysts is
like that of the alchemists, who, when they put
earth into the retort, never could get anything but
earth, and could get gold only by introducing some
substance containing gold. The philosopher s stone
of this modern psychology is of the same character
as that employed in mediaeval physics. If we put in
only sensations, as some do, we have never anything
but sensations, and a &quot;dirt philosophy,&quot; as it has
been called, is the product. If we get gold (as cer
tainly Mr. Mill does at times), it is because it has56 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
been quietly introduced by the person who triumph
antly exhibits it.
Ill Tests may be furnished to try intuitive truths.
From the days of Aristotle down to the present
time, it has been asserted that there are first truths,
the support of other truths, while they themselves
require no support. Profound thinkers have sys
tematically or incidentally been striving to give us
the marks of such truths. Amidst considerable dif
ference of nomenclature and confusion of thought
and statement (such as we might expect in the first
efforts to catch and express the exact truth in so
difficult an investigation), there has been all along a
wonderfully large amount of agreement in the cri
teria fixed on. These have been such as self-evidence,
necessity, and universality. Some have fixed on one,
and some on another of these, as their favorite test
ing principle, and have overlooked the others.
Some have employed two, overlooking the third.
But these three are, in fact, the tests which, in a
loose or more stringent form, have been announced
or applied by the great body of deep and earnest
thinkers. It could be shown that Aristotle had at
least glimpses of all of them. In modern times,
Locke formally propounded the self-evidence, refer
ring incidentally from time to time to the necessity
and universality. Keid was in the way of referring,
not always in a very clear or satisfactory way, to all
the three. Leibnitz brought out prominently theTHE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION. 57
necessity ; and Kant, followed by Sir W. Hamilton,
conjoined necessity and universality, all three
overlooking the self-evidence, in consequence of their
keeping away very much from realities, and dwell
ing among mental forms.
1 We shall find Mr. Mill
employing all of them, without, however, fully ap
prehending their character or seeing their signifi
cance.
As we proceed, we shall gather these tests into
heads, and establish then
1
validity, and give them
their proper expression. We shall show that asso
ciation of ideas, which is supposed to work such
wonders, cannot give these characters to any appre
hension or proposition. No experiential or derived
truth can stand any one, or at least the whole, of
these tests. A general truth discovered by a gather
ed experience, as that night succeeds day, cannot be
said to be self-evident. Nor can it be represented
as having any necessity in thought, for we can easily
apprehend it to be otherwise. Nor can it be de
scribed as universal, for the time may come when, in
consequence of a change of mundane arrangements,
the day or the night may cease.
Following out these principles, I mean, in discuss
ing the questions started by Mr. Mill, to proceed in
the following method :
(1.) I allow him to try his power of analysis, ac
cording to his psychological method, on all alleged
1 These tests will be consided, infra, review of them will be found in The
Chap. xii. A historical and critical Intuitions ofthe Mind, Part i. B. ii. c. 358 THE METHOD OF INVESTIGATION.
fundamental truth, without reserving any exception.
This is what Sir W. Hamilton would not have done,
as he regarded consciousness as deciding the whole
question at once, and authoritatively and conclusive
ly. I hold that consciousness has a most important
part to act. It has to disclose to us what are the
ideas and convictions in the mind when it begins to
reflect, and what is the precise nature of the ele
ments into which we would resolve them. But I
admit that in the mature man all is not intuitive
that is spontaneous and apparently instantaneous.
And so I freely permit Mr. Mill to attempt to de/-
compose any idea into simpler composites. But as
he does so, I claim the right to sit by and watch
him, lest he unconsciously change the elements in
the process; and at the close I carefully inquire
whether he has explained all the characteristics of
the idea and conviction.
(2.) When he fails, as I believe it will be found
that he does fail, in regard to certain mental prin
ciples, then I hold that these principles which the
acute intellect of Mr. Mill cannot decompose, may
be regarded as elementary, at least provisionally so
;
that is, till some abler man (which is not likely to
happen) makes the attempt and succeeds.
(3.) I bring the aUeged first truths to the test of
self-evidence, necessity, and universality, and when
they can stand these criteria, I pronounce them con
clusively to be original and primary and funda
mental.CHAPTER III.
MR. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
THE
common impression regarding Mr. Mill s
philosophy is that it needs no intuitive prin
ciples ; that the author of it does not presuppose or
allow that there is anything innate in the mind.
Some of his admirers give him credit for weaving a
rich fabric without any material except sensations,
and with no machinery except experience. Mr.
Mill s cavils against those who support fundamental
truth, and the manner in which he expounds his
own system, are fitted to leave this impression. He
begins the construction of his theory with sensa
tions
; he goes on to fashion them into various forms
by association of sensations
; he allows among the
series of sensations a memory of the past, an expec
tation of the future, and a power of observing co
existences and successions, resemblances and differ
ences between sensations
; and he makes the mind
as it advances receive powerful aid from the artificial
instrumentality of language. These seem, at least
to a cursory observer, to constitute the matter and
the agency by which he ingeniously constructs the
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ideas, many of them so grand and far-ranging, which
the mind of man is capable of forming. But while
these seem to be the original furniture of the mind
and the sum of the assumptions he has to make, we
find if we look more carefully that in rearing his
fabric he is ever and anon calling in other principles,
some of them openly and avowedly, and others un
consciously and furtively ; and that these form when
placed together a huge but ill-fashioned and in
congruous body of what are in fact, whatever he
may call them, intuitive principles or metaphysical
truth.
It will be found, indeed, that the mental analysts,
whose ambition it has been to reduce the original
capacities of the mind to a very small number, have
been obliged to bring in a vast body of assumptions
and new elements as they advance. Locke satisfied
himself that he had derived all our ideas from sensa
tion and reflection, but then he called in faculties to





as these powers operate ; he
gives an important function to
&quot;
intuition,&quot; and sup




relations. Even Hume, who of all metaphysicians
is disposed to make fewest admissions, remarks in
criticising Locke,
&quot; I should desire to know what can
be meant by asserting that self-love, or resentment
of injuries, or passion between the sexes, is not in
nate.&quot; (Works, vol. iv. p. 23.) The Sensational
School made all our ideas transformed sensations;ME. MILL S ADMISSIONS. 61
but in order to get such ideas as those of personal
identity, power, and duty, they quietly gave the
transforming act a power of transmuting one thing
into another. I am now to show how many prin
ciples Mr. Mill has been obliged to call in, as he goes
along, in order to explain the actual phenomena of
the mind on his hypothesis. I must give consider
able extracts in order to do justice at once to his
views and my argument. The admissions are no
doubt candidly made, and they are always clearly
stated. Our readers must judge as to how far they
affect the apparent simplicity and modify the logical
consistency of his system. As I may have occasion
to refer to them in the course of the discussion, I
number and designate them by the letters of the
Greek alphabet.
a. There is an immediate and intuitive knowledge.
His language is express.
u We do know some things
immediately and intuitively.&quot; (p. 126.)
/?. From the truths known by intuition, others are
inferred.
&quot; Truths are known to us in two ways ;
some are known directly and of themselves, and
some through the medium of other truths. The
former are the subject of intuition or consciousness,
the latter of inference. The truths known by intui
tion are the original premises from which all others
are inferred.&quot; (Logic, Introd. 4.)
/. Reasoning carries its back to intuition, from
which it derives its ultimate premises. He thus fol
lows up the passage last quoted
:
&quot; Our assent to the62 ME. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
conclusion being grounded upon the truth of the
premises, we never could arrive at any knowledge
by reasoning, unless something could be known an
tecedently to reasoning.&quot; And in the work more
immediately under review: &quot;Unless, therefore, we
knew something immediately, we could not know
anything mediately, and consequently could not
know anything at all.&quot; (p. 126.) Elsewhere he says
First Principles cannot be proven
:
&quot; To be incapable
of proof by reasoning is common to all first prin
ciples
: of our knowledge as well as of our con
duct.&quot;
( Utilitarianism, p. 51.)
These statements are very satisfactory as to the
existence of intuition, and the place occupied by it,
and the purpose served by it. He does not in these
passages state the grounds on which he admits in
tuition, nor the tests by which he would try it.
These, however, may come out incidentally as we
advance. Let us inquire what he represents as ex
ercises of intuition.
d. Consciousness is a form of intuition. This is
implied throughout, and will be shown to be so by
the passages quoted under other heads.
e. Whatever consciousness reveals is to be received.
&quot;
According to all philosophers the evidence of con
sciousness, if only we can obtain it pure, is con
clusive.&quot; (p. 126.)
&quot;If consciousness tells me that I
have a certain thought or sensation, I assuredly have
that thought or sensation.&quot; (p. 141.)
. Consciousness and intuitive convictions are ar-ME. MILL S ADMISSIONS. 63
biters from which there is no appeal.
&quot; The verdict
of consciousness, or, in other words, our immediate
and intuitive conviction, is admitted on all hands to
be a decision without appeal.&quot; (p. 127.)
rj
m The truth revealed by consciousness rests on its
own evidence.
&quot; All the world admits, with our au
thor, that it is impossible to doubt a fact of internal
consciousness. To feel, and not to know that we
feel, is an impossibility. But Sir William Hamilton
is not satisfied to let this truth rest on its own evi
dence. He wants a demonstration of it. As if it
were not sufficiently proved by consciousness itself,
he attempts to prove it by a reductio ad dbsurdum&quot;
(p. 132.) He then criticises, I think justly, Sir Wil
liam Hamilton s proof, which he says carries us
&quot; round a long circuit to return to the point from
which we set out.&quot;
&quot; He has deduced the trust
worthiness of consciousness from the veracity of the
Deity ; and the veracity of the Deity can only be
known from the evidence of consciousness.&quot; (p. 138.)
Mr. Mill himself would have the truth
&quot; rest on its
own evidence.&quot; I rejoice in this appeal. For
what is this ultimate test but that of Self-Evidence,
so often enunciated, or at least referred to and im
plied in the writings of profound thinkers, from Aris
totle downwards, and among others, very expressly
by Locke ? Nothing can be clearer or more satis
factory than Mr. Mill s language
:
&quot;We know intui
tively what we know by its own evidence, by di
rect apprehension of the fact.&quot;64 ME. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
A. It is impossible to doubt or deny thefacts made
known by consciousness.
&quot;A real fact of conscious
ness cannot be doubted or denied.&quot; (p. 134.) What
is this but the other famous test of first truths, the
test of Necessity appealed to by Plato, Aristotle,
Leibnitz, Kant, and so many other profound thinkers
of ancient and modern times? Already, then, we
have the two tests of Self-Evidence and Necessity
sanctioned. In the passage quoted under last head
he had, as most philosophers have done, mixed them
up together as being intimately connected.
&quot; It is
impossible to doubt a fact of internal consciousness.
To feel, and not to know that we feel, is an impos
sibility
:
&quot; and so he would have the truth
&quot; rest on
its own evidence.&quot; The law of necessity is repeatedly
appealed to.
&quot; The facts which cannot be doubted
are those to which the word consciousness is by most
philosophers confined; the facts of internal con
sciousness; the mind s own acts and affections.
What we feel, we cannot doubt that we feel. It is
impossible for us to feel, and to think perhaps that
we feel not, or to feel not, and think perhaps that
we feel.&quot; (p. 132.) Sir William Hamilton has no
where made a more decisive use of the law of neces
sity and principle of contradiction than Mr. Mill has
done in these passages.
i. No man ever doubted of the facts of conscious
ness.
&quot;
Consciousness in the sense usually attached
to it by philosophers, consciousness of the mind s
own feelings and operations, cannot, as our authorME. MILL S ADMISSIONS. 65
truly says, be disbelieved. The inward fact, the feel
ing in our minds, was never doubted, since to do so
would be to doubt that we feel what we feel.&quot; (p.
141.) As in a passage previously quoted, the tests
of self-evidence and necessity were joined, so in this
the tests of Necessity and Universality (universality
of conviction) are combined, and the universality is
traced to the necessity. The fact
&quot; was never doubt
ed,&quot; since to do so would be to doubt that we feel what
we feel, which is represented as impossible. We thus
find the tests of intuition, as I cursorily sketched them
in last chapter, and mean to unfold them more fully
in a future chapter, employed by Mr. Mill, and in the
very logical order in which I have placed them. He
makes an appeal to self-evidence
; the truth
&quot; rests
on its own evidence.&quot; He tests this by the principle
that
&quot; to feel, and not to know that we feel, is an
impossibility.&quot; And now we find him appealing to
catholicity or common consent, and founding it on
necessity
: the fact
&quot; was never doubted,&quot; since it
&quot; cannot be disbelieved.&quot;
%. In arguing with the sceptic we are entitled to call
in the assurance of immediate knowledge as a test.
&quot; I put to him (the sceptic) the simplest case conceiv
able of immediate knowledge, and ask, if we ever
feel anything ? If so, then, at the moment of feel
ing, do we know that we feel ? Or if he wiU not
call this knowledge, will he deny that we have a
feeling, we have at least some sort of assurance, or
conviction, of having it? This assurance or con-66 MB. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
viction is what other people mean by knowledge. If
he dislikes the word, I am willing, in discussing with
him, to employ some other. By whatever name this
assurance is called, it is the test to which we bring
all our convictions.&quot; (p. 126.) This passage has not
the logical power of some of Hamilton s arguments,
but it is altogether after his manner. I have quoted
it to show, that Mr. Mill thinks himself justified in
appealing to the assurance of consciousness as an
ultimate and decisive test.
L The revelations of consciousness, together with
what can be inferredfrom them, constitute the sum of
our knowledge. &quot;What consciousness directly re
veals, together with what can be legitimately in
ferred from its revelations, composes, by universal
admission, all that we know of the mind, or indeed
any other
thing.&quot; (p. 107.) I do not admit that this
statement is correct, unless he make consciousness
synonymous with intuition, and include the senses
and our primitive beliefs, which also contribute, and
this largely, to what we know. I quote it to show
how deep a place our author allots to the revelations
of consciousness.
These admissions all relate to Consciousness, the
word being used, however, now in a wider and now
in a narrower sense ; sometimes being coextensive
with intuition, as when (see t.) he speaks of
&quot; con
sciousness, or in other words, immediate and intuitive
conviction
;
&quot; and in other passages meaning (see i.)
(i consciousness of the mind s own feelings and opera-MB. MILL S ADMISSIONS. 67
tions.&quot; In the heads that follow, his admissions re
late to facts it may be attested by consciousness, but
not beyond it.
p. We may be sure of what we see as well as of
what we feel &quot;What one sees or feels, whether
bodily or mentally, one cannot but be sure that one
sees or feels.&quot; (Logic, Introd. 4.) This is a satis
factory statement, but he afterwards detracts from it
by observing that we often suppose that we see what
we do not see, and he is evidently doubtful whether
we see anything beyond ourselves. This topic will
require to be carefully examined in a future chapter.
Meanwhile I bring forward the statement to show,
that if it can be proven that we do intuitively see
external objects, and that our intuitions of external
ity and extension are not resolvable into anything
simpler, then we must be prepared to grant that the
objects exist. Speaking elsewhere of the
&quot;
first
premises of our knowledge,&quot; he says, that
&quot;being
matters of fact, they may be the subject of a direct
appeal to the faculties which judge of fact, namely,
our senses and our internal consciousness.&quot;
( Utilita
rianism, p. 51.)
v. We know existence, and make, assertions about
existence. Thus he places existence among his cate
gories, and does not attempt to resolve it into any
thing else.
&quot; Besides the propositions which assert
sequence or Co-existence, there are some which
assert simple existence,&quot; etc. (Logic, B. i. v. 5, 6.)
. We are capable of experiencing and knowing68 ME. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
sensations. We need not produce passages or refer
ences to prove this, for the evidence of it runs
throughout his works.
o. Pleasure and pain are what we feel them to ~be,
and nothing else. Speaking of these, he says of
Hamilton, that &quot;he is not so much the dupe of
words as to suppose that they are anything else
than what we feel them to be.&quot; (p. 479.)
n. Extension is an essentialpart of the concept of
body.
&quot; The truth is, that the condition of space
cannot be excluded
; it is an essential part of the
concept of body, and of every kind of bodies.&quot; (p.
327.) This is not an adequate statement, but it im
plies that man has at least one necessary concept as
to body, and I shall endeavor to show that this can
not be resolved into sensation or association.
(). There is evidently an ultimate fact in memory.
&quot; Our belief in the veracity of Memory is evidently
ultimate : no reason can be given for it which does
not presuppose the belief, and assume it to be well-
grounded.&quot; (p. 174.) This statement appears in a
foot-note,
1 and our author does not even try to show
1 Mr. Mill makes the admission answer (as they most certainly will)
frankly and candidly, but he was driv- that they do include past experience as
en to it by a criticism of Dr. Ward : well as present, then again I deny
&quot; I would ask of these philosophers their allegation, that they build their
(those who build wholly upon Expe- philosophy wholly on experience,
rience), do they mean by experience
&quot; How can you even guess what your
the experience of the present moment, past experience has been ? By trust-
or do they include past experience ing memory. But how do you prove
also ? If they say the former, I reply that those various intuitive judgments,
it is obviously false that they do in any which we call acts of memory, can
sense build their philosophy wholly or rightly be trusted ? So far from this
chiefly on experience. But if they being provable by past experience, itMR. MILL S ADMISSIONS. 69
how it fits into his system. The justification of the
principle will fall under our notice under another
head. Meanwhile I call attention to the admission.
He declares that memory carries with it its own




evidently ultimate.&quot; I shall endeavor
to show that the full facts of memory are not em
braced in this brief statement. But there is much
stated, and there is more implied. He here concedes
fully that there is a
&quot;
veracity
&quot; in at least one other
faculty of the mind besides internal consciousness,
that there is a
&quot;
belief&quot; that can be trusted, and that
this belief is &quot;ultimate,&quot; is in fact &quot;evidently ul-
must be in each case assumed and taken
for granted before you can have any
cognizance whatever of your past ex
perience.&quot;
&quot; As it is most desirable
to bring this point quite clearly home,
I will cite and apply a passage in
which Mr. Stuart Mill states his own
philosophical doctrine. There is no
knowledge a priori; no truths cog
nizable by the mind s inward light, and
grounded on intuitive evidence. Sen
sation and the mind s consciousness
of its own acts are not only the ex
clusive sources, but the sole materials
of our knowledge. Let us test, then,
by these principles an act of memory.
I am at this moment comfortably
warm ; but I call to mind with great
clearness the fact, that a short time
ago I was very cold. What datum
does sensation give me ? Simply
that I am now warm. What datum
does consciousness give 1 that I
have the present impression of having
been cold a short time ago. But both
these data are altogether wide of the
mark. The question which I would
earnestly beg Mr. Mill to ask himself
is this : What is my ground for be
lieving that I was cold a short time
ago ? I have the present impression
of having been cold a short time ago ;
this is one judgment. I was cold
a short time ago ; this is a to
tally distinct and separate judg
ment. There is no necessary, nor
even any probable, connection be
tween these two judgments, no
ground whatever for thinking that the
truth of one follows from the truth of
the other, except upon the hypoth
esis that my mind is so constituted as
accurately to represent past facts. But
how will either sensation or con
sciousness/ or the two combined, in
any way suffice for the establishment
of any such proposition ?
&quot;
(On Na
ture and Grace, 1860, pp. 26-28.) The
Philosophical Introduction is the work
of a mind of extraordinary acuteness,
and has unfolded many important
philosophical truths. Published at the
same time as the first edition of my
work on The, Intuitions of the Mind,
both Dr. Ward and myself have noticed
curious coincidences in the two works.70 MB. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
timate.&quot; He who allows so much might have in
quired whether there may not be other beliefs of the
same kind, and equally veracious, involved in the
exercise of other faculties of the mind. Mr. Mill is
constantly and terribly severe in his strictures on the
Intuitive School of Philosophy; but it is clear he
himself belongs to an intuitive school, without know
ing or at least avowing
it. Admitting an intuitive
consciousness and an ultimate belief, he makes no
attempt to show how far they modify his empirical
philosophy, and he enters upon no scientific investi
gation of the nature, the laws, or the mode of oper
ation of these elements of our nature.
a. The mind, whatever it be, is aware of itself, is
aware of itself as a series of feelings, is aware of it
self as past and yresent. The statements he makes
are very curious :
&quot; Our notion of Mind, as well as
of Matter, is the notion of a permanent something,
contrasted with the perpetual flux of the sensations
and other feelings or mental states which we refer
to it.&quot; (p. 205.)
&quot;If we speak of the Mind as a se
ries of feelings, we are obliged to complete the state
ment by calling it a series of feelings which is aware
of itself as past and future.&quot; Again, if but a series
of feelings, it
&quot; can be aware of itself as a series.&quot;
(pp. 212, 213.) I shall have to subject this language
to a sifting examination in the two next chapters,
where it will be shown that it does not fairly or fully
embody the facts of which we are conscious. I quote
it at present to show that Mr. Mill is obliged toHE. MILL S ADMISSIONS. 71
allow that there is something permanent in mind,
and that the mind is in a sense aware of itself and
of this permanence.
The above seem to be very much of the nature
of those first or original principles which the Intui
tive School of Metaphysicians, to which Mr. Mill is
so much opposed, are in the way of putting forward.
Those that I am now to state seem to be of the
nature of laws or faculties operating in the mind.
No doubt, as we are ever being told, we prove that
they exist by observation. But wiiile it is by ex
perience we discover them and learn their nature,
they must operate prior to our experience, and in
dependent of it.
T. There is a native law of expectation. He tells
us that the psychological method Ihich he adopts
&quot;
postulates, first, that the human mind is capable of
Expectation. In other words, that after having had
actual sensations, we are capable of forming the con
ception of Possible sensations
; sensations which we
are not feeling at the present moment, but which we
might feel, and should feel if certain conditions were
present, the nature of which conditions we have, in
many cases, learnt by experience.&quot; (p. 190.) Almost
all metaphysicians have postulated, that the mind
has a capacity and a tendency which prompt it to
look forward from the past and present to the future.
They have done so because internal observation
shows that there must be some such principle, and
they have endeavored to give the proper expression72 ME. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
of it : some describing it (unfortunately, as I think)
as an expectation that the future will resemble the
past ; others (also unfortunately, as I think) as a be
lief in the uniformity of nature
; by others, more
philosophically, as a belief in the identity of self and
of other objects, together with a conviction that the
same agents, acting as a cause, will produce the
same effects. But it does not concern us at present
to inquire what is the accurate and adequate expres
sion of the law (this discussion will be taken up as
we advance) ; only, I may remark, that Mr. Mill s
version seems to me to be about the most defective
and confused I have met with, experience being the
arbiter, for he makes a series of feelings, each one
of which must pass away before another appears,
expect something of itself. It is satisfactory, how
ever, to find him granting that there is such a law ;
and surely he cannot object to others making a like
postulate, and endeavoring to give an account of it
which they regard as being more in accordance with
our conscious experience.
v. There are original laws of association. The
psychological theory
&quot;
postulates, secondly, the laws
of the Association of Ideas.&quot; Then follows an
enumeration of these laws. It is unnecessary to
give it at this place ; it will subsequently fall under
our notice and review. It does not seem to me to
be the best in our language ; and we shah
1
find that
he enormously exaggerates the power of association.
I refer to it at present to show that he is admittingME. MILL S ADMISSIONS. 73
at this place a new law, or rather group of laws
operating in the mind.
(p. The mind can form very lofty ideas as to the
Infinite and the Absolute. In this respect he adopts
deeper and in some respects juster views than those
of Hamilton. &quot;Something infinite is a conception
which, like most of our complex ideas, contains a
negative element, but which contains positive ele
ments also. Infinite space, for instance : is there
nothing positive in that? The negative part of
this conception is the absence of bounds. The posi
tive are, the idea of space, and of space greater than
any finite space, so of infinite duration,&quot; etc. Again,
&quot;Absolute, in reference to any given attribute, sig
nifies the possession of that attribute in finished per
fection and completeness. A being absolute in
knowledge, for example, is one who knows, in the
literal meaning of the term, everything. Who will
pretend that this conception is negative or unmean
ing to us ?
&quot;
(pp. 45, 47.) This is a very just account,
so far as it goes, of our apprehension of the infinite
and perfect
1 a better phrase than the absolute.
Mr. Mill does not say that this conception implies
any intuitive capacity ; in fact, he neglects to tell us
how it is formed. Whether ultimate or not, it is
acknowledged that the mind has such a conception ;
and Mr. Mill, if he account for it on his psychological
1 I have endeavored to show (Tntui- Deity, and that we regard that thing
tions of the Mind, Pt. n. B. ii. c. 3) as (1.) ever exceeding our widest
that we have a positive notion of some image or notion, and (2.) such that
thing as infinite, say space, or time, or nothing can be added to it74 ME. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
theory, will require to bring in something much
deeper than the sensations and associations of sensa
tion, from which he seems to draw our ideas.
We have yet to look at some other laws which
look excessively like the first or ultimate truths,
which metaphysicians of the Intuitive School have
been in the way of enunciating and employing.
X. Beliefs are ultimate when no reason can be given
for them which does not imply their existence and
veracity. I have already (see Q.) given the passage
which authorizes this law. After stating that belief
in the veracity of memory is evidently ultimate, he
adds,
&quot; No reason can be given for it which does not
presuppose the belief, and assume it to be well ground
ed.&quot; After announcing this principle, he might have
been expected to inquire whether it does not sanc
tion other cognitions and beliefs, such as those which
we have of the externality and extension of bodies,
and the existence of time and of an abiding self. It
can be shown that every attempt to derive these
from other elements presupposes the ideas and the
convictions.
t//. There are truths implied in other truths neces
sarily^ and according to an ultimate law, internal or
external. He is speaking of logical Proprium, and
of its being involved in the attribute which the
name ordinarily or specially connotes
; and he affirms,
that
&quot; whether a Proprium follows by demonstration
or by causation, it follows necessarily ; that is to
say, it cannot but follow consistently with some lawME. MILL S ADMISSIONS. 75
which we regard as a part of the constitution either
of our thinking faculty or of the universe.&quot; (Logic,
B. i. c. vii. 7.) As I understand this statement, it
implies that when a Proprium follows by demonstra






language reminds us of that of Reid and Hamilton,
to. A.ny assertion which conflicts with the Funda
mental Laws of Thought is to us ttnbelievable, and
this may very possibly proceedfrom the native struc
ture of the mind. His language is very remarkable.
He is speaking of the three Fundamental Laws of
Thought, those of Identity, Contradiction, and
Excluded Middle, and he thus comments upon them :
&quot; Whether the three so-called Fundamental Laws are
laws of our thoughts by the native structure of the
mind, or merely because we perceive them to be
universally true of observed phenomena, I will not
positively decide
; but they are laws of our thoughts,
now and invincibly so. They may or may not be
capable of alteration by experience, but the condi
tions of our existence deny to us the experience
which would be required to alter them. Any asser
tion, therefore, which conflicts with one of these
laws, any proposition, for instance, which asserts
a contradiction, though it were on a subject wholly
removed from the sphere of our experience, is to us
unbelievable. The belief in such a proposition is, in
the present constitution of nature, impossible as a
mental fact.&quot; (p. 418.) The language is cautious76 ME. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
and hesitating. It is evident that he would fain ex
plain the incapacity of believing contradictory prop
ositions by his favorite law of association. We shall
see as we advance that this law cannot explain our
peculiar conviction, but meanwhile it is interesting
to notice that he will not decide whether these
fundamental principles may not be &quot;laws of our
thoughts by the native structure of the mind.&quot; The
hesitation implies a doubt of the whole system of
empiricism.
Some of my readers, in looking at these passages
thus brought into convenient (or inconvenient) jux
taposition, may require to be assured that I have not
taken them from Hamilton s works, instead of the
Examination of Hamilton and other works of Mr.
Mill. And were it not that in the expression of
them they have not the homeliness and depth of
Keid, nor the clinching logical grasp of Hamilton,
they might be mistaken for utterances of the two
great Scottish metaphysicians. I have allowed Mr.
Mill to speak for himseE All that I have done is
to cull out the scattered statements as to ultimate
truth, and present them in relievo., that students of
philosophy may mark their significance. I mean to
refer to them from time to time in the coming dis
cussion
; but I do not make use of them simply as
concessions by Mr. Mill. I would not think it worth
while employing a mere argumentum ad hominem.
I feel no pleasure in pointing out real or seemingME. MILL S ADMISSIONS. 77
incongruities in the metaphysical system of an emi
nent thinker, who, in other departments, such as polit
ical economy and inductive logic, has done so much
to advance knowledge. I employ these admissions
because they contain important truth, not always in
the best form, but capable of being fully vindicated.
Mr. Mill, I believe, would urge that many of the
admissions thus made are not separate and distinct
from each other, and that several of them might be
included under one head. Be it so, it is nevertheless
of advantage to have them spread out in the several
shapes in which they are presented, the more so that
some of these imply very important principles with
far-looking results.
The rst principles thus avowed in the course of
his exposition should have had a formal place allot
ted them in the system, say at the commencement
or the close. Had this been done, it would have ui&amp;gt;
terly destroyed the apparent simplicity, and I believe
also the symmetry of his system, which would have
been seen to be a very complex and heterogeneous
one. Seemingly a continuation of the philosophies
of Hobbes, Condillac, and Hume, it contains as many
assumptions as are demanded by the Scottish meta
physicians, who appeal to fundamental laws of
thought, or by the German metaphysicians, who
stand up for a priori forms.
It will not be difficult to show, as we proceed to
take up one special topic after another, that these
admissions logically imply vastly more than is con-78 ME. MILL S ADMISSIONS.
ceded in the metaphysical system constructed. In
particular, it will be proven that they are made on
avowed or implied principles, such as those of the
veracity of consciousness, and of ultimate beliefs,
such as those of self-evidence, necessity, and univer
sality, which require that vastly more be conceded.
Already it is clear that the question between Mr.
Mill and the school he opposes cannot be said to be
one as to the existence of intuition. I am not sure
that any judicious defender of fundamental truth
would demand or postulate a greater number of first
principles than those allowed by the most influential
opponent of necessary truth in our day. The ques
tion is not one as to the reality, but as to the nature
and significance of ultimate truth.
Of this I am sure, that the pressing philosophical
want of our day is an exposition, with an enumera
tion and classification of the intuitions of the mind
which, we have seen, must be admitted even by
those who are supposed to deny them. It is time
that those who allow them incidentally should be
required to avow them openly and formally, and
give a separate place to them. A flood of light will
be thrown on metaphysics, and a world of logomachy
between rival schools scattered, when we have an
earnest attempt, by one competent for the work, to




the school to which Mr. Mill has attached him
self, there is a perpetual reference to Sensation.
Those who look into their works with the view of
discovering the deeper properties or higher affections
of the mind, are wearied by the everlasting recur
rence of the word, and by the perpetual obtrusion
of the thing denoted by it.
1 Some members of the
school seem to be incapable of comprehending any
thing but matter, and the sensations excited by mat
ter. I bring no such charge against Mr. Mill. He
is clearly capable of mounting into a higher and
more spiritual region. But even he is often dragged
down to the dust of the earth by the weight of the
theory which he has undertaken to support. As w.e
1 The mental sciences elevate those School, and that they be kept from so
who study them in proportion as they setting their questions, as to encourage
exhibit the higher faculties and ideas the reading only of the works of
of the mind. This leads me to remark, writers belonging to that school. In
that in the Competitive Examinations those departments in which the men-
which now exercise so great an in- tal sciences have a place, they are
fluence on the studies of our young surely meant to stimulate and to test
men, care should be taken that the a different order of tastes and talents
Examiners in Morals should not be from those called forth by the physical
taken mainly from the Sensational and physiological sciences.
(79)80 SENSATIONS.
are threatened with a revival, under a new and dis
guised, and somewhat more elevated form, of the
Sensational system which wrought such mischief in
France at the %nd of last century, it is essential that
we inquire what sensation is, and settle what it can
do, and what it cannot do. In other words, let us,
with the internal sense as our informant, look care
fully at the original matter out of which Mr. Mill
draws our higher ideas, with the view of determining
whether the seed is fitted to yield such fruit.
What, then, is Sensation ? It is allowed on all
hands that it cannot be positively defined. This
arises from its being a simple quality, and there is
nothing simpler into which to resolve it. All we
can do in the way of unfolding its nature, is to bid
every man consult his consciousness when any bodily
object is affecting his senses or sensibility. But while
we cannot furnish an affirmative definition, we can
offer some explanations to remove misapprehensions,
and some decided denials to oppose accepted errors.
It should be understood that the word is employed
to denote an affection of the conscious mind (what
ever that may be), and not of the mere bodily frame.
It should further be borne in mind that it does not
include that knowledge of bodily objects, of their
externality and extension, which is now denoted by
the phrase
&quot;
sense-perception.&quot; It is of special im
portance to press attention to the circumstance that
sensation is not a separately existing object like this
stone, this tree, or this bird, but is an attribute ofSENSATIONS. 81
an object. At this point we are coming in collision
with Mr. Mill. Elsewhere (Logic, B. i. c.
iii.) he has
an ingenious distribution of namable things or real
ities into substances, attributes, and feelings, the last
of course including sensations.
&quot; Substances are not
all that exist : attributes, if such things are to be
spoken of, must be said to exist, feelings certainly
exist.&quot;
&quot;
Feelings, or states of consciousness, are as
suredly to be counted among realities, but they can
not be reckoned among substances or attributes.&quot;
This distribution of realities, especially this separa
tion of feelings from substances or attributes, seems
to me to be curious : I have not met with it else
where. It is favorable to Mr. Mill s purpose, which
we did not so well know when we had only his work
on Logic, but with which we are now made fully ac
quainted by the fuller exposition of his views in the
Examination of Hamilton: that purpose being to
banish, to as great a distance as possible, substance
and attribute, and leave only feelings. We are not
yet sufficiently advanced, in these discussions, to
deal with the confused metaphysics of substance and
attribute. The present topic is sensation, and sensa
tion I maintain is an affection, that is an attribute,
of the conscious mind.
But Mr. Mill tells us that u the sensations are all
of which I am directly conscious.&quot; (Logic, B. i. c. iii.
7.) This mode of representing our conscious states
was introduced by Hume, who derived his sceptical
conclusions from it. He maintained that we are
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conscious only of impressions and ideas, the ideas
being merely fainter impressions. Hume took care
never to enter into any explanation as to what he
meant by &quot;impression;&quot; whether it implies, as it
should do if it has any meaning, a thing impressing
and a thing impressed. The doctrine of the school
of Mill is that we are conscious merely of feelings,
and among these, the first and all along the main
place is given to sensation. Now, in opposition to
these defective statements, I maintain that we are
conscious, not of a mere impression, but of a thing
impressed, not of sensation apart, but of self as sen
tient. On hearing this statement, metaphysicians
will be disposed to ask with amazement, perhaps with
scorn, &quot;What! are we really then conscious of
self?&quot; And they will tell us that the child has
never said to itself,
&quot; This is I.&quot; If they think it
worth while going any further, they may then in
condescension, or compassion towards our ignorance,
explain to us that the Ego is a metaphysical notion,
the product of advanced reflection. But I disarm
ah
1
this at once, by allowing that we are never con
scious of a self, apart from self as sentient, or as
engaged in thinking, willing, or some other opera
tion. And I balance this statement by another, that
we are just as little conscious of the sensation, or
the impression, or the thought, or volition apart from
self. The child has never said to itself,
&quot; This is I
;
&quot;
but just as little has it said, &quot;This is an impression ;&quot;
&quot;This is a sensation.&quot; We are in fact conscious ofSENSATIONS. 83
both in one concrete act; ever conscious of self in
its present affection, conscious of self as affected.
,Mr. Mill uses language which implies this when he
says (4) that
&quot; sensations are states of the sentient
mind ;
&quot; and everybody employs like expressions if
he does not happen to be upholding a special theory.
He who leaves out either of these elements is not
giving a correct interpretation of consciousness.
We may, by abstraction, separately contemplate the
two, and important intellectual purposes are served
by such a process. Each of the things we thus dis
tinguish in thought has a real existence
; the one as
much as the other : the sensation or feeling has an
existence, but so has also the self. Not that either
has a separate existence, or an independent exist
ence, or an existence out of the other. As the one
is an abstract, so is also the other. If you call the
one, say the self, a metaphysical entity, you should
in consistency describe the other, the sensation, as in
the same sense a metaphysical entity. The correct
statement is that we are conscious of the sensation as
a sensation of self, and of the self as under sensation.
And as we can never be conscious of the self, except
as sentient or otherwise affected, so we can never be
conscious of a sensation except as a sensation of a
sentient self. It is high time, when physiologists
and metaphysicians are drawing such perverted con
clusions, to put this seemingly insignificant and yet
really important limitation upon the common state
ment.84 SENSATIONS.
I am quite willing that Mr. Mill should apply the
sharp razor of his Psychological Method to sensation.
I have called in consciousness to declare what is in
sensation, but I do not allow consciousness to decide
at once, and without further inquiry, that sensations
are and must be primary and elementary. I freely
allow the mental analyst to put them in his crucible,
and to try if he can decompose them. No such at
tempt has been made
; I believe no such attempt
will ever be made. Mr. Mill and his school acknowl
edge that they are unresolvable and ultimate. I am
glad to have one element allowed, it may prepare
the way for the admission of others on the same title.
In particular, the self (I will show in next chapter)
may turn out to be quite as unresolvable as the sen
sations of self.
As so much is made of sensations by this whole
school of philosophy, we must be careful to inquire
what is really embraced in them, and not allow any
thing to be drawn from them which is not truly in
them. It is necessary in these times to utter even
such a truism as this, that a sensation is a sensation,
and is nothing more. A sensation is not a thing ex
tended, is not extension, is not space. A sensation
being only momentarily under consciousness, is not
the same as time, which has a past and a future. A
sensation is not matter or body, which is extended
and occupies space. A sensation may be preceded
by resistance, but is not itself resistance, which im
plies one body opposing the movement of another.SENSATIONS. 85
It is important even to make the further statement,
that we are conscious of many other mental acts and
affections which are not identical with sensations.
A sensation is not memory, say the remembrance of
my reading Mr. Mill s book at a particular time. A
sensation is* not expectation, the expectation which
I cherish that truth will in the end prevail over error.
A sensation is not an imagination, as when I paint a
glorious ideal of beauty or of virtue. A sensation
is not judgment, even when that judgment is about
sensation, as when I decide that the sensations pro
duced by a noise are not so pleasant as those excited
by music. Certainly, sensation is not reasoning, as
when I argue that mere sentient affections cannot
yield our higher ideas and deeper convictions. Sen
sation is not even the same as emotion, as when I
fear that the sensational philosophy is to prevail for
a time in this country. A sensation is something far
lower than sentiment or affection, as when I would
love God and my neighbors, even those from
whom I differ in most important points. A sensa
tion is not a volition, as when I resolve to do my
best to oppose prevailing error, even when coun
tenanced by influential names.
But may not sensation be the cause of something
else ? I can answer this question only after giving
an explanation. In ordinary mundane action, an
effect is always the result of the operation of more
than one agent or antecedent.
&quot;A man,&quot; says Mr.
Mill,
&quot; takes mercury, goes out of doors, and catches86 SENSATIONS.
cold. We say, perhaps, that the cause of his taking
cold was exposure to the air. . . . But to be accurate,
we ought to say that the cause was exposure to the
air while under the effect of mercury.&quot; (Logic, B. in.
c. v. 3.) I agree with this doctrine of Mr. Mill (it
will be expounded more fully in chapter xiii. of this
treatise), and I would apply it to the supposed causa
tive influence of sensations. Sensation may be one
of the antecedents which go to make up the cause,
but it cannot, properly speaking, be a cause in itself;
it is a condition or occasion, and can produce an
effect only when conjoined with some other agent.
A sensation may be the occasion of something else,
say of a violent derangement of a bodily organ ; but
that derangement is not the sensation, and in ac
counting for it we must look not merely to the sen
sation, but the properties of the organ affected. A
sensation may, in like manner, be the occasion of a
new thought arising, but the thought should not be
confounded with the sensation ; the sensation is not
even the cause of the thought. Such a sensation in
a plant (supposing it to be capable of feeling), such
a sensation in one of the lower animals, would give
rise to no such thought. The sensation can origin
ate the thought only by stirring up a mental ca
pacity in the soul, which mental potency is to be
regarded as the main element in the complex cause.
And yet this essential element is inexcusably, cul
pably overlooked by the Sensational School, when
they derive all our thoughts from sensations. TheySENSATIONS. 87
make the mere auxiliary or stimulating condition
the producing power, as if, to use a homely illustra
tion, we. should make the setting of the pointer,
which roused the attention of the sportsman, the
cause of the killing of the bird shot by him. The
mind of man, consciousness being the witness, does
entertain a vast variety of ideas, some of them of a
very elevating character, such as those we entertain
of God, and good, and eternity. I doubt whether
these are the product of sensations in any sense. Of
this I am sure, that they do not proceed from sen
sations except when sensations are employed and
moulded by lofty mental faculties, which faculties,
and not the sensations, are the main agents in the
production of the effect
; and they should have their
nature, laws, and modes of action unfolded by any
one who would give us a correct theory of our men
tal operations.
By insisting on such points as these, we lay an
effectual arrest on those rash speculations of our day
which derive man s loftiest ideas from so low and
subordinate an agent as sensation.CHAPTER V.
MIND, PERSONALITY, PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE.
ME.
MILL admits fully the veracity of conscious
ness and the reality of the facts_attest(Bd
.Jrg_it
(see d, e, 77.) But his view of the objects of which
it is cognizant is very defective. It seems to be de
rived, through Mr. James Mill and Dr. Thomas
Brown, from Hume and the Sensational School of
France. Condillac, and those who followed him,
designated all the states of the mind by the words
sentir and sensibilite, which conveniently embraced
two such different things as sensations excited by
oui&amp;gt;
ward objects, and mental emotions, such as hope and
fear. We have no such pliable word in our tongue,
and Brown, who caught so much of the French spirit,
had to adopt a narrower phrase when he habitually
represents all states of mind as Feelings
: thus he
speaks of feelings of relation
&quot; and feelings of
approbation,&quot; both of which imply judgment. Mr.
James Mill says,
&quot;In the very word feeling, all that
is implied in the word consciousness is involved.&quot;
And now we find Mr. J. S. Mill declaring
K a feeling




[that is, in the philosophy of Thomas




everything is a feeling of which the mind is con-i
scious everything which it feels, or, in other wordsJ
which forms a part of its own sentient existence.&quot;)
Again,
tt
Feeling, in the proper sense of the term, is (
a genus of which Sensation, Emotion, and Thought f
are the subordinate
species.&quot; (Logic, B. i. c. iii. 3.)
Of course Mr. Mill is at liberty to choose his own
nomenclature, and use it in the signification he thinks
fit to attach to it. But others have an equal liberty
to reject it and give their reasons. It seems to me
an unwarrantable use o the phrase to make Feel
ings embrace Thought, and I may add Volition ; and
those who so use it will be found, in spite of them
selves, and of all explanations, understanding the
word in its habitual and proper signification ; and
when all other ideas and resolutions are spoken of
as
&quot;
feelings,&quot; the impression will be left that they
are part of our sentient and (at best) emotional
nature.
Mr. Mill claims the liberty of examining all the
facts of consciousness, and of resolving them if he
can into simpler elements. I freely grant him this
power. Our sensations, he grants, are simple and
original. But I have argued that when we are con^
scious of a sensation, we are always conscious of self]
as sentient. Now I am quite ready to allow Mr.
Mill or any other to reduce the self to something
more elementary. But I am sure no components,90 MIND, PERSONALITY,
which did not contain self, could give us seE Surely
our perception of self could not be given by mere
sensations, that is, by sensations in which self is not
mixed up. We are as conscious of the self as of
the sensation ; and the sensation could as little give
us the self as the self could give the sensation. It
should not be forgotten that this self appears in all
our other mental exercises, thus showing that it
is more essential than our very sensations; it is
found in our memories, beliefs, imaginations, judg
ments, emotions, and volitions. We are conscious
of these not separately or as abstracts; but of
self as remembering, self as believing, self as imag
ining, self as judging, self as under feeling, self as
willing.
This self is what I call a Person. Thus under
stood, it is altogether correct to say that we are con
scious of ourselves as persons. Not that we are
conscious of personality as a separate thing ; we are
conscious in one concrete act of this person as sen
tient, or as thinking, or resolving. I believe that the
infant, that the child, does not separate the two.
Even the mature man seldom draws the distinction
unless, indeed, he be addicted to reflection, or has to
speak of the ego and the non ego. It is only on our
remembering the self, and finding it necessary to dis
tinguish between the various states of self, and on
our discovering that there are other conscious beings
besides ourselves, that we ever think of forming to
ourselves the abstraction personality, or taking thePERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 91
trouble to affirm that we are the same persons to
day as we were yesterday, or that we are different
from all other persons.
So much for our consciousness of our present self,
or of ourselves as persons. The truth now evolved
enables us to develop the exact psychological nature
of our conviction of personal identity. In all our
waking moments we have a consciousness of a
present self. But in every exercise of memory we
have a remembrance of a past self. We remember
the event as in past time. We remember it as an
experience of self. Thus, in remembering that we
visited the London Exhibition, we recollect not mere
ly the Exhibition, but ourselves as seeing
it. True,
this recollection of ourselves may be very faint in
comparison with that of the brilliant objects wit
nessed
; and, from laws of memory to be afterwards
referred to, it may very much disappear ; stih
1
it is
there wrapt up in one concrete act with the image
of the external things. In this remembrance of
ourselves we have more than a recollection of a past
thought or a past feeling, say of the feeling we had
when visiting the Exhibition
; we remember the feel
ing as a feeling of self. Here, as in so many other
cases which will come under our notice, Mr. Mill has
failed to apprehend and unfold all that is in the fact
of consciousness.
&quot; The feeling I had yesterday,&quot; is
his account (Logic, B. i. c. iii. 2),
&quot;is gone never to
return ; what I have to-day is another feeling ex
actly like the former, but still distinct from it.&quot; This92 MIND, PERSONALITY,
is not the correct statement. What I had yesterday
was a conscious self under one affection, say grief;
what I have to-day is also a conscious self under, it
may be, a like affection of grief, or it may be under
a different affection, say joy. Having thus a past
self brought up by memory, and a present self un
der consciousness, we compare them and affirm that
they are the same. This is simply the expression of
the fact falling under the eye of consciousness. Let
Mr. Mill, if he choose, try his sharp analysis upon
it.
If he does so, he will find the edge of his instrument
bent back as he would cut it. It is a rock, itself
needing no support, but fitted to act as a foundation.
It is a self-evident truth, attained by the bare con
templation of the objects ; and no one can be made
to come to any other decision, or to allow that he
is a. different person now from what he was when
he recollects himself at some given instant in the
past.
We see what is meant by personality and personal
identity. We can express both these, without wrap
ping them in that awful mystery in which they have
so often been made to appear. Personality is the
^ty/ /(self of which we are conscious in every mental act.
II Personal identity is the sameness of the conscious
) self as perceived at different times. The phrases do
not point to some unknown essence, apart from or
behind the known thing. They simply designate an
essential, an abiding element of the thing known.
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are entitled to insist that they be brought out to
view and expressed in every proper science of psy-
chology. One of Aristotle s definitions of the sou
is &quot;that (tovto) by which we live, and feel, and \m-
derstand.&quot;
1 Some have charged him with intro-
ducing an unmeaning phrase when he mentions not
only certain qualities of the soul, but a that by whichi*
we exercise the qualities. But Aristotle was far too
comprehensive and accurate a thinker to omit the
tovtOy by which, no doubt, he meant to designate a
thing, an existence, or rather a thing having
exisi&amp;gt;
ence, and capable of living, feeling, understanding.
As we advance, we shall see that Mr. Mill is obliged
to use similar phrases to denote the permanent thing^
that abides, amid the changes of attribute or ex^/
ercise. In ordinary circumstances, no doubt, our at
tention is directed most forcibly to the changing
element, to the action and new manifestation, and
may allow the other, which is ever the same, to fall
very much into what Mr. Mill calls
&quot;
obliviscence.&quot;
But it is the office of the careful psychologist to ob-
serve it
; to bring it out from the shade in which it
lies
; and to give this conscious self, this remembered
self, this identical self, the same place in his system
as it has in the mind of man.
We are now in circumstances to judge of Mr.
Mill s account of mind, and his psychological theory
of the nature and genesis of the idea we form of it.
1 H i/wp? 6e TOVTO cj &[iev, Kal aloQa- /loyof ri av elrj Kal eMof, cM, ovx. v^
pEQa, Kal 6iavovofj.e6a nporug uare Kal ~,o vTTOKi/j,rvov. De Anima, u. 2.94 MIND, PERSONALITY,
In framing these he has neglected to look carefully
and patiently at the actual facts of consciousness,
both in regard to the idea and conviction, and the
elements out of which he would fashion it. He ac
knowledges that mind involves some sort of notion
&amp;gt;of what Kant calls Perdurability. He begins, indeed,
by telling us that
&quot; we neither can know nor imagine
it, except as represented by the succession of mani
fold feelings which metaphysicians call by the name
| of states or modifications of mind.&quot; (p. 205.) I have
put in italics the words which Mr. Mill uses, must
use, to express the facts
; the words which correspond
to the tovro of Aristotle. He goes on to say,
&quot; It is
nevertheless true that our notion of Mind, as well as
of Matter, is the notion of a permanent something
contrasted with the perpetual flux of the sensations
and other feelings or mental states which we refer to
it; a something which we figure as remaining the
same, while the particular feelings through which it
reveals its existence change.&quot; This is an inadequate
account of the idea and conviction entertained by us
in mature life. We do not refer the mental states
to it, we know it in a particular state. We do not
figure self as remaining the same, we judge or de
cide the conscious self of to-day to be the same as
the conscious self of yesterday remembered by us.
It does not reveal itself through feelings, we know
it as feeling, the one being as immediate as the other.
Nevertheless his account, though confused and
never exactly hitting the facts, is a very remarkablePERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 95
one. We must look at it carefully:
&quot; Besides
present feelings, and possibilities of present feeling,
there is another class of phenomena to be included
in an enumeration of the elements making up our
conception of mind. The thread of consciousness,
which composes the mind s phenomenal life, consists
not only of present sensations, but likewise in part
of memories and expectations. Now, what are
these ? In themselves, they are present feelings,
states of present consciousness, and in that respect
not distinguished from sensations. They all, more
over, resemble some given sensations or feelings, of
which we have previously had experience. But
they are attended with the peculiarity, that each of
them involves a belief in more than its own exist
ence. A sensation involves only this : but a remem
brance of sensation, even if not referred to any
particular date, involves the suggestion and belief
that a sensation, of which it is a copy or representa
tion, actually existed in the past
: and an expectation
involves the belief, more or less positive, that a sen
sation or other feeling to which it directly refers,
will exist in the future. Nor can the phenomena in
volved in these two states of consciousness be ade
quately expressed, without saying, that the belief
they include is, that I myself formerly had, or that I
myself, and no other, shall hereafter have, the sensa
tions remembered or expected. The fact believed is,
that the sensations did actually form, or will here
after form, part of the self-same series of states, or96 MIND, PEESONALITY,
threads of consciousness, of which the remembrance
or expectation of those sensations is the part now
present. If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a
series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the
statement by calling it a series of feelings which is
aware of itself as past and future : and we are re
duced to the alternative of believing that the Mind,
or Ego, is something different from any series of
feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the
paradox, that something which ex hypothesi is but a
series of feelings, can be aware of itself as series.&quot;
(pp. 212, 213.) This surely is an excessively round
about and far-fetched account of a very clear fact, in
order to suit it to an empirical theory. Making the
mind
&quot; a thread of consciousness,&quot;
&quot; a series of feel
ings,&quot; he is obliged to give to this thread or series a
set of attributes, such as that it is aware of itself\ in
order to make it even in appearance embrace the
obvious phenomena. He prefaces the above by an
acknowledgment that
&quot; the theory has intrinsic diffi
culties [they are those stated] which it seems to me
beyond the power of metaphysical analysis to re
move.&quot; The intrinsic difficulties are very much the
creation of the theorist. We decline certainly being
shut up to the position, that the mind is
&quot; a series of
feelings aware of
itself,&quot; for if thus aware of it
self, it is more than a series; the genuine fact
is that the mind is aware of itself as abiding.
But as little do we consent to take the other
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ent from the series of feelings ; it is an abiding
istence with a series of feelings.
He adds,
&quot; the truth is, we are here face to face
with that final inexplicability at which, as Sir Wil
liam Hamilton observes, we inevitably arrive when^
we reach ultimate facts.&quot; As finding himself shut
up to such an issue, he should have exercised more
patience in dealing with those who, like Reid, Kant,
and Hamilton, have been painfully striving to give
an adequate account of these ultimate facts. If he
says they are beyond investigation or expression, I
meet him with a direct denial. The operations are
within consciousness, and we can observe and co
ordinate them. The fact is, Mr. Mill himself has
been trying to unfold them, but has given a very in
sufficient and perplexed rendering.
&quot; The true in
comprehensibility perhaps is, that something which
has ceased, or is not yet in existence, can still be in
a manner present
: that a series of feelings, the in
finitely greater part of which is past or future, can
be gathered up, as it were, into a single present con
ception, accompanied by a belief of reality. I think,
by far the wisest thing we can do, is to accept the
inexplicable fact, without any theory as to how it
takes
place.&quot; This is a most circuitous and inade
quate, I believe, indeed, an inaccurate statement of
the fact. That which has ceased to exist is not
present \ it is the remembrance, which is a very dif
ferent thing, that is present. The future is not
gathered into the present 5 we at the present antic-98 MIND, PERSONALITY, .
ipate the future. We cannot, of course, give a
theory of the production of an ultimate fact, but we
can state it correctly, and even, I believe, seize and
express its law.
Let us inquire what he makes of the
1 fact accord
ing to his Psychological Method. We shah
1
find him
accumulating statements which bring in new ideas,
without his being able to reduce them even to an
apparently consistent system, or to resolve them into
simpler elements.
&quot; The belief I entertain that my
mind exists, when it is not feeling, nor thinking, nor
conscious of its own existence, resolves itself into a
belief of a Permanent Possibility of these states.
If I think of myself as in dreamless sleep, or in the
sleep of death, and believe that I, or in other words
my mind, is or will be existing through these states,
though not in conscious feeling, the most scrupulous
examination of my belief will not detect in it any
fact actually believed, except that my capability of
feeling is not in that interval permanently destroyed,
and is suspended only because it does not meet with
the combination of outward circumstances which
would call it into action: the moment it did meet
with that combination it would revive, and remains,
therefore, a Permanent Possibility.&quot; (p. 205.) It
could be shown that at this place we are brought
very nearly to the doctrine of Hume, who represents
the mind as
&quot; a bundle or collection of different per
ceptions,&quot; to which we are led, by certain tendencies,
to give a fictitious identity. (See Works, vol. i. pp.PERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 99
318-334.) But we have here to do not with Hume
but with Mr. Mill, who represents mind as a series
of feelings, with a belief of the permanent possibility
of its states. It is admitted, then, that there is more
than feelings, more than even a series of feelings,
there is belief. Surely Mr. Mill might have inquired
more particularly into the nature of this belief, and
he might then have seen that it is quite as note
worthy a phenomenon and quite as essential to the
mind as the very feelings themselves
; he might have




in the veracity in memory is acknowledged to be
(see Q.) ; or rather he might have found it involved
in that ultimate belief.
Observe how mental attributes are growing in
number, without an attempt to reduce them to sim
pler elements. He seems to allow that they cannot
be resolved into sensation.
&quot;
They are attended
with the peculiarity that each of them involves a
belief in more than its own present existence. A
sensation involves only






something. Mark that we have now
Time. He has stolen in imperceptibly (time always
does so), but we should notice him now that he is
in
; and we are entitled to ask him what he is and
whence he has come
; and he is far too important a
personage to allow himself to be dismissed at our
wish. It is a permanent possibility, we decide that
there may be things in this enduring time. Observe
what we have now gathered together. We have100 MIND, PERSONALITY,
sensations ; we have a series of sensations ; we have
a belief; we have a belief in time; a belief in time
as permanent, and of possibilities in time. These
are evidently different from each other, conscious
ness being witness. The belief is not the same as
the sensations, or the series of sensations. The per
manence is not identical with the belief. The possi
bility is different from the permanent. I know no
philosopher who has called in so many unresolved
instincts to account for our convictions of memory
and personal identity as Mr. Mill has done. His
psychological method is multiplying, instead of di
minishing, ultimate elements. His system, so far
from being simple, is in reality very complex ; and
its apparent simplicity arises merely from his never
summing up, or distinctly enunciating, the original
principles he is obliged to postulate and assume.
But I would not have objected to his system
merely because of its complexity, provided it had
embraced all the phenomena. But I deny that he
has noticed, or stated correctly, the facts of conscious
ness. No doubt there is a belief; but it is a belief
in my past existence, conjoined with a knowledge
of my present existence. There is time, an idea of
time, and a conviction of the reality of time
; but it
is in the form of a belief that I existed in time past.
There is more than a belief, there is an immediate
decision, that the present self known is the same with
the past self remembered. There is more than an
idea of mere possibility, there is the assurance thatPEESONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 101
I did exist at a particular time, and that I who then
existed do now exist. I acknowledge that I have
no intuitive certainty that I existed every moment
of a dreamless sleep. I have intuitive assurance that
I existed when I fell asleep, and that I exist now
when I have awoke, and I am led by the ordinary
rules of evidence to believe that I existed in the in
terval. Here it is that Mr. Mill s permanent possi
bility of feeling comes in : I believe that had I been
awakened sooner, I should have been consciously
active as I now am. But these very possibilities all
proceed on an intuitive remembrance of self, and an
intuitive decision as to the identity of self.
Mr. Mill labors to prove that his psychological
theory leaves the doctrines that our fellow-men exist,
and that God exists, and that the soul is immortal,
where it found them. For we look on other people s
minds as but a series of feelings like our own
; and
we may regard the Divine Being as
&quot; a series of the
Divine thoughts and feelings prolonged throughout
eternity;
&quot; and our immortal existence to be &quot;a suc
cession of feelings prolonged to
eternity.&quot; (p. 207-
211.) Now we are not yet in a position to inquire
(which is the all-important question) whether Mr.
Mill s theory admits of the usual arguments for the
existence of our fellow-men, and of God, and of an
immortal life
; or whether, if it cannot adopt the old
arguments, it furnishes new ones. But before leav
ing our present subject I may remark, that the com
mon doctrine, which I believe to be the true one,102 MIND, PERSONALITY,
and which I have endeavored to enunciate philosoph
ically, is much more in accordance with our cher
ished convictions and sentiments than the subtle one
defended by Mr. Mill. As believing that I myself
am more than a series of feelings, that I have a per
manent existence amid all mutations, I can, on evi
dence being adduced of their existence, take the
same view of my fellow-men, of my friends, and my
family that is, I can look upon them as having not
only a permanent possibility of feelings, but a perma
nent personality, round which my affections may clus
ter and which leads me to treat them as responsible
beings like myself. He says elsewhere (Logic, B. m.
c. xxiv. 1)
:
&quot;My belief that the Emperor of China
exists is simply my belief that if I were transported
to the imperial palace, or some other locality in Pekin,
I should see him. My belief that Julius Caesar ex
isted is my belief that I should have seen him if I
had been present in the field of Pharsalia, or the
senate-house at Kome.&quot; This is to reverse the
proper order of things, and to confuse all our con
ceptions. Looking on ourselves as persons with a
permanent being, on evidence produced of their ex
istence, we take the same view of the Emperor of
China and Julius Caesar, and thus believe that if we
were in Pekin we should see the one, and that if we
had been in the battle of Pharsalia we should have
seen the other. The picture presented of the Divine
Being, in this new philosophy, will appear to the
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and unmeaning, or rather in the highest degree
shadowy, uncertain, and evanishing; and they will
rejoice when they are invited to contemplate Him
instead as Jehovah, I AM THAT I AM, the independent
and self-existent One. I am not inclined to urge
our conviction of personality and personal identity
as in itself a proof of our immortality ; but in con
structing the cumulative argument, and cherishing
the hope of a life beyond the grave, I feel it satisfac
tory to regard myself, I believe on sufficient evidence,
not as a permanent possibility of feeling, but a per
manent being, the same in the world to come as in
this.
We may now combine the results which we have
reached. In every conscious act we know an exist
ing thing, which when we begin to reflect we learn
to call self, manifesting itself in some particular way
which we are taught to regard as an attribute.
Again, in all remembrance, we recollect self as exer
cising some particular attribute in time past, and we
know self as now remembering ; and on comparing
the two we decide that they are the same. This is
a bare statement of the facts, as they daily present
themselves. I defy Mr. Mill, or any other mental
analyst, to reduce these facts of consciousness to
fewer or simpler elements. In all consciousness, I
have a knowledge of self as a person ; in all remem
brance, a recollection of self as a person; and in
the comparison of the two a perception of their
identity.104 MIND, PERSONALITY,
And let it be observed, that both in the conscious
self and the recollected, we have the self perceived
bv us as operating in a great number of ways, with
thoughts and emotions in infinite variety. We come,
too, to discover (in a way which will come under our
notice below) that there are other beings besides
ourselves, who have the same personality and iden
tity, and the like incalculable number and diversity
of ideas, wishes, and feelings. As we begin to re
flect on all this, and as we would speak about it, and
make ourselves intelligible, we find it convenient to
have a word to denote that which abideth in us, and
is the same in us and in others. We have such a
word in Substance, and we say that
&quot; mind is a sub
stance.&quot; In saying so, we mean nothing more than
this, that in us and in others there is (1.) an exist
ing thing; (2.) operating; (3.) with a permanence.
But in saying this, we say much, that is, we make a.
statement full of meaning. By multiplying words
of description or explanation we should only con
fuse and perplex the subject, which may be clearly
discerned if only we look steadily at it, and weigh
the several parts which make up the indissoluble
whole.
And here I feel myself called on to state that no
doctrine of modern philosophy, not even the ideal
theory, or theory of representative ideas, so con
demned by Reid and exposed by Hamilton, lias
wrought such mischief in speculation as that of
Locke in regard to substance. His statements on thisPERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. 105
subject are unsatisfactory throughout, and when
they were attacked by Stillingfleet, he defended
them by a sparring and fencing unworthy of such
a lover of truth ; he employed himself in repelling
the objections of his opponent, instead of seeking to
make his own views clearer. a So that if any one
will examine himself concerning the notion of
pure substance in general, he will find he has no
other idea of it at all, but only a supposition of he
knows not what support of such qualities, as are
capable of producing simple ideas in us.&quot; (Essay, B.
n. c. xxiii. 2.) In the controversy he affirms and
re-affirms that he does not deny the existence of
substance, or that we have an idea of it, and is very
indignant with Stillingfleet for saying that he
does. But he makes it to be &quot;the support,&quot; but||
&quot; unknown
&quot;
support, of qualities. As the support
was something unknown, Berkeley in the next age
did a good service to philosophy by discarding it
altogether, so far as matter is concerned. But in the
succeeding age the avenger came, and Hume took
away the unknown substratum from mind, as Berke
ley had done from body. E^id rushed in to save
fundamental truth
; but he did not show his usual
shrewdness and wisdom when he retained Locke s ^
,
&quot;substratum,&quot; and argued so tenaciously that the \
known quality intuitively suggests an unknown sub-
stance. We should have been saved a world of con
fused and confusing controversy if Reid, when aban
doning Locke s
&quot;
idea,&quot; had also rejected his
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known support of qualities.&quot; Kant met the Scottish
sceptic in a still more unsatisfactory manner, when
he allowed that by the outward senses and by the
internal consciousness we perceive only the phenom
enon, and then referred us to some noumenon beyond.
In the schools which have ramified from Kant, the
question has ever since been, Is ..there merely a
phenomenon, or is there a noumenon also? Sir
William Hamilton in this, as in so many other topics,
has endeavored to combine Keid and Kant. He
identifies the phenomenon of the German, with the
quality of the British, philosophy; he argues that
the quality implies the substance, and the phenom
enon the noumenon, but makes the substratum or
noumenon unknowable. Mr. Mill takes much direct
ly or indirectly from Hume ; he favors in Kant all
that is destructive; he allows to Hamilton all his
negative positions
: and so we find him building on
the miserably defective views which they have given
of substance. &quot;As our conception of body is that
of an unknown exciting cause of sensations, so our
conception of mind is that of an unknown recipient or
percipient of them, and not of them alone, but of all
our other feelings. As body is the mysterious some
thing which excites the mind to feel, so mind is the
mysterious something which feels and thinks.&quot; (Logic,
B. I. c. iii. 8.) He finds no great difficulty, as
Hume had done before him, in putting aside this un
known and mysterious something. And it is high
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radical truth should abandon this unknown and un
knowable substratum or noumenon, which has ever
been found a foundation of ice, to those who would
build upon
it. Sir William Hamilton having handed
over this unknown thing to faith, Mr. Herbert Spen- ^
/
cer has come after him, and consigned religion to it j
as to its grave, and there, it may safely be said, it
will disturb no one, not even by sending out a ghost
from its gloomy chambers.
We never know quality without knowing sub
stance, just as we cannot know substance without
knowing quality. Both are known in one concrete
act. Wejyaay, however, separate them in thought.
In contemplating any given object, such as the think




which changes, and the
&quot; existence
&quot; which abideth.
As both are known in the concrete, so both may be
said to have an existence, not an independent exist
ence, but an existence in, or in connection with, each
other. The one always implies the other ; that is, the
thinking always implies a thinking existence, and
the thinking existence is always exercised in some
thought. Mr. Mill gets a momentary glimpse of this
doctrine, but does not follow it out.
&quot; We can no
more imagine a substance without attributes, than
we can imagine attributes without a substance.&quot;
(Logic, B. i. c. iii. 6.) Taking this view, we cannot
without protest allow persons to speak of substance
as being something unknown, mysterious, lying far
down in a depth below all human inspection. The108 MIND, PEESONALITT,
substance is known, quite as much as the quality.
True, the substance is never known alone, or apart
from the quality, but as little is the quality known
alone, or apart from a substance. Each should have
its place, its proper place, neither less nor more, in
every system of the human mind.












Phenomenon means an appearance, but appearance
is an abstract from a concrete ; we never see an ap
pearance apart from a thing appearing. It is the
object appearing to the subject seeing it. If the
phrase is to be retained in philosophy, let us under
stand what is meant by
it. Let us not as we employ
it deceive ourselves by imagining that we have, or
can have, an appearance apart from a thing appear
ing. A phenomenon is a thing manifesting itself to
us, as a quality is a thing in action or exercise. As
to the
&quot;
noumenon,&quot; it is not so easy to determine
what can be meant by it. If it signifies the thing
perceived by the mind, this is neither less nor more
than the phenomenon. If it means a thing per
ceived by no mind, I allow that there are certainly
things existing not perceived by the human mind,
but then these things may be perceived by other
minds, I suppose must certainly be perceived by
the Divine Mind. But if the noumenon means
something acting as the ground of the thing mani
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we have no evidence of there being such a thing,
and I can see no purpose, philosophical or practical,
to be served by it in the way of hypothesis or other
wise. Here Mr. Mill seems to me altogether right
:
&quot; This unknown something is a supposition without
evidence.&quot; But I abandon it, because we have a
known something ; in the case of mind a thing ex
isting, acting, and permanent.
But then it is said we do not know the thing in *
itself (I)mg an sick). It is high time to insist on
knowing what is meant by this phrase, taken from
Kant, and with which of late years so many meta
physicians have been conjuring. It cannot be
al-j
lowed to play a part any longer till it explains itself.
|
It seems full of meaning, and yet I believe that if
we prick it, it will be found to be emptiness. I un
derstand what is meant by the thing ; it is the ob
ject existing. But what is meant by in itself? I
acknowledge no itself beside, or besides, or beyond
the thing. I confess to be so stupid, as not to be
able to form any distinct idea of what is meant by
the thing in itself. If it mean that the thing, the
whole thing, is within the thing, I have about as
clear a notion of what is signified as I have of the
whale that swallowed itself. If it mean that there
is a thing, in addition to the thing as it manifests it
self, and as it exercises property, I allow that, for
aught I know, there may be many such things. My
knowledge of the thing, of all things, nay, of any110 MIND, PERSONALITY,
one thing, is confessedly limited. As to what may
be beyond the phenomenon, the thing as it appears
to me, and to others who may report to me, I ven
ture to say nothing, as I can know nothing about it.
But believing that no other man knows anything
jtabout it any more than I do, I protest against its
^being represented as being a support of the thing
^known, or in any way essential to it. Though I
were to get new faculties and know that great un
known, I am not sure that it would make the thing
known the least clearer, in any way more mysterious
or less mysterious than it now is. As it is confessed-
II ly unknown, I can trace no relation of dependence,
I
j or of anything else between it and the known.
Lying as it does in the region of darkness which
compasses the land of light, I think it best to leave
it there.
We are thus brought to the doctrine which com
mends itself to our first thoughts, that we know
self immediately as existing, as in active operation,
and with a permanence. This primitive knowledge
furnishes a nucleus round which we may gather
other information, by experience and by reasoning,
till we come at last to clothe mind with qualities so
many and varied that it is difficult to classify them.
I confess I grudge the school of Comte the epithet
&quot;
Positive.&quot; It is a title which they have no right to
appropriate to their crude system, which observes
only the more superficial facts in these two wondrousPERSONAL IDENTITY, SUBSTANCE. Ill
worlds of mind and matter. I have in these two
last chapters stated what I believe to be true positive
doctrine in regard to mind, that is, the expression




have now to face a more perplexing subject,
the idea and conviction which we have in- re
gard to an external world, the way in which we reach
these, and the objective reality involved in them.
In this border country there has been a war for ages
in the past, and there is likely to be a war for ages
in the future. There are real difficulties in the in
quiry, arising from the circumstance that conscious
mind and unconscious matter are so different,
while yet they have an evident mutual relation, and
also from the apparent deception of the senses ; and
speculators have gathered an accumulation of imag
inary ones by their refined and elaborate specula
tions, so that now there are not only the original
obstacles in the way, but a host of traditional feuds.
I cling to the conviction that there is a doctrine of
natural realism, which, if only we could seize and
express it, will be found encompassed with fewer
difficulties than any far-fetched or artificial system.
Sir William Hamilton has given us a very elabor
ate classification of the theories of sense-perception.
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It is not needful to follow him in this treatise. But
in order to correct errors and prepare the way for a
fair discussion, it may serve some good purposes to
look at the account given, of the steps involved, by
the three British metaphysicians who have given the
greatest attention to the subject. To begin with
Dr. Thomas Reid. According to him, there is, first,
an action or affection of the organism ; there is, next,
a sensation in the mind
; thirdly, this sensation, as a
sign, suggests intuitively an external object. The
two points on which he dwells chiefly are, first, that
there is no idea between the external object and the
mind perceiving; and, secondly, that we reach a
belief in the external world intuitively, and not by
any process of reasoning.
&quot; This conviction is not
only irresistible, but it is immediate ; that is, it is
not by a train of reasoning and argumentation that
we come to be convinced of the existence of what
we perceive.&quot; ( Works, p. 259.) I believe that he
has established his two points successfully, and in
doing so he has rendered immense service to philos
ophy. Dr. Thomas Brown gives a different account
of the operation. There is first, as in the other
theory, indeed in all theories, an affection of the
bodily frame
; secondly, a sensation in the mind
; and
thirdly, a reference of that to an external object as
the cause. He calls in two general mental laws to
give us the reference. The first is an intuitive law
of cause and effect, which impels us when we dis
cover an effect to look for a cause. We have a sen-
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sation of resistance, of which, we discover no cause
within the mind, and therefore we look for it beyond
the mind. The second law, of which he makes large
use, is that of suggestion, which connects sensations,
so that one becomes representative of others.
Sir &quot;William Hamilton and Mr. Mill are forever
criticising these two doctrines, but it may be doubted
whether either has given a clear and correct exposi
tion of them. Hamilton, when he commenced his
edition of Eeid, thought that philosopher s views
were the same as his own (we shall see wherein
they differ immediately) ; as he advances, he sees
that this is not the case
; and he nowhere gives us
a precise account of Reid s theory, which, whether
well founded or not, is consistent and easily under
stood. As to Brown, Hamilton is forever carping at
him, as if he had a cherished determination to re
move his system out of the way, as one that opposed
the reception of his own. The circumstance that
neither Reid s theory nor Brown s theory would
quite fit into his compartments, is a proof that Ham
ilton s classification of theories, though distinguished
by great logical power, is not equal to the diversities
of human conception and speculation. He clearly
does injustice to Brown, by insisting on making him
an idealist he makes him a cosmothetic idealist.
Now there is no idea in Brown s system, as there
was in the older theories. He made great use of
sensation, and was in great difficulties when he air
tempted to show how, from this sensation, we couldBODY. 115
infer an external world ; but the sensation is an ex
isting, and not an imaginary thing like the idea
;
and the sensation was held by him to be an effect,
but not at all a representative, of an external and
extended object. Mr. Mill, in criticising Hamilton s
criticism, would make Eeid an idealist, (p. 177.) This
is obviously a mistake. Reid did call in a sensation
as a sign, but it was not supposed to be representa
tive, that is, to bear any resemblance or analogy like
the old idea to the external object. All that is as
serted of it is that we are conscious of it, which we
are not of the idea, and that it suggests a belief in
an external object intuitively, and by the appoint
ment of Him who gave us our constitution. Mill
represents Reid and Brown as holding substantially
the same doctrine :
&quot; The difference between them is
.extremely small, and, I will add, unimportant.&quot;
(p. 175.) Reid held that we never could reason
from the sensation within to the extended object
without. Brown labors to show that the whole pro
cess is one of ordinary inference, proceeding always
on the intuitive law of cause and effect, aided by the
association of ideas. But Mr. Mill tells us that
&quot; Brown also thinks that we have, on the occasion of
certain sensations, an instantaneous conviction of an
outward
object.&quot; (p. 164.) I am surprised at such a
statement from one who has imbibed so much from
Brown, who so clearly represents the process as in
volving inference. We find everywhere such pas
sages as the following
:
&quot;
Perception, then, even in116 BODY.
that class of feelings by which we learn to consider
ourselves as surrounded by substance, extended- and
resisting, is only another name, as I have said, for
the result of certain associations and inferences that
flow from other more general principles of the mind.&quot;
(Lectures, xxvi.) I call the theory of Brown (which
is taken from the Sensational School of France) the
Inferential, as distinguished from the Ideal theory
on the one hand, and the Intuitive theory on the
other.
Hamilton s doctrine differs both from that of Keid
and Brown. It is, that there is first an action of
the organism, and, secondly, a simultaneous sensation
and perception. He labors particularly to show that
sense-perception being evoked, there is nothing be
tween it and the object, no sensation, no idea
; but
that we gaze at once on the object, in fact are con-,
scious of it, conscious at one and the same time of the
ego and the non ego. Between this and Brown s doc
trine there is an irreconcilable difference. Brown
makes the process one of inference, implying, no
doubt, an intuition, but an intuition of a general cha
racter bearing on all other mental operations. Hamil
ton makes the perception primitive and original and
immediate. Hamilton also differs from Eeid, but the
point is not so important. Eeid makes the sensation
precede the perception; whereas Hamilton, in accord
ance, I think, with the revelations of consciousness,
makes them contemporaneous. Both make the opera
tion intuitive and not inferential. This doctrine ofBODY. 117
Hamilton is not without its difficulties. It leaves many
points unexplained, perhaps they are ultimate and
cannot be explained, possibly they are so simple
that they do not need explanation. It does not pro
fess to show how the preceding organic affection is
connected with the mental perception. Perhaps the
human faculties cannot clear up the subject. Pos
sibly the question itself may be unmeaning, for there
may be no how to ask about, no connection except
this, that the cognitive mind is so constituted as to
know the bodily frame with which it is so intimately
connected. This doctrine, as it is the most simple,
seems to me to be upon the whole the most truth-
like, that has yet been propounded. It does not pro
fess to clear up all mysteries, but it embraces the
acknowledged facts, and it starts no hypotheses. I
regret the dogmatism which the author displays in
asserting it. I do not agree with him in thinking
that it can be established at once by an appeal to
consciousness. But embracing as it does only facts,
I am inclined to adhere to it, till some facts not con
tained in it be ascertained by physiology or psychol
ogy, or the two combined. I am certainly not dis
posed to abandon it for so hypothetical a doctrine as
that adopted by Mr. Mill and elaborated by Professor
Bain.
In the mature man we find certain ideas, beliefs,
and, I would add, judgments. I readily allow all of
these to be subjected to an analysis. Mr. Mill is
quite justified in declaring that &quot;we are not at118 BODY.
liberty to assume that every mental process which
is now as unhesitating and rapid as intuition was in
tuition at its outset.&quot; (p. 144.) At present we have
to look at the ideas and convictions which we enter
tain in regard to the external world. I allow at
once that
&quot; we have no means of now ascertaining
by direct evidence, whether we were conscious of
outward and extended objects when we first opened
our eyes to the
light.&quot; (p. 147.) I am willing, there
fore, to consider Mr. Mill s theory of the genesis of
our apprehension and belief. His theory seems to
be, that we can get them by means of sensations and
associations of sensation. &quot;All we know of objects
is the sensations they give us, and the order of the
occurrence of these sensations.&quot; &quot;Of the outward
world we know and can know absolutely nothing,
except the sensations we experience from it.&quot; (Logic,
B. i. c. iii. 7.) The result reached by him is, that
(e matter may be defined a permanent possibility of
sensations.&quot; (p. 198.) He does not commit himself,
but he is not averse to the idea that
&quot; the non ego
altogether may be but a mode in which the mind
represents to itself the possible modifications of the
ego.&quot; (p. 189.)
In the discussion which is forced upon us by this
doctrine, which at first sight seems so strange, there
are two points to be specially attended to : First, is
Mr. Mill s account of the ideas and convictions which
we have concerning body correct ? Under this head
our appeal must be to consciousness. I believe thatBODY. 119
it declares that Mr. Mill, in his analysis, commonly
leaves out the main element. A second question
has to be answered, Does Mr. Mill s hypothesis ex
plain all that is in our apprehension and belief? In
answering this question we must be careful not to
allow him to do, what Mr. Crosse and M. Pouchet
are suspected of having done in professing to estab
lish the doctrine of spontaneous generation by ex
periment. Mr. Crosse is alleged to have had the
germs of the acari produced by him in his carelessly
cleaned vessels; and M. Pouchet to have had the
germs from which he derived animals in the putres-
cent matter. Certain it is, that when other persons
performed the same experiments as Mr. Crosse, tak
ing care to exclude all organized bodies, no animals
were produced ; and M. Pasteur maintains that, if
you allow him to destroy the germs in the putres-
cent fluid, no life will appear. Now, we must keep
a strict watch on Mr. Mill, lest he be guilty of a like
oversight in deriving all our ideas and convictions
from so few germs. As we do so, we shall find that
in order to prop up the theory, which he pro
fesses to rear on so narrow a basis, he is obliged to
add buttress after buttress in the shape of new ideas
and implied faculties. In particular, we shall find
him guilty of a very grave logical mistake : he is
ever assuming, without perceiving it, the idea which
he professes to explain. In admitting the veracity
of memory, he himself lays down a most important
principle, that we should assume the belief &quot;for120 BODF.
which no reason can be given which does not pre
suppose the belief, and assume it to be well-ground
ed.&quot; We shall find that in unfolding his theory of
the genesis of our ideas of body he neglects this
rule, and without being aware of it, assumes the
ideas of Externality, and Eesisting Force, and Ex
tension, which he is seeking to generate and explain
by a circuitous process. Let us look at these ideas
in the order now mentioned.
(1.) What is implied in Externality ? Mr. Mill says
we are aware of ourselves as a series. If I were
inclined to adopt this representation, I would say
that by externality we mean a something without
and beyond the series. But I have objected to this
account as inadequate. I have endeavored to show
that in all mental action, even in sensation, there is
a perception of self as existing; that in memory
there is a remembrance of self, and that we proclaim
the present self and the remembered self identical.
Now, by an external object I mean a thing existing,
but not this self, a thing different from this perma
nent and identical self. I believe that our first per
ceptions of externality are derived from things ap
prehended as extended, as having a direction and
stretching away in space. But as this involves ex
tension, the consideration of it falls under next head.
For the present we must look at externality simply
as denoting an existing thing, different from, and not
part of, the ego known by self-consciousness. Mr.
Mill admits that every man comes to entertain someBODY. 121
apprehension.
&quot;I consider them (the sensa
tions) to be produced by something not only exist
ing independently of my will, but external to my
bodily organs and my
mind.&quot; (Logic, B. i. c. iii. 7.)
I am here to examine his account of the generation
and the nature of this idea and conviction. I have
found great difficulty in handling the subject, owing
to the gossamer character of the theory, which is
far too subtle and ingenious to be solid or true.
In conducting this whole discussion, we must be
on our guard against being misled by an ambiguity
in the use of the phrase
&quot; outward world.&quot; It may
mean the world out of the conscious mind, this
I venture to call the extra-mental world ; or it may
mean the world beyond the body, this, for dis
tinction s sake, I call the extra-organic world. I
am not sure that Mr. Mill, or Mr. Bain who helps
him to develop his system, have escaped the perplex
ities thus arising. I insist that they are not at lib
erty to assume the existence of the bodily frame,
and then and thus account for the idea of a world
beyond. Assuming only a series of sensations
aware of itself, they must thence generate something
exterior.
Mr. Mill thus gets the idea of externality
: &quot;I
see a piece of white paper on a table. I go into an
other room, and though I have ceased to see it, I
am persuaded the paper is still there. I no longer
have the sensations which it gave me
; but I believe
that when I again place myself in the circumstances122 BODY.
in which I had those sensations, that is, when I go
into the room, I shall again have them
; and further,
that there has been no intervening moment at which
this would not have been the case. Owing to this
law of my mind, my conception of the world at any
given instant consists, in only a small proportion, of
present sensations. The conception I form of the
world existing at any moment comprises, along with
the sensations I am feeling, a countless variety of
possibilities of sensation.&quot; (p. 192.) I wish Mr. Mill
would employ language consistent with his theory,
and we should then be in a position to judge











all which certainly imply the
very externality he is seeking to gender. We may
believe that Mr. Mill does not forget, but it is neces
sary to warn his readers against forgetting, that we
have yet only one sensation succeeding another.
He refers to
&quot; a law of mind.&quot; The law he postu
lates is,
&quot; that the human mind is capable of Expect
ation. In other words, that after having had actual
sensations, we are capable of forming the conception
of possible sensations.&quot; (p. 190.) It is one of the
many postulates he is ever making. His assumptions
are far from being the fewest and the simplest fitted
to explain the phenomena. If he had postulated
that in every act of sense-perception we apprehend
a something external, the facts would have been ex-BODY. 123
plained much more satisfactorily. But let us go on
with his explication. He calls attention to the cir
cumstance, that
&quot; the sensations are joined in
groups/ so that
&quot; we should have, not some one sen
sation, but a great and even an indefinite number
and variety of sensations, generally belonging to
different senses, but so linked together that the
presence of one announces the possible presence, at
the same instant, of any or all the rest.&quot; (p. 194.)
But let it be observed that we do not yet know that
the sensations belong to different senses, or come
from different parts of the body, and the groups of
sensations can no more give us externality than the
individual sensations. But then
&quot; we also recognize a
fixed order in our sensations.&quot; We have not yet
cause and effect, but we have
&quot; an order of succes
sion which, when ascertained by observation, gives
rise to the ideas of cause and effect.&quot;
&quot; Whether we
are asleep or awake, the fire goes out, and puts an
end to one particular possibility of warmth and light.
Whether we are present or absent, the corn ripens
and brings a new possibility of food.&quot; I have again
to remind Mr. Mill s readers that we do not yet know
that we have bodies to sleep or wake
; the sleeping
and waking, the fire and the corn, are all in us as
sensations. The
&quot;present&quot; and the &quot;absent&quot; slip
in very dexterously ; but as yet we know no place
at which we are present, or from which we may be
absent. The incipient cause and effect are as yet
mere antecedence and consequence within the mind.124 BODY.
&quot; When this point has been reached, the Permanent
Possibilities in question have assumed such unlike-
ness of aspect, and such difference of position rel
atively to us, from any sensations, that it would be
contrary to all we know of the constitution of human
nature that they should not be conceived as, and
believed to be, at least as different from sensations
as sensations are from one another.&quot; (p. 196.) Still,
all is within the thread of consciousness. But then
it is said there is something in our
&quot; constitution
&quot;
that makes us believe the possibilities to be different
from sensations. I am glad of an appeal to our con
stitution, in which there is more, I believe, than Mr.
Mill has unfolded. Yet I fear that the actual appeal
is in no way complimentary. Our constitution
makes us believe this
&quot;
possibility
&quot; of sensations to
be different from the sensations. But Mr. Mill does
not say, and would not say, that our constitution is
right in all this, or that there is any reality corre
sponding to the belief. I am not quite sure to what
law of our constitution he refers. If it be his favorite
principle of association of sensations, it is clear that
it cannot help him, for the associated sensations are
all in the mind
; and if a train of sensations could
give us (which, I believe, it cannot) what is not in
the ideas, it must be in virtue of some power in the
train which is not unfolded. If he mean the ten
dency, on which he dwells so much elsewhere, to give
an external reality to things within, I admit that
there is such a tendency in loose thinking ; but thenBODY. 125
it is in minds that have already reached a knowledge
of something outward, and it is for Mr. Mill to show,
which would be difficult, that it could exist in a mind
that as yet had no idea of externality. I cannot see
that by either process Mr. Mill has got the concep
tion of an outward world, and I am sure that neither
process would justify our belief in the reality of
such a world. A belief generated by an accidental
or fatalistic association might be error quite as
readily as truth, and the disposition to give an ex
ternal embodiment to internal feelings is avowedly
illusory. Already we see those flaws in the founda
tion which render the whole structure insecure, and
make it impossible for man to be certain that he can
reach any truth beyond the consciousness of the
present sensation.
Our author now crosses at one leap the widest
gulf of all.
&quot; We find that they (possibilities of
sensation) belong as much to other human or sen
tient beings as ourselves.&quot;
&quot; The world of possible
sensations, succeeding one another according to
laws, is as much in other beings as in me
; it has
therefore an existence outside me
; it is an external
world.&quot; But where in the procession of internal
feelings which has passed before us can other human
beings come in? &quot;I conclude that other human
beings have feelings like me
; because, first, they
have bodies like me, which I know in my own case
to be the antecedent condition of feelings ; and be
cause, secondly, they exhibit the acts and other out-126 BODY.
ward signs which in my own case I know by expe
rience to be caused by feelings.&quot; Doubtless, if we
had got our bodily frames as out of ourselves, the
argument might have been conclusive. He tells us
that we observe bodies which do not call up sensa
tions in our consciousness ; and since they do not do
so in my consciousness, I infer that they do it out
of my consciousness. The inference might be legit
imate, provided we had otherwise got an apprehen
sion of things out of and beyond the consciousness.
Ah
1
reasoning is usually said to be from what we
know ; but in this inference we have in the conclu
sion what is not in the premises. Or, if we take
Mr. Mill s theory of reasoning, that it is from partic
ulars to particulars, by some sort of registered ob
servation, the argument is seen to be equally falla
cious
; for we have no register of objects out of
ourselves to authorize us to infer that these possibili
ties constitute an external world. I am not at all
sure that Mr. Mill (p. 207) has cause to condemn
Reid, when he maintains that a like position taken
by Hume lands us hi a system of solitary egoism, or,
as Mr. Mill expresses it, that
&quot; the non ego altogether
may be but a mode in which the mind represents
to itself the possible modifications of the
ego&quot; I
am convinced that it is not by such a process, that
babies come to believe in the existence of those who
nurse them and are round about them. So far as I
can see, Mr. Mill has never logically got out of the
shjell of the ego ; nor can I see how any one can getBODY. 127
out of it, except by means of an original impulse.
I suspect that in Mr. Mill s belief of the existence
of his fellow-men, for whose benefit he has written
so many able volumes, there is involved a spontane
ous step more convincing than his reflex logic.
The conclusion reached is :
&quot; Matter may be de
fined, a permanent possibility of sensation.&quot; (p. 198.)
We shall not be in circumstances thoroughly to ex
amine this definition till we have fully unfolded, in
the next two heads, the nature of our perceptions
of Eesistance and Extension, which enter essentially
into our apprehension of Matter. Considered as an
account even of Externality it is defective. I believe,
indeed, that it is the only result which Mr. Mill can
reach from his induction or his premises. It should
be observed that he does not, as some would expect
him, define matter the Cause of sensations. Mr.
Mill says what he means, and means what he says,
when he describes Matter as the Possibility, not the
cause of sensations. Dr. Brown, by help of in
genuity and twisting, could reach a cause, for he
called in an intuitive conviction, which impels us
when we discover a phenomenon to look for a cause ;
and when, as in the case of certain sensations, we
cannot get a cause within, we are driven to seek it
without. His theory, however, was after all defect-
ive, for it makes matter, as a cause, unknown, whereas
we know matter, as we shall see forthwith, as resist
ing our effort, and as extended. But Mr. Mill cannot
be sure, and does not profess to be sure, that he has128 BODY.
reached matter even as an unknown cause. For our
sensations have no discoverable causes within the
mind ; and as we have no sensitive experience of
sensations having causes, and no original conviction
constraining us to seek for a cause, it is quite con
ceivable that they have no causes. But do these
&quot;
possibilities
&quot; amount to the idea, which we have,
of an outward world ? So far as we have gone, we
do not seem to be beyond the
&quot; series of
feelings,&quot;
for the idea we have got is simply of possibilities of
sensation. Mr. Mill thinks that
&quot; both philosophers
and the world at large, when they think of matter,








important element, presupposing the idea of time,
and of the past and the future
; all of which carry
us into a region high above sensation, and imply
mental faculties with an extensive capacity and wide
range. But not even with this addition does the
description come up to the reality, I mean mental
reality. Mr. Mill says that these
&quot; Permanent Pos
sibilities&quot; are now &quot;conceived as, and believed to
be, as different from sensations as sensations are
1 Mr. Mill (p. 200) admits that the from our observation that every ex-
majority of philosophers fancy that perience has a cause ; it is thus that
matter is something more, and that we are led to suppose that things have
the world at large, if asked the ques- a substantive reality. As I do not
tion, would undoubtedly agree with stand up for a substance different from
the philosophers. But then he ac- the thing known, I do not require to
counts for this
&quot;
imaginary concep- examine this theory. In future chap-
tion,&quot; as he calls it, by two tendencies ters his defective view of the compar-
of the mind, one derived from our ative power of the mind and of causa-
observat on of differences, the other tion will be subjected to criticism.BODY. 129
from one another.&quot; (p. 196.) It should be observed
that the sensations thus discovered to be different,
are all sensations in the
&quot; series of feelings
&quot; or
&quot; thread of consciousness.&quot; But our apprehension
of an outward world is of something, not only differ
ing from the sensations as one sensation differs from
another, but different from the self, which, as we
have found in last chapter, we know as sentient.
&quot;We apprehend the material object as an existing
thing, quite as much as the self, but distinct from
the self.
1 It never has been shown how the ego, by
reasoning or any other logical process, can give the
non ego. I must therefore look on the ego as having
a capacity of discovering the non ego, directly or
indirectly. Mr. Mill has utterly failed to rear up the
actual mental idea and conviction from the postu
lated materials. Till such time as a mean can be
1 Professor Bain reaches the con- so we contradict ourselves.&quot; (p. 385.)
elusion :
&quot; It is quite true that the ob- Again,
&quot; we are incapable of discuss-
ject of consciousness, which we call ing the existence of an independent
Externality, is still a mode of self in material world ; the very act is a con-
the most comprehensive sense, but not tradiction.&quot; (p. 379.) At this point
in the usual restricted sense of self extreme sensationalism and extreme
and mind, which are names for the idealism, Mr. Bain and Mr. Ferrier,
subject to the exclusion of the object.&quot; meet and are one
; it would be a con-
(Senses and Intellect, p. 381.) We are tradiction to speak of the one as inde-
accustomed to say that
&quot;
light exists pendent of the other ; they are joined
as independent fact, with or without in this philosophy of identity, which
any eyes to see it. But if we consider transcends that of Hegel himself ! But
the case fairly, we shall see that this joking aside, it is easy to represent
assertion errs not simply in being be- the doctrine which affirms the exist-
yond any evidence that we can have, ence of independent objects out of the
hrc also in being a self-contradiction, mind so as to make it contradictory ;
We are affirming that to have an ex- but there is no contradiction in the
istence out of our minds which we doctrine when correctly stated. Of
cannot know but as in our minds, course, knowledge is in a mind, but it
In words, we assert independent ex- may be of an existence
&quot; out of our
istence, while in the very act of doing minds.&quot;
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pointed out by which we can reach the outward
world as an existence, I cling to the belief that the
self is endowed with a capacity of immediately know
ing not only the self, but the not-self.
But it will be necessary to review Mr. Mill s theory
of the genesis of our idea of Matter more carefully.
We shall find it throughout a series of assumptions,
no one of which admits of proof, and some of which
can be disproven. Often do I wish, as I examine it,
that Sir William Hamilton had been still alive to
brush away by his sweeping logic the ingenuities
which are employed to support it.
&quot; Our concep
tion of Matter,&quot; says Mr. Mill,
&quot; comes ultimately to
consist of Resistance, Extension, and Figure, together
with miscellaneous powers of exciting other sensa
tions.&quot; (p. 219.) There is a palpable omission here,
for it omits those powers (specially mentioned by
Locke, Essay, B. n. c. ii. 23), by which one body
operates upon another
;
&quot; thus the sun has a power
to make wax white, and fire to make lead fluid.&quot; It
is enough for us here to examine Mr. Mill s theory
of the production of the idea of Resistance and of
Extension.
(2.) We have certainly an idea of RESISTANCE and
a belief in it. In the mature man it becomes a per
ception, and a conviction of an object out of the
body, or in the body, resisting an effort to move a
member of the body. In next chapter I will give
some account of the sense which reveals the resist
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Mill s theory. (See pp. 219-21.) Kesistance is only
another name for a sensation of our muscular frame,
combined with one of touch.&quot; It should be remarked
that this language is not meant to imply that we
have a muscle, or that we have skin
; the resistance
and the touch must yet be considered as sensations
in the mind.
&quot; When we contract the muscles of
our arm, either by an exertion of will or by an in
voluntary discharge of our spontaneous nervous ac
tivity, the contraction is accompanied by a state of
sensation, which is different according as the locomo
tion, consequent on the muscular contraction, con
tinues freely or meets with an impediment. In the
former case the sensation is that of motion through
empty space.&quot; We shall see that we seem to have
no sensation of motion in empty space. When our
muscular effort is not opposed by anything without
the body, what we have is a feeling of tension, or of
one muscle resisting another. But let this pass, as
having no special connection with our present dis
cussion. He goes on to say, that if we will to exert
our muscular force, and the exertion is accompanied
by the usual muscular sensation, but the expected
sensation of locomotion does not follow, we have
what is called the feeling of resistance, or, in other
words, of muscular motion, and that feeling is the
fundamental element in the notion of matter. He
shows how
&quot; skin sensations of simple contact in
variably accompany the muscular sensations of resist
ance ;
&quot; how our sensations of touch
&quot; become rep-132 BODY.
resentative of the sensations of resistance with which
they habitually coexist ;
&quot; and
&quot; our idea of matter
as a resisting cause of miscellaneous sensations is
now constituted.&quot; Every one knows that the mus
cular sense and touch combine, to give us the knowl
edge of matter as a resisting object. But does Mr.
Mill s account come fully up to the facts falling un
der the eye of consciousness ? Does his theory ex
plain the facts ? Both questions must be answered
in the negative. In touch, as we shall see in next
chapter, we localize, J believe intuitively, our sensa
tions in a given direction, and at a given point in
the surface of the body. Again, in the exercise of
the locomotive energy, accompanied by muscular
sensation,, we have a sense of a member of our body
which we will to move, of which member we must
have some idea, otherwise we could not form a voli
tion regarding it
; and we have a perception of this
member in motion, resisted by a body out of our
frame. Mr. Mill s theory does not yield all of these,
I rather think not even any one of these thoroughly.
It takes no notice of the volition which moves the
member, for this would introduce an element above
sensations. It is not consistent with that idea of a
member of the body, which is necessary to the voli
tion
; for the theory to be consistent must presup
pose that we have yet no knowledge of our bodily
frame. There can yet be no apprehension of motion
in space, for as yet we have no idea of space. The
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we have no idea of a resisting object. So far as we
have gone we have only sensations differing from
each other in feeling or in intensity, and sensations
coexisting, and sensations succeeding each other, and
sensations the signs of other sensations.
(3.) The mature man has also an idea of Extension
and a belief in Extended objects. We have an appre
hension and a conviction of our bodies as extended,
and of other bodies as extended, that is, as occupying
space, as being contained in space, as being of a cer
tain spatial form, and as being movable in space.
Can the sensation and association theory account
for the generation of this mental phenomenon ? I
believe it breaks down both psychologically and
physiologically.
At this point Mr. Mill hands us over to his friend
Professor Bain, who, in The Senses and the Intellect,
has elaborated into a minute system the general
statements scattered throughout Mr. Mill s Logic.
Beginning with Feelings, he goes on to Thought,
making its fundamental attributes to be Conscious
ness of Difference, Consciousness of Agreement, and
Ketentiveness
; and he builds up his system mainly
out of Feelings by means of the laws of Association
by Contiguity and Eesemblance. I cannot in a work
like this, devoted to a different individual, review
Mr. Bain s theories. But I beg to ask whether we
ever have Feeling without some perception of an
object, say self, as feeling ? Feelings, even such as
joy or pain, are mere abstracts separated from our134 BODY.
consciousness of self, as rejoicing or in distress. A
proper psychological system should begin with the
concrete perception, and not with a quality separated
from it, So much for his foundation. And as to his
mode of building, it will be shown to be altogether
unsatisfactory, in the strictures we have to offer on
such subjects as Association of Ideas, Comparison,
and Eelativity of Knowledge, as treated by Mr. Mill.
Mr. Bain has received great praise for combining
physiology with psychology. It is true that in his
introduction, and in various parts of his work, he has
given an account of the anatomy and physiology of
the brain and nerves and organs of movement. But
there is a mighty gap, which he can scarcely be said
to have tried to fill up, between these unconscious
parts and the conscious thoughts and feelings of
mind proper. The most valuable part of his work
is that in which he describes, more minutely than
had ever been done before, the feelings excited by
muscular and nervous action, accounting, I think, so
far successfully, for many of our spontaneous and
supposed instinctive movements. But he is out of his
proper region when he comes to deal with the pecu
liar operations and the higher ideas of the mind.
With a fine capacity for observing bodily affections,
and an undoubted vigor and tenacity of intellect in
dealing with material facts, he seems to be unfitted
for realizing fully pure mental or spiritual phenom
ena, as falling simply under the eye of conscious
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Hartley did of vibrations, and seems to identify con
scious feelings with them, making the current and
the consciousness two sides of one thing. Even
when he is professedly treating ofEmotions, Thoughts,
and Volitions, he has great difficulty in rising above
nerve affections
; and when he does make the at
tempt, it is immediately to fall back to his old level
of sensations. He is to be constantly watched when
he would draw our higher ideas of necessary truth,
of beauty, and of moral good from sensitive affec
tions variously associated. It could be shown, that
in treating of our intellectual and moral and volun
tary operations, while apparently proceeding in so
matter of fact a manner, he is continually passing,
without seeing it, from unconscious to conscious ac
tion, from bodily sensations to mental ideas, and ad
vancing hypotheses as to the influence of nervous
and muscular action, which could be shown to be
true only by their explaining all the mental facts
revealed by consciousness ; and this he cannot be
said to have attempted, as consciousness is seldom
consulted, even formally or professedly. There is
proof of all this in his theory of what constitutes
our idea of extension and its mode of growth.
In the earlier editions of his Logic (B. i c. iii. 7),
Mr. Mill had described Brown as showing clearly
that the notions of extension and figure are derived
&quot; from sensations of touch, combined with sensations
of a class previously too little adverted to by meta
physicians, those which have their seat in the136 BODY.
muscular frame.&quot; He adds, characteristically.
&quot;Who
ever wishes to be more particularly acquainted with
this admirable specimen of metaphysical analysis,
may consult the first volume of Brown s Lectures or
Mill s Analysis of the Mind&quot; The thought has
germinated, and in his later editions he is able to re
fer to Mr. Alexander Bain and Mr. Herbert Spencer
as following out the investigation. Mr. Bain has
certainly taken up the idea, and ridden it to exhaus
tion, I should say to death.
&quot;We may accede,&quot; says Professor Bain, as quoted
by Mr. Mill (p. 226),
&quot;to the assertion sometimes
made, that the properties of space might be con
ceived or felt in the absence of an external world, or
any other matter than that composing the body of
the percipient being ; for the body s own movements
in empty space would suffice to make the very same
impressions on the mind as the movements excited
by outward objects. A perception of length, or
height, or speed, is the mental impression or state of
consciousness accompanying some mode of muscular
movement, and this movement may be generated
from within as well as from without.&quot; In criticising
this theory, so cloudy in its outline, we are placed in
difficulties, in consequence of its not being clear
whether Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain assume the existence
of the bodily frame as a material object, in the com
mon acceptation, as implying objective existence and
extension, or, even in their own sense, as
&quot; the mere
possibility of sensations.&quot; Are they accounting forBODY. 137
the extra-mental world, including the bodily frame ?
or simply for the extra-organic world ? In most
places Mr. Bain seems to posit the body as a reality.
In the passage quoted, he speaks of the matter com
posing
&quot; the body of the percipient being/ as if he
needed it to explain our idea of
&quot; the properties of
space.&quot; He talks of a movement being
u
generated
from within/ which cannot mean within the mind,
which is a mere series of feelings ; it must mean
within the body, which is quietly assumed. The
whole plausibility, I had almost said intelligibility,
certainly the expressibility, of the theory lies in its
being supposed that there is a body, and even an
extended body. He derives all from nerve-currents
which imply space, and motion in space, and he con
structs the idea of extension by a sweep of the hand,
or a sweep of the eye, or a volume of feeling, which,
if taken metaphorically, explain nothing, and if
taken literally, that is, as actualities, imply space and
motion in space. But if the body is assumed as
known immediately, then there is admitted a vast
body of intuition, of which he should have measured
the amount, and acknowledged the significance. Or
if it be said that the bodily frame is assumed as an
hypothesis, the answer is obvious. If it explains, as
he thinks (I do not), the whole facts, then the hypoth
esis is rendered probable, and he must adhere to
it ; for the author of an hypothesis cannot be allowed
to employ it to reach a conclusion and then abandon
it
; on the contrary, he must keep by it and all138 BODY.
its logical consequences. On whatever ground as
sumed, it is clear that when assumed there is little







sweep/ and of having
&quot; a movement
generated within,&quot; it can be no difficult matter to
conceive of other bodies being extended, and in mo
tion, and resisting our movement.
But in this discussion I must in all fairness sup
pose that he does not assume the existence of the
bodily frame.
1 His business is to show, on his theory,
how our conception in regard to body is generated.
As he attempts to do so, I am entitled, after this
statement, to take care that he does not assume sur
reptitiously what he professes to produce by a pro
cess. He has as yet got nothing but a series of feel
ings, with a possibility of sensations coming no one
1 Since writing the above, I find Mr. visional assumption is eventually
Herbert Spencer saying of Mr. Mill : proved true by its agreement with
&quot;
If, knowing more than his own facts
; for in these cases the facts with
states of consciousness, he declines which it is found to agree are facts
to acknowledge anything beyond con- known in some other way than
sciousness until it is proved, he may through the hypothesis
: a calculated
go on reasoning forever without get- eclipse of the moon serves as a verifi-
ting any further; since the perpetual cation of the hypothesis of gravitation,
elaboration of states of consciousness because its occurrence is observable
out of states of consciousness can without taking for granted the hypoth-
never produce anything more than esis of gravitation. But when the
states of consciousness. If, contrari- external world is postulated, and it is
wise, he postulates external existence, supposed that the validity of the pos-
and considers it as merely postulated, tulate may be shown by the explana-
then the whole fabric of his argument, tion of mental phenomena which it
standing upon this postulate, has no famishes, the vice is that the process
greater validity than the postulate of verification is itself possible only
gives it, minus the possible invalidity by assuming the thing to be proved.&quot;
of the argument itself. The case _ Art., Mill v. Hamilton, in The
must not be confounded with those
Fortnightly Review, No.V.
cases in which an hypothesis or pro-BODY. 139
can tell from what quarter. I cannot allow him, in
order that he may ingeniously get more, to employ a





&quot; When a muscle,&quot; says Mr. Bain, as quoted by
Mr. Mill (see pp. 222-24), &quot;begins to contract, or a
limb to bend, we have a distinct sense how far the
contraction and the bending are carried; there is
something in the special sensibility that makes one
mode of feeling for half contraction, another for
three-fourths, and another for total contraction.&quot;
66 If the sense of degrees of range be thus admitted
as a genuine muscular determination, its functions in
outward perception are very important. The at
tributes of extension and space fall under its scope.
In the first place, it gives the feeling of linear ex
tension, inasmuch as this is measured by the sweep
of a limb or other organ moved by the muscles.
The difference between six inches and eighteen
inches is expressed to us by the different degrees of
contraction of some one group of muscles ; those,
for example, that flex the arm, or, in walking, those
that flex or extend the lower limb. The inward
impression corresponding to the outward fact of six
inches in length, is an impression arising from the
continued shortening of a muscle, a true muscular
sensibility. It is the impression of a muscular effort
having a certain continuance
; a greater length pro
duces a greater continuance (or a more rapid move
ment), and in consequence, an increased feeling of
expended power. The discrimination of length in140 BODY.
any one direction includes extension in any direc
tion.&quot; This reads very like assuming an extended
bodily arm taking a sweep, and thus giving us the
idea of extension. Of course we understand, on re
flection, that the sweep is only a sensation in the
&quot; series of feelings,&quot; but when we understand this,
we see how far we are from having the idea of ex
tension produced.
In explanation of the theory, Mr. Mill says,
a Mr.
Bain recognizes two principal kinds or modes of
discriminative sensibility in the muscular sense : the
one corresponding to the degree of intensity of the
muscular effort, the amount of energy put forth ;
the other corresponding to the duration, the
longer or shorter continuance of the same effort.
The first makes us acquainted with degrees of resist
ance, which we estimate by the intensity of the mus
cular energy required to overcome it. To the second
we owe, in Mr. Bain s opinion, our idea of extension.&quot;
I have already commented on the defects in Mr.
Mill s account of our apprehension of resistance.
We have here to consider the theory of the genesis
of the idea of extension. It is referred to the con
tinuance of a sensation.
And here it is proper to state, that some deny the
existence of such a sensation as arising when the
arm sweeps through empty space. E. H. Weber had
come, in 1852, to the conclusion: &quot;Of the volun
tary motion of our limbs we know originally nothing.
We do not perceive the motion of our muscles byBODY. 141
their own sensations, but attain a knowledge of them
only when perceived by another sense. The muscles
most under our control are those of the eye and the
voice, which perform motions microscopically small,
yet we have no consciousness of the motion. We
move the diaphragm voluntarily against the heavy
pressure of the liver, etc., yet with as little conscious
ness of the motion. It follows that the motions of
our limbs must be observed by sight or touch in
order to learn that they move, and in what direc
tion.&quot; Mr. Abbot quotes this passage in his Sight and
Touch (p. 71), and he adds, &quot;The more recent re
searches of Aubert and Kammler not only confirm
this result, but tend further to prove that there is
not in the muscles any sense whatever of their con
traction.&quot;
&quot;
Accordingly, they remark that the fric
tion of our clothing is a considerable aid in judging
of our motions, especially if it is close fitting.
When wearing boots, etc., with which we are not
familiar, we are less certain of our judgments,
and this is the more noticeable in riding, as the eye
does not then control our judgment.&quot; The question
is for physiologists to settle. I am not satisfied that
the Germans referred to can have established their
point. But until there is a more thorough deter
mination of the exact function of the nerves attached
to the muscles, it is preposterous to found a huge
metaphysical theory on our muscular sensations
when the arm moves in empty space.
My opinion on such a subject is of no value, but142 BODY.
I am disposed to think that we have a sense of the
contraction of at least some of our muscles, and of
its continuance.
1 On the supposition that we have
a sense of resistance, which seems established, the
muscles of our arm, being always in a state of more
or less tension, must feel the resistance offered by
one muscle to another. Dr. Kirkes says that the
muscles
&quot;
possess sensibility by means of the sensi
tive nerve-fibres distributed in them. The amount
of common sensibility in muscles is not
great.&quot;
&quot; But they have a peculiar sensibility, or at least a
peculiar modification of common sensibility, which
is shown in that their nerves can communicate to
the mind an accurate knowledge of their states and
position when in action.&quot; (Phys., p. 530, 5th ed.) We
may, therefore, know the contractions. But let us
take along with us the full facts. The sense of touch-
proper, as we shall see in next chapter, always refers
the sensations to the points in the skin at which
the nerves terminate
; and the muscular sense merely
intimates that one organ is resisting another. In that
u
sweep of the arm,&quot; of which Mr. Bain makes
so much, there is implied, first, a direction of
the points of sensation in the skin
; secondly, a mus
cular resistance
; and, I rather think, thirdly, an ex
perience to enable us to combine the two. There is,
1 Mr. H.Lewes thinks he has dem- tributed to the muscular sense.&quot; (Brit.
onstrated the existence of the Mus- Assoc , 1859.) We require a more
cular Sense. He skinned a frog, and thorough investigation of the relations,
thus made it insensible to external and differences, of the precise func-
impressions, and found it
&quot;
to mani- tions of the nerves of touch-proper
fest all those phenomena usually at- and the muscular senseBODY. 143
I suspect, a further element. In whatever way it
may begin, the continuance of the experimental
bending of the arm, which Mr. Bain employs, must
be done by the will. But a vague directionless effort
will not move a limb, still less continue to move it
in a certain way. The volition to continue the sweep
of the arm implies a contemplated end, or some idea
of the arm, and a belief in its existence, and, I should
think, in its extension. It thus appears that it is to
reverse the proper order of things, to make the con
tinuance of
&quot; the sweep of the arm
&quot;
constitute or
give us the idea of extension. In the very move
ment we have an idea of an extended arm by touch-
proper or feeling ; as we move the arm, we become
acquainted with the resistance of one felt member
by another
; and in order to the continuance of the
voluntary sweep, there must be some apprehension,
more or less vague, of the limb which we continue
to move.
There are many serious physiological difficulties in
the way of accepting this muscular theory. The
extent of a sweep of the arm does not depend mere
ly on the amount of force put forth
; nor does it de
pend solely on the continuance of the effort : it de
pends also on the proportionate length of the two
arms of the lever on which the muscle operates.
For instance, the biceps muscle of the arm is inserted
an inch below the elbow-joint, whilst the distance
from the point of insertion to the end of the limb
may be sixteen inches. When the muscle contracts144 BODY.
to a certain extent, the rapidity of the movement at
the extremity will be sixteen times as great as it
would have been if the insertion had been at the
extremity; and, on the other hand, the force em
ployed by the muscle has been sixteen times as great
as would have been required if the insertion had
been at the extremity. A large amount of force is
thus expended in order to secure the great advantage
of rapidity of movement. It is clear, therefore, that
neither the intensity nor the extent of contraction
can give us the amount of motion in the part on
which the muscle operates ; and, that while the mus
cular sense may inform us of the intensity, and ex
tent of the intensity, and extent of the contraction
of the fibres of a muscle, it can give us no information
of the extent of the movement of our limbs, till
after long experience applied to each limb.
&quot; It is
doubtful,&quot; says Dr. Kirkes (Phys., p. 646),
&quot; how far
the extent of muscular movement is obtained from
sensations in the muscles themselves. The sensation
of movement attending the motions of the hand is
very slight ; and persons who do not know that the
action of particular muscles is necessary for the pro
duction of given movements, do not suspect that the
movement of the fingers, for example, depends on
action in the forearm.&quot; Mr. Abbot has pressed some
of the difficulties (Sight and Touch, p. 70)
: &quot;Let us
suppose a blind man trying to get the notion of dis
tance from the motion of his hand. He finds a cer
tain sweep of the hand brings it into contact with aBODY. 145
desk
; the distance of which, therefore, is represented
by that effort. But it requires a greater effort to
reach the eyes or the nose ; and distance being
= locomotive effort, it is demonstrated that the nose
extends beyond the desk. The top of the head must
be conceived as more remote, and the back farthest
of all. In general, when we refer distances to the
eye, as we habitually do, objects four inches from the
eye must appear farther from us than those at
twelve. This is another novelty. But again, since
the hand moves in curves, and cannot without con
siderable effort be made to move in a straight line,
it is also demonstrated that an epicycloid is shorter
than a right line between the same points.&quot;
But, after all, the question is to be decided by
psychological rather than physiological considera
tions. The phenomenon to be explained is our idea
of extension, and consciousness will require to be
consulted. The theory was started by Brown, and
Hamilton had thus examined it (Append., Reid s
Works, p. 869)
:
&quot; The notion of Time or succession
being supposed, that of longitudinal extension is
given in the succession of feelings which accompanies
the gradual contraction of a muscle ; the notion of
this succession constitutes ipso facto the notion of a
certain length ; and the notion of this length
&quot;
(he quietly takes for granted)
&quot;
is the notion of
longitudinal extension sought. The paralogism
here is transparent. Length is an ambiguous
term
; and it is length in space, extensive length,
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and not length in time protensive, whose notion it is
the problem to solve.&quot; Mr. Mill (p. 227) quotes this
language, and tries to avoid the argument by urging
that the
&quot; assertion of Brown, and of all who hold
the Psychological theory, is that the notion of length
in space, not being in our consciousness originally, is
constructed by the mind s laws out of the notion of
length in time. The argument is not, as Sir William
Hamilton fancied, a fallacious confusion between two
different meanings of the word length, but an iden
tification of them as one.&quot; This statement is cer
tainly sufficiently clear, but it crowns the absurdity.
&quot;When we say that there is a space between A and
B, we mean that some amount of these muscular
sensations must intervene; and when we say the
space is greater or less, we mean that the series of
sensation (amount of muscular effort being given) is
longer or shorter.&quot; &quot;Now this, which is unques
tionably the mode in which we become aware of sen
sation, is considered by the psychologists in question
to be extension.&quot; I need not repeat that what is here
represented as unquestionable, has been questioned
physiologically. But we are now discussing the
psychological question.
We have here three different phenomena, con
sciousness being the witness. We have (1.) Series
of Muscular Sensations; (2.) Length of Time; (3.)
Length of Space. These three may have relations
one to another, but they are surely diverse from one
another. Mr. Mill explains that he does not drawBODY. 147
the one from the other, which would be preposterous
enough, but he declares them identical, which is ab
surd in the extreme. It matches the doctrine of
Hegel, justly regarded as the reductio ad dbsurdum
of his whole philosophy, that all things are one.
Hegel lessened the absurdity of this statement by
another, that all things are different
; but Mr. Mill has
no such explanation to offer, for he declares musular
sensations, time, and space to be identical, without
a difference. Mr. Mill gives a scanty enough account
of the faculties of the mind, but he acknowledges
that we possess a power of discerning differences.
If we can trust our capacities at all, they declare
that the three things under consideration are as
different as any one thing can be from any other.
A series of muscular sensations and length of time
are surely different. They are different in them
selves, and we can conceive an animated being, say a
lobster, to have a succession of sensations, and yet
no idea of time. Again, series of muscular sensations
and extension are not the same. The series of feel
ings excited as I pass my hand over a table is not
the same as the yard square which is the size of the
table. Curious consequences would seem to follow
from this doctrine of identity. If, in the next ai&amp;gt;
tempt with the same series of sensations, my hand
passed over a table two yards long, the theory would
identify the time with two yards, as before it did
with one : and as Mr. Mill admits the law of identity
(see cu.), or, that things which are identical with the148 BODY.
same thing are identical with one another, it would
make one yard, which is the same with a series of
sensations; identical with two yards, which is iden
tical with the same series of sensations. To represent
this otherwise. The length of time taken by us to
travel between London and Paris does not merely
help us (as every one admits) to estimate the length
of way when we have an idea of the rate at which
we are travelling (as the thermometer measures heat
for us), but is the very same with the length of the
way ; and as we travel it in a longer or shorter time,
or with more or fewer sensations, so is the length of
way actually longer or shorter at different times.
If we draw back from such consequences by appeal
ing to a different measure, would not this show that
we had unfortunately taken the wrong rule ? But,
after all, I will not positively affirm that such con
sequences follow, for the doctrine is one that baffles
all reasoning because it sets aside the first premises
of reasoning. Mr. Abbot says very properly,
&quot; In
deed the obvious differences between the two ideas
are so great, that a philosopher who has neglected
them can scarcely be convinced by more abstruse
considerations. Thus, muscular effort has degrees,
its parts are not equal; extension does not admit of
degrees, its parts are equal. Extension has three
dimensions, muscular effort only one. The parts of
extension are co-existent
; those of muscular effort
are successive.&quot; Finally, length of time and length
of space are not the same. As well might we iden-BODY. 149
tify colors with smells, sounds with shapes, sweet
with sour, light with darkness, love with hatred,
virtue with vice, Mr. Mill with Sir William Hamilton,
as identify extension with duration.
Mr. Mill s attempt to get support to his hypothesis
from the sense of sight is, if possible, still more un
successful. He is obliged to suppose that in vision
we have originally only a sensation of color, and
that the idea of an extended surface is given by, or
rather is identical with, the time occupied by the
muscular sensations as we move the eye. Sir Wil
liam Hamilton, in reviewing Berkeley, had noticed
the doctrine that the eye gives us only color, and his
criticism has commonly been regarded as amounting
almost to a demonstration: &quot;All parties are, of
course, at one in regard to the fact that we see color.
Those who hold that we see extension, admit that
we see it only as colored
; and those who deny us
any vision of extension make color the exclusive ob
ject of sight. In regard to this first position all are
therefore agreed. Nor are they less harmonious in
reference to the second
; that the power of perceiv
ing color involves the power of perceiving the differ
ences of colors. By sight we, therefore, perceive
color, and discriminate one color, that is, one colored
body, one sensation of color, from another. This
is admitted. A third position will also be denied by
none, that the colors discriminated in vision are, or
may be, placed side by side in immediate juxtaposi
tion
; or one may limit another by being superin-150 BODY.
duced partially over it. A fourth position is equally
indisputable ; that the contrasted colors, thus bound
ing each other, will form by their meeting a visible
line, and that, if the superinduced color be sur
rounded by the other, this line will return upon it
self, and thus constitute the outline of a visible
figure. These four positions command a peremptory
assent
; they are all self-evident. But their admis
sion at once explodes the paradox under discussion
&quot;
(that extension cannot be cognized by sight alone).
&quot; And thus : A line is extension in one dimension,
length ; a figure is extension in two, length and
breadth. Therefore the vision of a line is a vision
of extension in length ; the vision of a figure, the
vision of extension in length and breadth.&quot; (Metaph.
vol. ii. p. 167.)
Mr. Mill acknowledges,
tt I cannot make the answer
to this argument as thorough and conclusive as I
could wish.&quot; (p. 239.) His attempts to lessen its
force are exceedingly weak and palpably insufficient.
He calls attention to the circumstance that the eye
&quot; does not cognize visible figure by means of color
alone, but by all those motions and modifications of
the muscles connected with the eye, which have so
great a share in giving us our acquired perceptions
of
sight.&quot; Be it so, the demonstration remains un
touched, that we take in figure when we take in
color. He says, that an eye immovably fixed
&quot;
gives
a full and clear vision of but a small portion of
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He throws us once more on Mr. Bain, who tells us,
&quot; When we look at a circle, say one-tenth of an inch
in diameter, the eye can take in the whole of it with
out movement.&quot; The tenth of an inch is as good
as a whole inch, or a foot, or a yard. In the tenth
of an inch is extension with a boundary, and may
be a measure to aid us in ascertaining the extent we
can take in by the sweep of the eyes. Mr. Mill ad
mits &quot;a rudimentary conception must be allowed;
for it is evident that even without moving the eye
we are capable of having two sensations of color at
once, and that the boundary which separates the
colors must give some specific affection of
sight.&quot;
He would lessen the significance of this admission in
a very unworthy manner :
&quot; But to confer on these
discriminative impressions the name which denotes
our matured and perfected cognition of extension,
or even to assume that they have anything in com
mon with it, seems to be going beyond evidence.&quot;
No one maintains that our primary vision of a sur
face by the eye comes up to our perfected cognition
of extension
; still it is a surface, and it has a bound
ary, and therefore it has something in common with
it. Mr. Bain tells us,
uWe may still, however, see
very strong grounds for maintaining the presence of
a muscular element, even in this instance.&quot; Be it
so
; the demonstration of Hamilton holds good, that
in the two colors in this space, whether with or with
out the aid of the muscles, we have lines and spaces.
But he adds,
&quot; In the second place, the essential im-152 BODY.
port of visible form is something not attainable
without the experience of moving the eye. If we
looked at a little round spot, we should know an
optical difference between it and a triangular spot ;
and we should recognize it as identical with another
round spot.&quot; And then, subjecting the fact to his
theory, instead of forming his theory from the facts,
he tells us,
&quot;We mean by a round form something
which would take a given sweep of the eye to com
prehend
it.&quot; I suppose this is what he means by the
import of form, that it is the time spent in muscular
action (!), which I rather think might be the same
for a square, or a triangle, or an oval, of a certain
size, as for a circle. I really cannot understand how
we should optically know the difference of the figures,
unless we perceived them as figures. In spite of all
these perverted attempts at the resolution of them
into something else, there still remains the surface
and the boundary perceived by the eye.
Failing utterly in the psychological analysis, Mr.
Bain and Mr. Mill (p. 232) fall back on a statement
of Platner, which Sir William Hamilton had copied
into his Lectures without knowing what to make of
it. &quot;In regard to the visionless representation of
space or extension, the attentive observation of a
person born blind, which I formerly instituted in the
year 1785, and again in relation to the point in ques
tion, have continued for three whole weeks, this
observation, I say, has convinced me that the sense
of touch by itself is altogether incompetent to affordBODY. 153
us the representation of extension and space, and is
not even cognizant of local exteriority ; in a word,
that a man deprived of sight has absolutely no per
ception of an outer world beyond the existence of
something effective, different from his own feeling of
passivity, and in general only of the numerical diver
sity, shall I say of impressions or of things ? In
fact, to those born blind, time serves instead of space.
Vicinity and distance means in their mouths nothing
more than the shorter or longer time, the smaller or
greater number of feelings which they find necessary
to attain from some one feeling to another. That a
person blind from birth employs the language of
vision, that may occasion considerable error
; and
did, indeed, at the commencement of my observa
tions, lead me wrong ; but, in point of fact, he knows
nothing of things as existing out of each other
; and
(this in particular I have very clearly remarked) if
objects, and the parts of his body touched by them,
did not make different kinds of impressions on his
nerves of sensation, he would take everything ex
ternal for one and the same. In his own body he
absolutely did not discriminate head and foot at all
by their distance, but merely by the difference of
the feelings (and his perception of such differences
was incredibly fine) which he experienced from the
one and from the other, and, moreover, through time.
In like manner, in external bodies, he distinguished
their figure merely by the varieties of impressed
feelings ; inasmuch, for example, as the cube by its154 BODY.
angles affected his feelings differently from the
sphere.&quot;
Let it be observed of this account, that it is largely
theoretical, by one who believed with Kant, that
there were a priori forms of space and time in the
mind, and that these were brought forth empirically
only by the sense of sight. Platner does not give
us the facts to enable us to judge for ourselves
; he
favors us only with his conclusions. His observations
carry us as far back as 1785, when the distinction
between touch-proper and the muscular sense was
not established. Later physiological research has
shown that, in the case of the blind, as in all others,
touch-proper makes us localize the affections of our
bodily frame, and that the muscular sense gives us
&quot;
something effective, different from our feeling of
passivity
:
&quot; we may add, different from our felt
bodily frame. It has been proven, by later and fully
detailed researches, that those born blind know their
own body as extended by the common sensations of
feeling, and know extra-organic objects by the resist
ance offered to their muscular efforts. Even Mr.
Mill is obliged to modify and explain Platner s state
ment (p. 233)
: &quot;But Platner, though unintention
ally, puts a false color on the matter when he says
that his patient had no perception of extension
; he




&quot; all that is meant by persons who see.&quot;
Without this explanation the statement of Platner
would be fatal to the theory of Mill, who makes usBODY. 155
get our knowledge of extension from the muscular
feelings, and not as Platner, whose avowed aim is to
get it from sight. With this explanation it can help
neither side, for it puts those who see in the same
position as the blind, and those who see will be ad
mitted by all to have &quot;a perception of an outer
world
&quot;
by the sense of touch. I believe that Plai
ner may be right when he says that
&quot; local exterior
ity,&quot; that is, objects out of the body, may not be
given by touch-proper or feeling ; but this is certainly
given by the muscular sense in the case of the blind,
as in that of the seeing. When he speaks of time
serving instead of space to those born blind, and
that vicinity and distance means only shorter or
longer time, or the smaller or greater number of
feelings which they find necessary to attain from
some one feeling to another, I believe he was led
astray by not distinguishing between our apprehen
sion of space and the measure of space. The idea
of members of the body localized is given most
probably by all the senses. But the actual measure
ment of space is always a subsequent process, im
plying comparison and a standard. I believe that
in all of us the succession of our feelings, of our
muscular feelings, but also of our mental ideas and
feelings as well, is one means of helping us to
measure (not only time, but) space ; we measure it
in a loose way, by the feelings we have experienced
in passing over it in travelling, or by a member of
our body. Those born blind must be specially de-156 BODY.
pendent on such a measure. Those who see have a
natural measure provided in the surface which falls
under the perception of the eye. Those born blind
have such a measure in the surface of the body given
by touch, and in the effort of the locomotive energy
reported by the muscular sense. We shall see in
next chapter that a very different account from that
of Platner is given by later German physiologists.
1
As the result of these discussions, it appears that
we have ideas and convictions of externality, of
resistance to the energy of self, and of extension,
that cannot be resolved into any elements which do
not imply them. But do these subjective apprehen
sions and beliefs imply corresponding objective real
ities ? This is the old question of metaphysics. To
treat it historically, logically, and critically would
1 In order to be able to form an in- of each. When their head, and their
telligent opinion on these subjects, I legs, and their arms were pricked ex-
put myself in communication with the actly alike, they at once showed us the
Rev. J. Kinghan, who for twenty seat of sensation, and knew the points
years has been connected with the In- to be out of each other. I moved
stitution for the Blind in Belfast, first their hand first over a book seven
as assistant, and now as Principal, inches long, and then over a desk four-
He declares that he has never found teen inches long, occupying the same
anything, in all his teaching of the time with each process, and they at
blind, or intercourse with them, to con- once declared that the latter was much
firm Platner s statement. Those longer than the former. We allowed
born blind cannot have the visual idea a boy to feel round a room with which
of space, but they have, he says, a he was unacquainted, and he at once
very clear notion of figure and dis- declared its shape. One of these
tance got directly from the sense of children was a girl of the age of eight,
touch. With his aid I have experi- just entered the Institution, so igno-
mented with very young children born rant that she did not know the meaning
blind. I put two small pieces of wood, of angle or corner or point, calling the
one triangular and the other square, corners of the figures
&quot;
little heads.&quot;
under the palm of the hand, and with- She said the square had two little
out being allowed to move the hand heads and two little heads, but was
over it, they at once told us the shape not sure that two and two make fourBODY. 157
require a separate volume. Fortunately it is not
necessary here to enter upon the wide question.
Mr. Mill grants that there is an assurance which is
&quot; a test to which we may bring all our convictions
&quot;
(see x.) ? and that
&quot; we may be sure of what we see
as well as what we feel
&quot;
(see //-). Following these
admitted principles, I do not see that Mr. Mill can
object to the reality of an extended world, provided
always that it be shown that our ideas as to exter
nality and extension cannot be resolved into simpler
elements. The conviction we entertain as to an ex
ternal world is of the nature of a primitive percep
tion, and not a derivative idea. &quot;We perceive objects
out of ourselves resisting us and extended. This
perception, like that of consciousness, is self-evident :
we seem to look at once on the object. It is also
necessary
: no doubt we can imagine it to be other
wise, but we cannot be made to judge or believe
that our hand is not an extended object. It is uni
versal : all men entertain it and act upon
it. Inge
nious objections may be urged against all this, but
they are such as are advanced not only against all
truth, but against all inquiry, and proceed upon a
universal scepticism, which Mr. Mill, who professes to
be a lover of truth, does not avow.
These same considerations justify us in looking
upon body as a substance. It will be remembered
that I do not stand up for an unknown substratum
beneath the known thing. Whatever is known as
existing, as acting, and having permanence, I regard158 BODY.
as a substance. Mind is a substance, as it can be so
characterized. But we have seen that we know
body as an existence, in operation, and with, as Mr.
Mill allows, a permanence ; it is therefore a sub





is an actuality. It is more than a possibility of
&quot; sensations ;
&quot;
it has an existence even as the sensa
tions have y and a body is known not only as giving
sensations, but as capable of acting on other bodies
in a variety of ways, which it is the office of physical
science to classify and to reduce to laws. By adher
ing to these simple principles we are made to feel
that we are out of the region of phantoms and in
the land of realities.CHAPTER VII.
THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
THERE
is an impression among many that Mr,
Mill s theory has the support of physiology, and
this is strengthened by the anatomical and physio
logical details which constitute so large a portion of
Mr. Bain s work. But I cannot discover that either
has found a basis, or even a starting-point, for their
general theory of the mind, or for their particular
theory of the manner in which we reach the idea
of an extended world, in any ascertained phenomena
of our bodily frame. Their speculations receive
no aid from physiology, and must stand or fall by
their psychological merits or demerits. The phys
iology of the senses is still in a very uncertain con
dition, and, whatever it may do in ages to come, can
as yet throw little light on strictly mental action,
except, indeed, in the way of correcting premature
hypotheses. It may be profitable to look at some
of the later researches into the senses conducted by
eminent physiologists, especially in Germany. We
shall find that they give no sanction to the hypoth
esis of Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain, and seem to favor a the
ory of a very different character. In the sketch that
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follows, I have made free use of the great works on
physiology which have been published in our coun
try, and still more particularly of the admirable his
torical, critical, and expository summary by Wundt,
in his Beitrdge zur Theorie der Sinneswahrnehmung
TOUCH.
The scientific investigation of this sense may be
said to have commenced with the researches of J.
Miiller and E. H. Weber. The general result reached
by Muller is, that
&quot;
every point in which a nerve-
fibre ends is represented in the sensorium as a space-
particle.&quot; ( Wundt, Theor. Sinneswahr.) There are
disputes as to how the general law should be stated,
but we have a fact here which has not been and
cannot be set aside. The nerves of touch proper,
setting out from the base of the brain, tend towards
the periphery of the body. They reach the skin
each at a determined point
: there is a special aggre
gation of these points in the mid-finger and the tip
of the tongue. Now, wherever the nerve terminates,
there the sensation is felt : thus, if we prick a nerve
which reaches the mid-finger, the pain is localized at
the point where the nerve terminates. If we stretch
or pinch the ulnar nerve, by pushing it from side to
side, or compressing it with the fingers, the shock is
felt in the parts to which its ultimate branchlets are
distributed, namely, in the palm and back of the
hand, and in the fourth and fifth fingers.
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ing as the pressure is varied, the pricking sensation
is felt by turns in the fourth finger, in the fifth, in
the palm of the hand, or in the back of the hand
;
and both on the palm and on the back of the hand
the situation of the pricking sensation is different,
according as the pressure on the nerve is varied;
that is to say, according as different fibres or fasciculi
of fibres are more pressed upon than others. The
same will be found to be the case in irritating the
nerve in the upper
arm.&quot; (Mliller s Physiology, by
Baly, p. 740.) So strong is this tendency to localize
the sensation at the extremities of the nerves, that
when an arm or leg is amputated the person has still
the feeling of the lost limb. Miiller has collected a
number of such cases. (Ib., pp. 746, 747.)
&quot;A stu
dent, named Schmidts, from Aix, had his arm am
putated above the elbow thirteen years ago ; he has
never ceased to have sensations as if in the fingers.
I applied pressure to the nerves in the stump ; and
M. Schmidts immediately felt the whole arm, even
the fingers, as if
asleep.&quot;
&quot;A toll-keeper in the
neighborhood of Halle, whose right arm had been
shattered by a cannon-ball in battle, above the elbow,
twenty years ago, and afterwards amputated, has
still, in 1833, at the time of changes of the weather,
distinct rheumatic pains, which seem to him to exist
in the whole arm; and though removed long ago,
the lost part is at those times felt as if sensible to
draughts of air. This man also completely confirmed
our statement, that the sense of the integrity of the
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limb was never lost.&quot; When there is a change made
artificially in the peripheral extremities of nerves,
the sensations are still felt as if in the original spots.
&quot; When, in the restoration of a nose, a flap of skin is
turned down from the forehead and made to unite
with the stump of the nose, the new nose thus formed
has, as long as the isthmus of skin by which it main
tains its original connections remains undivided, the
same sensations as if it were still on the forehead
;
in other words, when the nos&amp;lt; is touched, the patient
feels the impression in the forehead. This is a fact
well known to surgeons, and was first observed by
Lisfranc.&quot; (Ib., p. 748.)
No doubt it is possible to ascribe all this to ex
perience and the association of ideas. We first, it is
said, find by observation that a certain sensation
originates in a particular part of the body, and the
same sensation ever after suggests the part. But the
facts, as a whole, will not submit to this explanation.
It is difficult to see how the phenomena quoted can
be thus accounted for. For surely an experience of
thirteen or twenty years might have been sufficient
to change the associations acquired at an earlier date,
and to place the persons under the influence of new
ones, provided always that the original ones had not
been instinctive or native. In the case of the trans
ference of the flap of skin, Miiller says,
&quot; When the
communication of the nervous fibres of the new nose
with those of the forehead is cut off by Division of
the isthmus of skin, the sensations are of course noTHE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 163
longer referred to the forehead; the sensibility of
tbe nose is at first absent, but is gradually developed.&quot;
This language implies that the old reference to the
forehead ceased in spite of the old association when
the isthmus was cut; and that the new reference
to the nose was occasioned by the sensibility of the
nerve, according to the physiological law, which
makes us ascribe the sensation to the extremity of
the nerve. It is not easy to see how experience
could give us the ready localization of the sensation,
more particularly when the feeling is within the
body, and in a part which has never fallen under the
senses of touch or sight. It is hard to believe that
the instantaneous voluntary drawing back of a limb
when wounded, and the shrinking of the frame when
boiling liquid is poured down the throat, can proceed
from an application of an observed law as to the seat
of sensations. From a very early age, and long be
fore they give any evidence of knowing distance
beyond their bodies, or having any other acquired
perceptions, children wiU indicate that they know at
least vaguely the seat of the pain felt by them
; if
a child is wounded in the arm, it will not hold out
its foot. But the question seems to be set at rest by
a physiological fact, thus stated by Dr. Baly:
&quot; Professor Valentin (Repertor. fur Anat. und Phy-
siol, 1836, p. 330) has observed, that individuals who
are the subjects of congenital imperfection, or ab
sence of the extremities, have, nevertheless, the in
ternal sensations of such limbs in their perfect state.164 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
A girl aged nineteen years, in whom the metacarpal
bones of the left hand were very short, and ah
1
the
bones of the phalanges absent, a row of imper
fectly organized wartrlike projections representing
the fingers, assured M. Valentin that she had con
stantly the internal sensation of a palm of the hand,
and five fingers on the left side as perfect as on the
right. When a ligature was placed round the stump,
she had the sensation of formication in the hand
and fingers ; and pressure on the ulnar nerve gave
rise to the ordinary feeling of the third, fourth, and
fifth fingers being asleep, although these fingers did
not exist. The examination of three other indi
viduals gave the same results.&quot; (/&., p. 747).
1
Miiller maintains, that in this way we get a knowl
edge of the greater number of the parts of our body,
and in all the dimensions of space ; and that when
our body comes into collision with another body, if
the shock be sufficiently strong, the sensation of our
body to a certain depth is awakened, and there
arises a sensation of the contusion in the whole
dimensions of the cube. He thus makes the knowl
edge not only of the third dimension of space, but
of our own body, to depend on an original disposi
tion (Anlage). He carries this doctrine so far as to
hold that as the nerves of all the senses are extended
over the frame, so there is a representation of space
1 Mr. Mill refers (p. 246) to a case was unable to localize the feeling,
given him by Hamilton from Maine de The case is valueless, as evidently the
Biran, of a person who had lost the functions of the nervous apparatus
poAver of the motor nerves, but who, were deranged,
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given not only by touch and sight, but also by taste
and smell, the sense of hearing alone not giving
us a perception of space, because it does not perceive
its special extension. &quot;The first idea of a body
having extension, and occupying space, arises in our
mind from the sensation of our own corporeal ex
tension. This consciousness of our own corporeal
existence is the standard by which we estimate in
our sense of touch the extension of all resisting
bodies.&quot; (Physiology, p. 1081.) Wundt says (p. 2),
&quot;These views, if they are not always carried out
with such consistency, are in their essential funda
mental positions still acknowledged at this day by
most physiologists.&quot;
It is interesting to notice that a like doctrine was
held on independent grounds by two of the greatest
psychologists of this century, by M. Saisset in
France, and Sir William Hamilton in this country.
The former dwells on the localization of our sensa
tions in their various organic seats. (See Art.
&quot;
Sens&quot;
in Diet des Sciences Philos.} The latter says that
*
&quot; an extension is apprehended in the apprehension
of the reciprocal externality of all sensations,&quot; and
that
&quot; in the consciousness of sensations relatively
localized and reciprocally external, we have a veri
table apprehension, and consequently an immediate
perception of the affected organism, as extended, di
vided, figured,&quot; etc.
(App. Reid s Works, pp. 884, 885.
j
1
i It is interesting to find D. Stewart companied with a perception of the
saying,
&quot; It is characteristical of all local situation of their exciting
causes.&quot;
sensations of touch, that they are ac- (Elem., vol. iii. p. 310.)166 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
I confess that I have a great partiality for this doc
trine. Even the sense of hearing, if it does not
yield the extension of our frame, may give a direc
tion to the sound heard in the ear. The conclusion
is the result of accurate physiological research, and
it seems to me to clear up most of the psychological
difficulties connected with the senses, and to favor a
metaphysical realism which enables us to stand up
for the veracity of our original sense-perceptions,
which are mainly of the body as affected. It sup
poses that when the soul is roused into consciousness
by an affection of the nerves, it gives a direction and
a localization to its sensations, and as it feels simul
taneously a number of sensations from different
members of the body, it feels them to be out of each
other, and related in respect of direction
; and as
sensations accumulate and succeed each other, it
gives a sensation, or rather perception, of our ca
pacity of being affected at very different points of
the periphery, and consequently of a volume. When
in a tepid bath we have not only a pleasant sensa
tion (which is all that Mr. Bain allows), we have a
feeling of the frame as affected over the whole smv
face. But let not this statement be misunderstood.
No one means to affirm that we have as yet a repre
sentation or image in the mind of the external con
figuration of the body, and of its several parts, such
as we reach when we come to feel them with the
hand or see them in a mirror. This is a subsequent
attainment made by a gathered experience throughTHE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 167
the combination of various senses ; and we are often
in perplexity from the difficulty of uniting the in
tuitive with the acquired knowledge, as when we
know that the pain in toothache is in a certain direc
tion, and yet are in doubts as to what tooth corre
sponds externally to the internal localization. But
as the ground of the whole, we have a localized per
ception of points, and of different points and direc
tions, in our bodily frame, which, I may add, is felt
to be ours by the command which our efforts have
over it, and the sensations of which it is felt to be
the seat. Some parts of this general view seem to
me to be established by physiological arguments, and
the theory as a whole is vastly better fitted to meet
and account for our idea of extension than the base
less hypothesis sanctioned by Mr. Mill.
The curious experimental researches of Weber
seem to confirm the general doctrine that Touch
Proper or Feeling is very specially, as the Germans
represent it, a space-giving organ. His experiments
were conducted by means of a pair of compasses
sheathed with cork, with which he touched the skin
while the eyes were closed, in order to determine
how close the points of the compasses might be
brought to each and still be felt as two bodies. The
distance between the points necessary to indicate
different sensations was found to vary in different
parts of the body, from one-half Parisian line on the
tip of the tongue to thirty Parisian lines on the back
of the body, thus showing the sensitiveness of the168 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
one part to be sixty times finer than that of the
other part. The capability of discerning the differ
ence of sensation is somewhat different in different
individuals, but it is said that their relative propor
tion in different parts of the body remains tolerably
constant in the same individual. The researches
seem to imply that the sense of touch indicates to
us, in a way which cannot be the result of a gathered
experience, both points of space and intervals of
space, always within and not beyond the bodily
frame. The points must be perceived immediately,
and an interval or line between is either perceived
immediately, or is necessitated in mathematical
thought by the comparison of the different points.
Weber regards the skin as a sort of mosaic of
circles or compartments, which in different positions
have different magnitudes and shapes, and that each
has its own capacity of sensation. The theory sug
gested by Fick is thus stated by Dr. Carpenter
:
&quot;Each nerve-fibril breaks up into a pencil of fine
filaments at the periphery, which are distributed
over a certain space, perhaps on the average about
1.25 of an inch in diameter. An impression made
upon any one of these filaments conveys the same
sensation to the sensorium, providing no other nerve
be distributed to the same space ; but this hardly
ever occurs, and hence compound sensations arise by
which our perception of the precise spot of the skin
touched by a point is accurately determined. It is
obvious that the closer these sensory circles are,THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 169
and the more intimately the branches of different
nerves are intercalated with one another, the greater
will be the sense of locality of that part
; or, in other
words, the greater will be the facility with which
minute differences in the precise spot touched will
be appreciated.&quot; (Hum. Phys., p. 611.) The subject
has been keenly discussed in Germany. According
to George, movement is the source of all objective
consciousness. If by objective consciousness is meant
not that of our bodily frame, but of something be
yond, I believe the doctrine is correct. We discover
extra-organic objects by the resistance offered to our
movement. Fortlage ascribes our intuition of body
to the restraint laid on our impulse (Triebhemmung).
It is thus, no doubt, we know the existence of ob
jects beyond our bodies, but already in touch we
hav$ an apprehension of our frames as extended.
Lotze has observed much, and speculated more on
this whole subject. He says that when two object-
points come into perception through two excitations
of the nerves, the consciousness of their spatial near
ness to one another is not given ; and he starts the
hypothesis that this is furnished by a third nerve-
process, which he calls
&quot;
place indicators.&quot; Meissner
has sought to bring Lotze s hypothesis into unison
with physiological and anatomical researches. He
thinks he has discovered &quot;touch-corpuscles,&quot; which
he represents as the actual touch-organs. These are
found specially in the hand and the foot, and they at
once give us bodies without us as objects, apaitfrom170 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
the sensation of pressure. These researches and dis
cussions all proceed on the idea that our knowledge
of an extended world is obtained not exclusively by
a sweep of the hand, but by some special provision
in the sense of touch proper or feeling.
The admitted conclusions are thus stated by
Wundt (pp. 64, 65): &quot;With every single sensation
(Empfindung) is connected involuntarily the repre
sentation of the place at which it occurs. As soon
as there are two contemporaneous sensations in the
perception ( Walirnehmung), there is thence given a
dim representation of the extent of the skin which
the impressions embrace, whereby the impressions
are immediately conceived as spatially separated.
But about the magnitude of their separation in space
nothing determinate can yet be declared, as that rep
resentation is for this purpose altogether indistinct.
It is usually only when one is first led through an
internal or external impulse to resolve upon an esti
mation by measure, that there is raised a clear image
of the entire parts of the body and of the points
touched, and thereby is first given the determinate
representation of the interspace which lies between
the impressions.&quot; He then explains, that, in regard
to the distance which is to be found between two
impressions, the soul, in that it perceives two different
sensations of place ( Ortsempfindungen)., is compelled
to put an interspace between them, and to represent
this out of the like experience through sight or the
muscular sense.THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 171
MUSCULAR SENSE.
Sir Charles Bell established the great truth, that
the nerves of sensation differ from those of motion.
From his physiological researches, and the ingenious
psychological speculations of his contemporary, Dr.
Thomas Brown, has proceeded the very general ac
knowledgment in this country of the existence cf a
Muscular Sense to be distinguished from Touch
Proper. Physiologically the Muscular Sense consists
of a Motor nerve, under the control of the will, going
out from the brain and moving the muscle attached
to it, and of a Sensor nerve going back to the brain
and giving intimation of the motion. Psychologi
cally this sense serves as important purposes as either
touch proper or sight. It may be doubted whether,
apart from this endowment, we should have a sense
or knowledge of any object beyond our bodily frame.
Feeling, or the skin-sense as it has been called, seems
to give us merely the periphery of our bodies
; and
when we become cognizant of an extra-organic ob
ject, as when on pressing the palm of the hand on
a table we feel a surface, I believe there is a combi
nation of the two senses of touch proper giving us a
sense of the surface of the hand, and of the muscular
sense giving a knowledge of an outward object re
sisting this surface. &quot;If we lay our hand upon a
table, we become conscious, on a little reflection,
that we do not feel the table, but merely that part
of our skin which the table touches.&quot; (Miiller,172 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
p. 1081.) Even as to the colored surface falling under
the eye; it is doubtful whether we should place it
certainly out and beyond our organism without the
concurrence of the muscular sense and a gathered
experience. The boy born blind, whose eye was
couched by Cheselden, said that objects at first
seemed
&quot; to touch his eyes as what he felt did his
skin.&quot; In a like case operated upon, and recorded
by Home, objects seemed at first to touch the eye.
The expressions are somewhat vague, but it is clear
that the objects were felt as having a close relation
ship to the eye, and were not known as being at a
distance. It is certain that it is mainly and most
effectually (if not exclusively) by the muscular sense
that we obtain an apprehension, or rather knowledge,
of an object beyond our bodily frame, and indepen
dent of it. Dr. Carpenter, with his usual sound judg
ment, declares that it is probably on the sensations
communicated through this sense that
&quot; the idea of
the material world, as something external to our
selves, chiefly rests; but that this idea is by no
means a logical deduction from our experience of
these sensations, being rather an instinctive or intui
tive perception directly excited by
them.&quot; (Hum.
Phys., p. 612.)
I cannot do better than quote once more from
Wundt, who gives us the result of German research
(p. 427.)
&quot;The first acts of sense-perception are
grounded on the operation of the Muscular Sense
[that is, so far as objects beyond the body are con-THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES. 173
cerned]. When we move our members we come
upon external resistances. We observe that these
resistances sometimes give way before our pressure ;
but we find at the same time that this takes place
with very different degrees of facility, and that in
order to put different bodies in motion we must ap
ply very different degrees of muscular force ; but to
every single degree of the contraction-force there
corresponds a determinate degree in intensity of the
muscular sensations. With these muscular sensa
tions, the sensations of the skin which cover our
members of touch so continually mingle, that the
intensity of these touch-sensations goes parallel to
the intensity of the accompanying muscular sensa
tions. We succeed in this way in connecting the
degree of intensity of the muscular sensations in a
necessary manner with the nature of the resistances
which set themselves against our movement.&quot;
VISION.
The eye is a more complicated structure than any
of the other organs of sense, and there are more dis
putes as to the functions and operations of its parts
than in regard to those of any of the other senses.
On some points, however, there is a pretty general
agreement among the scientific physiologists in
Germany, who have devoted so much attention to
the subject ; and these are sufficient for our purpose,
being opposed to the hypothesis supported by Mr.
Mill and Mr. Bain.174 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
It seems to be admitted on all hands, that by the
eye we have immediately a perception of space in
two dimensions, or of a surface. In stating the
views of Miiller, Wundt says (p. 95),
&quot; We can per
ceive spatial extension and the relation in position
of outward objects only so far as we have a spatial
sensation of our own retina and the relative position
of its single points. As the retina spreads itself in
a surface, the images of objects obtain upon it only
two dimensions. But this disadvantage, under which
sight labors as compared with feeling, is compensated
by the body s own movements, by means of which
we can view successively the one object from different
stand-points. As regards the sense of sight, the per
ception (Anschauung) of the third dimension is
through a judgment, and so Muller calls it a repre
sentation ( Vorstellung), while he designates the in
tuition of surface as a sensation.&quot; &quot;The grand
principle of the theory of Miiller, that the percep
tion of a surface is a sensation, and that the percep
tion of depth on the other hand is a representation
formed through judgment, is to this day the univer
sally received one, and the researches remain settled,
although this department since that time has been
enriched by a great many new facts, and although
this principle, so far as certain matters of fact are
concerned, does not seem to be sufficient.&quot; The in
sufficiency does not relate to the original discern
ment of a surface by the eye, which seems to be ac
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eye itself for discovering the three dimensions of
space.
&quot; The perception of superficial space, which
goes before all representations of space, and makea
the same possible, is bound up in the sense of sight
so intimately with the pure sensation, that there is
nowhere in the consciousness any act lying in the
middle between the sensation and its perception in
the form of
space.&quot; (p. 145.) It should be added
that Waitz and Lotze are opposed as to whether the
chief importance should be attached to the sensible
or motor factors : Waitz ascribing the greater value
to the sensation
; and Lotze, to the motor element.
Wundt (p. 104) says that all observation shows that
both exercise an influence at the same time.
So much for our perception of a superficies by the
eye. But there is a provision in the organ of sight
for giving us space in three dimensions, and for dis
covering the distance of objects. This can be done
even by the single eye, not immediately with every
perception, as may be done by the two eyes, but by
a succession of perceptions. This is accomplished in
the case of a single eye by its power of accommo
dating itself to different distances. Much attention
has been given of late years to the nature of the
accommodation-mechanism by Helmholtz and others.
The accommodation seems originally to be involun
tary and unconscious, but is brought under our notice
by the attached muscular feeling. So far as this
means is concerned, the determination of distance
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but there is a great help to it in the movement of
the ball of the eye, of which intimation is given by
the attached muscles. But by far the most important
provision in the visual organ for discovering the
third dimension of space is to be found in binocular
vision, that is, in the convergence of the axis, accord
ing as the objects are near, and in the different as
pect of the object falling under each eye. Wundt
again supplies us with an excellent summary
:
&quot; The
measurements which we are able to bring out by
means of our senses which give us the intuition of
space show this remarkable difference between the
two, that the eye as the sense operating in the dis
tance measures space according to all the four dimen
sions
; whereas sensations by the skin, which are
effected only by the immediate contact of the
outward .object with the surface of the skin,
are all disposed only over one surface. The per
ception of the third dimension of space through
the sense of sight is, however, so far as can be proven
by experience, a mediate one derived from the move
ments of the muscles of the eye (partly of the ex
ternal, which move the apple of the eye ; partly of
the internal, which regulate the accommodation-
mechanism). These measurements of distance de
pend on nothing but the estimation of the muscular
sensations accompanying the movements, and there
fore the perception is accomplished only by means
of a lengthened experience and practice, and hence
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all measurements of that kind. Originally all spatial
sense-intuitions are of surfaces
; depth for the eye
comes forth gradually out of the surface ; the sense
ever penetrates deeper and deeper into boundless
space, its circle of vision widening as the visual circle
of its experience extends.&quot; (p. 29.)
That the eye is immediately cognizant of direction
and superficial figure is proven by the reported
cases of persons born blind, but who acquired eye
sight by means of a surgical operation. The best
reported case is that of Dr. Franz of Leipzig (Phil
Trans, of Roy. Soc. 1841), and I shall quote from it
at considerable length. The youth had been born
blind, and was seventeen years of age when the ex
periment was wrought which gave him the use of
one eye. When the eye was sufficiently restored to
bear the light,
u a sheet of paper on which two strong
black lines had been drawn, the one horizontal, the
other vertical, was placed before him at the distance
of about three feet. He was now allowed to open
the eye, and after attentive examination he called
the lines by their right denominations.&quot;
&quot; The ouir
line in black of a square, six inches in diameter,
within which a circle had been drawn, and within
the latter a triangle, was, after careful examination,
recognized and correctly described by
him.&quot; &quot;At
the distance of three feet, and on a level with the
eye, a solid cube and a sphere., each of four inches
diameter, were placed before him.&quot; &quot;After atten
tively examining these bodies, he said he saw a quad-
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rangular and a circular figure, and after some con*
sideration lie pronounced the one a square and the
other a disc. His eye being then closed, the cube
was taken away and a disc of equal size substituted
and placed next to the sphere. On again opening
his eye he observed no difference in these objects,
but regarded them both as discs. The solid cube
was now placed in a somewhat oblique position be
fore the eye, and close beside it a figure cut out of
pasteboard, representing a plane outline prospect of
the cube when in this position. Both objects he
took to be something like flat quadrates. A pyramid
placed before him with one of its sides towards his
eye he saw as a plain triangle. This object was now
turned a little so as to present two of its sides to
view, but rather more of one side than of the other :
after considering and examining it for a long time,
he said that this was a very extraordinary figure ;
it was neither a triangle, nor a quadrangle, nor a
circle
; he had no idea of it, and could not describe
it
; in fact, said he, I must give it up. On the con
clusion of these experiments, I asked him to describe
the sensations the objects had produced ; whereupon
he said, that immediately on opening his eye he had
discovered a difference in the two objects, the cube
and the sphere, placed before him, and perceived
that they were not drawings ; but that he had not
been able to form from them the idea of a square
and a disc until he perceived a sensation of what he
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the objects. When I gave the three bodies (the
sphere, cube, and pyramid) into his hand, he was
much surprised he had not recognized them as such
by sight, as he was well acquainted with mathemat-
ical figures by his touch.&quot; These observations show
that the eye takes in surface and superficial figure
at once, but cannot immediately discern solidity. If
the persons have the use of both eyes, they would
observe the difference between a disc and a solid,
but they would not be able to say, till they feel it,
that the latter is a solid. It requires to be added,
that persons who have their sight thus given them
require observation and thought to reconcile the in
formation they had got from touch with that which
they are now receiving from sight, just as persons
who have learned two languages, say German and
French, require practice to enable them readily to
translate the one into the other. In the case reported
by Cheselden, the boy,
&quot;
upon being told what things
were whose form he before knew from feeling, said
he would carefully observe that he might know them
again.&quot; Dr. Carpenter tells us of a boy of four years
old, upon whom the operation for congenital cataract
had been very successfully performed, that
&quot; he con
tinued to find his way about his father s house rather
by feeling with his hands, as he had been formerly
accustomed to do, than by his newly acquired sense
of sight, being evidently perplexed rather than as
sisted by the sensations which he had derived through
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his sight, and evidently perceived the increase of
facility which he derived from it.&quot; (Man. of Phys.
p. 593.)
All the recorded cases show that there is also a
process of reasoning and experience in the discovery
of distance. Mr. Abbot (p. 150) gives the following
account of the observations of Trinchinetti : u He
operated at the same time on two patients (brother
and sister), eleven and ten years old respectively.
The same day, having caused the boy to examine an
orange, he placed it about one metre from him, and
bade him try to take it. The boy brought his hand
close to his eye (quasi a contatto del suo occliio), and
closing his fist, found it empty, to his great surprise.
He then tried again a few inches from his eye, and
at last, in this tentative way, succeeded in taking the
orange. When the same experiment was tried with
the girl, she also at first attempted to grasp the
orange with her hand very near the eye (colla mano
assai vicina all occhio), then, perceiving her error,
stretched out her forefinger and pushed it in a
straight line slowly until she reached the
object.&quot;
Other patients have been observed (by Janin and
Duval) to move their hands in search of objects in
straight lines from the eye. Trinchinetti
&quot;
regards
these observations as indicating a belief that visible
objects were in actual contact with the
eye.&quot; It is
clear that the eye gives direction to the object, but
does not apprehend distance immediately. Franz
says of his patient, that
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estimate of
tt the distance of objects from his own
person, or of two objects from each other, without
moving from his place, he examined the objects from
different points of view by turning his head to the
right and to the left.&quot;
The German physiologists have paid great atten
tion to the case of persons born blind, and the con
clusions reached do not correspond with those of
Platner. &quot;As respects persons born blind,&quot; says
Wundt (p. 60),
&quot; who are not supported by the accom
panying and preceding experience of the sense of
sight, the perception of the sensation of place takes
place after a much more tedious and laborious man
ner. The blind man receives the representation of
his body wholly through his own touch. While he
touches with the finger or hand different parts of
his body, there arise in the muscles of the arm just
as many different muscular feelings. These become
to him a measure of different distances. Thus he
receives from the mutual spatial position of single
points a representation of his skin-surface, and while
at the same time, at every point, the Quale of the
sensation corresponding to the same imprints itself,
he is placed in a position also to declare the place
where are to be found the impressions which work
from without.&quot;
This is more fully explained (p. 31)
:
&quot; The repre
sentation of the third dimension can also be awakened
in the person born blind, but this only through a
long series of conclusions, in which the changing182 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
impressions of the sense of feeling, and the muscular
sensations of the entire self-moving body, work to
gether. As the person seeing remains in his place,
and lets the objects in a manner come towards him,
while he, at his will, opens his eyes to the far or the
near
; so must the blind person, when he would dis
cover the outer world, go and seek out the objects
which remain to him in unchangeable
rest.&quot;
&quot; The
person seeing accommodates only his eye, the blind
man his whole body, to the objects.&quot;
It does not concern us in this discussion to inquire
what truth there is in the Berkeleyan theory of
vision. If the above conclusions be trustworthy, as
I believe they are, they show it can be accepted only
with important modifications. Berkeley was posi
tively mistaken in arguing that the eye is percipient
only of color, and not of extension. He was further
guilty of an oversight in not attending to the very
special provision in the organs of vision for enabling
us, always by experience, to discover the third dimen
sion of space, and distance. It is firmly established
that a surface is ever presented to the eye, and is
perceived immediately; and this surface supplies a
measure to us in all our other visual perceptions. It
is now proven that there is a beautiful teleological
apparatus in each eye, and still more in the rela
tive position of the two eyes, whereby we can dis
cover the solidity and estimate the distances of
bodies.
1
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As the result of this criticism, conducted on the
Psychological Method, we find ourselves entitled to
adhere to a certain body of intuitive truth respecting
both mind and matter. Instead of looking on mind
as a mere
&quot; series of
feelings,&quot; we apprehend it as
an abiding existence, with various properties which
evolve themselves from day to day in our experience.
Instead of regarding matter as a
&quot;possibility,&quot; we
contemplate it as having a permanent being, with
diverse forms of activity, which are ever manifesting
themselves to our senses. On this intuitive truth
we build others by a gathered observation, and as
we do so we feel that they are laid on a foundation
which cannot be shaken.
Some object to this realistic doctrine, whether as
held by the world at large or by professed metaphy
sicians, that it is contradicted by the established
truths of modern physical science, which shows that
light and heat are not substances, but vibrations in
an ether, and that all the other physical forces are
correlated with them. But these discoveries of recent
science are all consistent with a doctrine of natural
realism, when the same is properly expounded. Our
senses afford us primarily a knowledge of the affec
tions of our bodily frame, these affections being al
ways localized. Such information is given us by
touch, by sight, and probably also by smell, taste,
and hearing. Then, by the muscular sense, we come
to know objects resisting the movement of our local
ized organs, and external to these organs. In these184 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
operations, and especially in muscular resistance, we
know motion and force, that is, we are sensible of a
limb moving in consequence of an effort, and being
stayed by an extended object with a resisting force.
This is all we know primarily of matter by the senses,
and it has not been set aside by any doctrine of
modern physical science.
I have no partiality for the distinction between the
Primary and Secondary Qualities of bodies. In fact,
as has often been acknowledged, the secondary qual
ities, such as heat and smell, are not so much proper
ties of matter as felt affections of our organism, which
may indeed imply an external cause, but with which
they are not to be identified. We can, however,
specify the qualities of body which are primarily or
intuitively known. These seem to be Externality,
Eesisting Force, and Extension, together, I think,
with Motion in Space. All besides, such as temper
ature, odors, tastes, and sounds, are mere affections
of our organism, giving notice of changes in our
bodily frame. Lotze says that our sense of pressure
and of temperature is not an object, but a condition
which the incitement in the parts of the skin brings
forth. Meissner, following out the same doctrines,
says that they are not sensations (Empfindungen),
but feelings, in so far as they do not stand in relation
directly and immediately to an object, but are a
condition of the subject, our own selves. Even color
itself, though more objective, is felt merely, as in the
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can say nothing more of it than that it affects us in
a particular manner.
Taking this view of matter, we see that we have
first an original or intuitive knowledge. To this we
are ever adding by observation, by generalization,
and by deduction. But then, in the rapidity of
thought and the hurry of life, our observations are
often loose, our generalizations too wide, and our
reasonings hasty. Hence the errors into which we
are led, which, however, are not to be charged on
our senses, but upon the judgments we have super
induced upon the information which they furnish.
It cannot be shown that our intuitive perceptions,
being those that have the sanction of Him who made
us, ever do deceive us, or that they are contradicted
by any established truth of science.
1
Adopting these views of our original perceptions,
we see how we have a confirmation of their trust
worthiness in the circumstance that the different
senses yield the same testimony. I am persuaded,
indeed, that our conviction rests primarily, and all
along most firmly, on the assurance we have as to
the veracity of each sense (see ^). Still it is possible
to get verifications even of our intuitions and dem
onstrations, thus land-measuring and astronomy
corroborate our geometrical deductions. It is cer-
1 1 have endeavored to show that (2.) That between Sensation and
the difficulties connected with the ap- Perception ; (3.) That between the
parent deception of the senses can be Objects intuitively Perceived ; all of
removed by attending to three dis- them being extra-mental, but some of
tinctions : (1.) That between our them also extra-organic. (Intuitions,
Original and Acquired Perceptions; Pt. u. B. n. c. i. 3.)186 THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SENSES.
tainly satisfactory to find that, in their original
depositions, the senses, which are so far independent
witnesses, thoroughly concur. Thus both touch and
sight give us surfaces, which a little experience
enables us to discover to be identical. It is probable
that all the senses give us direction outward. It is
certain that they all give us information directly or
indirectly of external objects ; and thus each in its
own way prepares us for looking out upon and esti
mating a world which, beginning at self as a centre,
extends as far into space as the eye, aided by the
telescope, can penetrate.CHAPTER VIII.
MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS, BELIEF, AND UNCONSCIOUS
MENTAL OPERATIONS.
THE
faculty of Memory has not received any very
special consideration in the writings of Mr. Mill.
When we turn to the account given by his prede
cessors in the school, we find it defective, in fact, as
is usual with them, overlooking the main element.
Our recollections are represented as
&quot; revived sensa
tions.&quot; The statement might be allowed to pass in
common conversation, or in loose literature, but can
not be accepted from a metaphysician. There may
be a revival not merely of our sensations, but of
our mental operations generally, of our thoughts,
our emotions, of our very recollections. And in
every exercise of memory there is more than a re
vival of our experience. As the new and the essen
tial element, there is a belief that we have had the
experience) and that the event has been before us,
in time past. All this being matter of constant con
sciousness, we seldom notice it, just as we pay no at
tention to the bodies which we ever see falling to
the ground. But as it was the falling apple, which
ordinary men thought beneath their regard, which
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seemed to Newton (if the common story is to be
credited) the phenomenon to be weighed, and which
actually furnished the key to the explanation of the
path of the moon and planets in their orbits
; so it
is in the familiar facts of our consciousness that the
psychologist finds the means of clearing up the
more complex laws of our mental nature. In par
ticular, every one who would dive into the deeper
mysteries of mind must specially estimate what is
involved in memory, which is quite as important
a faculty as even sensation in our mental consti
tution.
In memory, let it be observed, we are beyond the
territory of immediate knowledge, with the object
before us : we are now in the region of Faith. We
believe in the existence of an object not now present ;
in that, say, of a departed friend never again to be
met with in this world. We believe that this friend
lived, arid thatwe had frequent intercourse with him,
in time past. I call this the Recognitive Power of
Memory, to distinguish it from the mere reproductive,
the recalling and imagining power. What we thus
experience, what we are conscious of, cannot be
called
&quot; a revived sensation
&quot; without giving the re
vival much that was not in the sensation. We have
now not only Faith in its rudiments, we have Time
in all its significance. No doubt it appears first in
the concrete mixed up with other things ; but so do
all Qur ideas, so do our very sensations. It comes in
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time past. But it is there in the mind, consciousness
being witness; and we have only to abstract the
time from the event to have the abstract idea of
time, just as we have the idea of sensation by
separating in thought the sentient from the self-sen
tient. Time thus reached has quite as real an
existence as the very sensation which may have
been conjoined with our original perception of the
event.
Mr. Mill, in language already quoted (supra, pp.
68, 94), admits the existence of the belief involved
in memory, and asserts its veracity and ultimate
veracity. Our memories and expectations are present
feelings, but each of them involves a belief in more
than its own existence. A remembrance involves
&quot; the belief that a sensation, of which it is a copy or
representation, actually existed in the past ;
&quot; and an
expectation involves the belief,
&quot; that a sensation or
other feeling to which it directly refers will exist in
the future
;
&quot; and the belief the two include is,
&quot; that
I myself formerly had, or that I myself and no other
shall hereafter have, the sensations remembered or
expected.&quot; He is fond, as we shall immediately see,
of ascribing most of our convictions, beliefs, and
judgments to association of ideas. Mr. James Mill
had declared broadly,
&quot; that wherever the name
Belief is applied, there is a case of the indissoluble
association of ideas
;
&quot; and that u no instance can be
adduced in which anything besides an indissoluble
association can be shown in belief.&quot; (Analysis, p. 281.)190 MEMOBY, ASSOCIATION OF
But his son has been obliged to modify this doctrine,




to association, and independent of it. I am sure that
he is right in calling in such a belief. But I am also
sure that he should have called in other beliefs
equally independent of association; and we shall
have to supply his deficiencies as we advance by
showing how wide is the domain of faith. Mean
while let us observe how much is involved in the
faith of memory and expectation. We have seen in
last chapter that the senses directly or indirectly
open to us the distant and the remote, till our minds
are lost in the immensity of space. Now we see
time stretching away into the past and the future,
till it goes out into eternity. And it is interesting
to notice, that while these ultimate beliefs, like the
senses, carry with them their own evidence, they are
ever meeting with corroborations. We remember a
field, a dell, a cottage which we once visited; we
have not seen it for many years, but as we now go
back to it, we find it as we have been picturing it in
our minds. These confirmations of our lower faiths
help us to put a more implicit trust in our higher
natural beliefs, which may not admit of any confirm
ation by sense. Already, in this belief of memory
and expectation, we have the beginnings and the
rudiments of that faith in the unseen, which in
its higher flights carries us so far beyond ourselves,
and lifts us as on wings high above this world.
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mately connected with Memory, has long engaged
the attention of British metaphysicians. It is re
ferred to by Hobbes, who was evidently aware of
what Aristotle had written. It was employed by
Locke to explain certain anomalies and eccentricities
of mind and character. Its importance in account
ing for ordinary mental action was first brought out
fully by Francis Hutcheson, who showed in particular
how it helped to create secondary affections. Some
of its properties had a prominence given them by
Hume, who used it to help his sceptical purposes by
explaining by it many of the beliefs usually ascribed
to reason. A fuller and a juster account of it than
any previously published was given by Turnbull (the
preceptor of Eeid) in his Moral Philosophy. Hart
ley speculated upon it in an empirical and peculiarly
Anglican manner, identifying association with vibra
tions in the nerves. All the Scottish metaphysicians,
including Eeid, Beattie, and Stewart, discoursed upon
it with greater or less fulness. But as universal at
tention was called to it, its power and significance
came to be greatly exaggerated. This was certainly
done by Alison when, passing far beyond the more
sober views entertained on the same subject by Hutch-
eson and Beattie, he sought to account by this one
principle for all the phenomena of beauty. Brown
drew back from so extreme a position, and maintained
that there was excited by beautiful objects a class of
feelings which could not be resolved into association
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iology suggestion plays a very important, I would
say the principal, part. He treats of our intellectual
operations under the heads of Simple and Relative
Suggestion, and indulges in an excess of ingenuity
in making these two faculties manufacture so many
of our ideas. Mr. James Mill followed, and carrying
out a hint thrown out by Brown, that all our asso
ciate feelings could be reduced to
6( a fine species of
proximity&quot; (Lecture xxxv.), resolved all suggestion
into the one law of contiguity; and abandoning
Brown, who stood up for intuitive beliefs, and adher
ing to Hume, accounted for our very beliefs and
judgments by association. The time for a reaction
had now come. Artists never favored Alison s reduc
tion of beauty to association. New and profound
ideas were introduced into English metaphysics by
Coleridge, and through the taste stimulated by him
and others for German speculation. But the recoil
was actually called forth by Sir James Mackintosh s
Dissertation on Ethical Science, which at once created
the opposition of our higher moralists to the attempt
made by him to manufacture our idea of moral good
by means of association. Sir W. Hamilton, who
belongs to this period, devoted his penetrating intel
lect to the more thorough expression of the laws of
the reproduction of our ideas, and has thrown not a
little light on the subject, at the same time keeping
the principle in its own place. Some of us had
hoped that this tendency to exaggerate the power
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and was now past forever. But the wheel of specu
lative opinion seems to have come round to the posi
tion it had an age ago ; and we find association of
ideas occupying in the writings of the younger Mill
and Mr. Bain as high a place as it ever had in the
works of Alison and Brown, of Mackintosh and the
older Mill, or, we may add, as it had two ages
earlier still in the philosophy of Hume and of Hart
ley. There is evidently clear room for a new dis
cussion of the whole subject. Of late it has been
taken up by the German metaphysicians generally ;
and the School of Herbart, in particular, has been
seeking to give a mathematical expression to the
laws of the succession of our ideas. I should like
to see the results of the investigations of the British
School, especially of Hamilton, and of the later
German metaphysicians, wrought out into a consist
ent system.
Mr. Mill can scarcely be said to have added much
to our knowledge of the laws of association. He
specially dwells on two points, and he exaggerates
and distorts both. The first is what he calls the Law
of Inseparable Association.
&quot; Associations produced
by contiguity become more certain and rapid by rep
etition. When two phenomena have been very
often experienced in conjunction, and have not in
any single instance occurred separately, either in ex
perience or in thought, there is produced between
them what has been called Inseparable Association ;
by which is not meant that the association must in-
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evitably last to the end of life, that no subsequent
experience or process of thought can possibly avail
to dissolve it, but only that, as long as no such ex
perience or process of thought has taken place, the
association is irresistible, it is impossible for us to
think the one thing disjoined from the other.&quot;
x(p. 191.) We have here an important truth, which
was much dwelt upon by our author s father. It
can scarcely be raised to the dignity of a law; it
results from higher laws. According to the fre
quency with which two ideas have been together, so
will be the tendency of the one to recall the other.
When they have often been associated, the one will
bring up the other, not only without an act of will
on our part, but it may be in opposition to our ut
most efforts. Thus there are painful recollections
which we would fain be rid of, but they cleave to us
with horrid pertinacity, because conjoined with ob
jects which are forever pressing themselves on our
notice. The only way of dissolving such a combina
tion is by forming a new one, as in chemistry we
dissolve a compound by bringing to bear upon it
another substance, which having a strong affinity to
one of the elements, draws it away from that with
which it is now united. It is thus we break up an
old set of associations by forming new ones, say by a
change of scene or society.
So far we have a well-known operation, according
to a well-known law. But let us understand precisely
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BO stretched the law as to make it embrace an en
tirely different phenomenon. It is implied that two
ideas having been together, the one will never cast
up without the other tending to follow. But this
does not require that we judge or decide that there
is, and still less that there must be, some relation
between them in the nature of things, or discerned
by the mind. On the contrary, we may see them to
be utterly discrepant, and wish that we could only
break the links that join them in the chain of asso
ciation. Thus there is a lovely spot where we once
saw a foul act committed, and ever since, as we pass
it, the whole scene rushes into our mind; but we
never think or conclude that there is any necessary
or even natural connection between the place and
the deed. Mr. Mill has slipped in a word very dex
terously, when he says,
&quot; It is impossible for us ever
to think the one disjoined from the other.&quot; This is





the idea of.&quot; It is a fact that the one idea recalls the
other, but we do not therefore think the one to be
joined to the other, either in the nature of things,
or according to the laws of thought.
We have here come to one of the gravest errors
into which Mr. Mill has fallen in his theory of the
operations of the mind. It is that of making the
association of ideas usurp the province of judgment,
which declares that two ideas or objects have a rela
tion. I admit that the two, suggestion and judg
ment or comparison, often coincide and co-operate,196 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF
and accomplish most important ends as they do so.
Things that have a natural connection are often pre
sented to us together; they are thus brought under
the law of association, and they are henceforth often
recalled at the same time. In this way the associa
tion of ideas may lead to a hasty belief, not founded
on a careful comparison of facts. I believe that
much of what is usually reckoned understanding or
judgment contains little else than an association of
ideas. The so-called &quot;thought&quot; of the lower ani
mals, of children, and even of men of mature
years, consists mainly in ideas succeeding each other
in a train determined by outward circumstances or
by habit. It has to be added, that association of
ideas often essentially aids us in forming a mature
judgment, by bringing things that have a positive
relation into juxtaposition, whereby we are enabled
to discover the connection. As the association helps
the judgment, so the judgment, when it once con
nects the two things, creates an association of ideas,
whereby the one tends to bring up the other, and
thereby we may be led to discover further relations,
real or imaginary. But the actual comparison of
two ideas or objects, and the predication of their
agreement or disagreement, is always an operation
different from, and should be regarded as higher
than, the mere alliance of them by an accidental asso
ciation in our minds. The psychologist, instead of
confounding, should be careful to distinguish them.
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possible from the power of accidental conjunctions,
and bringing us under the habitual influence of a
judicial temper of mind, which looks to the nature
of things. Mr. Mill has done as much as within him
lies to degrade human intelligence, by grounding
beliefs on association, when he should have led us to
seek for a deeper foundation in the mind s capacity
of discerning realities and their relations. This is a
subject which will come more fully before us when
we consider Comparison.
Mr. Mill makes great use of another peculiarity of
association, which had been much dwelt on by
Brown.
&quot; When impressions have been so often ex
perienced in conjunction, that each of them calls up
readily and instantaneously the ideas of the whole
group, these ideas sometimes melt and coalesce into
one another, and appear not several ideas but one.&quot;
(Logic, B. vi. c. iv. 3.) Thus far we have a correct
statement. When ideas have often been in com
pany, they flow together so spontaneously, and in
the end so rapidly, that we cannot stay or even
watch them in their course. As thus having no at
tention bestowed on them, some, or perhaps the
whole, pass away into oblivion, according to a law
to be immediately unfolded. Possibly we do not
declare them to be one, I rather think we make
no declaration about them at all
; but we do not, we
cannot, distinguish them one from another. And
when high feeling mingles with them, there may be
produced upon our nervous organism a combined198 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF
result of a peculiar, perhaps of an intense, kind,
which may abide when the mental ideas and emo
tions are gone.
But Mr. Mill goes much further than this. &quot;When
many impressions or ideas are operating in the mind
together, there sometimes takes place a process of a
similar kind to chemical combination.&quot; (Logic, B. vi.
c. iv. 3.) This he explains,
&quot; The effect of concurring
causes is not always precisely the sum of the effects
of those causes when separate, nor even always an
effect of the same kind with them
;
&quot; thus water, the
product, differs in its qualities from its two elements,
oxygen and hydrogen. We must be very careful
here to ascertain the precise facts, to guard against
exaggerating them, or allowing them to be turned
to illegitimate purposes. Let it be observed, that in
chemical action we have always two substances,
each with many properties known and unknown:
we bring them into a certain relation to each other ;
an action takes place very much of an unknown char
acter, but implying the operation of electricity, or of
one of the correlated forces of the universe; the
result is the formation of water, which possesses
properties different from the oxygen, and the hydro
gen, and the energy exerted in producing the
changes, but which is always capable of being re
solved into the same old elements with the same
measure of energy. Now the question is, is there an
analogous operation produced by the association of
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and repeated conjunction, ideas, each, it may be,
with its own peculiar feeling, succeed each other
with incalculable rapidity, so that we cannot distin
guish between them ; and that they may coalesce in
a result. Show the mother a plaything which be
longed to a deceased child, and what a rush of re
membrances and attached emotions will spring up,
which she is not only not inclined, but not able, to
analyze. But is there anything in all this like
chemical action ? There is a mighty torrent, but it
appears to me that in the confluence there is noth
ing after all but the individual ideas with their cor
responding feelings. There may be new associa
tions, but there does not seem to be a new idea.
Some of the ideas may pass away on the instant
never to be recalled, whereas others may bulk
largely before the mind, and leave their observed or
abiding consequences. But in the agglomeration
there seems to be nothing but the ideas, the feel
ings, and their appropriate impressions, coalescing;
there is no new generation, no generation of an idea
not in the separate parts of the collection.
In particular, it is altogether unwarrantable out
of mere associated sensations to draw those lofty ideas
which the mind can form as to substance and quality,
cause and effect, moral good and moral obligation.
Let us observe with care what is implied in the pro
duction of a new body by chemical composition.
There is one element with its properties, and
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tion in which there is potential energy expended,
and a new product with its properties. And this
mutual action we reckon a wonderful action of
bodies; we distinguish it from mechanical action;
we call it by the name of chemical affinity, and we
seek to determine its laws. But let us suppose that
instead of two elementary bodies we have two sen
sations, say of two colors, or two smells, or two
sounds, and that these have been often together, so
that the one always comes up immediately after the
other
; I ask, whether we have any ground to believe
that these would of themselves generate a third thing
different from the two ? If they do, it must be by
some causal power in the sensations, or out of the
sensations, in the mind or out of the mind
; and it is
the business of the psychologist not to overlook this
power, not to confound it with the mere association
of old ideas, but to separate it from them carefully,
diligently to observe it, and endeavor to discover its
laws, as the chemist seeks to find the law of
elementary affinity. I can discover no evidence that
two sensations succeeding each other will ever be
anything else than two sensations, or that two re
membered sensations will ever be anything else than
two remembered sensations. &quot;When a further pro
duct appears, such as the idea of power, or the idea
of the good, it cannot be the effect of a mere sensa
tion, except in the sense above explained (p. 85), of
a,n occasion, implying a co-operative capacity in the
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moral good, which capacity should be noted as
carefully as the sensations. In short, the laws of as
sociation are the mere laws of the succession of our
ideas and attached feelings, and can generate no
new idea, without a special inlet from without or
capacity within. Association cannot give a man born
blind the least idea of color, and as little can it pro
duce any other idea. By mixing the colors of yel
low and blue, the hand could produce green ; but
give a person the idea of yellow and the idea of
blue, and from the two he could not manufacture
the idea of green ; still less could he from these sen
sations, or any others, form such ideas as those of
time or potency.
There are two points in regard to the association
of ideas which require to be cleared up. The first
is the precise and ultimate expression of the law,
that things which are related, in particular, that
things which are like suggest each other. This
law, under one form or other, has appeared in nearly
every classification of the laws of the succession of
our mental states from the time of Aristotle down
wards. Mr. Mill puts the law in the form,
&quot; Similar
phenomena tend to be thought of together.&quot; (p. 190.)
I believe that other related things do also suggest
each other; but let this pass. The unsettled ques
tion is, must the relation be seen by the mind before
the law operates ? I see a portrait, and it at once
suggests the original. I have never seen the two
together; I see the portrait for the first time, the202 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF
original is not present, and yet it is immediately
called up. It can scarcely be alleged in such a case
that I first discover the resemblance, and then have
the idea of the original, for until the idea of the
original springs up I cannot discover the resem
blance. Is the law then to take this form, that like
suggests like before the likeness is observed ? This
is a topic on which Hamilton often pondered, and he
has advanced some subtle considerations which are
perhaps not sufficiently reduced to a consistent
system. Mr. Mill severely criticises Hamilton, but
has not himself sounded the depths of the subject,
which requires to be further cleared up before we
have an ultimate expression of the laws of associa
tion. In endeavoring to explicate it, we must ever
keep a firm hold of the distinction between the
observation of relations, which is an act of compari
son, and the mere suggestion of one thing by
another. We shall see that the school of Mr. Mill
has perseveringly confounded them.
The other point requiring further elucidation re
lates to the Secondary Laws of Suggestion, as they
have been called by Brown, or the Law of Prefer
ence, as it has been called by Hamilton. To explain
what this means : suppose that the idea now before
the mind has been associated with a great number
of others, according to the laws of contiguity and
correlation; the question arises, why among these
ideas does it go after one rather than another ? I
met with a dozen people at a dinner
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me think of some one of them rather than the
others ? Many references had been previously
made to the facts bearing on this subject, but the
first enumeration of Secondary Laws, as different
from the Primary, was made by Brown, whose ar
rangement though clear was defective in logical
reduction. I am sure there are two Laws of Prefer
ence which have a powerful influence. One of these
is the law of native taste and talent. We go after
the ideas which have the deepest interest to our
natural faculties. Some, for instance, have a great
tendency to observe resemblances, and among possi
ble associations they will find likenesses, analogies,
and affinities coming up most stronglyand frequently
Some have constitutionally certain strong appeten
cies or passions, and their thoughts will tend towards
the corresponding objects. The mother with a
strong love of offspring will find every topic started
and event occurring, suggesting possible perils or en
joyments to her children. I need not dwell on this,
as it has no special reference to our present discus
sion, which certainly the other has.
I call it the Law of Mental Energy. Those ideas
are brought up most readily and frequently on
which we have bestowed the greatest amount of
mental force. Every mind seems to be endowed
with a certain amount of power, and, according to
the power expended on an idea, so is it remembered
for a greater length of time, and so is it suggested
more easily and frequently. It may be an energy204 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF
of sensation, as when the idea has been very pleas
urable or very painful. It may be an energy of in
telligence, as when we have devoted one or several
of our faculties, eagerly or for a length of time, to
a given object. It may be an energy of emotion, as
when a lively hope or an anxious fear has collected
round a particular event. Or it may be an energy of
will, as when we have given earnest attention to a sub
ject. Of course, the ideas, when they appear, always
come up according to such Primary Laws as those
of contiguity and correlation
; but the Law of Energy
shows why, among a variety of objects which it
might follow, the mind takes one rather than
another. It is thus we explain that Law of Insep
arable Association on which Mr. Mill dwells so much :
the ideas have been together, and much energy
having been expended on them in their frequent
combination, they come up together, and they come
up often. Much the same effects as are produced by
frequent occurrence follow from a very strong energy
being exerted only for a brief period, only, may be,
for a few minutes or moments. A strong sensation,
as that of an avalanche, heard, it may be, only once
in our lives, may leave a life-long impression of itself.
&quot;We can never forget the moment when, after long
search and toil in some branch of research, a glorious
thought burst on our view like the sun, and threw a
flood of light on all surrounding objects. A terrible
convulsion of fear will imprint itself on our souls for
life, and be renewed by every correlated circum-IDEAS, BELIEF, ETC. 205
stance. An acute sorrow will
&amp;gt; burn itself into the
soul, and leave a wound which a thousand circum
stances will tend to open., thus the widow can
never pass the spot where her husband was thrown
out of a carriage and killed in her presence, without
having the whole scene with its nervous agitations
revived.
This train of thought and observation opens to us
what I regard as a very deep and fundamental law
of memory in its recalling power. I believe we are
momentarily conscious of every sensation, idea,
thought, or emotion of the mind. But it is merci
fully provided that many of our mental states are
never reproduced
: they are happily allowed to pass
away into forgetfulness, at least they cannot be
brought up in ordinary circumstances, though
there are curious recorded instances of their reap
pearing in extraordinary positions. We should cer
tainly be in a pitiable condition if every tick of the
clock in the room in which we sit, if every act of
will put forth in moving our limbs, if every passing
thought in our day dreams or our night dreams,
came up as readily as our more important cogitations,
which have engaged and engrossed much thought
and attention. While we are conscious (so it ap
pears to me) of every mental operation, it seems to
be necessary that a certain amount of mental force
should be expended in order to our having the capac
ity to recall it. Very possibly this mental law may
be connected with a physiological one, with what has206 MEMOBY, ASSOCIATION OF
been called by Dr. Carpenter
&quot; unconscious cerebra
tion.&quot; I am inclined to think that our conscious
mental affections tend to produce an unconscious
brain affection, and that the concurrence of the
brain thus affected is necessary in order to memory,
or the reproduction of an idea. Now, a certain
amount of mental force may be necessary to produce
the cerebration, without which there can be no rec
ollection. Whether from purely mental or cerebral
causes, or as I think from the two combined, it looks
as if the recalling of ideas requires that they should
first have been in the consciousness with a certain
amount of force or vividness. Many ideas which
have been in the mind never reappear, and those
which do, come forth, according to the power or prero
gative we have imparted to them, like the stars,
which do not all show themselves, for otherwise
the sky would be one blazing concave, but which,
when they do appear, come out according to their
nearness to us and their magnitude.
It is by this broader and deeper principle that I
account for what Mr. Mill chooses to call the Law of
Obliviscence. I agree with Sir William Hamilton in
thinking that there may be more than one object
before the mind at one time. Suppose that there
are five objects before the eye, I believe that we
could notice all of them. But our apprehension of
all and each is so spread and dissipated, is so faint
and vague, that the chance is, that no one of them
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But let one of them be of a very brilliant color, or
let it have a large amount of attention centred upon
it for a special end, or suppose that it had created
an interest in itself in time past so that it now
awakens lively feeling, that object will be found to
have so imprinted itself on the mind, that it will re
main when others pass into obliviscence.
&quot; After
reading,&quot; says Mr. Mill (p. 260),
&quot;a chapter of a
book, when we lay down the volume do we remem
ber to have been individually conscious of the printed
letters and syllables which have passed before us ?
Could we recall, by any effort of mind, the visible
aspect presented by them, unless some unusual cir
cumstance has fixed our attention upon it during the
perusal? Yet each of these letters and syllables
must have been present to us as a sensation for at
least a passing moment, or the sense could not have
been conveyed to us. But the sense being the only
thing in which we were interested, or, in excep
tional cases, the sense and a few of the words or
sentences, we retain no impression of the separate
letters and syllables.&quot; By the same principle, we
account for the facts which of late years have been
commonly ascribed to Unconscious Mental Action.
Mr. Mill has done essential service to philosophy
by opposing the tide which, both in Germany and in
Britain, has been flowing too strongly in favor of this
theory. And yet I am not sure that he has appre
hended all that is in the facts supposed to favor the
doctrine.208 MEMORY, ASSOCIATION OF
(1.) I hold that the soul, from the very first, is en
dowed with certain powers or tendencies. Even
matter has capacities which lead to action, and to
changes of state when the needful conditions are
fulfilled
; and much more must the soul have original
properties, which come forth in operation according
to the law imposed on them. But in these primary
endowments there is no action, conscious or uncon
scious
; there is simply a capacity of action. Some
of the German philosophers who support the theory
confound these a priori powers or regulative prin
ciples of the mind, of which we are certainly not
conscious, with the actions that proceed from them,
and of which we are conscious.
(2.) The mind by action is ever acquiring and lay
ing up power, capacity, tendency. We have some
thing analogous in physical nature. In the geolog
ical ages, the plants by drinking in the sunbeams
acquired a stock of power, which went down with
them into the earth as they sank into it, which abides
in the coal which they helped to form, and is now
ready to burst out in heat and flame in our fires, and
supply mechanical power to our steam-engines.
There seems to be a like laying up of power in the
mind
; of intellectual, and, I may add, of moral or
immoral power, the result of continued mental
action. When we have done an act, we have a
greater capacity, along with a tendency to do it
again. Thus it is that we are. all our lives long, and
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dispositions, habits, inclinations, which are to abide
with us for years, perhaps forever. This is one
of the regulating principles in the reproduction of
our mental states generally, and particularly in the
association of ideas. What is done, and especially
what is done repeatedly, leaves its trace on the soul,
and may appear in deeds long, long after. Ideas which
have been together simultaneously or in immediate
succession, have the property and the tendency
to come up together, and this in proportion to
the mental energy which has been expended in pro
ducing them, and under this to the frequency with
which they have been together. This is one of the
elements which gives its beneficent and its awful
power to habit. But let it be carefully observed,
that in all this we have not come in sight of Uncon
scious mental action. We were conscious of every
step of the actual operations of the mind, and we
were responsible for them throughout. Those who
support the theory mistake the unconscious acquired
power for unconscious acts.
(3.) The mind by action may affect the structure
of the brain, or the forces, mechanical, chemical,
vital, operating in it, and in the nervous system.
Materialistic physiologists represent high mental
capacity as resulting from a large or finely con
structed brain. The more probable theory is, that a
nicely adapted and a finely strung cerebral structure
results from high mental capacity and activity. It
is not the casket which forms the jewel, but it is the
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jewel that determines the size and shape of the
casket ; or, to use a better illustration in such a con
nection, it is the kernel that determines the form of
the husk. The finely organized brain thus produced
may, in man and the lower animals, tend to go
down by the ordinary laws of transmission from
parent to offspring. It is thus, that in certain of the
West India Islands, by examining the heads of the
negroes on a plantation, a hatter can tell at what
age their forefathers were transplanted from Africa,
the brain being larger in those families whose an
cestors have been longest in contact with civilized
men. It is thus, that in our own country, the aver
age size of the heads of the educated classes is larger
than that of the uneducated. But in this, the actual
action of the mind is conscious throughout. It is only
the organic product of which we are unconscious.
This is not the place to work out these principles
to their results. They imply important and far-
ranging consequences, mental and organic. But
these are not the doctrines defended by those whose
opinions I am here reviewing. Not satisfied with
native endowments, and acquired powers, and bodily
effects, which are unconscious, they insist on the ex
istence of actual operations which are unaccompanied
with consciousness. They are not agreed among
themselves as to what is the nature of this action.
The theory was introduced into modern speculation
by Leibnitz, who connected it with the essential ac
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tain of the pantheistic speculators of Germany, who
maintained that the Divine Idea awakes to conscious
ness according to certain laws. As held in the
present day, it takes two different, I should say in
consistent, forms. According to a numerous school
in Germany, which may be held as represented by
the younger Fichte, the unconscious mental action
is thought, and thought of the highest kind : the
thought which in the bee constructs the cells on
mathematical principles; which bursts out in the
highest products of genius, artistic, literary, and
philosophic, and gives birth even to inspiration. The
theory under this form seems to me to be fanciful in
the highest degree. As to animal instincts, they are
clearly to be traced to original or inherited proper
ties, obeying laws not yet determined. And as to
genius, it is to be explained by far different principles.
We account for it by high mental endowment, often
stimulated into intense action by a peculiar nervous
temperament. We have no evidence, that, prior to
Bacon composing the Novum Organum, or Shak-
speare writing Hamlet, there was any mental opera
tion below consciousness. There were lofty gifts hi
both, and also a training and experience which left
their permanent effects
; but when these came forth
into action, I apprehend that the illustrious authors
were quite conscious of them, though they might
not have been able or disposed to furnish a metaphys
ical analysis of them.
The theory of Hamilton is of a more sober char-212 MEMOBY, ASSOCIATION OF
acter, but seems to be equally devoid of evidence to
support
it. The class of facts on which he rests his
opinion are misapprehended.
&quot; When we hear the
distant murmur of the sea, what are the constituents
of the total perception of which we are conscious ?
&quot;
(Metaph., vol. i. p. 351.) He answers that the mur
mur is a sum made up of parts, and that if the noise
of each wave made no impression in our sense, the
noise of the sea, as the result of these impressions,
could not be realized.
6i But the noise of each sev
eral wave at the distance, we suppose, is inaudible ;
we must, however, admit that they produce a cer
tain modification beyond consciousness on the per
cipient object.&quot; He speaks of our perception of a
forest as made up of impressions left by each leaf,
which impressions are below consciousness. There
is an entire misapprehension of the facts in these
statements, and this, according to Hamilton s own
theory of the object intuitively perceived. The mind
is not immediately cognizant of the sound of the
sea, or of its several waves, nor of the trees of
the forest and their several leaves. All that it knows
intuitively is an affection of the organism. The im
pression made by the distant object is on the organ
ism
; and when the action is sufficiently strong, the
mind is called into exercise, and, from the perceived
affections, argues or infers the peculiar nature of the
distant cause. In this class of phenomena there is
no proof of a mental operation of which we are un
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Hamilton explains, by supposed unconscious acts,
a class of mental phenomena with which we are all
familiar. We walk in a &quot;brown study&quot; from a
friend s house to our home : there must have been
many mental acts performed on the way, but they
cannot be recalled. The question is, were they ever
before the consciousness ? Dugald Stewart maintains
that they were for the time, but that we cannot rec
ollect them. Notwithstanding the acute remarks
of Hamilton, I adhere to the explanation of Stewart.
I do so on the general principle, that in propounding
an hypothesis to explain a phenomenon, we should
never call in a class of facts, of whose existence we
have no other proof, when we can account for the
whole by facts known on independent evidence.
Hamilton tells us,
&quot; When suddenly awakened during
sleep (and to ascertain the fact, I have caused my
self to be roused at different seasons of the night), I
have always been able to observe that I was in the
middle of a dream
;
&quot;
but, he adds, that he was often
scarcely certain of more than the fact that he was
not awakened from an unconscious state, and that
we are often not able to recollect our dreams. He
represents it as a peculiarity of somnambulism, that
we have no recollection when we awake of what has
occurred during its continuance. (Vol.
i. pp. 320-322.)
Every one will admit that we are often conscious of
states at the time, which we either do not remember
at all, or more probably cannot remember, except
for a very brief period after we have experienced214 MEMOBY, ASSOCIATION OF IDEAS.
them. We have thus an established order of facts
sufficient to explain the whole phenomena, and do
not require to resort to alleged facts of which we
have and can have no direct evidence. We walk
home of an evening from a place at a distance con
versing as we go along with a friend. In order to
our reaching our dwelling, there must have been a
number of mental acts to enable us to thread our
way, along possibly a very perplexed road. Next
morning we remember the topics gone over in the
conversation, but have entirely and forever forgot
the acts of will implied in guiding our steps. But I
venture to affirm that at the time we were conscious
of both, that we were conscious even of the volitions
that brought us safely to our home, and that we
should have seen this and acknowledged it, and re
membered it, had there been anything to call our
attention to it at the time. The reason why the one
is remembered while the other is forgotten, is to be
found in the circumstance, that the conversation ex
cited our interest, whereas the walk, as being the
result of long acquired habit, called forth no feeling,
and so passed into oblivion.CHAPTER IX.
JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON.
IN
this chapter I have to point out first, a grave
defect, and then a still graver error.
There is no part of the psychology of the school
to which Mr. Mill belongs in which their defects are
so evident as in their account of the Judging, Com
parative, or Correlative capacity. They may have
been misled in part by Brown, who joined in one
suggestion and relation, under a faculty which he
called Kelative Suggestion, whose function it is at
once to discover relations and suggest objects accord
ing to relations. Brown was wrong, I think, in allow
ing two such diverse functions to one power ; but it
is justice to him to say that he has given a compre
hensive view of the relations which the mind of man
can discover. He has a generic and a specific divis
ion. He has first a grand twofold division into Co
existence and Succession. Under the first he em
braces Position, Resemblance or Difference, Propor
tion, Degree, Comprehension ; and under the second,
Causal and Casual Priority. The later members of
the school, such as Mr. James Mill, Mr. J. S. Mill and
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Mr. Bain, have been lessening the number, and low
ering the importance of the relations which can be
discovered by our faculties, and thus narrowing our
mental powers, so as to enable them the more readily
to account for the phenomena of the mind by sensa
tions and association. Mr. James Mill does speak of
Kelative Terms, but contrives to get them without
calling in a special faculty of Comparison. Mr. J. S.
Mill, after specifying 1st, Feelings, 2d, Minds, and 3d,
Bodies, as included among namable things, men
tions,
&quot; 4th and last, the Successions and Co-exist
ences, the Likenesses and Unlikenesses between feel
ings or states of consciousness.&quot; In explanation, he
tells us,
&quot; Those relations, when considered as subsist
ing between other things, exist in reality only be
tween the states of consciousness which those things,
if bodies, excite, if minds, either excite or experience.&quot;
(Logic, B. i. c. iii. 15.) This statement is quite in
accordance with his general theory as he has now
developed it. As we know originally only feelings
or states of consciousness, so the relations we dis
cover can only be between feelings and possibilities
of feeling. No doubt most people imagine that in
comparing Julius Caesar, Charlemagne, and Napoleon
Bonaparte ; and in comparing or contrasting Louis
Napoleon with Augustus, Comte with Hobbes, and
Mill with Hume, we are comparing things out of our
states of consciousness : but the new philosophy cor
rects this vulgar error, and in doing so is consistent
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tuitive assurances or no. To complete the simplicity
of the reduction, Mr. Bain tells us, in reviewing
Grote s Plato (MacmiUaris Magazine, July, 1865),
&quot; These two facts, Cognizance of Difference and Cog
nizance of Agreement, can be shown to exhaust the
essence of knowledge, and both are requisites. All
that we can know of a gold ring is summed up in its
agreement with certain things, round things, small
things, gold things, etc., and its differences from
others, squares, oblong, silver, iron,&quot; etc.
I maintain that this account of man s power of
correlation is far too narrow, consciousness being
the witness and arbiter. Profound thinkers have
given a much wider sweep to the intellect. I have
quoted the enumeration by Brown, and I have pre
sented below the classifications of such thinkers as
Locke, Hume, and Kant.
1 I ask the reader to look
at them, and to decide for himself whether they can
all be reduced to agreement and disagreement. Mr.
Mill gives a place to co-existences and successions.
In this he is surely right
: for when I say that Shak-
speare and Cervantes died the same year, and that
the ancient epic poets, Homer and Yirgil, lived be
fore the modern ones, Dante and Milton, I indicate
1 Locke specifies Cause and Effect, II. Quality, containing Reality, Nega-
Time, Place, Identity and Diversity, tion, Limitation. III. Relation, con-
Proportion and Moral Relations (Es- taining Inherence and Subsistence,
say, B. ii. c. xxxvii). Hume men- Causality and Dependence, Commu-
tions Resemblance, Identity, Space nity of Agent and Patient. IV. Mo-
and Time, Quantity, Degree, Con- dality, containing Possibility and Im-
trariety, Cause and Effect. Kant s possibility, Existence and Non-Exist-
categories are, I. Quantity, con- tence, Necessity and Contingence.
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more than an agreement in the former case and a
disagreement in the latter, I intimate the point
of relation, which is that of Time, a relation, I
may add, the significance of which has not been
estimated by Mr. Mill. When I say that one figure
before my eyes is a disc, and another a solid, I declare
more than a difference or co-existence, I declare that
the two differ in respect of their occupation of space.
Again, when I affirm that oxygen is one of the ele
ments of water, I predicate a relation of part and
whole, and imply one of composition, which is surely
more than agreement, or co-existence, or succession.
The same may be said of other relations, such as
that of quantity, when I maintain that Chimborazo
is higher than Mont Blanc
; and of active property,
when I declare that the sun attracts the earth, and
that oxygen combines with hydrogen to form water.
1
We are now in a position to discover and expose
what is perhaps the most fatal error in the whole
theory: it consists in ascribing to association the
functions of judgment. Mr. James Mill thus sums
up a statement :
&quot; We have now then explored those
states of Consciousness which we call Belief in ex
istences : Belief in present existences
; Belief in past
existences; and Belief in future existences. We
have seen that, in the most simple cases, Belief con
sists in sensation alone, or ideas alone
; in the more
i I have arranged the Eolations as tity, Resemblance, Active Property,
those of Identity and Difference, and Cause and Effect. Intuitions, P
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complicated cases, in sensation, ideas, and association,
combined ; and in no case of belief has any other
ingredient been found.&quot; As to Propositions, he says
they are either of general names or particular names.
Of the former he says,
&quot;
They are all merely verbal ;
and the Belief is nothing more than recognition of
the coincidence, entire or partial, of two general
names.&quot; As to the latter, he says,
&quot;
Propositions re
lating to individuals may be expressions either of
past or future events.. Belief in past events, upon
our own experience, is memory ; upon other men s
experience, is Belief in testimony ; both of them re
solved into association. Belief in future events is
the inseparable association of like consequents with
like antecedents.&quot; (Analysis, pp. 290, 307, 308.) I
am not sure whether the son would adopt the whole
of this statement : he has been obliged to admit that
memory yields an ultimate belief, which is not the
result of association. But his theory in the main
coincides with that of the father. It is admitted
that there is an original consciousness of sensations,
and that there is a memory of sensations, which can
not be resolved into anything simpler. It is further
postulated that there is an association of sensations
according to contiguity and agreement, and that there
is an expectation of sensations. Out of these, as I
understand, spring our judgments (if indeed we have
the power of judging) and our beliefs, which imply,
and can imply nothing more than contiguity or
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with stripping man of the capacity of judging of the
actual relations of things ; and making all our beliefs,
except those involved in sensations, and the memory
of them, to be the creation of circumstances, and
capable of being changed only by circumstances with
their conjunctions and correspondencies, which, for
anything we can ever know, may be altogether for
tuitous or fatalistic.
The defects of the theory commence in the account
given of the matter with which the mind starts : this
is supposed to be merely sensations. But the fatal
consequences do not become evident till we see what
must be the explanation rendered of the mind s
capacity of Judgment. I have endeavored in this
treatise to meet and stop the error at its inlet, that
so we may be preserved from the issues. I have
shown that the mind starts with an original stock
of knowledge and belief. In sense-perception it
knows objects, with an existence, external to self,
extended, and capable of resistance and of motion.
In self-consciousness it knows self as an existing
thing, sentient, or knowing, or remembering, or
believing, or judging, or resolving, or entertaining
moral or other sentiments. In memory we remem
ber ourselves and the event in the past, and thus
have a continuous and identical self, with the impor
tant element of time. And now we can compare all
these, and discover relations among them. By this
further faculty the domain of our knowledge is indef
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object is very vague and very limited till we have
detected its connections with other things. But
what I wish specially noticed is, that the comparison
is not between mere
&quot;
feelings or states of conscious
ness/ but between things, without us as well as
within us. I compare self in one state, say under
sensation, with self in another state, say recollecting
or resolving. I compare one extended object
with another, and declare the one to be larger than
the other. I compare events remembered, and de
clare that they happened at different times. I com
pare my very comparisons, and discover further, it
may be more recondite, proportions and harmonies,
till we link all nature within and without us in a
series of uniformities. And let it be observed, that
our judgments throughout are judgments as to real
ities. As being cognizant of extended objects in
perception by the senses, on noticing two extended
objects, say St. Paul s and its door, we declare the
one to be greater than the other
; and our judgment
is about things, and not about sensations, or the
mere possibilities of sensation. On seeing two per
sons on our right hand and two persons on our left






remember our school days and our college days, and
we declare the one to be prior to the other. Our
comparisons in such cases are of things, and our
judgments upon things, and not on mere feelings, or
mere possibilities of feeling. Circumstances have222 JUDGMENT OB COMPARISON.
not produced the judgments, nor can circumstances
change or modify them. In all circumstances I de^
cide that the house is larger than its door
; that two
and two make four
; and that an event which oc
curred when we were ten years old must be prior to
one which happened when we were twenty.
I admit that association tends to produce action,
independent of judgment upon a comparison of the
things. When things have often been together in
the mind, we go spontaneously from the one to the
other
; and if action be needed to secure the second,
we will be disposed to exert it. As Mr. Bain, in un
folding the nature of our Beliefs, expresses it (Emot.
and Will, p. 579),
1
&quot;An animal sees the water that
it drinks, and thereby couples in its mind the prop
erty of quenching thirst with the visible aspect.
After this association has acquired a certain degree
of tenacity, the sight of water at a distance suggests
the other fact, so that, from the prospect, the animal
realizes to some degree the satisfying of that craving.
The sight of water to the thirsty animal, then, in
spires the movements preparatory to actual drinking ;
the voluntary organs of locomotion are urged by
the same energetic spur on the mere distant sight,
as the organs of lapping and swallowing under the
feeling of relief already commenced. This is the
state of mature conviction as to the union of the
two natural properties of water.&quot; I reckon this as
1 Mr. Bain admits Intuitive Beliefs, born energy of the brain gives faith,
but then they deceive us.
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a case mainly of association, and not of judgment
I do allow that association tends to make us form
judgments. When two objects have been often
brought together, we are led to discover a resem
blance, real or imaginary, between them. But ad
mitting all this freely, I maintain that the mind has
a power of judgment, upon the bare contemplation
of objects, and apart altogether from the association
of instances. On the simple consideration of two
straight lines, I am sure they cannot enclose a space.
I have only to hear of a case of ingratitude for favors
to declare it to be bad and blameworthy.
While the two, association and comparison, often
help each other, yet they are never the same. The
one may exist without the other
; and the one does
not increase nor decrease with the other. In many
t/
cases there is a strong and inseparable association
without the judgment perceiving any relation, nay,
where it would declare that there is no connection
in the nature of things. Thus the letter A natur
ally suggests the letter B, because they have come
so often together in our repetition of the alphabet ;
yet no one thinks that the two have in them
selves any bonds of union. It so happens that, when
the name St. Patrick is brought up, I always associate
with it the legend I heard in my youth about
the saint swimming from Donaghadee to Portpatrick,
with his head in his teeth; yet the frequency of
the conjunction has not been able to convince me of
the possibility of the act. Often have the numbers224 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON.
17 and 20 been together in my mind, from the ac
cident of their having been printed together on a
card on which I had frequent occasion to look
; but
it has never occurred to me that the two must have
a necessary connection. It thus appears that fre
quency of association cannot of itself generate a
judgment with its attached belief. On the other
hand, a judgment declaring that there is a connec
tion does not imply that there has been a frequent
association. Comparatively seldom have 17 -f- 20
been conjoined in my mind with 37, certainly not
so frequently as 17 has been associated with 20,-
and yet, on the bare contemplation of 17+ 20, 1 de
clare them to be equal to 37, and cannot be made
to decide otherwise. If I hear that Peter Jones
robbed his master John Smith, who trusted him, I
declare that Peter Jones deserves punishment, and
this though I never heard of Peter Jones before.
Mr. Mill is prepared to carry out his principles
to consequences, which seem to me a reductio ad
absurdum of the principles. He tells us (p. 69) that
&quot; the reverse of the most familiar principles of geom
etry might have been made conceivable, even to our
present faculties, if these faculties had co-existed
with a totally different constitution of external na
ture,&quot; and quotes at length, in proof of this, from
Essays by a Barrister, in which it is said,
&quot; There
is a world in which, whenever two pairs of things
are either placed in proximity or are contemplated
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brought within the contemplation of the mind en
gaged in putting two and two together. This is
surely neither inconceivable, for we can readily con
ceive the result by thinking of common puzzle tricks,
nor can it be said to be beyond the power of Omnip
otence. Yet in such a world surely two and two
would make five.&quot; This certainly would be the
result on Mr. Mill s theory. But such consequences
can be admitted only by those who deny the mind
all power of knowing the nature of things. Those
of us who stand up for a power of independent judg
ment, that is, a judgment founded on the perception
of things, cannot allow such conclusions. Were we
placed in a world in which two pairs of things were
always followed by a fifth thing, we might be dis
posed to believe that the pairs caused the fifth thing,
or that there was some prearranged disposition of
things producing them together ; but we could not
be made to judge that 2 -f- 2 5, or that the fifth
thing is not a different thing from the two and the
two. On the other supposition put, of the two pairs
always suggesting a fifth, we should explain their
recurrence by some law of association, but we would
not confound the 5 with the 2 -|- 2, or think that the
two pairs could make five.
The same ingenious gentleman supports the theory
by another illustration, and receives the sanction of
Mr. Mill.
&quot; It would also be possible to put a case
of a world in which two lines would be universally
supposed to include a space. Imagine a man who
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had never had any experience of straight lines
through the medium of any sense whatever, suddenly
placed upon a railway stretching out on a perfectly
straight line to an indefinite distance in each direc
tion, He would see the rails, which would be the
first straight lines he had ever seen, apparently meet
ing, or at least tending to meet, at each horizon
; and
he would thus infer, in the absence of all other ex
perience, that they actually did enclose a space when
produced far enough.&quot; Now I allow that this person,
as he looked one way, would see a figure presented
to the eye of two straight lines approaching nearer
each other and that as he looked the other way
he would see a like figure. But I deny that in com
bining the two views he would ever decide that
the four lines seen, the two seen first and the
two seen second, make only two straight lines.
In uniting the two perceptions in thought, he
would certainly place a bend or a turn some
where, possibly at the spot from which he took
the two views. He would continue to do so till he
realized that the lines seen on either side did not in
fact approach nearer each other. Or to state the
whole phenomenon with more scientific accuracy
:
Intuitively, and to a person who had not acquired
the knowledge of distance by experience, the two
views would appear to be each of two lines approach
ing nearer another
; but without his being at all cog
nizant of the relation of the two views, or of one
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than another. (See supra, pp. 160-168.) As expe
rience told him that the lines receded from him on
each side, he would contrive some means of com
bining his observations, probably in the way above
indicated
; but he never could make two straight
lines enclose a space.
The same remarks apply, mutatis mutandis, to a
third case advanced by the Barrister. Thomas Keid,
who was a man of humor and addicted to mathe
matics, amused himself and relieved a dry discussion





147), in which he exhibits the conclusions which
could be deduced from the supposed perceptions of
sight. He proceeds upon the Berkeleyan doctrine
of vision, and supposes that by sight we could have
&quot; no conception of a third dimension
&quot; of space ; and
that a person with sight, but without touch, would
see length and breadth, but could have no idea of
thickness, or of the distinction of figures into planes
and curves. Such a one, he thinks, might be driven
by geometry to the conclusion that
&quot;
every right line
being produced will at last return into itself
;
&quot; that
&quot;any two right lines being produced will meet in
two points;&quot; and that &quot;two or more bodies may
exist in the same
place.&quot; But these inferences can
be deduced only by denying to vision functions
which belong to it, and ascribing to it others which
are not intuitive or original. We have seen that
the eye takes in intuitively a colored surface, and if
there be two colors on the surface, divided by a228 JUDGMENT OR COMPARISON.
curve line, we at once have the perception of a
curve. Again, by binocular vision we have, if not
intuitively, at least by an easy process of experience
and inference, space in the third dimension. It is
further to be borne in mind, that in our acquired per
ceptions we lay down rules which may help us in
common cases, but which, not being absolutely cor
rect, may lead into error when improperly applied
to other cases ; as when we argue from the crooked
image presented to the eye that there is a crooked
stick corresponding to it in the water. Proceeding
on such assumptions as these, it is possible to show
that we are landed in the consequences so graphi
cally pointed out by Reid. But the consequences
are not legitimate, because they are drawn from a
misapprehension of the precise nature of our intui
tive perceptions in vision. There is and can be no
evidence that a person with the sense of sight, but
without the sense of touch, would draw them. I
hold that the very vision of two straight lines would
prevent us from being led to declare that they could
meet at two points. Upon the bare contemplation
of the lines, whether made known by sight or touch,
we at once reject all such conclusions, however in
geniously constructed from premises which have not
the sanction of our constitution.
When such consequences are allowed and defend
ed, we see how ominous is this conjunction in the
philosophic firmament of the School of Comte with
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places truth, that is, a knowledge of the nature of
things, beyond the reach of human faculties
; which
commence with they know not what, and close,
after a laborious process, with results which may
have as little reality as a succession of dissolving
views. Stripping us of a power of independent
judgment, it leaves us the servants, I should rather
say the slaves, of circumstances, with their conjunc
tions and correspondences, which may all be the
issue of blind chance or dead mechanism, cer
tainly without our being able to say that they are
not. Along with independence, I fear there is also
taken away all responsibility, of judgment and
belief, except, indeed, such accountability as we
may require of a horse or a dog when we associate
its vices with a lash, simply to prevent the animal
from doing the deed again. I am persuaded that
such a creed must exercise, whether the persons are
or are not aware of it, whether they do or do not
confess it, a deadening influence on those who
actually believe it and come under its sway ; and if
ever it should be accepted in its results (I say re
sults, for its processes are too subtle to be grasped
by the rough hands of the common people), and its
appropriate sentiments diffused, in a community, the
consequences would be as fatal as those which flowed
in the end of last century in France, from the prev
alence of the Sensational Philosophy, when it gave
a wrong direction to the great political upheaval,
and helped to degrade the national character.230 JUDGMENT OE COMPABISON.
We can avoid these issues only by maintaining
that man is so constituted as to know originally
something of the reality of things, and to be capable
of rising to an acquaintance with their relations.
Association may help us to form a reasonable judg-
ment and it is a happy circumstance when it does
so ; but whether we are or are not so aided, we
should be taught that it is our duty to found our
beliefs on a previous judgment, in which we look to
the nature of things as the same can be discovered
by us. One end, no doubt, of a good training is to
encompass us with profitable associations in the
family, in the social circle, and in the community ;
with associations originating in the highest senti
ments, and sanctioned by the common conscience
and the universal reason of the men of former ages.
But it is a still higher end of the highest education
to raise us above all hereditary and casual associa
tion of times or circumstances, and to constrain us
to base our beliefs on an inspection of realities and
actualities. Every youth should be taught that he
is endowed with an inherent power of discernment,
which he is not at liberty to lay aside in any circum




Professor Ferrier propounded the theory
that one s self mixes as an integral and essen
tial part with our knowledge of every object, and Sir
William Hamilton unfolded his doctrine of the rela
tivity of knowledge, I felt constrained to declare
that there were views prevalent in metaphysical
speculation which were working as much mischief
as the ideal theory had done in the days of Berkeley ;
and I ventured to affirm that if Professor Ferrier s
speculations were not regarded as a reductio ad
absurdum of the whole style of thinking,
&quot; the next
phenomenon appearing in the philosophic firmament
must be a Hume or a Fichte.&quot; (Meih. of Div. Gov
ern., 4th Edit. App. pp. 536-539.) In now holding
that this fear has been realized, it is not needful to
maintain that Mr. Mill is in every respect like either
the great Scottish sceptic or the great German
idealist, any more than to assert that these two are
like each other. Mr. Mill is not so original a thinker
as Hume, nor does he like him profess scepticism.
He does not possess the speculative genius of Fichte,
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and he defends his system in a much more sober
manner. But it can be shown that his philosophy
comes very nearly to the positions taken up by Hume,
when Hume is properly understood
; and in main
taining that mind is a series of feelings aware of
itself, and that matter is a possibility of sensations,
he has reached conclusions quite as visionary as
those of Fichte. As Hume brought out fully the
results lying in the Philosophy of Berkeley as
one of the offshoots of the philosophy of Locke, and
as Fichte carried to their logical consequences cer
tain of the fundamental principles of Kant, so Mr.
Mill, and we may add Mr. Herbert Spencer, are pur
suing to their proper issues the doctrine floating in
nearly all our later metaphysics, that we can know
nothing of the nature of things.
Mr. Bain speaks complacently of
&quot; the great doc
trine called the Eelativity of Knowledge, which has
risen by slow degrees to its present high position in
philosophy.&quot; But unfortunately I should rather
say fortunately no two defenders of the doctrine
have agreed as to the sense in which they hold it ;
in fact I can see no point in which they meet except
the Comtian position, that the knowledge of the
actual nature of things is beyond the reach of man.




&quot; admits of a great
variety of meanings, and that when a philosopher
lays great stress upon the doctrine,
&quot; it is necessary
to cross-examine his writings, and compel them toRELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 233
disclose in which of its many degrees of meaning he
understands the
phrase.&quot;
There is a doctrine sometimes passing by this
name, which will recommend itself to all sober
thinkers: who will admit (1.) that we can know
objects only so far as we have faculties of knowl
edge ; (2.) that we can know objects only under the
aspects presented to the faculties ; and (3.) that our
faculties are limited in number and in range, so that
not only do we not know all objects, we do not know
all about any one object. These positions have
been disputed by none except some of the Alexan
drian Neo-Platonists in ancient times, and a few
German defenders of the Absolute Philosophy in
modern times. A doctrine embracing these posi
tions has been known and acknowledged under such
designations as that of
&quot; the limited knowledge of
man,&quot; and should not be expressed by so ambiguous
a phrase as
&quot; the relativity of knowledge,&quot; which is
applied to a very different theory. That theory has
of late years assumed four different forms.
I. There is the form given to it by Sir W. Hamil
ton. He thus unfolds it (Metaph.
i. 148):
&quot;Our
knowledge is relative, 1st, because existence is
not cognizable absolutely and in itself, but only in
special modes; 2c?, because these modes can be
known only if they stand in a certain relation to
our faculties.&quot; Mr. Mill thus comments :
&quot; Whoever
can find anything more in these statements than
that we do not know all about a thing, but only so234 BELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
much as we are capable of knowing, is more ingen
ious or more fortunate than myself.&quot; But surely it
is desirable to have even this much allowed and
clearly enunciated
; only I think it unfortunate that
two such inexplicable phrases as
&quot;absolutely&quot; and
&quot;in itself&quot; should have been introduced. Sir Wil
liam gives a third reason, and here the error appears.
&quot;
3d, Because the modes, thus relative to our facul
ties, are presented to and known by the mind only
under modifications determined by these faculties
themselves.&quot; This doctrine is thoroughly Kantian
in itself and in its logical consequences. It makes
the mind look at things, but through a glass so cut
and colored that it gives a special shape and hue to
every object. &quot;Suppose that the total object of
consciousness in perception is= 12
; and suppose
that the external reality contributes 6, the material
sense 3, and the mind 3, this may enable you




ii. p. 129.) This
doctrine very much neutralizes that of natural
realism, which Hamilton seems, after the manner of
Reid, to be so strenuously defending. To suppose
that in perception or cognition proper we mix
elements derived from our subjective stores, is to
unsettle our whole convictions as to the reality of
1 Sir William Hamilton has used that he had some means of satisfying
very unguarded language as to hu- himself that he held by the reality of
man nescience ; but I have reason to things. There is a point here on
believe that he thought himself misun- which it is hoped some of his pupils
derstood, and I am inclined to think may be able to throw light.RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 235
things; for if the mind adds three things, why
not thirty things, why not three hundred, tih
1 we are
landed in absolute idealism, or in the dreary flat
into which those who would float in that empty
space are sure in the end to fall, that is, absolute
scepticism. By assuming this middle place between
Reid and Kant, this last of the great Scottish mei&amp;gt;-
aphysicians has been exposed to the fire of the
opposing camps of idealism and realism, and it
will be impossible for the school to continue to
hold the position of their master.
It required no great shrewdness to. foresee the
logical consequences that would be drawn, and so I
take no credit for resolutely opposing the doctrine
from the time of its publication. It should be al
lowed that sensations, feelings, impressions, associate
themselves with our knowledge, but every man of
sound sense easily separates them
; and it should not
be difficult for the philosopher to distinguish between
them, to distinguish between our intuition of a tooth
and the pain of toothache, between the perception
of a landscape and the aesthetic emotions which it
calls up. Following the spontaneous convictions of
assurance and certitude in the mind (see x.), which
all but the sceptic allow speculatively, and which
even the sceptic must actually proceed upon in de
fending his scepticism, we should hold, (1.) that
we know the very thing as appearing, and not a
mere appearance without a thing to appear; and
(2.) that our knowledge is correct so far as it goes,236 EELATIVITT OF KNOWLEDGE.
and is not modified by the subjective forms of the
mind. I have been striving in these chapters to
show that we immediately know a self and extended
objects beyond. But we have the same grounds for
affirming that our knowledge is correct as for assert
ing that we have knowledge. In the event of man s
intuitive knowledge being mistaken or fallacious in
any point, it is certain he could never discover it to
be so with his present faculties. Our perceptions of
sense, consciousness, and intuitive reason all combine
in a consistent result, and we must receive the whole
or reject the whole. Hamilton declares that &quot;no at
tempt to show that the data of consciousness are
(either in themselves or in their necessary conse
quences) mutually contradictory, has yet succeeded.&quot;
&quot;An original, universal, dogmatic subversion of
knowledge has hitherto been found impossible.&quot; (App.
to Reid s Works, p. 746.) That there should be such
consistency in intuitive truth that the acutest human
intellects have not been able to detect a contradic
tion, is not the primary proof, but is a confirmation
of its truth. That there should be such consistency
in total error, or in a mixture of truth and error, is
scarcely believable : we could account for it only on
the supposition that it was produced by a mischievous
deity, who wished so to deceive us that we could
never discover the deception, a supposition con
tradicted by the circumstance that the whole con
stitution of our minds and of things is fitted to im
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that the Creator and Kuler of our world is a God of
Truth.
II. Mr. Mill has enunciated the doctrine in a second
form, and accepts it as expressing
&quot; a real and im
portant law of our mental nature. This is, that we
only know anything by knowing it as distinguished
from something else
; that all consciousness is of dif
ference; that two objects are the smallest number
required to constitute consciousness
; that a thing is
only seen to be what it is by contrast with what it
is not.&quot; (p. 6.) He tells that the employment of the
phrase to express this meaning is sanctioned by high
authorities, and he mentions Mr. Bain,
&quot; who habit
ually uses the phrase relativity of knowledge in
this sense.&quot; It is quite true that the doctrine, that
all knowledge consists in comparison, has appeared
again and again in speculative philosophy; but as
destroying the simplicity of our mental operations,
and reversing the order of nature, it has wrought
only mischief.
The mind, as I apprehend, begins its intelligent
acts with knowledge, and, we may add, with beliefs,
and then it can go on to compare the things known
and believed in, and thereby widens the domain both
of knowledge and belief. It commences, we may
suppose, with a perception, which is knowledge,
of an external object, and a consciousness, which
is knowledge, of self as perceiving the object.
Then it remembers, and in doing so has a belief in
+he object which has been perceived. In all this238 EELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
there is no comparison, but having this, the mind
can forthwith institute a comparison and pronounce
a judgment. Thus, having a knowledge of body in
the concrete, the mind can then, when a purpose is
to be served by it, declare that body exists, and that
it is extended ; and having a knowledge of self, it
can assert that it exists, and that it is under grief or
joy, as our experience may be at the time. Ke-
membering an event as happening in time past, it
can declare that the event is real, and the time real.
But while such judgments are involved in our pri
mary cognitions, I rather think that they come in
later life : the child, I rather think, as knowing its
own existence and never doubting it, is not at the
trouble of asserting it. But the child, on perceiving
two objects successively, or it may be simultaneously,
delights to discover a relation between them. Such
judgments follow so immediately on the cognitions,
that it is not necessary to distinguish them from one
another except in scientific psychology. But if meta
physicians lay down an opposite doctrine, and draw
consequences from it, it is absolutely necessary to
correct the statement.
I suppose Mr. Mill would represent the mind as
beginning with sensations. We have then a sensa
tion. Is there comparison in this ? I cannot discover
that there is. No doubt, upon another sensation
rising up, we may compare the one with the other
and discover an agreement or difference. But in
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memory, in recalling the sensation, must bring it up
prior to the comparison. But Mr. Mill may say that
we have two sensations simultaneously, say a sen
sation of resistance by one sense, and a sensation of
color by another, and we declare them at once to
agree or to differ. But could we not have the sen
sation of resistance or the sensation of color though
each came alone ? Even when they come simulta
neously, we are able to compare them, because we
know so much of each. We ever proceed on a sup
posed knowledge of the objects when we compare
and decide. When I say that 2 -f- 2 = 4, it is be
cause I know what is meant by the terms. If I say
Ben Nevis is a few feet higher than Ben Macdhui, it
is because I know somewhat of the height of each
mountain. If I say that Aristotle s Induction was
not the same as Bacon s
; that Comte s Positive
Method differs essentially from Bacon s Inductive
Method
; that Locke was not a follower of Hobbes
;
that Condillac had no right to proclaim himself a
disciple of Locke
; that Reid met Hume in a more
sagacious manner than Kant did
; that Brown vainly
endeavored to combine the Sensational School of
France with the British Association School and the
School of Reid
; and that a good Inductive Logic
must combine certain principles of Whewell with
those of Mill, I do so because I think I know
something of the philosophic systems of which I
speak, and am thus able to compare or to contrast
them.240 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
But Mr. Mill may refer me to the philosophy of
Hamilton, which declares that in the very first act
of consciousness we discover the relation of the ego
and the non ego. My readers, however, will have
seen by this time that I am not bound to follow
Hamilton, who, in fact, though without meaning it,
prepared the way for a farther doctrine from which
he would have turned away with the strongest aver
sion. I believe that in our conscious sense-percep
tions we know both the self and the noi^self in one
concrete act
; and of course we have in ah
1
this the
materials for a judgment ; but I doubt much whether
the infant actually pronounces the judgment. But
then it is said that our knowledge of the object is
an apprehension of the relation of the object or sen
sation to the perceiving mind. Now, I believe that
a relation is formed in the very act of knowledge.
But my knowledge does not consist in the percep
tion of the relation ; on the contrary, the relation
may arise simply from the knowledge. I apprehend
the President of the United States of America; as I
do so, I have constituted a relation between myself
and him
; but there may have been no previous re
lation
; and if I declare the relation, it is by a con
sequent and subsequent act. I strive to rise to a
contemplation of the Divine Being; there is no
doubt a relation of my mind to the object viewed ;
but the relation consists in my contemplation. When
the Divine Being looks down on His works and pities
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this is dependent on His creatures
; the viewing of
them by Him with regard and commiseration consti
tutes the particular and interesting relation. It is
high time to lay an arrest on that style of represent
ation, so frequent in the present age, which would
make us perceive a relation before perceiving the
things related, and make the very Divine knowledge,
so far as we can comprehend it, depend on creature
relations.
I take exception, on like grounds, to another part
of the same doctrine :
&quot; That a thing is only seen to
be what it is by contrast with what it is not.&quot; I ad
mit that where we can discover contrasts, our notions
are rendered more distinct and vivid. But I cannot
allow that we should not have known a sensation,
say the feeling of a lacerated limb, to be painful, un
less we had contrasted it with a pleasurable one
; on
the contrary, I maintain that in order to contrast the
two, we must have experienced them in succession.
I cannot believe that we should never have known
body as extended, unless we had previously known
something as unextended
; or that no one could
know and appreciate moral good unless he had been
acquainted with moral evil.
The doctrine I am expounding in this volume
makes the relations to be in the things compared,
and not the creation of the mind as it compares
them. The opposite doctrine reverses the order of
the mind s procedure, and, logically followed out, un
settles the foundation of knowledge. It makes us
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discover relations between things in themselves un
known, and it leaves us standing on a bridge of
which we do not know that it has a support at either
end. If we know a thing only in relation to another
thing, and this only in relation to some other thing,
as we thus ever chase the thing without catching it,
we are made to feel as if we had only a series of
strings put into our hands, at which we have to pull
forever without their bringing anything but other
strings.
Mr. Mill s theory obliges him to accept the special
doctrine I am now examining in its very lowest
form. The school of Kant, both in its German and
British modifications, supposes that the mind has a
rich furniture of forms and categories, out of which
can be fashioned an ideal world of a very lofty
character. But the school of Mill, admitting no a
priori elements, and limiting the comparative capaci
ties of the mind, can furnish no such glorious crea
tion. Mr. Mill gives us the power of discovering
only the relations of co-existence and succession,
and of resemblance and difference. He says that
&quot;
equality is but another word for the exact resem
blance, commonly called identity, considered as
subsisting between things in respect of their quatir
tity&quot; And then, in explaining what is implied in
quantity, &quot;When we say of two things that they
differ in quantity, just as when we say they differ in
quality, the assertion is always grounded upon a
difference in the sensations which they excite&quot;EELATIVITT OF KNOWLEDGE. 243
(Logic, B. i. c. iii. 11, 12)
: thus making us know
nothing of either quality or quantity or number,
except as denoting agreements in the sensations
forming the series which we call mind. Mr. Bain
goes down to a still lower level, when he tells us, in
a passage already quoted (p. 217), that cognizance
of difference and cognizance of agreement exhaust
the essence of knowledge ; that all we can know of
a ring is its agreement with certain things, and its
differences from other things ; which other things, of
course, can be known only as they agree with, or
differ from, yet other things. Knowledge can have
no resting-place when driven from one thing to
another in this shuttlecock process. It falls through,
by being placed between such instabilities. The
way to meet all this, and put knowledge on its
proper basis, is by showing that we have an original
knowledge of self, and of objects, such as a ring, be
yond self; and that, proceeding on this, we are able
to discover not only resemblances and differences,
but various other important relations, which enable
us to combine every one thing known with others as
also known in a compact structure, in which every
one part binds all the others, and helps to support
the whole.
HI. Mr. Mill would especially apply the phrase,
&quot;
relativity of knowledge,&quot; to a third doctrine, being,
in fact, his own theory of the mind. u Our knowl
edge of objects, and even our fancies about objects,
consist of nothing but the sensations they excite, or244 EELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
which we imagine them exciting in ourselves.&quot;
&quot;This knowledge is merely phenomenal.&quot;
&quot;The
object is known to us only in one special relation,
namely, as that which produces, or is capable of
producing, certain impressions on our senses
; and
all that we really know is these impressions.&quot;
&quot; This
is the Doctrine of the Relativity of Knowledge to
the knowing mind, in the simplest, purest, and, as I
think, the most proper acceptation of the words.&quot;
(pp. 7-14.) I confess I can see no propriety in
applying to such a theory a phrase which had been
appropriated by Sir William Hamilton, or by some
of us who had criticised him, to a different doctrine.
I do not see that it has any right to claim the title
of
&quot;
knowledge,&quot; or that it can get
&quot;
relations,&quot; when
it has no things to bring into relation. The theory
is simply that we know sensations, and possibilities
of sensations, while we cannot be said to know what
sensations are. But I have no interest in giving
the phrase any one special application rather than
another
; I believe it to be vague and ambiguous
in fact, not used by any two philosophers, I rather
think by no one philosopher, at different places, in
one and the same sense
; and I think it should be
altogether banished from speculation. And as to
the doctrine to which Mr. Mill would specially
apply it, I need not enter upon the consideration of
it here, as I have been examining it all through
out this volume. But there is a fourth form
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member of the same school, which demands a
notice.
IY. Mr. Grote, in his exposition of Plato s philoso
phy (Art. Thecetetus), has developed a theory of rela
tivity, which he ascribes to the Sophists, at least
to Protagoras, and which he himself is prepared to
accept. It is the doctrine ofHomo Mensura, which,
construed in its true meaning, is said to be,
&quot;
Object
is implicated with, limited or measured by, Subject ;
a doctrine proclaiming the relativeness of all objects
perceived, conceived, known or felt and the
omnipresent involution of the perceiving, conceiv
ing, knowing, or feeling, Subject
: the Object vary
ing with the Subject. As things appear to me,
so they are to me ; as they appear to you, so they
are to you. This theory is just and important if
rightly understood and explained.&quot; (Vol.
ii. p. 335.)
&quot; So far as the doctrine asserts essential fusion and
implication between Subject and Object, with actual
(
multiplicitity of distinct subjects denying the
reality either of absolute and separate Subject, or of
absolute and separate Object I think it true and
instructive.&quot; (p. 340.) Proceeding on this general
doctrine, he reaches another :
&quot; What is Truth to
one man, is not truth, and is often Falsehood, to
another
; that which governs the mind as infallible
authority in one part of the globe, is treated with
indifference or contempt elsewhere. Each man s
belief, though in part determined by the same causes
as the belief of others, is in part also determined by246 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
causes peculiar to himself. When a man speaks of
Truth he means what he himself (along with others,
or singly, as the case may be) believes to be Truth ;
unless he expressly superadds the indication of some
other persons believing in it.&quot; (p. 360.)
I have looked from time to time into the Platonic
and Aristotelian discussions on the subject, but I
confess I have never been able to discover what was
the precise philosophy of the Sophists, or whether
indeed they had a philosophy, or whether they were
anything more than instructors of youth, professing
to teach wisdom without knowing what wisdom
is. So far as any of them, such as Protagoras, had
a philosophic system, I think it probable that they
meant it to be that which has been elaborated by
the British Section of the school of Comte. But I
have here to do not with the Greek Sophists, but
with Mr. Grote. I am surprised to find him repeat
ing the juggle, which has so often been exposed,




Object.&quot; No doubt, if you use the terms as cor
relative, meaning by
&quot;
subject&quot; the mind contemplat
ing an object, and
by&quot; object&quot; a thing contemplated,
then the subject implies the object, and the object
the subject, as the husband implies the wife, and
the wife the husband. But as we cannot argue
from the husband implying the wife that every
man has a wife, or from the wife implying a hus
band that every woman has a husband, so we cannot
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must be an external thing to think about, nor from
the bare existence of an object or thing that there
must be a mind to think about it. As to the allega
tion that the subjective mind necessarily mixes its
own shapes and colors with the things known, I
have already examined it when discussing the first
form of the theory of relativeness. There is, there
can be no proof advanced in its behalf that is to
show that the mirror does not correctly reflect the
object presented to it. We have the same grounds
for believing in the accuracy of our primitive knowl
edge as we have for believing in the existence either
of the subject or the object.
But the fatal part of the doctrine lies in the asser
tion, that truth varies with the individual, and with
the circumstances in which he may be placed
: a
tenet which, if held by the Sophists, deserves all the
reprobation heaped upon it by Socrates, Plato, and
Aristotle, and, I may add, that the defence of it,
in the further light we now enjoy, is worse than the
original offence. By truth, I mean what philosophers
in general have understood by it, the conformity
of our ideas to things. There is no truth where
there is no correspondence of our notions to realities. /
I admit that human knowledge never comes up to
the extent of things. I allow that human knowledge
is often partial, that is, is only partly correct, and
may have error mixed up with it. But truth, so far
as it is truth, i& the agreement of thoughts with
things. To illustrate this. I will not trouble the248 EELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
school with transcendental or religious truth. I ap
peal to judgments pronounced on more common
and familiar affairs. Were any one to affirm that
there never had been such a country as ancient
Greece, such a man as Socrates, or such a sect as the
Sophists ; that Queen Victoria is incapable of cher
ishing the memory of departed friends, that Louis
Napoleon is a man of guileless transparency and
openness of character, or that President Lincoln was
a man given to crooked and dishonest policy ; that
Mr. Grote was utterly illiterate, had never written,
and could not write a history of Greece, and had
never been favorable to vote by ballot, I would
say of this person, not that he had got what is truth
to himself, but that he had not reached truth at all.
Were I to allow myself to think that a certain Lon
don banking-house of high repute is on the point of
bankruptcy, and that those who manage it are a
band of rogues and robbers, I should in the very
act be guilty not only of error but of sin
; and I am
sure that were I to give expression to such a thought,
I should be justly exposed to punishment.
Mr. Grote represents his doctrine as forming the
basis of the principle of toleration, and the opposite
doctrine as fostering intolerance, (p. 362.) I reverse
f&quot; this account, and declare that the person who avows
that he cannot distinguish between truth and error,
isjiot in circumstances to exercise the virtue of tol
erance
; for he has not discovered an error which he
is bound to tolerate
; and Mr. Grote s principle wouldEELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE. 249
lead him to refuse toleration, if ever he did reach)
positive truth. The principle of toleration, as I un
derstand it, is, that I am bound to tolerate what ]
believe, what I may know, to be error
; that the
power of punishing error as error has not been pu
into my hands, has in fact been mercifully withheld
from me by One who claims to be Himself the
Judge. I am quite sure that there is a God who
rules this world in justice and love, and yet I fee
that I must bear even with the
&quot; fool who says in
his heart, There is no God.&quot; This is my idea of
toleration, which I reckon a much deeper and juster
one than that held by those who say that truth
varies with the individual, the age, and the circum
stances.
But then Mr. Grote tells us
&quot; no infallible objective *
mark, no common measure, no canon of evidence, re-*
cognized by all, has yet been found.&quot; (p. 360.) I
admit freely that we cannot obtain what a certain




is about the most unintel
ligible in the language, whether as used by those
who favor or oppose the doctrine it is employed to
designate. I allow, further, that it is in vain
(search for any one criterion which will settle for
what is truth in all matters. But we have
quite sufficient to determine for us what is truth and
what is error in many matters, both speculative and
practical ; these I shall endeavor to unfold in a future
chapter. (See xix.) I have intuitive evidence of my250 RELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE.
own existence ; and evidence from testimony of the
existence of India, which I never saw
; and evidence
from induction and deduction of the existence of
the law of gravitation, and I declare of any one
who denies any of these that he is in error, and this
however strong his beliefs may be. To believe with
out evidence, and not to believe when we have
evidence, may both be sinful when our belief or un
belief involve duties which we owe to ourselves, to
our fellow-men, and to God.CHAPTER XL




conceive/ with its derivatives
&quot; con
ceivable&quot; and &quot;inconceivable,&quot; is one of the
most ambiguous in the philosophic nomenclature of
this country. When I say I cannot conceive the dis
tance of a star which requires hundreds of thousands
of years to transmit its light to our earth, I use the






I affirm that I have a conception of the animal king
dom, I mean that I have a general notion of beings
possessing animation. When I declare that I
cannot^
conceive that God should be unjust, I signify that 1
1
cannot so believe or decide. These three senses are 1
at once seen not to be the same when the difference I
is pointed out. We cannot easily imagine the dis
tance of a fixed star, but we decide on the evidence
produced, or believe on the authority of astronomers,
that it is at the distance it is said to be. We cannot
image the class
&quot; animal kingdom,&quot; for it includes
innumerable objects, yet we can intellectually think
about it, that is, about objects possessing the com
mon attribute of animal life. We cannot be made
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to decide or believe that Cleopatra s Needle should
be in Paris and Egypt at the same time, yet with
some difficulty we can simultaneously image it in
both places.
It could easily be shown that the phrase is used
in all these senses in philosophy, as well as in our
current literature.
&quot; By conception/ says Stewart
(Elem. c.
iii.),
&quot; I mean that power of the mind which
(enables us to form a notion of an absent object of
(perception.&quot; Sir William Hamilton professes to use
the word in the same sense as the German Begriff,
that is, for the general notion formed by an indefinite
number of objects being joined by the possession of
a common attribute. With or without avowing it,
philosophers have also employed it in the third sense.
Hamilton often explains conceive by &quot;construe in
thought,&quot; which must denote an act of judgment ;
he must employ it in this sense when he says it is
inconceivable that space should have limits. Dr.
Whewell s arguments in favor of necessary truth are
valid only when he uses it in the signification of
judging, as when he says,
&quot;we cannot conceive
j|reasoning to be merely a series of sensations.&quot; (Phil.
Ind. Sciences, i. 44.)
The question arises, and must now be settled, in
which of these senses, or in what other, is the word
employed when man s power or impotency of con
ception is supposed to be a test of truth. It is clear
that it cannot be employed in the first-mentioned
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proof of its existence : I can picture a hobgoblin
without supposing it to be a reality. Man s inca
pacity to image or represent an object is no proof of
its non-existence
; a blind man cannot have an idea
of color, but this does not prove even to him that
color has no existence. Nor can it be used in the
second signification above intimated. I can form a
notion of a class of mermaids without being con
vinced that mermaids were ever seen by any human
1
being. In these senses of the words there is much
conceivable by man which has no existence, much
inconceivable by man which has an existence. Con-
ceivability and inconceivability can be employed as
a test of truth only in the third meaning of the|
term, as signifying
&quot; construe in thought
&quot;
(whatever
that may mean), judge or decide.
Both the defenders and opposers of intuitive truth
have been in the way of going from the one of
these meanings to the other. Hamilton uses the
phrase both in the first and third of these significa
tions without perceiving that they are not the same
;
and it is very much because of this ambiguity that
he is able to make it appear that there is a contra
diction in human thought. He says, on the one
hand, that we cannot conceive space or time as
without bounds
; which must mean, when properly
interpreted, that we must always give a boundary
in the image we form of it. But then he tells us, on
the other hand, that we are altogether unable to
conceive space or time as bounded 5 that is, when254 MAN S POWER OF CONCEPTION
rightly understood, we cannot be made to judge or
decide that it has bounds. He has constructed a set
of opposed propositions as to space, time, and
infinity, the seeming contradiction arising very
much from the double signification of the word
&quot;
conceive.&quot; (See Art. on
&quot; Unconditioned
&quot; in Dis
cussions.) But the philosopher who has made the
most frequent use of the impossibility of conceiving
the opposite as a test of truth is Dr. Whewell. He
tells us that necessary truths are those &quot;in which
we cannot, even by an effort of imagination, or in a
supposition, conceive the reverse of that which is as
serted.&quot; Necessary truths are those of which we can
not distinctly conceive the contrary.&quot; (Phil. Ind. Sc.,





might lead us to think that by
&quot; conceive
&quot; we are to understand
&quot;
image,&quot; yet we
must attach a different meaning to it when he tells
us more accurately of necessary truths that we
&quot;see&quot; them which must mean
&quot;judge&quot; them
&quot;to be true by thinking about them, and see that
they could not be otherwise.&quot; (Ib., p. 20.) But so
loosely does he use this test, that he declares that
laws acknowledged to be discovered by experiment,
such as the laws of motion and of chemical affinity,
are such that it is inconceivable that they should
not be true. &quot;For how, in fact, can we conceive
combinations otherwise than as definite in kind and
quantity ?
&quot;
&quot;We cannot conceive a world in which
this should not be the case.&quot; (Ib., i 400.) WhenA3 A TEST OF TRUTH. 255
the defenders of fundamental truth fall into such
ambiguity of phraseology, and apply their test so
unsatisfactorily, there is some excuse for those who
criticise and oppose them when they take advantage
of their mistakes.
I say
&quot; some excuse/ for I cannot allow that this
is an entire justification of Mr. Mill when he uses
the word, as I shall show he does, in so many differ
ent senses; and when, in criticising Hamilton and
Whewell, he employs it in a way they would not
have allowed. Mr. Mill is aware that, when Sir
William Hamilton is wishing to bring out his full
meaning, he uses such phrases as
&quot;
think,&quot; and
&quot;construe in thought:&quot; and Dr. Whewell, while he
also uses the word
&quot;
think,&quot; is careful to represent
Conceptions as modifications of Fundamental Ideas,
which he enumerates and classifies. Mr. Mill always
employs the phrase in a vague manner, and often in







&quot; when he says,
&quot;We
cannot conceive a line without breadth ; we can
form no mental picture of such a line.&quot; (Logic., B. n.
c. v. 1.) This is all true, but it is also true that
we can form an abstract notion of such a line.
He states that Dr. Whewell s idea of necessary truth
is &quot;a proposition, the negation of which is not
only false, but inconceivable.&quot; But then, in criticis
ing this test, he uses the word in quite a different
sense :
&quot; When we have often seen and thought two
things together, and have never in one instance256 HANS POWER OF CONCEPTION
either seen or thought of them separate, there is, by
the primary law of association, an increasing diffi
culty, which in the end becomes insuperable, of con
ceiving the two things apart.&quot; (Ib.y 6.) It is clear
that while Dr. Whewell uses the phrases as applica
ble to a proposition declared to be true, Mr. Mill
employs it in the sense of mental pictures joined by
association. This is one other instance of an am
phiboly, which we have noticed before, and which
will require to be noticed again in examining Mr.
Mill s attempt to explain necessity of thought by
association of ideas.
He tells us,
&quot; The history of science teems with
inconceivabilities which have been conquered, and
supposed necessary truths, which have first ceased
to be thought necessary, then to be thought
true, and have finally come to be deemed im
possible.&quot; (p. 150.)- And then he gives us once
more his famous case of persons not being able
to conceive of antipodes, being &quot;merely the effect
of a strong association.&quot; But let us understand
precisely in what sense our forefathers had a diffi
culty in conceiving the existence of antipodes. It is
evident that they could have little difficulty in
imagining to themselves a round globe with persons
with their feet adhering to it all around. Their
difficulty lay in deciding it to be true; and the
difficulty was increased by the very vividness of the
picture of men, as they would have said, with their
feet upward and their head downward. It is clearA8 A TEST OF TRUTH. 257
that Mr. Mill, when he applies it to such a case,
must be using the word in the sense of &quot;judge
&quot; and
&quot;
believe.&quot; But let us understand on what ground
our ancestors felt a difficulty in yielding their judg
ment and belief. Not because of any supposed
intuition or necessary truth, I am not aware that
they ever appealed to such ; not even because of a
strong association : but because the alleged fact
seemed contrary to a law of nature established by
observation. A gathered experience seemed to
show that there was an absolute up and down, and
that heavy bodies tended downwards, and thus, and
not on any a priori grounds, did they argue that
there could not be antipodes, as persons so situated
would fall away .into a lower space. As a narrow
experience had created the difficulty, so it could
remove it by giving us a view of the earth as a
mass of matter, causing human beings to adhere
to it over its whole surface. And such a case
does not in the least tend to prove, that truths
which are seen to be truths at once, and without
a gathered experience, could ever be set aside by a
farther experience
: that a conscious intelligent
being could be made to regard himself as non-exist
ing ; that he could believe himself as having been
in existence before he existed
; or that he could be
led to allow that two straight lines might enclose
a space in the constellation Orion.
It is in the highest degree expedient, at the stage
to which mental science has come, that the word
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conceive/ and its derivatives, should be abandoned
altogether in such a connection ; as being fitted to
confuse our ideas and mislead our judgments. The
greatest and wisest philosophers have not appealed
to the possibility or impossibility of conception as
tests of truth or falsehood, but have pointed to other
and clearer and more decisive criteria.
1
1 The printing of this work had pro-
lief&quot; (i. 303.) But he himself con-
ceeded thus far, when I observed that tinues to take advantage of the am-
Mr. M., in 6th edition of Logic, just biguity, which is greater than he yet
published, has been obliged, in defend- sees. I have been laboring for years





&quot; to have an idea
&quot; or
&quot; to have a be-CHAPTER XII.
SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY THE TESTS OP INTUITION.
ME.
MILL freely admits the existence and the
veracity of intuitive perceptions. But he has
not inquired into their nature, their mode of opera
tion, their laws, their tests, or their limits. What he
has failed to do must be undertaken by others
; and
in the process it will be seen that intuition has quite
as important a place in the mind as sensation, asso
ciation, or any of Mr. Mill s favorite principles, and
that it must be embraced and have a distinct place
allotted to it in a sufficient theory of our mental
operations.
Our intuitions are all of the nature of perceptions,
in which we look on objects known or apprehended
:
on separate objects, or on objects compared with one
another. Sometimes the objects are present, and we
look on them directly, by the senses and self-con
sciousness. In other cases they are not present, but
still we have an apprehension of them, and our con
victions, whether beliefs or judgments, proceed upon
this apprehension. A very different account has
often been given of them. According to Locke, the
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mind in intuition looks at ideas, and not at things.
According to the theory elaborated by Kant, and so
far adopted by Hamilton, it is possessed of a priori
forms, which it imposes on objects. Such views are
altogether indefensible, and have in fact hindered the
ready reception of the true doctrine. Making our
intuitions mere ideas or forms in the mind, they have
very much separated them from realities. The in
tuitions I stand up for are all intuitions of things.
In opposition to M. Comte and his school in all its
branches, I hold that man is so constituted as to
know somewhat of things, and the relations of things.
What we know of things, with their relations, on the
bare inspection or contemplation of them, constitutes
the body of intuitive truth, and the capacity to dis
cover it is called intuition. Taken in this sense, the
exercise of intuition is not opposed to experience,
but is in fact an experience
: only it is not a gathered
experience ; it is a singular experience at the basis
of all collected experiences.
Our intuitive perceptions are all, in the first in
stance, individual or singular. Thus, by the external
senses, we observe an extended and colored surface
before us, or by the internal consciousness we ex
perience ourselves in a certain state of thought and
feeling. Our very intuitive judgments or com
parisons are singular. On finding that a particular
rod, A, is of the same length as another rod, B, and
that B is of the same length as a third rod, C, we at
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eralize these intuitive judgments, and then they be
come maxims or axioms. We see that what is true
of the rods A, B, C, would also be of the rods D, E,
F, or of any other objects found equal to one an
other, and we feel ourselves entitled to declare that
&quot;
things which are equal to the same thing are equal
to one another.&quot; As the generalization is the result,
not of an intuitive, but a discursive process, it is
possible that error may creep into it, that the gener
alized expression of our original perceptions may be
mutilated or exaggerated. But on the supposition
that the generalization has been properly conducted,
the maxim is as certain as the individual perception
is allowed to be.
By standing up for this distinction between what we
may call our spontaneous and our generalized intui
tions, we can answer an objection urged against the
existence of necessary truth by Mr. Mill.
&quot; The very
fact that the question is disputed, disproves the
alleged impossibility. Those against whom it is
needful to defend the belief which is affirmed to be
necessary, are unmistakable examples that it is not
necessary.&quot; (p. 150.) But what is the dispute ? It
is commonly not as to the belief, but simply as to
whether it is intuitive, which, as Mr. Mill knows and
asserts, is not to be settled by intuition. Take only
one example
: the sums of equals are equals ; there
is no dispute as to the truth of this. What Mr.
Mill s school objects to is, that it should be represent
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necessary truth maintain is, not that everyman must
hold speculatively by intuitive truth, that is, hold by
it in the generalized form given it by philosophers ;
but that all believe in, and spontaneously act upon,
their individual primitive perceptions. It is quite
possible for Mr. Mill to maintain that the law of
cause and effect is not necessary or universal, and
that there may be a phenomenon without a cause in
the Dog-star; but meanwhile it will be found that
on any given occurrence presenting itself, he will
look for something as producing it.
If we look carefully into the nature of the intui
tive perceptions of the mind, they will be found to
be of three kinds. Some of them are of the nature
of Primitive Cognitions
: the object is now present,
and we look upon
it. It is thus we are conscious of
self as existing in a particular state. This being
self-evident, we cannot be made to regard ourselves
as non-existent, and not in that particular state. In
other exercises our intuitions are of the nature of
Primitive Beliefs
; the object is not present, but we
contemplate it, and discover that it is of such a na
ture. It is thus that we believe of space, that it
does not cease when our eye is no longer able to
follow it : this appears from the very nature of space ;
and having such a conviction, we cannot be made to
believe that space, at the point at which it ceases to
be invisible, should come to a termination. Again,
some of our intuitions are of the nature of Primitive
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relations between things apprehended. Thus we are
told first of one man that he died at the age of fifty,
and then of another man that he died at the age of
fifty, and we at once declare that the two men died
at the same age ; and this being evident from the
contemplation of the things, we cannot be made to
decide otherwise.
The truth reached by intuition in these its three
forms is of course limited, is confined, indeed,
within very stringent boundaries. It is narrowed,
first of all by the original inlets, which are the out
ward and inward senses
; and secondly, by the limit
ed capacity of man to discover what is involved in
this primitive stock. What intuition may do of itself
is best seen in mathematical demonstration, in
which every step taken is seen to be true at once,
on the bare contemplation of the figures or num
bers, and by which we reach a body of truth of im
mense scientific value. But the main service of in
tuition consists in its furnishing a point from which
experience may start, and a foundation on which to
build. Our original perceptions lie at the basis of all
our acquired ones. I allow that our acquired ones,
obtained by a gathered experience, carry us far be
yond our primitive perceptions. But in fact intui
tions, for example those of sense and consciousness,
mingle with all our mental operations, and upon
them we must fall back in the last resort, when
required to specify the ground on which experience
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Keeping these explanations and distinctions in
view, it should not be difficult to find tests of intui
tion. The primary mark I hold to be Self-Evidence.
The evidence is in the objects, and is discerned by
the mind on the bare contemplation of them. From
the mere inspection of consciousness we perceive
self in some action or under some affection. From
the simple apprehension of 2 -|- 2 we see that it
makes 4. And wherever there is Self-Evidence there
will also be Necessity. But let us observe carefully
what this necessity consists in. It is not a fatalistic
necessity imposed upon us from without, and for any
thing we know in an arbitrary manner. It is neces
sity arising solely from the nature of things as the
same is perceived by the mind.
1 This conviction of
necessity may assume two forms, a positive and a
negative. On the bare contemplation of 2 -|- 2 I see
that it must make 4 : this is the positive form. I
am further constrained to decide that it cannot be
otherwise, that 2 -|- 2 cannot be 3, or 5, or any other
number : this is the negative form. These two forms
depend on each other, or rather they both depend
on the Self-Evidence and we may in argument of
1 Mr. Herbert Spencer, following in meanings, he is completely fettered by
this respect Sir William Hamilton, them. Their indestructibility is the
stands up for Necessity as a test of proof to him that his consciousness is
ultimate truth, but overlooks Self- imprisoned within them.&quot; (Fortn.Rev.
Evidence, the evidence in the thing No. v.) I have given a more pleasant
looked at.
&quot; No matter what he calls account of them. The necessity is
these indestructible relations [of Con- not a fetter or a prison, but a convic-
sciousness, using consciousness in a tion arising from an immediate per-
vcrv vague and perverted sense], no ception of the nature of the thing,
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any kind employ the one or other as may suit our
purpose. And as is the nature of the original per
ception, so is the precise nature of the conviction of
necessity. We have seen that our intuitions may be
of the nature of cognitions, of beliefs, or of judg
ments
; and whatever the intuition be, we must ad
here to it, and cannot be made to give our assent to
the opposite. Thus, if our intuition be a cognition
of an object as existing, we cannot be made to ac
knowledge it as non-existing
: if I know self as think
ing, I cannot be made to allow that it is not thinking.
Again, if our intuition be a belief, such as that I saw
a particular person yesterday, I cannot be made to
believe that I did not see him. The same is true of
our judgments
: deciding that two straight lines can
not enclose a space, I cannot be made to allow that
they can form a closed figure. Thus understood,
the necessity of conviction (and not the mere inca
pacity of conceiving) becomes a criterion of funda
mental truth, clear and certain, and not difficult of
application.
To these some have added Universality. But the
phrase has been used in two different significations.
As employed by some, it means the universality of
the truth. In this sense the universality is involved
in the necessity ; we cannot be made to believe that
two straight lines should enclose a space at any time
or in any world. Thus understood, the test of uni
versality is not different from that of necessity ; but
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aspect, it may often be usefully employed in deter
mining whether a truth is intuitive. But Univer
sality may also mean being entertained by all men.
This property of intuitive truth may be more appro
priately designated by Catholicity or Common Con
sent. This quality does belong to all primary truth,
and where it is found it may be regarded as a pre
sumption that the truth is intuitive. But it is not
a proof; for it may spring not so much from any in
born principle as from the uniformity to be found
in the experience of all men. All men expect that
the sun will rise to-morrow, not from any intuitive
principle, but from the gathered observations of the
past carried forward to the future.
These two then, Self-Evidence, and Necessity with
implied Universality, are the decisive tests of intui
tive truth. All intuitive truths possess these charac
teristics
; no others do. The question now to be
discussed is, Can these marks be produced by Asso
ciation of Ideas, or by Experience, the two princi
ples from which Mr. Mill gets all our general con
victions ?
(1.)
&quot;As for the feeling of necessity, or what is
termed a
&quot;
necessity of thought, it is of all mental
phenomena positively the one which an inseparable
association is the most evidently competent to gen
erate.&quot; (p. 299). In answer to this it can be shown,
in the first place, that in many cases of immediate
and necessary conviction we have not two ideas to
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and primitive beliefs. Take the consciousness which
the infant has of a sensation, or rather of self as
sentient. Here we cannot point to two objects which
have been often together
: we have only one object,
the sentient self as existing, and we cannot be made
to know it as not existing or not sentient. Again, I
remember that I was under a peculiar sensation of
pain two days ago
: I never had the same feeling be
fore
; the object is one, and there has been no repe
tition, and therefore no association can have been
formed ; and yet I have the most perfect assurance
that I existed two days ago under that sensation,
and I cannot be made to believe otherwise. These
are cases of intuition allowed by Mr. Mill (see e, q\
but in which association cannot generate the con
viction.
In other cases, I admit that there is a combination
of two ideas or two objects, that is, those in which
we institute a comparison or pronounce a judgment.
But even in such the judgment is pronounced not
in consequence of the mere association, but on a
comparison of the things brought together. What
Mr. Mill means by the feeling of necessity, which
can be generated by his examples, is evident from
his examples.
&quot; Many persons who have been fright
ened in childhood can never be alone in the dark
without irrepressible terrors. Many a person is un
able to revisit a particular place, or think of a partic
ular event, without recalling acute feelings of grief
or reminiscences of suffering.&quot; (p. 265.) This is a268 SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY
very glaring example of mistaking the point to be
proven. Mr. Mill is aware what those who hold






according to Kant s definition, is, that of which
the negation is impossible.&quot; But the necessity which
he looks at and accounts for is of a very different
character ; it is not a necessity of conviction, of
belief, or judgment, but is a mere association of two
ideas or thoughts, so that the one never comes up
without the other. He explains his meaning
:
&quot; When an association has acquired the character of
inseparability, when the bond between the two
has been thus firmly riveted, not only does the idea,
called up by the association become, in our con
sciousness, inseparable from the idea which suggested
it, but the facts or phenomena answering to those
ideas come at last to seem inseparable in existence :
things which we are unable to conceive apart, appear
incapable of existing apart/ (p. 191.) The word
&quot; conceive
&quot; has here come in with all its ambiguity,
and the two things denoted by it, having an idea,
and judging or deciding, are here represented as
being one. But the two are very different. The
fright in childhood may long continue to raise up
terror, but cannot of itself create conviction; as
may be seen in the case of multitudes who expe
rience the fear but have never believed in ghosts.
When Pascal was crossing a bridge in a carriage,
the two leaders took fright and plunged into the
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remained on the brink of the precipice ; ever after
he felt as if there was an abyss on his left hand, and
had a chair placed there to tranquillize his mind.
But this association, while it raised the painful idea,
did not convince his judgment that there was act
ually a river ever running at his left hand. I never
pass a particular spot without being reminded of a
youthful companion whom I met there for the last
time before his removal from this world- but this
association of my friend and the spot has not con
vinced me that the two have any real connection.
The mother never thinks of a particular church-yard
without remembering that her boy sleeps there ;
but she does not therefore think that her child will
be there forever
; on the contrary, she may firmly
believe that he will rise again.
(2.) Just as little can experience, I mean a
gathered experience, create the self-evidence and
its consequent necessity. A truth reached by an
accumulation of instances cannot be self-evident, for
the evidence is collected from the uniformity of
many, perhaps of innumerable cases. Neither is it
accompanied with any conviction of necessity. We
do not affirm of a general law thus discovered that
the opposite of it is impossible, and we allow that
there may be exceptions. Some persons are so
situated that they see crows daily, and they have
never seen them with any other color than black ;
they have sufficient evidence of the general law
that crows are of this color, and when the idea of a270 SELF-EVIDENCE AND NECESSITY
crow comes up before them, it will always be in a
sable hue : but it is not self-evident that crows
are black
; and they do not decide that they must
be of this color, or that there cannot possibly be
white crows in any other world which God has
made.
We have seen, in a former chapter, that the mind
is endowed with a capacity of observing relations.
Some of these are discovered by a process of length
ened observation. It is thus we know that all mat
ter attracts other matter, and that the elements of
bodies have certain chemical affinities which can be
expressed in numerical proportions. But there are
other relations which can be discerned immediately.
In saying .so, I do not affirm that they are noticed
independently of things compared; I mean that
they are discovered on the contemplation, the bare
contemplation, of the objects, and without a gathered
experience or an induction of instances. Thus, on
comparing my conscious self of the present moment
with the remembered self of yesterday, I at once,
and without any mediate proof, declare an identity
of person. A triangle being a figure with three
angles, I need no experiments to convince me that
one of the angles being a part is less than the whole,
and that the three angles make up the whole. I
may never have tried whether I could enclose a
space by two straight lines : I do not require to try
it, for I see it at once; and I would declare of any
apparent or professed attempt to make them form aTHE TESTS OF INTUITION. 271
closed figure, that it must involve some deception,
and that the two lines cannot be straight.
Mr. Mill derives what are usually reckoned intui
tive truths by &quot;simple enumeration without a
known exception ;
&quot; a method which Bacon declares
to be
&quot;puerile&quot; and useless, as the next instance
may prove an exception.
&quot; The principles of num
ber and geometry are duly and satisfactorily proved
by that method alone, nor are they susceptible of
any other
proof.&quot; (Logic, B. in. c. xxi. 2.) This
makes the evidence for mathematical axioms the
same in kind as that which the Hindu has for water
being always liquid; as that which we have for
crows being black all over the universe
; and for the
alternation of day and night continuing forever.
We see now how he should be obliged in logical
consistency to maintain that two and two may make
five in other worlds. I meet this by showing that
there is an essential difference between the two
classes of cases. In the one we see nothing in the
nature of things to necessitate the law; we adhere
to it simply on the ground of the number of instan
ces, and we can readily be made to believe that
the law is limited in range, and that there are ex
ceptions. But in the other class the relation is in
the very nature of the things; we discover it at
once by looking at the things ; we believe it to hold
wherever the things exist, and we cannot be made
to decide otherwise. In order to account for the
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attaches to mathematical truth, Mr. Mill refers to
the circumstance that geometrical curves admit of
being distinctly painted in the imagination, so that
we have &quot;mental pictures of all possible combina
tions of lines and angles.&quot; (Logic, B. n. c. v. 5.)
But what, I ask, makes he of algebraic demonstra
tions, where there can be no such painting of the
imagination, while yet there is the same necessity ?
And I call attention to the circumstance that men
tal pictures do not constitute an accumulation of in
stances, or tend in the least to bring the case under
the law of simplex enumeratio. They do, however,
serve a purpose. They enable us to perceive more
clearly the nature of the objects, and to conceive the
&quot;possible combinations of angles and figures,&quot; so
that we see the certainty and necessity of the truth.
Supposing, he says that two straight lines after
diverging could again converge,
&quot;we can transport
ourselves thither in imagination, and can frame a
mental image of the appearance which one or both
the lines must present at that point, which we may
rely upon as being precisely similar to the reality.&quot;
The clearness of the image does help us, but it is
simply in the way of giving us an apprehension of
the
&quot;
reality,&quot; and thus enabling us to pronounce a
judgment on which we may
&quot;
rely.&quot;
By means of these tests we can without much
difficulty distinguish between truths which are intui
tive, and truths which are reached by a gathered
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on these criteria. (See v\, Q, i.) And if any one will
take the trouble to look back upon the chapter in
which I have collected his
&quot;
Admissions/ he will see
that Self-Evidence, and Necessity with Universality,
cover, sanction, and justify all the intuitive princi
ples he has avowed. But as not following out these
criteria consequentially, he rejects as intuitive, and
labors to establish otherwise, truths which can stand
these tests quite as clearly and decisively as those
acknowledged by him. Hence the heterogeneous
character of his theory, which looks as if it stood
altogether on sensation, and was reared by associa
tion, but requires to be buttressed on all sides by in
tuition to keep it from falling. It is only by logi
cally carrying out these tests that we can construct
a consistent system of philosophy, in which we give
to intuition what belongs to intuition, and to expe
rience what belongs to experience. Let us now in
quire whether our conviction as to causation can




this subject a much sounder doctrine than
that entertained by most metaphysicians has
been laid down by Professor Bain, who, however,
has neglected to unfold all that is in the mental
phenomenon which he has noticed. &quot;As regards
muscular exertion, there is a notable specialty, a
radical difference in kind, signified by such phrases
as the sense of power/ the feeling of energy put
forth, the experience of force or resistance. This
is an ultimate phase of the human consciousness, and
the most general and fundamental of all our con
scious states. By this experience [observe, not a
gathered experience] we body forth to ourselves a
notion of force or power.&quot; He believes that u the
combined movements of locomotion are original or
instinctive.&quot; (Senses and Intell, pp. 98, 267.) Here,
then, we have a perception, original and intuitive, of
things exercising power. We are immediately con
scious of power exerted, and we find it producing an
effect. Again, things become known to us as exer
cising power upon us, and we know the effect as
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proceeding from a cause. This perception of power
exercised by us, and upon us, is the primary cogni
tion of things on which all our judgments as to
causation are founded. Our knowledge both of self
and of external objects is of things effecting and
being effected.
Mr. Mill tells us, in his Logic, that he has no in
tention of entering into the merits of the question
of causation u as a problem of transcendental meta
physics.&quot; And yet in his logical treatment of the
subject he is ever introducing, I think unfortunately,
metaphysical speculations. In the discussion he has
confounded (in this respect like some of the Scottish
metaphysicians) the principle of causation with that
of the uniformity of nature. When we say that na
ture is uniform, we mean that nature constitutes a
course or system ; that there is in it a determinate
number of agents, or rather a fixed amount of ener
gy, actual or potential, operating according to laws,
and in an arranged constitution. That there is an
invariable uniformity in nature, is discovered by a
long experience. It is certainly not an obvious truth
forced upon us by an early and easy observation.
Judging by first appearances, it looks as if nature
often acted unsystematically, or was swayed by in
fluences out of its sphere. The mother finds her
child in health to-day, sick to-morrow, better the
third day, and dead the next
; so far from showing
a uniformity, it seems rather to indicate a change of
agency, springing either from an unknown fatality276 CAUSATION.
or the will of a supernatural being. It is only as
the result of long and patient research; conducted
independently in the various departments of nature
and of history, that we reach the reasonable convic
tion that there is a fixed system constituted amidst
these seeming irregularities.
Now it is, in fact, of this uniformity of nature that
Mr. Mill is treating in his chapter on the
&quot; Evidence
of Universal Causation.&quot; He is right in saying of it,
&quot; There must have been a time when the universal
prevalence of that law throughout nature could not
have been affirmed in the same confident and un
qualified manner as at
present.&quot; He is further right,
so far as the uniformity of nature is concerned, when
he says that the reasons for our reliance on it
&quot; do
not hold in circumstances unknown to us, and beyond
the possible range of our experience. In distant
parts of the stellar regions, where the phenomena
may be entirely unlike those with which we are ac
quainted, it would be folly to affirm confidently that
this general law prevails, any more than those spec
ial ones which we have found to hold universally on
our own planet. The uniformity in the succession
of events, otherwise called the law of causation, must
be received not as a law of the universe, but of that
portion of it only which is within the range of our
means of sure observation, with a reasonable degree
of extension to adjacent
cases.&quot; In this passage he
identifies
&quot; the uniformity in the succession of events&quot;
with
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same. It is quite conceivable that there may be
worlds in which there is a universal causation, and
yet no self-contained system of natural causes. Some,
or many, or in fact all of the phenomena might be
produced by agents acting from above or beyond the
phenomena themselves, say by the Divine Being,
or angels, or demons. In such a world spring might
follow winter one year, and be prevented from fol
lowing it the next by the action of a supra-mundane
influence
; and no one would be able from the past
to anticipate the future. In this state of things there
would be no uniformity of physical agencies, and yet
there would be an invariable causation. Now the
grand metaphysical question is not about the uni
formity of nature, but about the relation of cause
and effect. There is a momentary discovery of the
difference of the two, and yet a studious identifica
tion of them in the following passage
:
&quot; There was a
time when many of the phenomena of nature must
have appeared altogether capricious and irregular,
not governed by any laws, nor steadily consequent
upon any causes. Such phenomena, indeed, were
commonly in that early stage of human knowledge
ascribed to the direct intervention of the will of
some supernatural being, and therefore still to a
cause.&quot;
It is admitted that the great body of mankind,
whether they are or are not persuaded of the exist
ence of a uniform system of nature, believe as to
every effect, as to every new thing produced, or278 CAUSATION.
change upon an old thing, that it must have had a
cause, whether natural or supernatural. The ques
tion is, Is this belief intuitive ?
This conviction can stand the tests of intuition.
On the bare contemplation of a new phenomenon,
that is, of a new thing appearing, of a thing which
did not exist before, we declare that it has had a
producing cause. It certainly appears in very early
life, before there can be a lengthened or wide obser
vation or enumeration of instances. It is strong in
very primitive states of society, long before mankind
had observed an invariable uniformity in the occur
rence of natural phenomena. It can be shown that
it is necessary and universal. Mr. Mill indeed tells
us,
&quot; I am convinced that any one accustomed to ab
straction and analysis, who will fairly exert his facul
ties for the purpose, will, when his imagination has
once learned to entertain the notion, find no difficul
ty in conceiving that in some one for instance of the
many firmaments into which sidereal astronomy now
divides the universe, events may succeed one another
at random, without any fixed law ; nor can anything
in our experience or in our mental nature constitute
a sufficient, or indeed any, reason for believing that
this is nowhere the case.&quot; The phrase,
&quot; fixed
law,&quot;
here employed, is ambiguous ; it may mean a mere
natural or physical law, such as that of attraction.
And I acknowledge at once that it is quite possible
to apprehend and to believe that there may be worlds
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ena, may be produced, without the operation of that
law of gravitation which seems to act everywhere in
our mundane system. But the real question is, would
not the mind insist, and this according to u a fixed
law&quot; of our &quot;mental nature,&quot; that the event must
have a cause in an agent physical or spiritual ? We
may observe that the old misleading phrase,
&quot; con
ceive,&quot; is once more casting up. I admit we can
have the idea of, that is, image to ourselves, a new
phenomenon without any necessary precedent. But
I hold that we cannot be made to judge, decide, or
believe, that in any firmament there could be a new
event, say a world springing into being with no
cause to produce it.
The mental phenomenon, the conviction and its
attached necessity, Mr. Mill would explain by the as
sociation of ideas. But then, in order to save himself
from obvious and pressing difficulties, he is obliged to
lay down very stringent precautions as to when asso
ciation can generate a feeling of necessity. In order
to produce the inseparable association, the phenom
enon must be
&quot; so closely linked in our experience,
that we never perceive the one without at the same
time, or the immediately succeeding moment, per
ceiving the other.&quot; Again,
&quot; No frequency of con
junction between two phenomena will create an in
separable association if counter associations are being
created all the while.&quot; (p. 266.) By help of these
two principles he tries to avoid the objection which
might be urged to his mode of accounting for the280 CAUSATION.
conviction of necessity. But he is seen to be involved
in hopeless perplexities when these laws are ap
plied to causation. For neither of them would allow
the necessary conviction to be formed as to cause
and effect from mere experience. For it is not the
case that we never perceive a cause without perceiv
ing an effect, or that we never observe an effect with
out also observing a cause. On the contrary, the
effects of causes operating, and the causes of effects
falling under our notice, are very often concealed
from us. Of how few of the occurrences happening
in the circle of our experience, or in the times in
which we live, are we able to estimate the conse
quences ? In a large proportion of the physical ef
fects which come under our notice, the cause is not
discovered at the time, and is only found out in the
end by a process of elaborate experiment, fitted to
distract instead of aiding association and in the case
of a large number of the occurrences of our personal
experience, or recorded in history, we never do rise
to the discovery of the causes. Again, as to the oth
er precautionary rule, we find that in the case of
cause and effect there is a constant formation of
&quot; counter associations
&quot;
by reason of the complexity
of the conditions which meet in the cause, and of inci
dents which attach themselves to the effect, and of
the combination of each of these with a host of con
comitant circumstances to disturb the formation of an
inseparable association. A friend dies : no doubt there
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many things prevent us from discovering or even in
quiring about it; and finding little satisfaction in the
contemplation, we dwell rather on the regard we had
for the departed, on his excellent qualities, on the loss
we have suffered; or, ifwe think ofwhat led to it, we
prefer referring the whole to the appointment of God.
That amidst all these complications, and in spite of
appearances to the contrary, mankind should ever
have clung to the belief that there is a cause, natural
or supernatural, to every event, is a proof that the
conviction is deeply seated in our nature.
When Mr. Mill confines his attention to the physi
cal and logical nature of causation, he throws light
upon the subject.
&quot; The statement of the cause is
incomplete unless in some shape or other we intro
duce all the conditions.&quot;
&quot; In practice, that particu
lar condition is usually styled the cause, whose share
in the matter is superficially the most conspicuous,
or whose requisiteness to the production of the effect
we happen to be insisting upon at the moment.&quot;
66 The real cause of the phenomenon is the assem
blage of all the conditions.&quot; There is new and im
portant truth in this statement. But I am- not sure
that Mr. Mill has got a full view of the facts. In
material nature there is always need of the action
of two or more agents in order to an effect. If a
ball moves in consequence of another striking it,
there is need of the one ball as well as the other,
and the cause, properly speaking, consists of the two
in a relation to each other. But not only is there a282 CAUSATION.
duality or plurality in the cause, there is the same
(Mr. Mill has not noticed it) in the effect. The effect
consists not merely of the one ball, the ball struck
and set in motion, but also of the other ball which
struck it, and which has now lost part of its momen
tum. By carrying out this doctrine, we can deter





when the phrases are applied to the operation of
causation. When we speak of an agent requiring a
&quot;condition,&quot; an &quot;occasion,&quot; or &quot;circumstances,&quot; in
order to its action, we refer to the other agent or
agents required, that it may produce a particular
effect. Thus that fire may burn, it is necessary to
have fuel, or a combustible material. In order that
my will may move my arm, it is needful to have
the concurrence of a healthy motor nerve. So
much for the dual or plural agency in the cause.
But there is a similar complexity in the effect, and
we need a like phrase to designate the part of it
which we do not require to consider at the time.
Thus the steam which has raised a certain weight
has expended meanwhile a certain amount of force ;
but persons striving merely to have the weight
raised care nothing for the other, and may call it
&quot; incidental
;
&quot; which incidental part, however, may
be the essential element in the view of the engineer
who requires to generate the steam. In the proper
enunciation of the cause and the effect the invari
able and unconditional cause and effect there
should be a statement of all the concurring antece-CAUSATION. 283
dents, and all the involved consequents, including
the conditions in the cause, and the incidents in the
effect.
By carrying out this doctrine consistently, we are
able to give (which Mr. Mill has not done) its







distinction between which has been noticed in some
form or other by most philosophers from the time of
Aristotle. The agent and patient are certainly not
to be identified with the cause and effect
; but they
are to be found in the cause, that is, in the assem
blage of circumstances necessary in order to the
production of the effect. These circumstances or
agencies must concur, in short, must operate on
each other, in order to action and change. Thus, in
order to the production of water, there must be both
oxygen and hydrogen; the two act on each other
according to their nature and laws ; and both are
changed and appear in the product. That which
we consider as acting may be called the Agent; that
which we regard as acted on may be considered as
the Patient. It should be observed and remembered,
that the agent under one aspect is always a patient
under another, and the patient may also be viewed
as an agent ; for that which acts is always acted on,
and that which is acted on always acts ; and action
is always equal to reaction. The account now given
enables us to settle a question which has often been
started, but never determined satisfactorily. The
question is, Is the effect always posterior in time to284 CAUSATION.
the cause, or may it not be contemporaneous ? The
answer is, that the complex effect always follows the
complex cause
; but that the concurrent agents which
constitute the cause may be regarded as acting on
each other simultaneously. The oxygen and the
hydrogen influence each other contemporaneously,
and are followed by the production of water as the
effect.
The reader may compare the statement now
offered with that given by Mr. Mill in his chapter
&quot; Of the Law of Universal Causation.&quot; Mr. Mill has
not seen that as the cause consists in an assemblage
of conditions, so the effect consists in an assemblage
of consequences. In the agents concurring in the
cause there is a real distinction between agent and
patient, whereas he says the distinction vanishes on
examination, or rather is found to be merely verbal.
He has discussed, but avowedly does not know how
to settle, the question as to whether the cause pre
cedes the effect. He has also noticed the circum
stance, that in some cases when the cause ceases, the
effect also seems to cease, whereas in others the
effect appears to remain
; but he has not been able
to give a full explanation of the phenomenon. The
effect remains when the assemblage of circumstan
ces which constitute the cause abides. It is thus a
book remains on the table as long as the table is in
a position to uphold it. It is thus oxygen and hy
drogen abide in water till an element with a
stronger affinity with one of them succeeds in draw-CAUSATION. 285
ing it off. In other cases the concurrence of agencies
acting as the cause is ever liable to be broken up,
and the effect ceases when the complex cause has
disappeared. It is thus that the book is upheld in
my hand only so long as I stretch out my arm:
thus that the room is illuminated by day only so
long as the sun shines, and by night only so long as
the lamp continues to burn. In all cases a change
implies a new agent, or a new concurrence of
agencies.
But we are now in the heart of our author s logi
cal discussions. Mr. Mill s Logic has never been sub
jected to a careful review on the part either of his
supporters or opponents. It deserves such an exam
ination because of its excellences, and it requires it
because of its errors, which many students are ac
cepting along with the truths. I undertake this
review in the immediately succeeding chapters.CHAPTER XI Y.
THE LOGICAL NOTION.
FOKMAL
Logic is usually represented as dealing
with the Notion, Judgment, and Seasoning.
Mr. Mill has no separate exposition of the Notion.
He treats instead, of Names : as if Names did not
stand for Thoughts, the nature of which should have
been previously investigated. This is surely a defect
in an elaborate Logical Treatise. In his controver
sial work he has given us his theory of the Notion
or Conception. It will be necessary to examine it.
The Notions, that is, apprehensions of things,
which the mind can entertain, are of three sorts :
First, There is the Singular Concrete Notion, such as
Homer, Virgil, Dante, Milton, this man, this dog, that
daisy, that book. This notion is singular, as it em
braces a single object. It is concrete, as it contem
plates the object as possessing an aggregate of quali
ties. The consideration of the nature of this notion
does not, properly speaking, come under Formal
Logic, which has to do only with Discursive Thought ;
that is, thought in which there is a process from some
thing given or allowed to something founded upon
it.
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It is furnished to us by intuition, primarily by the
senses and consciousness, and does not imply any logi
cal operation. But then it comes into Logic when it
is combined with the abstract and general notion in
the proposition and argument. Thus, when we say,
a Locke was an independent thinker,&quot; the subject is
a singular concrete notion compared with a general
notion in the predicate. Logic, therefore, cannot
overlook this notion, but it may hand over the
special discussion of its origin and validity to psychol
ogy or metaphysics. Mr. Mill gives us a correct
enough account of it, though he does not specially
investigate its nature :
&quot;A concrete name is a name
which stands for a
thing.&quot; (B.
i. c. ii. 4.)
Second, There is the Abstract Notion. It is the
apprehension of a part of an object as a part, say of
the head of a horse as the head of a horse. More
technically it is the apprehension of an attribute.
&quot; An abstract name is a name which stands for an
attribute of a
thing.&quot; (/&.) In this latter sense the
part cannot exist separate from the whole : thus
transparency cannot exist apart from a transparent
object, such as glass or ice. But though an abstract
quality cannot exist apart from an object, it is not to
be regarded as a nonentity or a fiction of the mind.
Eationality cannot exist apart from a rational being,
but it has a real existence in a rational being, such
as man.
On account of the defective view which he takes
of the intellectual faculties of man, Mr. Mill has not288 THE LOGICAL NOTION.
been able to furnish an adequate account of the
Abstract Notion. Speaking of the notion of length
without breadth,
&quot;
According to what appears to me
the sounder opinion, the mind cannot form any such
notion it cannot conceive length without breadth.&quot;
(B.
i. c. viii. 7.) And in his recent work,
&quot; The ex
istence of Abstract Ideas the conception of the
class qualities by themselves, and not as embodied
in an individual is effectually precluded by the
law of Inseparable Association.&quot; (p. 314.) The
ambiguous word
&quot; conceive
&quot; has once more cast up
without his telling us in what sense he employs
it.
I should say that in these passages he uses it in the
sense of
&quot;image,&quot; in which signification the state
ment is true. I believe that length cannot exist
except in an extended object which has also breadth,
and I am sure that I can image length only in an
extended object. He adds, that the mind
&quot; can only,
in contemplating objects, attend to their length, ex
clusively of their other sensible qualities, and so
determine what properties may be predicated of
them in virtue of their length
alone.&quot; This is not a
sufficiently comprehensive account of the Abstract
Notion; but it implies that there is more than a
mere image. If we inquire carefully into its nature,
we shall find that as a thought it implies not only
attention but a comparative act. We apprehend the
attribute to be an attribute of the concrete object,
thus comparing the part and whole. This apprehen
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attribute apprehended with other attributes, or with
concrete objects of various kinds, and make affirma
tions or denials. Thus, on perceiving a cone of
sugar as a concrete object, we can in abstract
thought fix on the figure, and from the contempla
tion of it we might by a further abstraction fix on
the conic sections, and by a process of reasoning
evolve their properties. In all this we should be
dealing, not with mere hypotheses, but abstracted
realities ; and the conclusions we reach will be found
true of all cones, and of all sections of the cone,
including the elliptic figures in which the planets
move.
1
Third, There is the general Notion, such as man,
poet, animal. We are so constantly forming notions
of this sort, that it should not be difficult to evolve
the processes involved in it. The two first steps
are, (1.) that we observe a resemblance among
objects; (2.) that we fix on the points of resem
blance. The first is accomplished by the mind s
power of perceiving agreements, and the second
by an operation of abstraction. No absolute rule
can be laid down as to which of these processes
is the prior. I believe that in most cases there
1
Regarding Logic as the Science of nished I. The Abstract Quality im-
the Laws of Discursive Thought, as plies a Concrete Object. II. When
above defined, the Abstract Notion is the Concrete Object is real the Ab-
clearly embraced in it, as in it we stract Quality taken from it is also
draw an attribute out of the concrete real. III. When the Abstract is a
object given, and we must endeavor Quality, it is not to be regarded as
to unfold the Laws of Thought in- having an independent existence ; Its
volved in it. The following may serve existence is in a Concrete Object,
provisonally till a better list be fur-
19290 THE LOGICAL NOTION.
is first a perception more or less vague of a like
ness, and then the separate consideration of the
points of likeness. But in other cases we seem
rather to fix primarily on an attribute, and conjoin
by it all the objects which we discover to possess
it. Thus, in zoology the naturalist fixes on the
possession of a backbone, and makes it the bond
of a class of animals. But there is more in gen
eralization than either or than both of these steps.
(3.) The consummating step is, that we constitute
a class which embraces all the objects possessing
the common attribute or attributes. Till this step
is taken there is no generalization. When this
step is taken the general notion is formed. Let
it be observed that there is here an operation be
yond the other two. In the first step we must
have observed or contemplated more or fewer ob
jects, and perceived them to resemble each other;
still the number was limited. In the second step
we fixed on a quality or qualities common to the
objects noticed. But in the final step the number
of objects is indefinite, and must include not
merely those we have observed and compared, but
all others possessing the mark or marks fixed on.
On seeing only half a dozen red deer I may have
been forcibly struck with their resemblance, and
may have been able to fix on their points of like
ness, such as their shape and their noble antlers.
But when I take the decisive step and form the
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those I have seen, but all others with that form
of body and horns; not only these six deer, but
all other deer now living, and all deer that ever
lived or shall live; not only so, but all imagina
ble deer, the deer sung of by all the poets, and the
deer that may be created by the ever active imagi
nation. A notion is not general unless it embraces
all the objects possessing the mark or marks fixed
on. Now this consummating step has not been no
ticed, or at least has not had its appropriate place
allotted to it, by most psychologists and logicians.
Dr. Brown dwells very fondly on the feeling of re
semblance, as he calls it (he should have said the
observation of the relation of resemblance), but
takes no notice of the all-important act by which the
species is made to embrace all the objects having
the resemblance. This specially intellectual step
was from time to time before the mind of Hamilton,
as when he says, that
&quot;
concepts have only a poten
tial, not an actual, universality; that is, they are
only universal, inasmuch as they may be applied to
any of a certain class of objects.&quot; But with an oc
casional glimpse of the truth, he loses sight of it
immediately after, and he talks of a mysterious
&quot;
synthesis in consciousness,&quot; wherein
&quot; the qualities,
which by comparison are judged similar, and by
attention are constituted into an exclusive object of
thought, these are already, by this process, identi
fied in consciousness ; for they are only judged sim
ilar, inasmuch as they produce in us indiscernible292 THE LOGICAL NOTION.
effects.&quot; (Logic, Lect. viii.) His whole exposition is
confused and unsatisfactory, and it issues in his find
ing a contradiction in the general notion. He loses
his consistency and clearness in endeavoring to
find some sort of reconciliation between nominalism
and conceptualism. Mr. Mill has unfolded no ele
ments in the general notion except the attribute
and the name.
&quot;We create an artificial association
between those attributes (to which we wish to de
vote our exclusive attention) and a certain combina
tion of articulate sounds, which guarantees to us
when we hear the sound, or see the written charac
ters corresponding to it, there will be raised in the
mind an idea of some object possessing those attri
butes, in which idea those attributes alone will be
suggested vividly to the minds, our consciousness of
the remainder of the concrete idea being
faint.&quot;
&quot; The association of that particular set of attributes
with a given word is what keeps them together in
the mind by a stronger tie than that with which
they are associated with the remainder of the con
crete
image.&quot; (p. 322.) There is a great oversight
here. There is no reference to the discovery of re
semblances among objects as constituting the com
mencement of the whole process. He ascribes to
the name what is done by the possession of com
mon qualities. &quot;For a class is absolutely nothing
but an indefinite number of individuals denoted by
a general name. The name given to them in com
mon is what makes them a class.&quot; But whatTHE LOGICAL NOTION. 293
makes the name applicable to the indefinite number
of objects? What enables us, when we discover a
new object, to say whether it is or is not entitled to
the name ? The answer to these questions will force
us to look beyond the name to the like attributes in
the objects/ as making the objects pass under the
same name, as enabling us to understand what is
denoted by the name, as being the meaning of the
name, and, in fact, constituting the bond which joins
the objects in a class. There is a passage in which
he has a glimpse of the consummating step, and
indeed of the whole process.
&quot;The only mode in
which any general name has a definite meaning,
is by being a name of an indefinite variety of things,
namely, all things known or unknown, past, present,
or future, which possess certain attributes.&quot; (Logic.,
I.
v. 3.) This language does point to something else
than the name as bringing together
&quot; the indefinite
number of individuals in the class :
&quot;





variety of things ;
&quot; and it implies, though it does
not just state, that the class must include all the
objects possessing these attributes. This account,
consequentially followed out, makes the common
notion embrace three elements : objects resembling
each other
; points of resemblance
; and the inclu
sion of all objects having these points. But Mr.
Mill habitually loses sight of some of these essential
characteristics, and ever falls back upon the attribute
and the name. This omission in the theory of the294 THE LOGICAL NOTION.
notion comes out in positive error in the account of
the judgment and reasoning.
According to the exposition now given, the Class-
Notion always includes both objects and attributes,
objects having a resemblance, and common attri
butes possessed by them. So far as it embraces
objects, it is said to have Extension. So far as it
contains attributes, it is said to have Comprehension
or Intension. This distinction was indicated in the
Port-Royal Logic, and was enunciated in several
logical works published in the end of the seven
teenth and the beginning of the eighteenth cen
tury
1
. It has been elaborated with great care, at
times with an excess of refinement, by Sir Wil
liam Hamilton. That every general notion should
have both these aspects, follows from the ac
count I have given of its formation and constitu
tion. In every General Notion there must be
objects compared; this constitutes the Extension.
There must also be marks to bring the objects
together under one head
; this is Comprehension.
The former is got by observation and comparison,
the latter by abstraction. We see that as the one
rises the other falls, and that as the one falls the
other rises. As we multiply the marks or attributes,
there must be fewer objects possessing them. As
1 In particular, I have found it in a an Introduction to Logic (2d edit.,
Compend of Logic, prepared and 1722) by Gershom Carmichael of Glas-
printed (there is n evidence of its gow University ; and again in a Coin-
having been published) for use of the pend of Logic by Francis Hutcheson,
Scottish Universities, by order of a which was used in Glasgow College
Parliamentary Commission, 1795 ; in till towards the close of last century.THE LOGICAL NOTION. 295
we multiply the objects, they must have fewer com
mon marks. Hence the rule, that the greater the
Extension, the less the Comprehension; and the
greater the Comprehension, the less the Extension.
Upon this distinction the remark is,
&quot; that the Ex
tension is not anything intrinsic to the concept ; it
is the sum of all the objects, in our concrete images
of which the concept is included : but the compre
hension is the very concept itself; for the concept
means nothing but our mental representation of the
sum of the attributes composing
it.&quot; (p. 333.) It is
clear that of the three constituents of common
notions he gives the chief, or rather exclusive, place
to the attributes.
&quot; All men, and the class man, are
expressions which point to nothing but attributes;
they cannot be interpreted except in comprehen
sion.&quot; (p. 363.) In opposition to this, I maintain
that the Extension of the notion is quite as impor
tant an aspect of it as the Comprehension; that
every common notion may be interpreted in Exten
sion as well as Intension ; that in the class there
must be objects to combine as well as attributes to
combine them; and that a mental representation
must be inadequate which does not embrace the
objects as well as the sum of the attributes possessed
by them. The Universal Notion is of objects possess
ing common attributes, the notion including all the
objects possessing the attributes. We see here, in Mr.
Mill s logical doctrine, a taint at the fountain, which
will be found running through the whole stream.296 THE LOGICAL NOTION-.
&quot; General concepts, therefore, we have, properly
speaking,
none.&quot; &quot;I consider it nothing less than
a misfortune that the words Concept, General No
tion, or any other phrase to express the supposed
mental modification corresponding to a class name,
should ever have been invented. Above all, I hold
that nothing but confusion ever results from intro
ducing the term Concept into Logic; and that
instead of the Concept of a class, we should always
speak of the signification of a class name.&quot; (pp. 321,
331.) But surely it is desirable to have a word to
express the &quot;mental modification&quot; when we con
template a
&quot;class,&quot; and Conception or General No
tion seems appropriate enough. I also think it
desirable to have a phrase to denote, not the
&quot;
signi
fication of a class name,&quot; but the thing signified by
the class name
; and the fittest I can think of is
Concept. Mr. Mill would replace Abstract and
General Idea by
u the connotation of the class name.&quot;
I reckon the epithet
&quot; connotation
&quot; a very good one
for some purposes. It was used by the schoolmen
;
it was a favorite one with Mr. James Mill
; and has
had a clear meaning attached to it.
&quot;A connotative








notes all things white, as snow, paper, the foam of
the sea, etc. ; and implies, or, as it was termed by




is an expressive enough
epithet, applied to certain predicates, it does noiTHE LOGICAL NOTION. 297
bring out what is contained in the class-notion.
&quot;
Horse/ for example, is a general notion, embrac
ing an indefinite number of objects ; but all this is
not expressed by applying the phrase
&quot;
connotative.&quot;
&quot;It denotes a subject;&quot; but what is the subject?
This question is left unanswered. It can be answered
only by saying that it consists, of all the objects
possessing the attributes
; and as to the phrase
&quot;
sig
nification of the class name,&quot; it leaves it unsettled
what the thing signified is. I am inclined to think
that the words Conception and Concept serve a
good purpose ; they express the signification of the
class name.
1
The General Notion being formed in the way ex
plained, we fix it and preserve it, and think of it by
means of a Sign. The Sign may be one or other of
two sorts. Lauding the founder of his School, Mr.
Mill says,
&quot; It is a doctrine of one of the most fertile
thinkers of modern times, Auguste Comte, that,
besides the logic of signs, there is a logic of images,
and a logic of feelings. In many of the familiar
processes of thought, and especially in uncultured
minds, a visual image serves instead of a word.&quot; (p.
329.) Omitting the consideration of the logic of
feelings as not coming specially before us, the doc
trine attributed to Comte as so
&quot; fertile
&quot; a thinker
1 The following are some of the Real. III. The Reality in the Uni-
Laws of Thought involved in the Gen- versal consists in the possession of
eral Notion : I. The Universal im- common attributes by all the objects
plies Singulars. II. When the Sin- embraced in it.
gulars are Real the Universal is also298 THE LOGICAL NOTION.
was long ago proclaimed by Aristotle, and has floated
ever since, in a more or less correct form, in logic
and speculative philosophy. According to Aristotle,
a notion is not the same as a phantasm, but it is
never found without a phantasm.
1 The expression
of Mr. Mill is much more loose. He talks of a
&quot;
logic of images ;
&quot; whereas it is not a logic, but a
notion entertained by means of an image. He
speaks of the image being a
&quot; visual sensation
&quot; and
&quot; visual appearance ;
&quot; whereas it may be a phantasm
by any of the senses, it may be of a smell, or a
taste, or a touch, or a sound.
I believe that the General Notion is kept before
the mind primarily by the phantasm. In every
such notion the objects are indefinite are innu
merable
; and so the human mind (whatever angelic
minds may do) cannot image them all
; but it images
one as a sign of the others. The attribute, or aggre
gate of attributes, cannot be imaged apart from
objects, but we labor to fashion an object which
may give prominence to the one attribute, if there
be only one, or combine them if there be many.
This, I am persuaded, is the original and spontaneous
agency by which we carry with us and compare our
concepts. Mr. Mill has a glimpse of this, and noth
ing more, when he says that
&quot; in uncultured minds a
visual image serves instead of words.&quot; The more
1
Distinguishing between Notions, dioiaei TOV $ 6av7 aapara, elvai, % ovdt
vorjuaTa, and ^avraa^ara, Aristotle ravra QavTitapara, aM OVK avev
&amp;lt;j&amp;gt;av&amp;gt;
says (see Anim. in. 7), N&amp;lt;%ara rivlTHE LOGICAL NOTION. 299
correct expression would be, that in cultured minds
the word often comes to serve the purpose of the
image and to supersede
it. I believe we naturally
resort to the image ; but the image is always felt to
be inadequate. Hence the common remark, that
we cannot have an adequate idea, that is, in the




&quot; when we think about the class, we
may, and do commonly, image some sort of beast with
four limbs ; but if the limbs be those of a horse, they
cannot be those of a dog, and if they be those of a
dog, they cannot be those of the horse
; and if they
be different from either, they cannot be those either
of the horse or the dog. All this does not prove
that we cannot in thought form a general notion, or
that we cannot legitimately employ it in judgment
and reasoning ; it merely shows that the image, as
being single, is not equal to the indefinite number
of objects, and, as being concrete, cannot be identi
cal with the attribute, which is abstract. The fact
is, the image, or, as I prefer calling it with Aristotle,
the phantasm, is a mere sign, one for the many,
that one being as far as possible a type of the many.
The mind spontaneously forms such representations,
and delights to do so
; and when it can have them,
the thinking is rendered much more vivid and
pleasant, and is more readily accompanied with ex
citement and emotion.
But when the generalizations are very high, when
the abstractions are very refined, and the common300 THE LOGICAL NOTION.
attributes are very numerous, or not very definitely
fixed, it becomes all but impossible to construct a
phantasm which will represent the class. We can
form a pretty fair representative image of quadru
ped, but what phantasm could stand for such com
plex notions as civilization, liberty, politics, art, and
science ? In striving to compass such notions, we
naturally resort to artificial symbols, particularly
language. If there be a word suitable to express
the thought, it will employ it; if there be not, it
will labor to invent one. But so far from images
serving instead of words, the words serve our pur
pose as being images. It has been remarked by
metaphysicians that most names were originally of
individual objects. An individual object, or the
image of it, was first taken to represent the class ;
and then the name of the individual, as a sound or
a written character addressed to the eye, was used
as a briefer and more convenient symbol. The ad
vantage of such verbal signs, which are always, be it
remarked, in a sense phantasms addressed to the eye
or ear, is that they do not distract us with the
peculiarities of individual objects, and allow us in
thinking to proceed only on the common qualities of
objects. All this renders the notion less lively and
emotional, unless indeed by those who resort to
word-painting to raise up a phantasm, but at the
same time better fitted for the conducting of rigid
thought. The most perfect artifical signs for the
limited end in view are those employed in algebra.THE LOGICAL NOTION. 301
in which meaningless letters denote quantities known
or unknown, and we can employ them according to
the settled laws of reasoning in quantity without
thinking of what they stand for, till we reach the
result, when we translate the sign into what it signi
fies. When we lose sight for the time for what the sign
stands for, this is what constitutes, properly speak
ing, Symbolical Thought. But it is always to be
understood that the sign does stand for a notion,
and has always a tacit reference to it
; that we can
predicate of the sign only what we could legiti
mately predicate of the notion; and that in pass
ing it on from premises to conclusion in a chain of
reasoning, we must be sure that we proceed on
principles which are applicable to the thing signified.
And in order to determine whether we are or are
not making a proper predication, we can always,
-
and should often, require that the sign should be
translated into the notion, and the notion com
pared with the thing.
1
A distinction of some importance may be drawn
between two kinds of Concepts. In the one the
class is determined by a single attribute, or by it
1 The following are some of the Notion. IV. In order to determine
Laws of Thought involved in the use whether we are making a proper pred-
of Signs as Instruments of Thought
: ication as to the Sign, we may de-
I. Every Logical Term stands for a mand at any time that the Notion be
Notion, which may be a Singular Con- substituted for it. V. In order to
crete, an Abstract, or a Universal, determine whether we are making a
II. According as it stands for one or proper predication as to the Notion, we
other of these, so is it to be interpreted, must inquire what is the nature of the
III. We can predicate of the Sign Things from which it has been formed,
only what might be predicated of the302 THE LOGICAL NOTION.
together with the attributes implied in it. Such
are the classes designated by adjectives, as gener
ous, faithful, virtuous, pointing to one quality
of an object, along with those that may be involved




is specially applicable ; they
denote an attribute, and connote objects possessing
it. In other cases the Comprehension of the class
consists of an aggregate of attributes. Thus, we
cannot fix on any one attribute of the class Man,
and derive all the others from it. Rationality is
one quality, but he has many others :
.
&quot; Men define a man
The creature who stands frontward to the stars,
The creature who looks inward to himself,
The tool-wright, laughing creature. Tis enough;
i We ll say instead the inconsequent creature man,
For that s his specialty. What creature else
Conceives the circle, and then walks the square ?
&quot;
The one kind of notions I would be inclined to call,
when it is necessary to draw the distinction between
them, the Generalized Abstract, because in it we
seize on a single quality, and put all the objects
possessing it into a class. The other I call the
Generalized Concrete, because in it we bring to
gether, by certain resemblances, individuals with
their aggregate of qualities. It was to the latter
that the schoolmen appropriated the phrase Species ;
I think they would scarcely have applied it to the
Generalized Abstract such as
&quot; rational
&quot; or
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tional.&quot; The Generalized Concrete evidently in
cludes all natural classes, such as reptiles, fishes,
birds, mammals, in the animal kingdom, and rosa-
ceae, cruciferse, solanaceae in the vegetable kingdom ;
the objects embraced in these have all a number of
common qualities.
It is of importance to keep these distinctions in
view in considering the nature of Definition. In
defining the Generalized Abstract Notion, we have
only to bring out the one common quality, and the
work is completed. But in attempting to define
the Generalized Concrete, we cannot fix on any one
quality as being the essential one
; and it often
happens that the common attributes are so numer
ous, that it would be vain and presumptuous to
attempt to specify all of them. Thus, no one can
tell what are the properties embraced in horse, dog,
metal, mineral. It fortunately, I believe providen
tially, happens that we have in nature classes called
Kinds, the nature of which has been so well ex
pounded by Mr. Mill. In these, one of the Marks is
an invariable accompaniment, and therefore a sign
of the others; and in specifying it we have truly
fixed the significates of the notion, that is, comprised
all the objects embraced in it and excluded others.
Thus it is a good definition to say,
&quot; Man is a rational
animal,&quot; for all his other special attributes are con
joined with rationality. If we call the attribute
fixed on the Differentia, the others may be repre
sented as Propria, if we wish to retain, after amend-304 THE LOGICAL NOTION.
ing it, the distinction of Porphyry between Differen
tia and Proprium.
Mr. Mill has offered some valuable remarks on
Definition, but from overlooking the distinction
between the Extension and Comprehension of a
Notion, he has not given us a thoroughly scientific
account of the logical process. Sir William Hamil
ton is right in saying, after older logicians, that it
is effected according to the Comprehension of a
Notion ; that is, it reflectively brings out the Marks
by which those who spontaneously formed the con
cept combined the objects. From overlooking Ex
tension Mr. Mill has omitted Division, a subject
which ought to be discussed in all logical treatises.
Logical Division proceeds according to the Exten
sion of a Notion, and spreads out the co-ordinate
species of a genus, according to marks added, so that
the species exclude one another, and together make
up the genus.CHAPTER XV.
LOGICAL JUDGMENT.
r 1 1HEEE is no part of Logic which has greater need
_A_ of being thoroughly cleared up than that which
relates to Judgment. In particular, first, what pre
cisely are the things compared, and in regard to
which the affirmation or denial is made ? In the
common logical treatises we are said to compare
two notions and declare their agreement or disagree
ment. Mr. Mill has made an important correction
of this statement: &quot;Propositions (except when the
mind itself is the subject treated of) are not asser
tions respecting our ideas of things, but assertions
respecting the things themselves. In order to be
lieve that gold is yellow, I must indeed have the
idea of gold and the idea of yellow, and something
having reference to these ideas must take place in
my mind
; but my belief has not reference to the
ideas, it has reference to the things.&quot; (Logic.,
I. v. 1.)
&quot;Do we never judge or assert anything but our
mere notions of things? Do we not make judg
ments and assert propositions respecting actual
things ?
&quot;
(p. 346.) There is truth here. But is the
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whole truth set forth ? The judgment is pronounced
in regard to objects, but then, it must be of objects
of which we have a notion. The judgment is not
pronounced of our notions as mental phenomena,
but neither can it be of things of which we have
had no notion, of such we can make no predica
tion. He tells us again and again,
&quot;The judgment
is concerning the fact, not the concept.&quot; But then
he is obliged to allow,
u that in order to believe that
gold is yellow, I must, indeed, have the idea of
gold, and the idea of yellow, and something hav
ing reference to these ideas must take place in my
mind;&quot; and he adds, that in order to believe,
&quot;a
previous mental conception of the facts is an indis
pensable condition.&quot; I ask, should not this indispen
sable condition have a place in the full statement of
the nature of propositions ? There is a sentence in
which he has got at least a momentary view of the
correct doctrine :
&quot; The real object of belief is not
the concept, or any relation of the concept, but the
fact conceived.&quot; (p. 348.) Yes, the facts conceived
are what we compare. If we could get philosophers
to reserve the word
&quot;conception&quot; for the mental





and consistently, not to the mental product, as Ham
ilton does, but to the things conceived, then the
proper account of Judgment, when we have a class-
notion, would be, the act in which we compare two
concepts. This account embraces the full mental
operation, and throws us back first upon the notionsLOGICAL JUDGMENT. 307
that we may judge of them, and these throw us
back on the things from which the notions have
been formed.
This leads me to notice another misapprehension
of our author s. Here, as all throughout his Logic,
he makes us look to names rather than to thoughts.
But surely Locke has shown, in that third book
of his Essay, which Mr. Mill so commends, that
names should ever carry us back to ideas, which
ideas, as Bacon had previously shown, should ever
carry us back to things. Logic has to do primarily
with Thought as employed about Things, and with
Names only secondarily and incidentally, as being
the expression of Thoughts. It is thus only that we
can employ the laws of thought, which are fixed, to
enable us to examine and correct language, which is
variable. But Mr. Mill reverses this order, and
makes Logic deal primarily with the proposition
or expression, and not with the judgment or com
parison, (p. 357.)
But the important and unsettled question is,
What is the precise relation between the two Con
cepts or Terms in Judgment? When it is said to
be an agreement or disagreement, the language is
far too vague for philosophic purposes. Sir William
Hamilton vacillates in the account given by him.
His common representation is that the relation is
one of whole and parts.
&quot;We may articulately
define a judgment or proposition to be the product
of that act by which we pronounce, that, of two308 LOGICAL JUDGMENT.
notions thought as subject and as predicate, the one
does or does not constitute a part of the other,
either in the quantity of extension or in the quan
tity of comprehension.&quot; (Logic,
I. p. 229.) In other
places the relation seems rather to be spoken of as




&quot; all men= some mortals.&quot; Again,
he seems to make the relation one of identity; for
he says that the law of identity
&quot;
is the principle of
all logical affirmation and definition&quot; (Ib. p. 80),
and he speaks of the two notions being
&quot; conceived
as one.&quot; (Ib. p. 227.)
It is not very easy, amidst Mr. Mill s criticisms of
others, to find his own theory. He tells us, &quot;Ex
istence, Co-existence, Sequence, Causation, Kesem-
blance, one or other of these, is asserted or denied in
every proposition without exception.&quot; But then he
explains away the affirmations and denials as to Ex
istence and Causation; for Existence, that is, nou-
menon, is unknown and unknowable, and Causation
is unconditional sequence. There remain only three
relations, and the judgment is a recognition of a re
lation &quot;of a succession, a co-existence, or a simili
tude between facts.&quot; (p. 353.) But he has a way of
still further reducing the number of relations. For
propositions which assert a resemblance, such as
&quot;this color is like that color,&quot; &quot;might with some
plausibility be brought within the description of an
affirmation of sequence, by considering it as an as
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two colors is followed by a specific feeling, termed
the feeling of resemblance.&quot; And as to the allega
tion that the propositions of which the predicate
is a general name, affirm or deny resemblance, he
says, that what is declared is the possession of
&quot; cer
tain common peculiarities,&quot;
&quot; and those peculiarities
it is which the terms connote, and which the prop
ositions consequently assert, not the resemblance.&quot;
(Logic,
i. v. 6.) By this subtle but not satisfactory
process, in which, as usual, he reaches simplicity
by overlooking the peculiarities of the phenomenon,
he makes propositions to declare
&quot; that a certain attri
bute is either part of a given set of attributes, or in
variably co-exists with them.&quot; (p. 361.) His final




the concept of the predicate is part of the concept
of the subject, or, to express ourselves more phil
osophically, in which the attributes connoted by
the predicate are part of those connoted by the
subject, are a kind of Identical Propositions
: they
convey no information, but at most remind us of
what, if we understood the word which is the sub
ject of the proposition, we knew as soon as the
word is pronounced. Propositions of this kind are
either definitions, or parts of definitions. These
judgments are analytical: they analyze the conno
tation of the subject-name, and predicate separably
the different attributes which the name asserts col
lectively. All other affirmative judgments are syn
thetical, and affirm that some attribute, or set of310 LOGICAL JUDGMENT.
attributes, is, not a part of those connoted by the
subjectaiame, but an invariable accompaniment of
them.&quot; (p. 359.) This analysis accords thoroughly
with Mr. Mill s psychological theory, and helps to
prop
it. It makes all judgments relate to attributes,
and simply to proclaim either an identity, or co
existence among them, which attributes are in
the end sensations, or possibilities of sensation. But
it is not in accordance with the revelations of con
sciousness, which show us that the mind pronounces
judgments not as to abstract attributes, but as to
things with attributes; and not only of identity
and co-existence, but of whole and parts, of resem
blance, of space, of quantity, and active property.
(See supra, pp. 217, 218.)
Much clearness, as it appears to me, may be in
troduced into this subject by distinguishing three
classes of judgments, corresponding to three classes
of notions :
(1.) There are judgments in which the objects
compared are Singular Concretes; as when by the
eye I see two marbles and judge them to be of
the same size, or by the ear hear two sounds and de
clare one of them to be louder than the other. In
the order of time these are the first judgments pro
nounced by the mind. It is by a succession of them,
that is, by observing resemblances among a number
of individual objects that we form the General No
tion. It is to these, as I understand his doctrine,
that Dr. Mansel applies the term Psychological Judg-LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 311
inents. (Proleg. Log., p. 63.) I have already ex
pressed my opinion, that the relations which the
mind can perceive among objects are very numerous
and diversified, much more so than Mr. Mill sup
poses. What is the nature and what the best class
ification of these comparisons; these are very im
portant questions in psychology, but do not specially
fall under the science which treats of discursive
thought.
(2.) There are judgments in which we compare
Abstracts, by which I do not mean mental states or
modifications, but things abstracted. For example,
&quot;






&quot; the best policy
&quot; are Abstracts, being neither
Singular Concretes on the one hand, nor Common
Concepts on the other, that is, they do not denote
separately existing things, such as
&quot; this man,&quot; nor





Logic is the science
of the laws of thought.&quot; Here both the subject,
&quot;
Logic,&quot; and the predicate,
&quot; the science of the laws
of thought,&quot; are not independently existing things
on the one hand, nor do they embrace indefinite ob
jects on the other. In this same class I place judg
ments regarding space, time, and quantity, such as
&quot;the zenith is the point of the visible hemisphere





12 o clock in the
day;&quot; and
&quot; 2+ 2= 4.&quot; Here both
the terms are abstract. We never met with such
separate things as 2 -j- 2 or 4
; nor can we describe312 LOGICAL JUDGMENT.
either 2 -(- 2 or 4 as a class embracing objects
: in
fact we cannot say of such abstract notions that
they have Extensions.
In all such judgments the relation is one of iden
tity or of equality. The judgments are convertible
or substitutive ; that is, we can change the position
of the terms, or substitute the one for the other,
without any change; in fact we can make either
term the subject or the predicate, as may suit our
purpose. Thus we reverse the order given above,
and say,
&quot;the science of the laws of thought is logic;
&quot;
&quot;the point of the visible hemisphere directly over




in the day is mid-day;&quot; and &quot;4 2+
2.&quot; Great
clearness is introduced into this part of Logic by
separating these judgments, in which we compare
Abstracts, from those in which we compare Singu
lars or Concepts.
(3.) A more important, but a more complicated,
class of judgments remains for consideration. It
consists of those in which there is an attributive,
and in fact, or by implication, a Concept or a class-
notion. This language requires to be explained.
When we say,
&quot;this cow ruminates,&quot; we have ab
stracted an attribute and ascribed it to the animal.
In this proposition the subject is singular. But in
judgments of this kind the subject may be a class-
notion
; thus we say,
&quot; cows ruminate,&quot; meaning that
the whole class do so. A judgment of this descrip
tion is called attributive. One of the terms is, prop-LOGICAL JUDGMENT. 313
erly speaking, the subject, and the other the predi
cate. And the terms cannot be converted simply;
in other words, the predicate cannot be made the
subject without limitation. Because all cows possess
the attribute of rumination, we cannot say all rumi
nating things are cows.
All Attributive judgments are judgments in Com
prehension, but they may also be made judgments




class embracing not only the cow but other animals,
such as the sheep and the deer. It will be admitted
that this is always possible. On the other hand, I
do not affirm that this is always done. In by far
the greater number of propositions the primary and
uppermost sense is in comprehension. Thus, when
we say
&quot; larks
sing,&quot; we probably mean not that larks
are among the class of singing birds, but that they
have the capacity of singing. But we may always
interpret in Extension the proposition which is pri
marily in Comprehension. This follows from the ac
count given in last chapter, of the mutual relation
and dependence of the two. When we have a mark,
we may always form a class, embracing the objects
possessing the mark. The mind in its discursive
operations tends to go on from Comprehension to
Extension. When the predicate of a proposition is
a verb, as in the example just given, the thought is
in Comprehension. But then we have also adjec
tives and common nouns as predicates Whon we
say the &quot;man hoards money/ the thought is in314 LOGICAL JUDGMENT.
Comprehension ; but we also say that
&quot; he is penuri
ous/ and the thought is rising to Extension; and
when we say
&quot; he is a miser/ the thought is in Ex
tension as well as Comprehension, for we have es
tablished a class, &quot;miser/ to which we refer the
individual. Mr. Mill seems to get a momentary
view of this ; for while he holds that all judgments
(except where both the terms are proper names)
are really judgments in Comprehension, he allows
that &quot;it is customary, and the natural tendency of
the mind, to express most of them in terms of Ex
tension.&quot; The &quot;tendency&quot; to do this must surely
proceed from some law of thought as applied to
things ; and the possibility of doing it surely implies
an intimate relation between the Comprehension and
the Extension. In not a few propositions the upper
most thought is in Extension. Thus, when the
young student of Natural History is told that
&quot; the
crocodile is a
reptile,&quot; his idea is of a class, of which
he may afterwards learn the marks. As in the other
cases, the mind tends to generalize the attribute,
and make the proposition one in Extension, so in
this case it should go on to translate the idea in Ex
tension into one in Comprehension. That proposi
tions can always be interpreted in both ways, is a
clear evidence of the indissoluble connection of the
operations.
It appears then that in alljudgments belonging to
this head the relation is always one of Comprehen
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likewise. This cannot be said of the second class, or
those in which we compare mere Abstracts. We
cannot call such attributive ; thus there would be no
propriety in saying that 4 is an attribute of 2 -|- 2.
Nor can such judgments be intelligently explained
in Extension. At this point we see that Sir William
Hamilton has fallen into error, from looking merely,
in his Logic, to the Conception or General Notion,
and overlooking the Abstract Notion. He makes
all logical propositions capable of being interpreted
both in Extension and Comprehension. But when
we affirm that 4 X 4= 16, we have no General No
tion, and the phrases Extension and Comprehension
are not applicable. In all cases, however, in which
the predicate is a formed class-notion or Concept,
the proposition should be interpreted both ways.
Not only so, but when the predicate is merely attri
butive, it is still possible to interpret the proposition
in both ; and we shall see in next chapter that in
reasoning its uppermost meaning is always in Ex
tension rather than Comprehension.
At this point we see the error of Mr. Mill, as at
the other we saw that of Sir William Hamilton.
Mr. Mill maintains that &quot;the supposed meaning in
Extension is not a meaning at all, until interpreted
by the meaning in Comprehension ; that all concepts
and general names which enter into propositions re
quire to be construed in Comprehension, and that
their Comprehension is the whole of their meaning.&quot;
Again,
&quot; The Extension of a concept is not, like the316 LOGICAL JUDGMENT.
Comprehension, intrinsic and essential to the con
cept ; it is an external and wholly accidental relation
of the concept, and no contemplation or analysis
of the concept itself will tell us anything about it.&quot;
(pp. 362, 364.) There is an accumulation of mis
takes in this statement, all arising from the inade
quate view taken by him of the elements involved
in the General Notion. We have seen that in the
General Notion there are objects as well as attri
butes; objects to combine as well as attributes to
combine them. In all propositions falling under
this head the Extension has quite as distinct a mean
ing (it connotes objects) as the Comprehension
(which denotes attributes) ; and both are
&quot; intrinsic
and essential to the concept.&quot; Extension is in
volved in every concept, and should always be
noticed when we are using the concept, and brought
out into distinct view when we analyze it. Even in
cases in which the primary sense of the predicate is
attributive, we may also turn it into a class-notion and
explain it in extension; and we shall see that we
always do so think it when we use the proposition
as a premise in an argument.
Looking upon all judgments of this class as having
both Extension and Comprehension, we can obtain
from any given proposition a set of what have been
called by Kant Syllogisms of the Understanding, and
by Hamilton Immediate Inferences, or what I call
Implied or Transposed Judgments. Thus, the judg
ment being given,
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can by Extension derive such judgments as the fol
lowing
: that man is a species in the genus responsi-
ole
; that some responsible beings are men
; that any
one man is responsible ; that it is not true that 110
men are responsible
; or that some men are not
responsible; that men of genius are responsible
with their genius ; and that God who calls men to
account is calling to account responsible beings.
Again, by Comprehension we can say, that responsi
bility should always accompany our notion of man ;
that responsibility exists, being found in man who
really exists
; that no man is irresponsible ; that ir
responsible beings cannot be men
; and since respon
sibility is to God, man being responsible is responsi
ble to God. These implied judgments bring us to
the very verge of mediate reasoning. By subalter-
nation we declare that all men being responsible,
some men are responsible
: there is but a step
between this and mediate reasoning, in which we
argue that all men being responsible, the New
Zealanders who are men, that is, some men, are re
sponsible. These Transposed Judgments appeared
in the old Logic under the heads of Opposition and
Conversion
; and in the New Analytic they have been
drawn out fully in Archbishop Thomson s Laws of
Thought (p. iii., where, however, they are not drawn
by Extension and Comprehension). It is a defect in
Mr. Mill s work, professedly A System of Logic,




order that they may reason, and reason validly,
it is not necessary that persons be logicians.
Man reasons spontaneously. The logician reflects
upon the natural operation, and seeks to unfold its
nature and its laws ; and he strives also to lay down
rules fitted to guide and guard us as we reason.
The grand question to be determined in scientific
logic is, what is the regulating principle of sponta
neous ratiocination? On this subject there is a
general agreement, and yet considerable diversity
of opinion, among logicians. Almost all admit that
the principle (when the conclusion is affirmative)
may be expressed, &quot;Things which agree with one
and the same agree with one another.&quot; But this
form is too vague, for it does not specify the nature
of the agreement. And so logicians have endeavored
to make the statement more definite. According to
the Dictum of Aristotle, the things must agree in
being both under some higher class or genus. The
form has sometimes been put,
u
Things are the same




Things which co-exist with the same co-exist
with one another.&quot; The distinctions which have
been drawn in the two last chapters in regard to the
Notion and Judgment will be found, if followed out,
to throw light on some of these points.
First, There are simple cases of reasoning in
which the terms are Singular or Abstract :
Thomas k Kempis was the author of the
&quot; Imitation of Christ;&quot;
Gerson was not Thomas a Kempis ;
.. Gerson was not the author of the
&quot; Imitation of Christ.&quot;
Or the unfigured syllogism of Hamilton :
Sulphate of iron is copperas ;
Sulphate of iron is not sulphate of copper ;
.. Sulphate of copper is not copperas.
In the same class may be placed all reasoning in
which the proposition are definitions or substitutive :
as,
u
Logic is the science of the laws of thought
Ethics is the science of the laws of our moral nature ;
therefore Logic is not Ethics.&quot; Under this head I
put all quantitative reasoning ; as,
&quot;A= B
; B= C ;
therefore A=
C.&quot; In such examples none of the
notions is properly a class-notion or attributive. As
none of them has quantity or extension, so we can
not speak of a minor or major term, or of a minor
or major premise. The division into figures has no
place ; for, as any one will at c ^ce see on trial, the
middle term may be made, as we Dlease, the subject
or the predicate of either premise. The regulating
principle in all such cases is either,
k
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same which are same with a third/ or
&quot;
Things which
are equal to the same are equal to one another.&quot;
Much confusion is avoided by alloting reasoning of
this description to a separate head. As there is no
class-notion the Dictum cannot be the regulating
principle.
Second, There is more complex reasoning in
which there is an attributive predicate or a class-
notion. In this the old Aristotelian Dictum remains,
after all discussion, the fundamental regulating prin
ciple
:
&quot; Whatever is predicated of a class may be
predicated of all the members of the class.&quot; No
other proposed Dictum has lived beyond the age of
its inventor. I am convinced that the same fate




really fundamental axiom of ratiocination,&quot;
as announced by him, is,
&quot;
Things which co-exist with
the same thing, co-exist with one another ;
&quot; and
&quot; a
thing which co-exists with another thing, with which
other a third thing does not co-exist, is not co
existent with that third
thing.&quot; But the phrase
&quot;
co-exist,&quot; if limited to co-existence in respect of
time or space, does not include most important cases
of reasoning ; and if widened beyond this, it becomes
meaningless. When we argue that the man hav
ing committed murder deserves punishment, the
premises and the conclusion have reference, not to
space or time, but to far different relations. When
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A is equal to C, we are not making affirmations
about co-existence. In explanation, he tells us (p.
203, foot-note, 6th ed.),
&quot; the co-existence meant is
that of being jointly attributes of the same
subject.&quot;
This statement is still vague, and is not adequate,
for it does not specify what is
&quot; the same
subject,&quot;
and it does not bring out that the attribution in
volves Extension : but it contains partial truth, and
it has a meaning, which we can examine.
This new Dictum gives him the following univer
sal formula :
Attribute A is a mark of Attribute B
;
A given object has the mark A
;
.. The given object has the attribute B.
But what does this first premise mean when we
translate it from abstractions into concrete realities ?
As there cannot be an Attribute existing separately
or apart from objects, it must mean, &quot;Whatever
objects have the attribute A have the attribute B.&quot;
And what is this but the major premise of the old
syllogistic formula? The second premise requires
an explanation.
&quot; A given object has the mark A :
&quot;
this object may be one object or a class of objects.
In order to give the formula a meaning, we must
interpret it,
&quot; Whatever individual or class has the
attribute A has the attribute B
; a given object or
class C has the attribute A
; therefore it has the
attribute B.&quot; The new Dictum and new Syllogistic
formula are just bad versions of the old ones. I




does not bring out the precise relation of the terms
on which the thought proceeds; and the phrase,
&quot; Attribute
A,&quot; requires to be interpreted in order to
have a relevant signification.
But he has given us another form, which he repre
sents as
&quot; an universal type of the reasoning process.
We find it resolvable in all cases into the following
elements : Certain individuals have a given attri
bute ; an individual or individuals resemble the for
mer in certain other attributes
; therefore they re
semble them also in the given attribute.&quot; (Ib. II. m.
7.) It may be observed that the phrase
&quot; co-exist
&quot;
has disappeared, and another and equally vague one
has taken its place ; it is a a resemblance
&quot; in certain
attributes, and in other attributes. It is allowed
that this is not
&quot; conclusive from the mere form of
the expression.&quot; By itself it would sanction falla
cious reasoning quite as readily as valid.
&quot; All men
have immortal souls ; the brutes resemble them in
certain attributes (as instincts and bodily organs) ;
they must also have immortal souls.&quot; We shall see
immediately that Mr. Mill allows that the syllogism
is an admirable test of the validity of reasoning,
which, it is conceded, this alleged
&quot; universal type
&quot;
is not. It wants the essential testing element, the
general rule that guarantees the conclusion, and
which in the syllogistic formula is embodied in the
major premise, the necessity of which is pressed
on us by the Dictum.
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sion as well as in Extension? In answering this
question it should be admitted fully, that reasoning
in Extension may always be translated into reason
ing in Comprehension. The reason of this is very
obvious: it follows from the account given of the
nature of the Concept. Extension always implies
Comprehension ; that is, the objects in the class are
joined in the class by the possession of common
marks :
He who has intelligence and free agency is responsible ;
Man has intelligence and free agency ;
/. Man is responsible.
This reasoning in Extension may be put in Com
prehension
:
Responsibility is an attribute of all who have intelligence and free
agency ;
Intelligence and free agency is an attribute ofman
;
.*. Responsibility is an attribute of man.
Mr. Mill maintains that all reasoning is in Com
prehension, and not in Extension.
&quot; All propositions
into which general names enter, and consequently
all reasonings, are in Comprehension only. Proposi
tions and reasonings may be written in Extension,
but they are always understood in Comprehension.&quot;
(p. 363.) I have granted that, so far as propositions
are concerned, spontaneous thought is chiefly in
Comprehension. In simple affirmation and denial,
we commonly mean to do nothing more than declare
or deny that an object or class of objects has or has324 x REASONING.
not a certain attribute, but without turning the predi
cate into a class-notion, or inquiring whether there
may or may not be other objects, which have or have
not the same attribute. When we say that &quot;the
horse is warm-blooded,&quot; we may be looking exclu
sively to the attribute, without caring, at the time,
whether there are other warm-blooded animals.
But it seems to be different in regard to reasoning,
the uppermost thought in which is always in Ex
tension. It seems to me to be so when, not know
ing whether the horse is or is not warm-blooded,
we call in a middle concept, and argue
&quot;that the
horse being a mammal, and all mammals being
warm-blooded, the horse must be so.&quot; Here we
place the horse in the class mammal, and mammals
among warm-blooded animals, and thus reach the
conclusion. Again, to take an example of negative
reasoning (falling naturally into the second figure) ;
When we argue that
&quot; the rat, not bringing forth its
young by eggs, is not a
reptile,&quot; we find in thought
that the class rats, not being in the class of animals
which bring forth their young by eggs, cannot be in
the class reptiles, which always bring forth their
young by eggs. Here, as in all other cases, we un
derstand the attributive terms such as bringing
forth their young by eggs as class-notions in order
to draw a conclusion. This is seen very clearly
when we have to determine whether our conclusion
should be universal or particular; that is, of the
whole class, or a part. We argue (in the thirdSEASONING. 325
figure) that
&quot; as the connection of soul and body,
though incomprehensible, is yet to be believed, that
therefore not all things, but some things to be
believed are incomprehensible;&quot; and how do we
reach this conclusion ? Because in thought we have
made a class of
&quot;
things to be believed,&quot; and found
that in this class are things incomprehensible.
1
Such considerations convince me that our sponta
neous reasoning is in Extension. I allow that Sir W.
Hamilton has furnished a valuable contribution to
Logic by exhibiting the forms of reasoning in Com
prehension. But I look on these as secondary and
derived, and not entitled to the same primary rank
as those in Extension. Most logicians teachers
and taught have shrunk from his 108 Modes as
being an oppressive burden on the mind, both on its
memory and its intellectual apprehension. I am in
clined to think that all the purposes of Logic will be
accomplished by retaining the old forms of reasoning
in Extension, and showing how, when any end is to
be served, they can be turned into the forms of
Comprehension. As to Mr. Mill, he has got a partial
and imperfect view of reasoning in Comprehension,
but has not taken the trouble of showing us how his
theory is adequate to explain the processes of spon
taneous reasoning.
He utters an emphatic denial regarding the syl
logistic form and its rules, that they are not
&quot; the
1 Mr. Kidd, in his very able work, conception of a class is present in
A Delineation of the Primary Princi- every instance of reasoning.&quot;
pies of Reasoning, shows, p. 121,
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form and the rules according to which our reason*
ings are necessarily, or even usually, made.&quot; But all
wise logicians have allowed that in spontaneous
reasoning persons have not before them the Dictum
of Aristotle, and still less the modes and figures of
the syllogism. The former of these is the regula
tive principle of reasoning, and the latter are ex
pressions constructed to test the validity of ratioci
nation. What I maintain is that the mind in all
reasoning grasps the three notions, that is, things
apprehended, and the relation between them. We
see a new kind of leaf that never fell under our
view before, and we notice that it is netted in its
veins, and we infer that the plant on which it grew
must be dicotyledonous
: we do so on the principle,
gathered probably from botanical books, that all
netted-veined plants are dicotyledons ; and we see
the relation of
&quot; this plant, having netted leaves, and
being dicotyledonous.&quot; But we do not enounce the
Dictum, nor do we spread out major, minor, and
conclusion. We leave all this to logicians, who
construct a reflex science out of a spontaneous
process.
He makes two most important admissions in favor
of the syllogistic analysis. One is that all reasoning
can be reduced to the formula of the syllogism ; and
the other, that this formula is admirably fitted to ex
pose invalid reasoning. The value of the syllogistic
form, and of the rules of using it correctly, is said to
consist
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those reasonings may always be represented, and
which is admirably calculated, if they are inconclu
sive, to bring their inconclusiveness to
light.&quot; But I
ask, how does it happen that all our reasoning can
be reduced to this form ? How is it that it comes
to test so admirably the conclusiveness and inclusive-
ness of all reasoning? It is surely strange that
there is a rule to which all reasoning is conformable,
and which acts as a criterion of all reasoning, and
yet is not the natural law of reasoning. I believe
that all arguments can be made to take this form,
because it is the right one. I believe it is a crucial
test of the soundness or unsoundness of all argu
ments, because it is the law of thought, springing
from the mental constitution with which our Maker
has endowed us.
I suppose Mr. Mill would account for the conform
ableness of all reasoning to the syllogistic form, and
for its aptness to act as a test, by saying that, though
all reasoning is naturally in Comprehension, it can
be represented in Extension. But if this be so, it
would show, I think, that propositions and reasoning
must, contrary to what Mr. Mill alleges, have a
meaning in Extension as well as in Comprehension.
And if reasoning be naturally in Comprehension,
we should expect that formulae drawn out on that
principle must be better fitted than those derived
from Extension to exhibit the validity or invalid
ity of arguments. Mr. Mill has, unfortunately, not
favored us with a development of the forms of rea-328 REASONING.
soning according to Comprehension. We are there
fore not in a position to say whether these would or
would not be superior, as a means of testing infer
ence, to those furnished in the old Logic. I am con
vinced that such forms, constructed even by so clear
a thinker as Mr. Mill, would have a more artificial,
a more twisted and translated look, and would be
far less fitted to expose fallacies in reasoning. I
rather think that we should have to translate them
back into Extension before we could fully recognize
their meaning. Looking upon reasoning as proceed
ing naturally by classification, rather than attribu
tion, I maintain that the great body of logicians,
from Aristotle downwards, have acted properly in
drawing out their formulae according to Extension,
and that it is when they are thus drawn out that
they are most easily understood and readily applied.
Mr. Mill has made a most important admission (p.
429):
&quot;The propositions in Extension, being, in
this sense, exactly equivalent to the judgments in
Comprehension, served quite as well to ground forms
of ratiocination upon: and as the validity of the
forms was more easily and conveniently shown
through the concrete conception of comparing classes
of objects, than through the abstract one of recogniz
ing co-existence of attributes, logicians were per
fectly justified in taking the course which, in any
case, the established forms of language would doubt
less have forced upon them.&quot; The two circumstances,
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veniently shown by comparing &quot;classes/ and that
the established forms of language, which are ex
pressions of the natural processes of the mind, would
have forced an expression according to classes on
logicians, is surely a presumption, if not a proof, that
the forms in extension are the development of spon
taneous thought.
&quot; I believe that, in point of fact, when drawing in:
ferences from our personal experience, and not from
maxims handed down to us by books or tradition, we
much oftener conclude from particulars to particulars
directly, than through the intermediate agency ofany
general proposition.&quot; Now, nearly all philosophers
have allowed that the mind begins its observations
with particulars, or, to use a better phrase, singulars.
Having observed a number of individuals, it can
reach a general conclusion
; but it is only by a pro
cess which the logician should fully unfold. Having
observed or heard that crows everywhere are black,
we conclude that the crow which we hear, without
seeing, is black. But we can argue thus only on the
condition that the induction is such as to justify the
general proposition that all crows are black. The
syllogism is so admirable a means of bringing to
light the inconclusiveness of fallacious reasoning,
just because it requires the general proposition to
be expressed in one of the premises.
&quot; All inference is from particulars to particulars ;
general propositions are merely registers of such in
ferences already
i lade, and short formulas for mak-330 BEASONING.
ing more.&quot; He thinks that the error of the syllo
gistic theory arises from not distinguishing between
&quot;the inferring part and the registering part, and
ascribing to the latter the functions of the former.&quot;
Now I admit that the general proposition may be
the record or register of a previous induction. And
if there has been reasoning in the process of induc
tion by which this has been reached, there must
have been a prior general proposition got by an ear
lier induction, or given by intuition. But in any
given argument we do not look to the previous ac
cumulation of particulars, but to the register em
bodied in a general proposition. The general prop
osition is certainly no part of the inference, but it
is an essential part of the assumption from which
we infer the conclusion, and should therefore have a
distinct place allotted to it in the premises. Mr.
Mih
1
has a partial view of the truth when he says
(Ib. c. iv.),
&quot;In drawing this inference, we conform
to a formula which we have adopted for our guid
ance in such operations, and which is a record of the
criteria by which we thought we had ascertained
that we might distinguish when the inference could
and when it could not be drawn.&quot; In any given
argument, as an argument, all that we have to do is
to look to this register, or record, or general prop
osition. If doubts arise as to its accuracy, we must
go back on the processes by which we reached it ;
and if there be reasoning in the processes, we must
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settled, the general proposition in which it is an
nounced is implied in the argument, and should
therefore have a place in the formula of reasoning.
We have already noticed that
&quot; universal type of the
reasoning process/ according to which we find that
&quot; certain individuals have a given attribute, and that
an individual or individuals resemble the former in
certain attributes, and therefore resemble them in
the given attribute.&quot; We remarked upon the vague
ness of this type as leaving us in doubt as to what
are the &quot;certain attributes&quot; which entitle us to
infer the presence of the
&quot;
given attribute.&quot; It is
the general proposition embodied in the major prem
ise, which spreads out the rules which, when we
take the minor premise along with it, entitles us
to draw the conclusion.
But it is asked, if all reasoning implies a major
proposition, where do we get our first major, that
with which we start? Aristotle did not overlook
this question, and he answered it. He tells us again
and again that the beginning of demonstration can
not be demonstration, and that all demonstration
carries us back to Intuitive Eeason (vov$, see Anal.
Post., i. 3, 22, 23). In certain acts of reasoning,
primitive perceptions, such as &quot;the effect has a
cause,&quot; give us the one proposition, and ordinary
observation the other, and the two necessitate the
conclusion. But in far the greater number of argu
ments the general proposition is the result of a
gathered observation. The criteria of these gath-332 SEASONING.
ered or inductive general laws will come under our
notice in next chapter.
&quot; The child, who, having burnt his fingers, avoids
to thrust them again into the fire, has reasoned or
inferred, though he has never thought of the general
maxim, Fire burns. He knows from memory that
he has been burnt, and on this evidence believes,
when he sees a candle, that if he puts his finger
into the flame of it, he will be burnt again. He
believes this in every case which happens to arise
;
but without looking, in each instance, beyond the
present case. He is not generalizing ; he is infer
ring a particular from particulars. In the same way,
also, brutes reason.&quot;
&quot; Not only the burnt child, but
the burnt dog dreads the fire.&quot; I am inclined to
think that in these cases, that of the child and the
dog, the process is very much one of the association
of ideas and feelings. The fire and the sensation
have been together, and upon the fire presenting
itself there is a tendency to a feeling which causes
shrinking. There is really no conclusion from ob
served, from remembered, from gathered particulars.
Should the fire only once have burnt the child, it
will turn away from it, possibly without remember
ing the previous case, certainly without an induction
of particulars, or an inference from them.
I have called attention to the circumstances that
while Judgment and Association are not the same,
they do yet conspire in their action, (pp. 195, 196,
222, 223.) I have now to apply this remark toREASONING. 333
reasoning and suggestion. Inference is not to be
confounded with mere association. In all reasoning
there is comparison, there is the perception of a
relation between things about which we reason.
Thus we argue,
&quot;A deer, being horned, is ruminant.&quot;






&quot; are among rumi
nant animals.&quot; Unless there be a positive percep
tion of the connection of the things, there is no rea
soning. .Herein is argument at once distinguished
from association, which does not imply any connec
tion between the things which have been together
in the mind, any comparison, or any observed rela
tion. But while the two mental operations are not
the same, association greatly helps reasoning. In
all inference there is a discovered relation, and the
related things may often have been together, and
thus the one tends to suggest the others. Some
think that it is a native law of the mind that cor
related things, such as like things, and cause and
effect, call up each other. However we may ac
count for it, whether from things being often
together or an original tendency, correlated things
come up simultaneously, altogether independent of
our observing the relation. Indeed, it is often the
circumstance that they have come up together
which invites or constrains us to notice the connec
tion. Now all this helps us to conduct the operation
of reasoning. Thus fire suggests the burning sensa
tion, and we collect cases till we reach the general334 SEASONING.
truth that fire burns, and then the process may
become one of inference. It is in this way we are
to account for the readiness, the rapidity, and for
what is often called the unconsciousness of the
reasoning process. The laws of association call up
correlated objects, and the mind perceives the cor












&quot; and perceiving the class relation of the
terms, we draw the conclusion that horned animals
are ruminant.
I believe that very much of what some regard as
reasoning in the brute creatures arises from mere
association, without the relation of the things being
discovered. In like manner the laws of suggestion
operate in children to excite fears and expectations,
before there are those observed relations which
must enter into reasoning. All our lives we act on
impulses produced by mere association, without any
accompanying argument. A loud noise will raise up
fear, without our having inferred that it proceeds
from a cause implying danger. The person who has
been seriously hurt by a horse or dog can never look
on a horse or dog without a feeling of tremor. In
such mental action I admit that there is no class-
notion, no general proposition, no regulating princi
ple of Extension. But just as little is there an in
duction of particulars, or attribution, or reasoning
in Comprehension ; there is no such process asSEASONING. 335
&quot;Attribute A being a mark of Attribute B, and C
having the mark A.&quot; But then it is one aim of in
tellectual teaching, and one very special end of
Logic, to raise us above the animal state and the
infant state
; to keep us from being driven along
passively by more casual associations
; and train the
mind to look narrowly into the relations of things
that pass before it, and of which it must have some
conception, that it may thereby reach sound conclu
sions which can be justified. In all such processes
of real reasoning, it will be found that there is a
general proposition involved, and this should have a
place in the formula which systematizes the sponta
neous operation.
But Mr. Mill tells us that &quot;in every syllogism
considered as an argument to prove the conclusion,
there is a petitio principii.&quot; But did any one ever
maintain that the syllogism is
&quot; an argument to
prove the conclusion ?
&quot;
It has usually been repre
sented as the form to which the argument can be
reduced. The petitio principii is a fallacious mode
of reasoning ; but the syllogism cannot with any
possible propriety be represented as a mode of
reasoning, valid or fallacious, for it is not reasoning,
but the formula of reasoning. I suppose Mr. Mill
meant to affirm that all reasoning in syllogistic form
involves a petitio. If so, then he is caught in
inextricable toils, for he admits that all rea
soning can be reduced to syllogistic form, which
seems to imply that it involves a begging of the336 REASONING.
question. The petitio principii is a fallacy in which
one of the premises is either the same as the con
clusion, or depends upon
it. But in reasoning, ac
cording to the syllogistic analysis, the conclusion
follows, not from one of the premises, but from the
two, or rather from the relations between the things
compared and the premises. It is when the rela
tions predicated in the two propositions are brought
before the mind that we see the force of the infer
ence. We wish to determine what we are not
expressly told in the gospels whether the Baptist
was a priest
: give us only one premise, as, that
&quot; the
Baptist was the son of a
priest,&quot; or, that
&quot; the sons
of priests were priests, and we can infer nothing ;
but place the two together, and the conclusion
is necessitated. The one of these premises is a
particular fact, the other is a general proposition, and
both are necessary to the validity of the conclusion.
Both premises are, in the reasoning, assumptions
they must be given or granted ; but neither of them
is an assumption of the conclusion
; the two are as
sumptions which warrant the conclusion. As to
whether the assumptions are or are not warranted, this
is to be determined by a previous investigation, to be
tested by the criteria of induction, intuition, or rea
soning. And it should be forever pressed on Mr.
Mill, that the objections he brings against the Dic
tum of Aristotle are quite as applicable to his own.
&quot;
Things which co-exist with one and the same thing
co-exist with one another
;
&quot;
this is quite as much aBEASONING. 337
truism as the old Dictum, while it is much more
vague ; and reasoning proceeding upon it must be
quite as liable to the charge of being a begging of
the question, as reasoning according to the syllogis
tic formula.
It should not be omitted that Mr. Mill does not
enter upon any special consideration of the nature
of Conditional Seasoning, whether Hypothetical or
Disjunctive. This is a great defect in a work which
professes to give us a full Logic of Inference. There
are very important questions started as to the regu
lating principle of Conditional Arguments, and these
should be discussed in every logical treatise worthy
of these advanced times. He tells us, in his &quot;Ex
amination of Hamilton,&quot; that a Hypothetical Judg
ment is
&quot; a judgment concerning judgments ;
&quot; but
he does not attempt to enounce the principle which
connects the &quot;judgment
&quot; with the &quot;judgments
&quot; with
which it is concerned. He further lets us know that
he looks on a Disjunctive Judgment as compounded
of two or more Hypotheticals, but he does not in
form us what is the relation of these Hypotheticals
to one another, (pp. 454, 455.) I confess I should
like to see his attributive theory of reasoning tried
by its application to Conditional, and specially to
Disjunctive reasoning. When we argue that &quot;the
season when a particular event took place not hav
ing been spring, summer, or autumn, must have
been winter,&quot; we seem to proceed on the principle
of Division, which is made according to the Exten-
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sion and not the Comprehension of a concept. But
I allude to these topics here, not in order to discuss
them, but to show that as Mr. Mill has avoided the
discussion, he cannot be said to furnish a full system
of Logic.CHAPTER XVII.
SECONDARY LOGIC ; OR THOUGHT AS DIRECTED TO PARTICU
LAR CLASSES OP OBJECTS.
I
AM inclined to justify Mr. Mill in introducing into
the science other topics besides those treated
of in what we may call Primary Logic. The effort
made by certain purists to exclude such matters as
Demonstration, Induetion, and Evidence generally,
must fail, and ought to fail. It is of vast moment
to have these subjects discussed in a scientific man
ner, and Logic is the field for the discussion ; and
our definitions of the science are too narrow if they
exclude them, and should be so widened as to give
them an acknowledged place. In treating of such
topics, or at least two of them, Induction and Evi
dence, our author occupies a far more distinguished
place than he does in Formal Logic. Still, even in
this department, his work, while possessed of great
merits, may be charged with grave errors, springing,
I believe, from his mistaken views of fundamental
truth.
I have commented already (Chap, xii.) on his ac
count of Necessary Truth generally. His defective
appreciation of intuition has led him to an errone-340 SECONDARY LOGIC.
ous exposition of the nature and office of Mathe
matical Definitions and Axioms. (Logic, n. v.-vii.)
Definitions are represented as hypotheses, and the
necessity of the truths derived from them consists
in the relation between the supposition and the con
clusions drawn from it. &quot;Axioms are experimental
truths
; generalizations from observation. The prop
osition, Two straight lines cannot enclose a space
or in other words, Two straight lines which have
once met, do not meet again, but continue to di
verge is an induction from the evidence of our
senses.&quot;
I reckon these views as radically erroneous. Defi
nitions are Abstracts, that is, things abstracted from
known concrete realities. A line is length without
breadth, that is, we consider the length without
regarding the breadth. A superficies has breadth
and length without depth, that is, in all reasoning
we agree to look to the length and breadth without
taking the depth into account. But Mr. Mill tells
us
&quot; there exist no real things exactly conformable
to the definition
&quot; there exist no lines without
breadth, no surfaces without depth. I admit that
there can be no such lines or surfaces with a sepa
rate or independent existence. But still they have
a reality; they have a reality in extended objects
which have, besides, length and breadth. Man s
mind is so constituted that he can think about
them, and draw deductions from them. But he tells
us, &quot;A line, as defined by geometers, is wholly in-SECONDARY LOGIC. 341
conceivable,&quot; where the word that covers so much
confusion appears once more, and in his latest edi
tion. We certainly cannot image such a line, but
we can image an extended object, and think about
its length. I believe that all further mathematical
truths are derived from Definitions. But when I
say so, I do not mean that they are obtained from
ideas in the mind, but from things abstracted from
concrete realities, and having a reality in existing
concrete objects. As there is a reality in the things
defined, so there is also a reality in all the conclu
sions logically drawn from them. The deductions
derived two thousand years ago from the definition
of the ellipse, are found to be realized in the plane
tary bodies, so far as they move in elliptic orbits.
I cannot see how this should follow, unless the thing
defined had been a reality.
Mr. Mill thinks that demonstrative truths follow
from Postulates and not Definitions. We postulate
that there may be a line with length without
breadth, and get deductions from our assumptions.
True, in all deduction the premises are assumptions,
but in mathematical definitions the assumptions are
abstracted realities. Here, as in so many other de
partments, his acuteness has given him a partial
view of the truth, and he says that
&quot; our reasonings
are grounded upon matters of fact in our defini
tions.&quot; When I say that mathematical demonstra
tion is founded upon definitions, I mean upon the
matters of fact or things defined, which no doubt342 SECONDARY LOGIC.
are postulated, but postulated as realities, giving us
corresponding realities in all legitimate deductions
from them. To support his confused theory, he is
obliged to give a twofold view of definitions. The
definition of a triangle, he says, obviously comprises
not one but two propositions perfectly distinguisha
ble. The one is,
&quot; There may exist a figure bound
ed by three straight lines;&quot; and the other, &quot;this
figure may be termed a triangle.&quot; But there is
no advantage secured, in the way of clearing our
thoughts or otherwise, by drawing such a distinction ;
for demonstration relates throughout not to the word,
but the thing, a figure bounded by three straight lines.
He argues that definitions, as such, are the premises
only in the reasonings which relate to words, and
that if we take any other view, &quot;we might argue
correctly from true premises, and arrive at a false
conclusion.&quot; Thus let the definition be,
&quot;A dragon
is a serpent breathing flame
;
&quot; out of this we may
carve the following syllogism
:
&quot;A dragon is a thing
which breathes flame ; but a dragon is a serpent
:
therefore, some serpents breathe flame,&quot;
&quot; in which
both premises are true, and yet the conclusion
false.&quot; But surely the premises are here true or
false according to what we understand as to the
objects compared. If we are speaking throughout
of imaginary things, the conclusion is true in the
same sense as the premises are. If we are speak
ing of actually existing things, both the premises
and the conclusion are false. After what I haveSECONDARY LOGIC. 348
said in regard to necessary truth (Chap, xii.), it is
not necessary to dwell on his theory of Mathemati
cal Axioms. They are represented as mere general
izations of an outward experience. I believe, indeed,
that in the axiom in its generalized form there must
be generalization. But they are not generalizations
of an outward or sensible experience. On the bare
contemplation of a whole object, say a table, we
declare it to be larger than a part of it, say its leg.
I do so at once on the mere sight or thought of the
object as known to me, and not from any induction
of particulars falling under my experience in time
past. Perceiving that I would do the same in every
like case, I may generalize the judgment and put it
in the form of an axiom, that
&quot; the whole is greater
than its
part.&quot; But this general truth is not the
generalization of a lengthened experience ; it is not
reached by our having observed a thousand times or
ten thousand times that a whole thing is greater
than a part of the same thing
: we see it at once on
the bare inspection of any one thing; our convic
tion could not be made stronger by multiplying ex
amples ; and we cannot allow that there should be
an exception. I may have observed of ten thousand
plants with netted leaves, that they have all sprung
from two seed-lobes, and I feel justified in laying
down the general rule, that
&quot; netted-leaved plants
are dicotyledonous ;
&quot; but the law is reached by a
gathered experience. I do not assert that it can
have no exceptions ; and when I learn that there is344 SECONDARY LOGIC.
a tribe of plants (including Arum, etc.) which have
netted leaves, and yet spring from one seed-lobe, I
may wonder at the fact, but I do not say that it
is impossible. But the mind having discovered,
from its knowledge of the nature of things, that the
whole is greater than a part, I cannot be made to
allow that there is anywhere an exception. To
apply these remarks to mathematical truth: In
proceeding with its demonstrations, the mind pro
nounces its judgments immediately on the objects
defined being presented to it, and it does not need
the axiom in its generalized form; indeed it feels
the force of the reasoning quite as clearly before as
after the maxim is announced. In learning geome
try, the beginner seems to discover the truth of the
axiom from the judgment pronounced in a given
case, rather than to recognize the validity of the
argument in the particular example by the maxim.
Still the axiom is the expression of the regulating
principle of reasoning, and it serves important pur
poses to enunciate it at the commencement of the
demonstration. It is one of the greatest defects of
Mr. Mill s work on Logic, that in consequence of
mistaking the nature and functions of definitions
and axioms, he has not been able to give a correct
account of the Method employed in Demonstration.
That Method I call the Joint Dogmatic and Deduc
tive. I call it Dogmatic, for it begins with assump
tions, with truths not proven, with truths perceived
by intuition; and I call it Deductive, for it drawsSECONDARY LOGIC. 345
other truths from its assumptions. The criteria of
its assumptions are the tests of intuitive truth, that
is, Self-Evidence and Necessity; the criteria of its
deductions are the forms of reasoning.
Mr. Mill s Book on Induction is far the most valu
able part of his Logic ; it contains the best exposi
tion which we have of the Method of Induction in
our own or in any other language. His Canons of
Causes are a great improvement upon the Preroga
tive Instances of Bacon, and are an advance upon
the rules proposed by Sir J. Herschel. But, while
he has admirably expounded the functions of Pre
rogative Instances or Canons in physical science, he
does not seem to see what is the precise logical pur
pose, that is, the purpose in thought, served by them.
Induction consists of two parts
: the gathering of
individual facts, which, however numerous, must
always be limited
; and the derivation from them of
a law announced in a general proposition. In the
first of these there is no special exercise of reason
ing ; the whole is the work of observation and trained
sagacity. But in the derivation of the law from
the scattered and incomplete facts there is inference.
Now, what is it that justifies the inference ? If there
be any truth in the Aristotelian or syllogistic analy
sis, there must be a general principle involved,
which, when the reasoning is put in syllogistic form,
becomes the major premise. Now, such rules as
these, involved in the Prerogative Instances of Ba
con, and the Canons of Mr. Mill, are the general346 SECONDARY LOGIC.
propositions which supply the major premise and the
particular set of facts give us the minor premise ; and
the two necessitate the conclusion. I drank brandy
on Monday, Wednesday, and Saturday, and had a
headache the succeeding mornings; I drank no
brandy on Sunday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday,
and had no headache on the following days. When
I conclude that my drinking brandy was the cause
of the headache, I have, as my major premise, such
a general proposition as the Canon of Difference :
&quot;If, in comparing cases in which the effect takes
place with other cases in which it does not take
place, we find the latter to have every antecedent in
common with the former except one, that one cir
cumstance is the cause, or a part of the cause
;
&quot; and
as my minor premise, the facts as constituting such
a case; and the conclusion follows syllogistically.
The excellence of Mr. Mill s Canons is, that they are
the simplest and most complete yet enunciated of
the general principles which guide us in rising from
the collection of individual facts to the causes. Had
Mr. Mill clearly perceived that there is reasoning in
all induction, he would have been prevented from re
versing the natural order by representing the rea
soning process as an induction.
But the discovery of causes is not the sole end of
science. In some departments the object is to re
solve the compounds of nature into their elements.
This is one of the main ends sought in chemistry,
and also in psychology. There should, therefore,SECONDARY LOGIC.
be Canons of Composition
1 as well as Canons of
Causes.
In another important group of sciences, those
called the Classificatory by Dr. Whewell, the end
sought is not the discovery of Causes or of Com
position, but of Classes
; that is, Natural Classes.
2 I
mention these things to show that, while Mr. Mill
has given us the best exposition we yet have of the
Logic of Induction, he has by no means completed
1 In the absence of an attempt by
any Logician to supply them, we may
give the folowing
: (1.) We have de
composed a compound when we have
decomposed it in separation from all
other substances. (2.) Having found
the elements of a compound in one
case, we have found them in all. A
caution requires to be added, that the
elements reached are to be regarded
as such merely provisionally. The
first rule theoretically guards against
a mistake, which is difficult to avoid in
practice. The second shows that one
decisive experiment may settle the
whole question of the decomposition
of a substance. Hence it is that in
Chemistry we may not require a large
induction, such as is necessary in Nat
ural History and many departments
of Natural Philosophy. As Chemis
try did not exist in the days of Bacon,
he does not seem to have contemplated
the possibility of so rapid a method of
reaching a law
; and his rules as to the
necessity of a wide induction, and the
gradual rising from particulars to mi
nor, middle, and major axioms do not
apply to this science, at least in its
present advanced stage, though I
rather think they did at its earlier
stages, before the nature of chemical
affinity had been ascertained. The cau
tion guards us against concluding,
when we have reached certain compo
nents, we must have got the ultimate
elements. Every chemist allows that
these sixty elements are to be esteemed
such, merely till there has been a suc
cessful decomposition of them.
2 The following Canons of Classes
may serve till better are furnished :
(1.) We have found the resemblance
among the objects in many and varied
cases. (2.) We must be in circum
stances to say that if there be excep
tions we should most probably have
fallen in with them. These two rules
will prevent us from drawing rash gen
eralizations from a few cases, or cases
confined to a limited region. But in
order to determine whether the class is
or is not a Natural Class, AVC require a
more important rule. (3.) The class
maybe regarded as a natural one when
it is one of Kinds ; that is, when the
possession of one mark is a sign of a
number of others. Thus we may
reckon Mammal as a Natural Class ;
for though founded on the single cir
cumstance of the animals belonging to
it suckling their young, it is found that
this characteristic is a sign of others,
as, that they are warm-blooded, and
that their heart has four compartments.
Such Orders as Kammculaceae, Cruci-
feriB, Rosaceae, are obviously Natural
Classes, for the plants included in each
have a number of resembling points.348 SECONDARY LOGIC.
the investigation. Much remains to be done by
other men and by other ages.
There has been an important discussion between
Dr. Whewell and Mr. Mill as to whether we may
now expect more from the Method of Induction or
of Deduction. Mr. Mill maintains that in most de
partments of science our hope of discovery lies more
in Deduction than in the Induction of Bacon. On
the other hand, Dr. Whewell holds that, whatever
may be the case with the social sciences, in the
physical sciences discoveries may be expected to be
made in time to come, as they have been in time
past, by a patient induction. Much confusion has
crept into this controversy from the circumstance
that these two eminent men have not come to an
agreement as to what is involved in the processes
about which they dispute. According to Mr. Mill,
the Deductive Method consists of three operations
:
the first, one of direct induction
; the second of
ratiocination
5 and the third of verification. (Logic,
m. xi.) Now of these three steps, the first, the di
rect induction of particulars, and also the third, the
verification by facts, are essentially inductive
; they
consist in collecting facts, with the view of deter
mining the law of the facts. What Mr. Mill calls
Deductive, I am inclined to designate the Joint In
ductive and Deductive Method. In those depart
ments of science which are yet in their infancy, we
must trust mainly to a careful collection of facts,
and allow the facts to suggest the law, at which weSECONDARY LOGIC. 349
may not yet be able even to guess. But in ad
vanced sciences in which laws have been established,
and are ready to form the general or major proposi
tion, advances may be expected mainly from the
combination of Deduction with Induction. Dr. Whe-
well and Mr. Mill have both done much to unfold
the steps of this Joint Method. But much yet re
mains to be done, by showing what is the separate
province of each, and how they may be combined
so as best to yield the wished-for results in the dif
ferent departments of science.CHAPTER XVIII.
LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS : THE PROVINCE OF LOGIC.
IN
this country Formal Logic is dealt with in four
different ways at this present time.
I. By some it is reckoned antiquated and ex
ploded, and never referred to without a sneer.
Though these persons are not likely to attend to me,
or favor me with an answer, yet I beg to ask them
whether it would not be very desirable to have a Logic
to unfold the laws of thought, and direct thought in
its various walks in which it is so apt to err ? If
they can be induced to reply candidly in the affirma
tive, I would then invite them to look into what
earnest and able thinkers have done ; and I would
show them how the Aristotelian Logic has cast up
again^and again, in spite of all efforts to suppress it ;
and that no other Logic has stood longer than a
single age
: in particular, no one now sets any value
on the attempts that were made to construct a
logical science by the school of Locke and the
school of Condillac.
n. There are those who accept the Aristotelian
Logic without criticism or modification. Most of
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these are inclined to accept it in the form in which
it is put by Whately, who, by his new and fresh
illustrations and examples, threw such life into the
bones which had become dry. The mastering of
Whately s Elements is certainly a most profitable
gymnastic to all young men, and is fitted to exer
cise a salutary influence upon their intellectual
habits, which is likely to continue with them all
their lives. But those who have a taste for the
study ought not to content themselves with such an
elementary exposition ; they should go on to make
themselves acquainted with the discussions in our
day in regard to logical forms
; and neither young
nor advanced students must be allowed to forget
that we have now a Logic of Induction quite as
important as the Logic of Deduction.
III. There is a British modification of the Logic
of Kant which has able supporters, the leader hav
ing been Sir W. Hamilton, who has had able and
learned fellow-workers in Dr. Mansel and Archbishop
Thomson. The Logic of this school has many excel
lences. It has allotted a distinct and intelligible
province to the science, which is described as that of
the Laws of Thought. It has so defined the depart
ment as to make it embrace the Concept and the
Judgment, as well as Reasoning. Sir W. Ham
ilton has revived the distinction between the Ex
tension and Comprehension of the Concept, and has
evolved and applied it in a more scientific manner
than was ever done before. Not satisfied with the352 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS:
Dictum of Aristotle as the one and universal regulat
ing principle of reasoning, the school is seeking to
enunciate a wider Canon, and important minor rules
derived from it. It has successfully shown that
reasoning may be put in the form of comprehension as
well as Extension. It has subjected all the forms of
reasoning, Categorical and Conditional, to a sifting
examination, which has introduced greater scientific
accuracy into the technicalities of Primary Logic.
With unsurpassed acuteness and erudition, Dr. Man-
sel has introduced us to important Aristotelian and
scholastic distinctions. Archbishop Thomson has
given us an admirable chapter on Language as the
instrument of thought, has clearly expounded the
distinction between Substitutive and Attributive
Judgments (though he has not seen what is
the precise nature of the forms), and drawn
out a comprehensive scheme of Immediate Infer
ences.
But on the other hand the Logic of the school is
tainted throughout with the false metaphysics of
Kant, and should not be accepted without important
explanations and modifications. It proceeds all
along on the principle that there are subjective
forms in the mind itself, which impose on objects as
we think about them, much that is not in the objects
themselves. From this general error there arise
several particular ones.
(1.) The school represent Logic as an & priori
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an important explanation which changes the whole
theory. It is all true that the mind in logical
thought proceeds according to native principles.
But the principles, as general rules, are not before
consciousness. It is upon the bare inspection and
comprehension of the case before it that the mind
proceeds in the exercises of thought. It being un
derstood that a crocodile is a reptile, and that all
reptiles bring forth their young by eggs, we at once
conclude that the crocodile must do so
; but without
having consciously before us the Dictum, that what
ever is predicated of a class may be predicated of all
that is contained in the class. It needs objects to
call the native capacities of the mind into exercise.
Not only so, but the exercises are always individual.
It is by a process of generalization that we derive
the general law from the individual cases; and as
there may be oversights and inaccuracies in the
generalization, so there may be discussions and
disputes about the expression of the general law.
The laws of thought may be in the mind a priori,
but we cannot discover and unfold them & priori.
In order to find the general principles of logical
thought, and to construct a science of Logic, there
must be a careful and extensive observation of
thought as directed to objects, and various classes of
objects.
(2.) Kant represents Logic as
&quot;
making abstrac
tion of all content of the cognition of the understand
ing and of the difference of objects, and having to do
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only with the form of thought.&quot; Sir W. Hamilton
makes a like statement :
&quot;
Logic is conversant with
the form of thought to the exclusion of the matter.&quot;
(Logic,
i. 15.) Now this account contains both a
truth and an error. It is quite true that Logic does
not look to the objects of thought, but to thought
:
but it is equally true that thought must be employed
about objects. If Logic, then, considers thought, it
must consider thought as employed about objects,
only it considers the thought and not the objects.
Taking this view, we see that we are warranted
(though, perhaps, Kant was not according to his
principles) in adopting the division of the science,
which we shall explain further on in this chapter,
into Universal and Particular Logic.
(3.) From the same mistaken view of thought,
the whole school represent the Notion or Concep
tion as being formed by the mind, according to a
priori laws, not altogether independent of objects,
but imposing on objects what is not in them. Ham
ilton speaks of
&quot; an act of thought as the recogni
tion of a thing as coming under a concept ;&quot; and
again,
&quot;
Thought is a knowledge of a thing through
a concept or general notion, or of one notion
through another.&quot; (Ib. p. 43.) This language pro
ceeds on the idea that there is a concept prior to the
thing, above the thing, and ready to be imposed
upon it, so as to shape and color it. But surely the
correct statement is not that thought is through a
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on the contemplation of things. The General No
tion is fashioned by the mind on the apprehension
of objects, by putting together the objects, real or
potential, having common properties.
(4.) The whole Kantian school omits the Abstract
Notion in the construction of logical science. Sir
W. Hamilton, indeed, gives a brief but correct ac
count of it in his Metaphysics (Lect. xxxv.), showing
that it implies comparison, and that
&quot; there is noth
ing necessarily connected with generalization in ab
straction.&quot; But in his Logic, the laws which he lays
down apply only to the Concept or General Notion.
This omission not only leads to a defective account
of Simple Apprehension in the first part of Formal
Logic, but makes him overlook a class of judgments
and a species of reasoning in which the terms are
abstract.
(5.) In consequence of neglecting to give the Ab
stract Notion a separate place, Sir W. Hamilton and
Archbishop Thomson have been led to represent
every Notion as having Extension and Comprehen
sion. Now, these are properties exclusively of the
General Notion. The Abstract Notion, say tranquil
lity, cannot be said to have Extension, for it denotes
not objects, but an attribute.
(6.) In a previous chapter I have shown that Sir W.
Hamilton has not unfolded fully nor accurately the
nature and the relations of the things compared in
Logical Judgment. He represents the comparison
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products, whereas it is between concepts as things
conceived. He vacillates in the account which he
gives of the relation discovered between the con
cepts, speaking of it at times as being identity, at
other times as that of whole and parts, and in some
places as equality.
(7.) One of Sir W. Hamilton s supposed improve
ments in Formal Logic consists in his insisting that
the predicate should always be quantified ; that is,
declared to be either universal or particular. Thus
the proposition,
&quot;All men are mortal,&quot; he would
write,
&quot; All men are some mortals.&quot; He defends this
on the general principle, that whatever is in thought
should be unfolded in the statement which professes
to express thought. I admit the principle, but I do
not admit that it requires the predicate to be quan
tified. For I have endeavored to show that in by
far the greater number of propositions the upper
most thought is in Comprehension, and we do not
think at all of the Extension. When we say
&quot; The
dog barks,&quot; we mean that the dog is engaged in the
act of barking, and we may not think of a class
of barking animals; we certainly do not trouble
ourselves with inquiring whether there are or are
not other animals that bark. Even in propositions
in which the Extension is in the thought, we do not
always settle whether the subject is or is not co
extensive with the predicate. Thus, when we say
&quot;Man is rational,&quot; we may not have determined
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besides man. It is sufficient to lead us to form the
judgment that man has the attribute rationality, or
that he is in the class rational, whether this class in
clude other beings or not. I hold that in the vast
majority of propositions the predicate is not quanti
fied in thought. I urge, further, in opposition to the
doctrine, that in those propositions in which the
terms are abstract, the predicate, properly speaking,
has no quantity or extension, for it is not a class-
notion. When we say that 3X^ = 9, neither sub
ject nor predicate has an indefinite number of ob
jects embraced in it. I admit that in reasoning,
when the predicate is known to be distributed, we
can convert the subject into the predicate, and the
predicate into the subject, without any change, and
draw a conclusion which we should not otherwise be
entitled to do. Thus when we have it demonstrated,
both that
&quot; all equilateral triangles are equiangular,&quot;
and that
&quot; all equiangular triangles are equilateral,&quot;
we can, upon a given triangle being found equilate
ral, declare it to be equiangular. Such cases are
worthy of special notice, and might have a separate
place allotted them in logical treatises, but, being so
limited, should not be allowed to change the whole
analytic of reasoning.
(8.) The new Canon of Keasoning adopted by the
school is very vague. It is thus stated in the Outr
lines of the Laws of Thought:
&quot;The agreement
or disagreement of one conception with another is
ascertained by a third conception, inasmuch as this358 LOGICAL DICUSSIONS:
wholly or by the same part, agrees with both, or with





is not explicit ; it does not
specify what the concepts agree or do not agree in.
This defect may be remedied by distinguishing be
tween those cases in which the terms are singular or
abstract, and those in which one at least is general.
In the former the regulating principle is &quot;things
which are the same with, or equal to, one and the
same thing, are the same with, or equal to, one
another.&quot; In the latter, in which we have a general
conception, the main regulating principle is, I believe,
the Dictum, which the founder of Logic propounded.
While this is the main law of thought, I am con
vinced that there may be others involved, such as
that of whole and parts, and of division in all dis
junctive reasoning. A thorough analytic of logical
forms should unfold ah
1
these laws, and give each its
separate place.
(9.) Sir W. Hamilton places reasoning in Compre
hension on the same level as reasoning in Exten
sion, or rather he gives it a prior and higher .posi
tion. I have stated my reasons for thinking that rea
soning is primarily in Extension. It may, indeed,
always be translated into the forms of Comprehen
sion, and it is desirable that students should know
how to do this, and do it when any purpose is to be
served by it. But it is not necessary to burden the
mind with the numerous modes which appear when
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join on the same footing reasoning in Comprehen
sion and reasoning in Extension.
IV. There is a large class who accept implicitly
the Logic of Mr. Mill.
1 These consist chiefly of
persons who are disgusted with the scholastic Logic
as being so abstract and technical, and are not pre
pared to give their adherence to the Kantian refor
mation, as they feel that its forms keep us too far
removed from things. Now, I rejoice to proclaim
that there are remarks, -as true and important as
they are fresh, scattered throughout Mr. Mill s
treatise. In Book First he has many useful observa
tions on Naming, which make us regret the more
that they are indissolubly mixed up with sensational
metaphysics. His Book on Induction is by far the
most valuable part of his work, though it is much
injured by doubtful speculations as to the nature of
our belief in causation.
2 There are practical lessons
of much utility conveyed in his Book on Fallacies,
only it is to be regretted that in pointing out with
so much keenness and relish the errors of the old
philosophy, he leaves unnoticed the still more glaring
fallacies of the nescience and association schools.
1 I should here have referred to the cussion. Students would feel it to be
very able attempt of Prof. De Morgan a great advantage to have his book on
and the late Prof. Boole to give us a Induction in a separate form, and
mathematical theory of reasoning, with the discussions on Intuitions left
But it would take us altogether out of out. This would leave them at
our present line of thought to discuss liberty to get their Formal Logic
it thoroughly, and I think it better not elsewhere, and to resort to his corn-
to enter upon it. plete work when they want to know
2 I regret to see that in the later edi- his theory of the mind and his other
tions Mr. Mill is crowding his work opinions.
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His closing Book is very defective as a full Logic of
the mental and social sciences, more particularly in
not estimating what is involved in man s essential
freedom
; but is of value as the commencement of a
discussion which must grow in interest and impor
tance. I propose to sum up the defects of the work
as gathered from the survey taken in the last four
chapters.
(1.) He denies that Logic is entitled to be
regarded as a separate science.
&quot; So far as it is a
science at all, it is a part or branch of Psychology ;
differing from it on the one hand as a part differs
from the whole, and on the other, as an Art differs
from a Science.&quot; (p. 388.) Now, there is no doubt
that Logic is closely connected with Psychology, is
in fact largely dependent on it for some of its
elementary truths. The same may be said of
Metaphysics, or the science of the laws of intuition
;
of ^Esthetics, or, as I prefer calling it, Kalology, the
science of the laws of the Feelings ; and Ethics, the
science of the laws of our motive and moral nature.
It is no doubt one part of the office of Psychology
to gather from an observation of the operations of
the mind the laws of discursive thought, as it is also to
find out the laws of our immediate perceptions, of
our emotional and moral nature. But having ascer
tained that there are such laws, and shown how they
act in the mind, it does not seek in a special way to
formalize them, to inquire into their relation to
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practical ends. Psychology leaves all this very ap
propriately to the other mental sciences, which are
no doubt her daughters, but have their separate
households, where they are married to their different
objects, each with its own alliances. In particular,
Logic strives to give a strictly scientific form and
expression to the mode of the mind s procedure in
apprehending, judging, and reasoning, and in gather
ing laws and cause
; and from these it draws rules
for the guidance of thought in its various walks of
investigation. Logic has the proper characteristics
of a science
; it is systematized truth, systematized
natural truth.
(2.) He does not give its proper place to the ele
ment of thought. No doubt he has done great ser
vice to the study, by calling our attention to the
objects of thought, which the scholastic and Kantian
logicians had very much declined to look at. But
Logic has not to do with things as things. This it
leaves to other, and what have been called material,
or real, or what in such a connection might be called
objective, sciences. Logic has to do not with objects,
but with thought as employed about objects. If
this distinction is not kept constantly in view, the
logician is ever tempted to mix up physical or psy
chological questions with those that properly belong
to Logic.
(3.) He makes Logic treat of Names, Propositions,
and Arguments, and not, as our more philosophical
logicians make it, with Simple Apprehension, Judg-362 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS:
ment, and Eeasoning. Every one allows that Appre
hensions may be expressed in Names, Judgment in
Propositions, and Eeasoning in Arguments, and that
Logic should look to these incidentally as the ex-
pression of thought. But the science should deal
primarily and throughout with the laws of thought,
always as applied to things, leaving the laws of lan
guage to a special department of science now being
formed. It is to be remembered, that as a term
may consist of one word, or twenty words, we
cannot by merely looking at words so much as
know what the term is
; and that we cannot make
an intelligent predication in a proposition without
knowing the meaning of the terms : all which shows
that Logic should expound thought rather than
names. Nor is it to be forgotten that the laws of
thought constitute the fixed element, while the
names or phrases differ not only in their sound, but
in what they express and embrace in different
languages. And then the forms of language are
often defective, and not unfrequently erroneous, and
need to be amended by the invariable and, I believe,
unerring laws of thought ; which we should endeavor
so to analyze and formalize as to aid the advancing
Science of Language, which will again, as it makes
progress, greatly help the Science of Thought.
(4.) In looking at language instead of thought,
he has given a very imperfect account of the topics
usually expounded in the first part of Formal Logic,
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of examining the various classes of apprehensions,
and carefully distinguishing them, he confines his
own attention and that of his readers to the name
and its connotation, without regard to the notion
which the name expresses, or bringing out accurately
what things, or aspects of things, the notion em
braces in its different forms.
Owing to his defective psychology, he has no ade
quate idea of the capacity of the mind to discover
relations among things, and he has failed to give us
a full or accurate exposition of the relation of the
two apprehensions in logical Judgment. He makes
us look not at the act of comparison, which is surely
the primary and main element, but at the attribute
connoted, overlooking, in the General Notion, the
class of objects combined by the attribute, and the
mental concept combining them.
(5.) The error goes up into his analysis of reason
ing, and makes him give a very partial exhibition of
the process, in which he sees only the attribute, and
overlooks the general conception and general prop
osition, which are involved in the validity of the
inference.
(6.) Mr. Mill has given us the most valuable con
tribution since the days of Bacon to one important
department of Logic, that which treats of Induc
tion. But still there are very grave mistakes in his
exposition of the topics that fall under Particular or
Secondary Logic. These spring from his erroneous
theory of Demonstration, more particularly of the364 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS:
nature, functions, and value of mathematical defini
tions and axioms
; from his mixing false metaphysics
with his logical exposition of causation; from his
not seeing that the discovery of the Decomposition
of compounds and of Natural Classes are among the
ends aimed at in science, and requiring Special
Canons : and finally, from an imperfect view of the
nature of the phenomena of the mind, which it is
the office of Psychology to co-ordinate, and for the
aid of which Logic should furnish a method.
It now only remains to gather from this discussion
what is the Province of the science of Logic. It
has to do with thought
: but what is meant by
thought in such an application ? It must evidently
be so explained as not to include the motive ex
ercises of the mind, and to exclude intuition, in
which we perceive objects or truths at once, and
which has always been allotted to Metaphysics. By
thought, in the technical sense in which the word is
used in Logic, is meant Discursive Thought, in which
we proceed from something given or allowed to
something else derived from it. It implies a process,
which must have laws. In order to construct the
science of Logic, we must endeavor to gather the
laws of thought, by a careful observation of the
operations of thought.
Kant has a twofold division of the science, as
Logic of the universal or of the particular use of
the understanding. &quot;The first contains the abso-THE PEOVINGE OF LOGIC. 365
lutely necessary laws of thought, without which no
use whatever of the understanding is possible, and
gives laws therefore to the understanding, without
regard to the difference of objects on which it may
be employed. The Logic of the particular use of
the understanding contains the laws of correct think
ing upon a particular class of
objects.&quot; (Kritik of
Pure Reason, Meiklejohn s trans., p. 46.) This lan
guage is not unexceptionable, more particularly as
pointing to laws independent of the observation of
objects ; and it is doubtful whether Kant, in consist
ency with his account of the science, which makes
abstraction of all content of the cognition, that is,
of all relation of cognition to its object&quot; (Ib. p. 49),
could adopt such a division. But if we take the
proper view of thought, as always engaged with ob
jects, then we can accept and justify the arrange
ment. We have, first, a Universal, or, as I prefer
calling it, a Primary Logic (identical with what is
commonly designated Formal Logic), conversant
with the laws of thought, not independent of objects,
but whatever ~be the objects. We have, secondly,
a Particular, or, as I would call it, Secondary Logic,
considering the operations of thought as directed to
particular classes of objects, say to intuitive percep
tions, as in demonstration; and the collection of
scattered facts, external or internal, as in Induction.
Under the first head Logic treats of Simple Appre
hension, Judgment, and Reasoning, which, no doubt,
all look to objects, but are the same for all objects.366 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS:
It has to consider, first, our apprehensions. Some of
these are of objects singular and concrete, what we
may call Percepts, as being immediately perceived
by the mind. Some of them, again, are of Abstracts,
or parts considered as parts of a whole, more par
ticularly of attributes of objects. Others are of Con
cepts, or of things having common attributes, and
joined in a class which embraces all the objects pos
sessing the attributes. All Concepts have both Ex
tension and Comprehension. Logic does not deal
immediately with the formation of Percepts, which
are intuitive
; but it evolves the laws involved in the
construction of Abstracts and Concepts. In Judg
ment we compare two of these Percepts, Abstracts,
or Concepts. This process also has laws, such as,
when the things compared are Abstracts the relation
is one of identity or of equivalence; and, when
there is a general notion, the relation is both of Com
prehension and Extension. There are also laws in
volved in Eeasoning, in which we compare two of
our apprehensions by means of a third. These are
derived very much from the nature of the apprehen
sions compared. Thus, in cases in which we com
pare Abstracts, the regulating principle is that of
identity or equality, &quot;things which are the same
with a third, or equal to a third, are the same with,
or equal to one another.&quot; But when there is a class-
notion involved and there is so wherever there
is attribution, then we must proceed according
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&quot;whatever is predicated of a class may be predi
cated of all that is contained in that class.&quot; While
these are the main ruling principles involved in all
cases of reasoning, there may also be other princi
ples implied in all cases, or in special cases. Thus
the principle of whole and parts is involved when
we include an individual in a class, or a species in a
genus. The Comprehension of the Notion is to be
taken along with us, when we translate reasoning in
Extension, so as to make Comprehension the upper
most thought. A principle of Division, that the co
ordinate sub-classes must make up the class, is in
volved in all Disjunctive Eeasoning
: thus when we
argue that this man, being either a knave or a fool,
and not being a fool, must be a knave, it is implied
that knave and fool make up the class to which this
man must belong.
Taking this view of Logic, we do not separate it
so entirely from realities as the scholastic logicians
did, and as the Kantian logicians still do. It has
not, indeed, to do with things directly. Many of
Mr. Mill s discussions would lead us to think that it
has, and we are thus involved in questions which
can be settled only by the sciences material or men
tal which deal with objects. Logic has to do not
with objects, but with thought as directed to objects.
This account makes it quite competent for Logic to
consider not only Apprehension, Judgment, and
Reasoning, which are the same for all objects but
also Thought as directed to particular classes of ob-368 LOGICAL DISCUSSIONS:
jects. The great body of thinkers in modern times
have felt that Logic ought to embrace other topics
besides those treated of in Formal Logic; in par
ticular that it ought not to exclude the Method of
investigation propounded by Bacon. The exposition
I have given makes it include not only Induction
but other modes of discovering truth.
It may consider thought as proceeding in the way
of Demonstration. Here all that is assumed in start
ing, and all that is assumed throughout, must be seen
to be true intuitively. The Method of Investigation
is what I call the Joint Dogmatic and Deductive.
It is Dogmatic, in that it assumes
; but then it should
assume only what is seen to be true on the bare con
templation of the nature of objects. It is Deductive,
in that it derives other truths from these assump
tions by a process of reasoning. But this Method is
applicable only within a very limited range, only so
far as we have an immediate intuition of the nature
of things. In most walks of investigation Demon
stration is not available. What we have before us
are individual and scattered facts, falling under the
senses or the consciousness. It is out of these that
we must gather the law. So far as we observe and
co-ordinate the facts with the view of rising to their
law, whether this be a class or a cause, or the consti
tution of compound objects, the Method pursued is
the Inductive. In this process we gather the facts
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accepted only when it embraces and explains all the
facts. But as science advances, by this method we
reach laws which may be regarded as at least pro
visionally established, and we inquire in certain
departments with the powerful aid of Mathematics
what consequences would follow from these laws ?
Another, and a very powerful Method, now becomes
applicable. I call it the Joint Inductive and De
ductive, in which we inquire what results must fol
low from certain supposed laws, and then compare
these with facts got by observation or experiment.
In all our advanced sciences this must now be the
principal mode of investigation.
I am inclined to think that Whately is right when
he represents Logic as both a Science and an Art.
It is a science, inasmuch as it is a systematized body
of natural truth. It is reared by the observation
and co-ordination of the spontaneous operations of
discursive thought. But it may also become an art,
or a body of precepts &amp;lt;Jrawn out to enable us to
accomplish a particular end, that is, to think cor
rectly, and expose confused thought or invalid rea
soning. It should aim at nothing less than the
discovery of the laws of thought operating in the
mind as it contemplates objects. When we have
accurately apprehended and expressed them, we
may then apply them to test and correct actual
thought. For this purpose we may derive from
them rules, and put these in various formulae, which
admit of a ready and useful application to our every-
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day thinking, and to scientific investigation. In par
ticular, Logic is of great use in clearing our notions ;
it shows what notions are singular and what universal ;
what concrete and what abstract
; and guards us
against using a general term as if it were a singular
concrete. It cannot tell us what judgments are true
and what false (this must be done by the depart
ments of knowledge which deal with objects), but it
tells us what is the precise relation between the Per
cepts, Abstracts, and Concepts compared, and thus
places our notions in such a light that we are better
able to say whether a given proposition is true or
false. Again, the syllogistic analysis lets us see that
in reasoning we have to look to the relation of three
notions, Percepts, Abstracts, or Concepts; and that
when one of the notions is a Concept, we always
need by implication a general proposition ; and the
formulae derived from this analysis unfold the various
possible forms of reasoning, and enable us to test
our own inferences and those of others. In the
Secondary (but not less important) Logic, there
can be tests laid down, such as those of self-evi
dence, necessity, and catholicity, sufficient to decide
readily and certainly what truths are intuitive, and so
entitled to become assumptions in Demonstration;
while the processes of deduction from intuitive truth
may all be tested by the syllogism. The Canons of
Causes enunciated by Mr. Mill settle for us, when we
are entitled to argue that we have discovered the
cause of a given phenomenon ; and I hope that inTHE PEOVINCE OF LOGIC. 371
due time we shall have Canons of Decomposition
and Canons of Classes, to determine when we have
reached the elementary constitution of bodies (pro
visionally), and when we have discovered natural
classes. We have already some Canons of Historical
Investigation to aid us in finding whether the evi
dence is sufficient to establish the alleged facts, and
these Canons should be adopted into Logic, and
made as succinct and comprehensive as possible.
Logic has thus a wide and most important field as
an art ; it furnishes guiding rules and tests in every
path of inquiry. It is thus fulfilling some of the
old pretensions made in its behalf. I do not like the
phrase,
&quot; Art of Thinking,&quot; for men think spontane
ously, without any science or art
; but Logic supplies
rules to guard against confused and erroneous think
ing. It is in a special sense the
&quot; Science of Method
;
&quot;
that is, of the Method to be pursued in discovering
scientific and historical truth. It is the
&quot; Science of
Sciences,&quot; not because superior to other departments
of knowledge, but because it supplies rules to guide
and guard in every other science.CHAPTER XIX.
WHAT IS TRUTH? CRITERIA OP TRUTH.
IT
is very evident that Mr. Mill has a pleasure in
seeing himself and his opinions reflected in the
convictions and writings of young men. On the
other side, the youth who give themselves up to his
guidance seem as if they could look only straight
before them in the path in which he leads them, and
as if they were incapable of taking a comprehensive
view of things lying on either side. As, however,
they will be obliged to do so sooner or later, it might
be as well if they now stopped for a little, in order
to look round them and inquire whither he is lead
ing, and where he is to leave them ? What have we
left us according to this new philosophy ? We have
sensations ; we have a series of feelings aware of it
self, and permanent, or rather prolonged; and we
have an association of sensations, and perceived re
semblances, and possibilities of sensations. The
sensations and associations of sensation generate
ideas and beliefs, which do not, however, either in
themselves or their mode of formation, guarantee
any reality. We have an idea of an external mate-
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rial world
; but Mr. Mill does not affirm that there is
such a world, for there are laws of the series of feel
ings which would produce the idea, whether the
thing existed or not; and our belief in it may be
overcome, just as our natural belief in the sun
rising is made to give way before the scientific con
viction that it is the earth that moves. He thinks
he is able by a process of inference to reach the
existence of other beings besides ourselves. But
the logic of the process is very doubtful. I believe
that neither Mr. Mill nor any other has been able to
show how from sensations, individual or associated,
we could ever legitimately infer the existence of any
thing beyond. What he claims to have found is,
after all, only other
&quot; series of feelings.&quot;
But have we not, it is said, a body of scientific
truth, for which Mr. Mill has done as much as any
living man, by showing how it may be best arranged?
I acknowledge that in the view of those who believe
in the reality of things, and who further believe in
a God who made and arranged, and still upholds
them, this systematized truth is a glorious body,
like the sun itself, with a central solidity which
keeps it firm, while it holds other bodies circling
round it, and with a gloriously illuminated atmos
phere, scattering light and heat all around. But
what is all this when interpreted in philosophic ac
curacy ? It is simply possibilities of sensations, com
ing in groups, and in regular succession, and with re
semblances which can be noticed. And is this the374 WHAT IS TRUTH?
sum of what has been gained by the highest science
of the nineteenth century ? As we contemplate it,
do we not feel as if the solid heart of truth and the
radiating light were both gone, and as if we had
left only a series of systematic vibrations in an un
known ether ? Does this satisfy the convictions and
the longings of man ? Does not the intelligence de
clare that it has something deeper than this ? Does
not the heart crave for something higher than this ?
And when the youths, who are led on so pleasantly
by the clear enunciations of Mr. Mill, stop at any
time to inquire what he has given them, must they
not feel that they are, after all, in darkness, with
only a camera obscura displaying figures before
them, always according to sternly scientific laws?
If they are satisfied with this, are they not in the
act abnegating the deeper capacities, and refusing
to follow the higher aspirations of their souls, which,
for want of proper exercise, will become dry, and
shrunk, and withered ? And if they are not satis
fied, as our higher minds will certainly not be,
how piteous must be the wail of disappointment and
anguish coming from the depths of their bosoms, as
they crave for truth on the one hand, and feel that
they can never catch it on the other ? I do fear for
the consequences, when our promising youths awake,
and in despair of attaining truth, are tempted to
plunge into deeper and yet deeper darkness. For
tunately such a state of things the deeper instincts
of human nature being so strong cannot continueCRITEBIA OF TRUTH. 375
for any length of time; and however lamentable
may be the experience and history of individuals,
the hour of thickest darkness will be found to excite
the cry for the returning light.
&quot; By nature/ says Aristotle,
u man is competently
organized for truth
; and truth in general is not
beyond his reach.&quot; Truth is usually defined as
the agreement of our ideas, or apprehensions, with
things. Profound thinkers have assumed, or labored
to prove, that, on the one hand, man has ideas
; that,
on the other hand, there are things ; and that man
can reach ideas which correspond with things. Let
us inquire what view must be taken of truth by
those who follow out Mr. Mill s system to its conse
quences ?
Mr. Mill acknowledges that we have ideas. But
he takes great pains to show that these originate in
sensations, and grow out of sensations, according to
the laws of the association of sensations. I am not
sure whether he acknowledges the existence of ma
terial things out of, and independent of, sensations.
He often uses language which seems to imply that
he does; but his system all tends the other way.
This is certain, that even if body exists we can never
know anything of it, except as
&quot; the possibility of
sensations.&quot; All that we know of objects is the sen
sations which they give us, and the order of the oc
currence of those sensations. &quot;There is not the
slightest reason for believing that what we call the
sensible qualities of the object are a type of any-376 WHAT IS TEUTH?
thing inherent in itself, or bear any affinity to its
own nature. A cause does not, as such, resemble its
effects
; an east wind is not like the feeling of cold,
nor is heat like the steam of boiling water : why then
should matter resemble our sensations ?
&quot;
(Logic, I.
in. 7.) Then as to the internal world : all that we
know of it is a series of feelings, with a prolongation
in time, which again is identical with a series of
muscular sensations. (Supra, p. 145.) I suppose he
would further say, though I do not remember any
passage in which he does say it, that we do not
know what is the nature of these sensations. As
things are thus unknown, and must be unknown with
our present faculties, and in the condition in which we
are placed, so man seems to be precluded from reach
ing any truth beyond the consciousness of present
sensations, and the possibility of other sensations.
But some have defined truth as the accordance,
not of our own ideas with things, but of our
ideas with one another. This is a view which
I do not think worth the pains of defending. It
is quite compatible with the existence of a uni
versal system of delusion and deception, provided
always that this system were consistent with itself.
Give a mathematician such a false assumption as
that matter attracts other matter inversely ac
cording to the distance (and not the square of
the distance), and he might construct from it an
imaginary world, every part of which would be in
agreement with every other, but no part in accord-CEITEEIA OF TEUTH. 377
ance with, the reality of things. It is imaginable
that the truth which man discovers is all of this
description: a consistency between an unfounded
hypothesis, and the results following from it accord
ing to the laws of our idea. Some ideal philoso
phers would be content with such a view of truth.
But then they think that this consistency is given
by the laws of reason, and that man can actually
reach truth, not it may be in congruity with phe
nomenal things, but, with the principles of reason
some of them would say absolute and eternal reason.
But truth thus understood is, according to our
author s system, quite as much beyond the reach of
man as truth in the other sense. For any accord
ance that there may be between our ideas might be
produced, not by independent reason, or consequen
tial reasoning, but by the association of ideas, by the
laws of contiguity or resemblance. When two phe
nomena have been very often experienced in con
junction, and have not, in any single instance, oc
curred separately, either in experience or in thought
:
&quot;When the bond between the two ideas has thus
been firmly riveted, not only does the idea, called up
by association, become, in our consciousness, insep
arable from the idea which suggested it, but the facts
or phenomena answering to these ideas come at last
to seem inseparable in existence : things which we
are unable to conceive apart appear incapable of ex
isting apart.&quot; (p. 191.) Thus 2 and 2 having been
associated in our experience with 4, we give them a378 WHAT IS TRUTH?
relation in the nature of things ; but if 2 and 2 had
been followed by the appearance of 5, we should
have had a like assurance of 2 -|- 2 and 5 being
equal. Truth in Mr. Mill s philosophy is not even
a logical or rational consistency between ideas; it
can be nothing more than an accordance of our
ideas with sensations, and laws of the association of
sensation; which sensations come we know not
whence, and are associated by resemblances, exist
ing we know not how, or, more frequently, by con
tiguity, implying no relation of reason, no con
nection in the nature of things, and very possibly
altogether fortuitous, or absolutely fatalistic.
We see now the issues in which the doctrine of
the relativity of knowledge, as held by Mr. Mill,
j
lands us. The geometrical demonstrations of Euclid
and Apollonius and Newton may hold good only
within our experience, and &quot;a reasonable distance
beyond.&quot; The mathematics taught in Cambridge
may differ in their fundamental principles from those
taught in the corresponding university of the planet
Jupiter ; where two and two may make five, where
two straight lines may enclose a space, and where
the three angles of a triangle may be more than
two right angles. Mr. Mill is exceedingly indignant
at Dr. Mansel for maintaining that the Divine
morality is not to be measured by human morality,
declaring that
&quot;
it is simply the most morally perni
cious doctrine now current.&quot; (p. 90.) But I can dis
cover no ground on which the rebuker can stand, inCEITEEIA OF TEUTH. 379
pronouncing such a judgment on Dr. Mansel s appli
cation of the doctrine of the relativity of knowledge.
Any one with half the acuteness of Dr. Mansel could
show that if two and two may make five, it is also
supposable that lying may be a virtue, and veracity
a vice, in other worlds; and that God (if there be
a God) may commend deceit in the constellation of
the Plough, even as He encourages truthfulness in
our world ; and this doctrine, I rather think, is quite
as &quot;morally pernicious&quot; as any now current, and
certainly much more so than that entertained by Dr.
Mansel, who holds resolutely (whether consistently
or not) by an absolute morality, which does not
change with times or circumstances.
1
Some represent Mr. Mill as falling back upon the
position of Berkeley. And I suppose we may reckon
Mr. Mill as favoring ah
1
the negative statements of
Berkeley ; but he has discarded all those grand
views and elevating sentiments which render his
system so attractive to certain minds. No consistent
thinker can stay at the place taken up by the Irish
metaphysician; he had to give way before the
Scotch one, who used the arguments against the
independent existence of matter, to undermine our
1 &quot;We can point to a doctrine forth there as right.
&quot;
(London Quarterly
which cannot be less morally perni- Review, Jan. 1866.) A very able con-
cious than Mr. Mansel s, than which tributor to that periodical has antici-
none indeed can be more morally per- pated Mr. Mill in many of his objec-
nicious.&quot; &quot;If in some other world tions to Hamilton s philosophy, but
two and two may make five ; in some rejects Mr. Mill s philosophy as a sub-
other world what we regard as virtue stitute.
may be vice, and our wrong may come380 WHAT IS TEUTH?
belief imthe independent existence of mind.
1 Our
author s system, both in its premises and conclusion,
has many striking analogies to that of Hume. Does
the one begin with sensations, these are very much the
same as the impressions of the other. The later meta
physician is only following the elder, in laboring to
show we get our ideas out of sensations and impres
sions, by means of association. They concur in not
knowing very well what to make of time and space ;
but neither allows them any separate reality. Both
hold that there is no such thing as substance
; that
all we can know of mind is, that it is a bundle of
states or a series of feelings, to which we give some
sort of unity or permanence, not justifiable by reason
or any higher principle ; and that body is an un
known something, from which we suppose we get
our sensations. Both deny that we have any intui
tive conviction as to cause and effect; and both
make the relation between these to consist in invari-
1 Some are looking with extreme ception of things and necessary truth ?
anxiety to the course which the pupils Or, abandoning the position taken by
of Hamilton may adopt at this crisis Hamilton, and defended by him in
in the history of philosophic thought, many a brave fight, are they to be
lt is clear, from their published writ- take themselves to the lines occupied
ings, that Dr. Cairns and Dr. Calder- by Kant or by Berkeley, and which
wood will be prepared to defend have been found so utterly untenable ?
natural realism, and the veracity of Ifthey take the latter course, it will be
our native convictions. But what line seen by every shrewd observer that
is to be taken by those who occupy they cannot stand one hour before the
chairs of philosophy, and have students keen play of Mr. Mill s musketry, or
under them ? I am convinced that Mr. Spencer s heavy artillery. Those
they cannot now stand where their illus- of their pupils who may try to stand
trious master endeavored to stand, on the sliding-scale, will only thereby
half way between Eeid and Kant be made to fall more rapidly to the
between realities and forms. Are base where the school of Mill will
they to fall back on an intuitive per- welcome them.CEITEEIA OF TRUTH. 381
able or unconditional conjunction, within 4he limits
of experience. Both admit some sort of original
power
: Hume stands up for innate instincts
; and
Mr. Mill for an ultimate belief in memory ; and it
should be added that neither knows very well what
to make of these inborn principles. Both derive
our motives originally from sensations of pleasure
and pain ; and both, it is well known, were clear
and eloquent expounders of the utilitarian theory of
morals. Nor is it unworthy of being mentioned,
tuat both point not unobscurely to changes, which
they think ought to be made, in the marriage rela
tion. It should be admitted that with these promi
nent points of correspondence there are also points
of difference. Hume s account of the relations which
the mind of man can discover is much more com
prehensive than that of Mill. On the other hand, it
is pleasant to find that the writer of this century
assumes a higher moral tone than the writer of
the last; both, however, concurring in overlooking
or despising the special Christian graces. But the
main difference lies in this, that Hume discovers
flagrant contradictions in human intelligences;
whereas the other maintains that the most certain
principles reached by us, being all the product of
circumstances, might have to give way before new
circumstances or in other conditions. Hume had to
say, that
&quot; the intense view of these manifold contra
dictions and imperfections in human reason has so
wrought upon me and heated my brain, that I am382 WHAT IS TRUTH?
ready to vreject all belief and reasoning, and can
look upon no opinion even as more probable or likely
than another.&quot; The modern author is saved from all
such contradictions; for if one set of experiences
showed him that two and two make four, and another
that two and two make five, he would proclaim both
true in the different conditions. The consequence
is, that the one is an avowed sceptic or professed
pyrrhonist, at least in many parts of his writings,
delighting to play off one dogmatist against another ;
whereas the other is a supporter of the doctrines of
nescience and relativity, holding that we can never
reach truths which may not be modified or set aside
in other times and circumstances. I am not sure
which of the issues is the more blank : I rejoice that
I do not feel myself required to make a choice be
tween them.
I hold that human intelligence begins with truth,
and if it proceeds properly it ends with truth
; which
may at times be mysterious, but never contradictory ;
which may be indefinitely enlarged, but cannot be
upturned or reversed. In the course of these dis
cussions we have gathered the means of trying the
supposed verities proffered for our acceptance. There
is to us no one absolute criterion of all truth
; but
there are tests of the various kinds of truth, both
of those with which we start, and of those which we
reach in our progress. Of Intuition itself we have
tests in self-evidence, necessity, and universality.
Of Reasoning we have stringent tests in the formsCEITERIA OF TEUTS. 383
of the syllogism. By these two combined we can
try Demonstration, which consists in a union of in
tuition and deduction. We have tests, too, of truths
reached in physical, in psychological, and in histor
ical investigation, by the Collection of Facts. These
are to be found in the Canons of Induction and in
the Canons of Verification
; which we may confi
dently expect to be more and more perfected in
their formalization and expression as the separate
departments of knowledge make progress.
It is admitted that these criteria demand that we
leave unanswered many questions which the ques
tioning mind of man can put. Whatever alleged
truth cannot stand such tests should be regarded as
unsettled, and allowed to lie for the present in the
land of darkness. As we use the criteria we shall be
led to see that there are very stringent limits set to
man s power of acquiring knowledge. But we shall
see at the same time how wide is the field of inquiry,
and even of certainty, thrown open to us. Geology
can carry us back in the history of our earth to
periods removed from us by millions of years. As
tronomy, aided by mathematics, lets us know of the
existence of bodies millions of miles away; and,
aided by chemistry, gives us an insight into the com
position of the atmosphere of a body so far removed
from us as the sun. Nor is it to be forgotten that,
by the observation of the evidences of design in
nature, combined with the principle of cause and
effect, and our moral convictions, we can rise to a384 .
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most reasonable belief in the existence of an Al
mighty and All-Perfect God. Man should ever claim
this wide field as an inheritance, and allow no one,
on any pretence, to deprive him of it. And having
such an inheritance he should be glad and grateful,
the more so as, attending always to the tests ap
pointed to guide and guard, he can indefinitely widen
and extend his possessions.CHAPTER XX.
UTILITARIANISM.
IN
specifying the influences under which Mr. Mill s
opinions were formed, I might have referred to
Jeremy Bentham and his utilitarian theory, as hav
ing not a little swayed the opinions of the young
thinker, either directly, or indirectly through his
father, who was a friend of Bentham s. But in this
treatise I meant to look more to Mr. Mill s general
philosophic system than his specially ethical views ;
and however eminent as a jurist, Bentham had no
name as a metaphysician. Our author s philosophy
is essentially a combination of that of Mr. James
Mill and of M. Comte, however, the utilitarianism
of the older Mill and of Bentham thoroughly fits
into the system. It would require a volume instead
of a chapter to discuss historically, psychologically,
and ethically the utilitarian theory. We can touch
here only on a few points intimately connected with
the preceding discussions.
I. Can Mr. Mill s psychological theory account for
the peculiar idea and conviction which we have in
regard to moral good and evil ? He admits that the
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mature man in the advanced stages of society has a
conscience and moral ideas : let us inquire how he
generates them. And first, let us try to ascertain
what he makes the original motive powers or springs
of action in the mind of man.
&quot; The utilitarian doc
trine is, that happiness is desirable, and the only
thing desirable, as an end.&quot; (p. 51.) It is clear that
he makes, as every other philosopher does, the desire
of personal pleasure a primary motive to action.
But I &quot;am not sure whether he makes the desire of
promoting the happiness of other beings also an
originating appetence in man. There are passages
which look as if he did, or at least wished to be re
garded as doing so. In rearing his theory he is
ever appealing to
&quot; the social feelings of mankind;&quot;








terest and sympathy.&quot; (pp. 45, 47.)
&quot; The idea of
the pain of another is naturally painful ; the idea of
the pleasure of another is naturally pleasure.&quot; (Dis.
p. 137.) I am sure that the great British moralists,
who lived at the beginning of last century, have
succeeded in demonstrating that man is not in his
nature and constitution an utterly selfish being, but
is capable of being swayed by a desire to promote
the welfare of others
; and the arguments of Shaftes-
bury, Hutcheson, and Butler have been repeated
and strengthened by the Scottish school of philoso
phers generally, including Keid, Stewart, and Brown,
and by M. Cousin, and the Eclectic school of France.UTILITARIANISM. 387
But these writers have shown that the same facts
and arguments which lead us to admit an original
principle of sympathy, require us also to call in a
cognitive and a motive moral power.
He allows as a psychological fact that virtue may
become ^a^good in itself, without looking to any
end beyond it,&quot; and that the mind is not .in a rigid
~^fate unless it love virtue
&quot; as a thing desirable in
itself.&quot; (p. 53.) In indignantly repelling the ob
jections of Dr. Sedgwick, he maintains,
&quot;It is a fact
in human nature that we have moral judgments and
moral feelings. We judge certain actions and dis
positions to be right, others wrong
: this we call ap
proving and disapproving them. We have also feel
ings of pleasure in the contemplation of the former
class of actions and dispositions, feelings of dis
like and aversion to the latter ; which feelings, as
everybody must be conscious, do not exactly resem
ble any other of our feelings of pain or pleasure.
Such are the phenomena; concerning their reality
there is no dispute.&quot; He then seeks to account for
the phenomena by his famous principle of the chem
istry of the association of ideas.
&quot; The only color
for representing our moral judgments as the result
of a peculiar part of our nature, is that our feelings
of moral approbation and disapprobation are really
peculiar feelings. But is it not notorious that pe
culiar feelings, unlike any others we have experi
ence of, are created by association every day?&quot; (Dis.
pp-. 139, 140.) He instances the desire of power, the388 UTILITAEIANISM.
feelings of ambition, of envy, of jealousy, and of the
miser towards his gold. Now, as to some of these
appetencies, I believe them to be natural. We see
them working strongly in certain individuals, show
ing that they are elements of their inborn character.
We see them descending hereditarily from father or
mother, to son or daughter or grandchild ; and we
find them stronger in certain families and races than
in others. As the love of power is a native appe
tence by which men may be swayed, surely the con
science and the felt obligation to do that which is
right may be the same.
But our present question is one not so much of
mere appetency or desires as of moral perceptions,
judgments, and sentiments. I grant that persons
may be led by mere prudence to attend to the du
ties of an outward morality, and by a kindly dispo
sition to relieve distress, altogether irrespective of a
moral sense. But there is a very special obligation
felt in regard to those actions which we call moral,
and which does not bear on other parts of our con
duct
; we are convinced that we ought to attend to
them, and that if we neglect to do so our conduct is
blameworthy. Whence the very peculiar and pro
found ideas denoted by the phrases &quot;obligation,&quot;
&quot;ought,&quot; &quot;blameworthy.&quot; Take the perception of
conscience, that deceit is a sin. Take the conviction,
that we are not at liberty to tell a lie when we might
be tempted to do so. Take the judgment, that the
person who has committed the act is guilty, con-UTILITARIANISM. 389
demnable, punishable. Take the feeling of remorse,
which rises when we contemplate ourselves as having
told a falsehood. We have here a series of mental
phenomena quite as real and quite as worthy of
being looked at, as our very sensations, or beliefs
of the reality of the past in memory, or our expecta
tion of the future. I am convinced that as these last
are admitted to be ultimate (see (&amp;gt;, o, T), so are the
others also. &quot;This instinct,&quot; says Isaac Taylor,
&quot;flushes in the cheek of every sensitive child, and
it prevails over the laborious sophistications of the
philosopher. This belief is cherished as an inestima
ble jewel by the best and purest of human beings ;
and it is bowed to in dismay by the foulest and the
worst
; its rudiments are a monition of eternal truth,
whispered in the ear of infancy ; its articulate an
nouncements are a dread fore-doom ringing in the
ears of the guilty adult. You say you can bring
forward a hundred educated men, who, at this time,
will profess themselves to be no believers in a moral
system ; but I will rebut their testimony by the
spontaneous and accordant voices of as many mil
lions of men as you may please to call for on the
other side.&quot;
I have already examined the general theory which
generates a new idea by means of an association of
sensations, and have shown how little truth there is
in it. (pp. 195-201.) Give us mere sensations, say of
sounds, or colors, or forms, or of pleasure and pain,
and they will never be anything else in the repro-390 UTILITABIANISM
duction of them than the ideas of sounds, colors,
forms, pleasures, or pains, unless, indeed, there be
some new power introduced, and this new element
in itself, or in conjunction with the sensations, be
fitted to produce a new idea, and that very idea. In
none of its applications is the theory seen to fail so
utterly, as in the attempt thus to produce our moral
perceptions. Provided we once had the ideas, the
laws of association might show how they could be
brought up again ; how in the reproduction certain
parts might sink into shadow and neglect, while
others came forth into prominence and light; and
how the whole feeling, by the confluence of different
ideas, might be wrought into a glow of intensity ;
but the difficulty of generating the ideas, such ideas,
ideas so full of meaning, is not thereby surmounted.
The idea I have of pain is one thing, and the idea I
have of deceit, that it is morally evil, condemnable,
deserving of pain, is an entirely different thing
our consciousness being witness. On the supposition
that there is a chemical power in association to cre
ate such ideas as those of duty and merit, sin and
demerit, this chemical power would be a native
moral power ; not the product of sensations, but
a power above them, and adapted to transmute
them from the baser into the golden substance.
It will be needful at this place to correct a misap
prehension into which Mr. Mill has fallen. He rep
resents the intuitive school of morals as holding
that
&quot; the principles of morals are evident a priori!
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(p. 3.) Now I admit that influential members of
the school have used language fitted to warrant this
statement. But there are others, and these the
wisest defenders of intuition, who have given a
different account. Our intuitions are perceptions of
individual objects or individual truths
; and in order
to reach an axiom or
&quot;
principle of morals/ there is
need of a discursive process of generalization. Our
author makes the intuitive agree with the inductive
school, in holding that &quot;the morality of an indi
vidual action is not a question of direct perception,
but of the application of law to an individual case.&quot;
The proper account is that the law is generalized
out of our direct perceptions. On the bare contem
plation of an ungrateful spirit, the conscience at
once declares it to be evil, apart from the conscious
apprehension or application of any general principle.
The enunciation of the law is a reflective and not
a spontaneous process, and is undertaken when
we wish to construct a code of morals or a science
of ethics. This representation saves the intuitive
theory of morals from many of the specious ob
jections urged against a different version. Our
moral intuitions are not a priori forms, which the
mind imposes on objects, but immediate perceptions
of qualities in certain objects, that is, in the volun
tary dispositions and actions of intelligent beings.
Taking this view of them, I believe they can stand
the tests which settle what truth is intuitive. They
are self-evident : on the simple apprehension of dis-392 UTILITARIANISM.
interested love we declare it to be good and com
mendable. They may be described, if we properly
explain the statement, as necessary
: give us a cor
rect representation of a deed of intentional deceit
for a selfish end, and we condemn, and cannot be
made to commend it. They have, in a sense, even
catholic consent in their favor : all men will condemn
deceit if it is properly laid before them, but the
deceit may be so painted as that we do not see
its true nature, and then we give our approval,
not of the deceit, but of its accompaniments. Man
kind can be so deceived as to give diverse judgments
on moral actions, only by the blinding influence of
sin, disguising and distorting the real nature of
things.
II. Does utilitarianism embrace sufficient sanctions
to induce us to approve virtue and condemn vice ?
Our author labors to show that the motives usually
supposed to lead to virtue are left untouched by this
theory. But this is not the question, the main ques
tion; and if any defender of a priori morals had
been guilty of such an ignoratio elenchi, we can con
ceive that the acute logician would have exposed it
with extraordinary zest. The question is not about
sanctions which other systems may employ, but it is,
Does utilitarianism contain within itself a body of
motives, or motive powers, fitted to lead to virtuous
conduct ? If it does not, if it is obliged to make us
look elsewhere for motives, then it is without one of
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morals. Utilitarianism bids us seek to promote the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. &quot;But
why should I strive to attain this end ?
&quot; asks the
inquiring youth. Practically, and in reference to
his future conduct, theoretically, and as interested in
the science of ethics, he insists on a reply.
uWhy
should I give up my immediate ease and comfort and
expected enjoyments, and restrain my strong native
impulses and indulged habits in order to look after
others, who may be quite able to look after them
selves ?
&quot;
&quot; Or why, at the best, may I not content
myself with attending to the feelings and immediate
wishes of the few persons in my family or circle,
with whose welfare my own is bound up, or of the
single person to whom I am attached?&quot; As he
presses these questions he will not be satisfied to be
told that other ethical systems have sanctions, and
that utilitarianism leaves them where it found them.
But let us look at those sanctions with which it is
said the theory does not meddle. We may find, as
to some of the guaranties or sureties to which we
are referred, that their credit is undermined, and
that they are rendered bankrupt, by the principles
of the new philosophy. Mr. Mill tells us, that if
persons believe that there is a God, they may still
have the motives derived from their religion to in
duce them to practise morality. This starts the
question, what religion has our author s system left
us? It is clear that utilitarianism deprives us of
one of the arguments which has been felt by pro-394 UTILITARIANISM.
found thinkers to carry the greatest weight, that
derived from the moral law in the heart arguing a
moral lawgiver. Nor is it to be forgotten, that our
greatest moralists have not been in the way of
appealing first to the Divine power or will, as a
motive to lead us to do good, but have rather sought,
by the principles of an independent morality, to
show that we ought to obey God. We may omit
entering further into this inquiry at present, as the
whole subject of the relation of Mr. Mill s philoso
phy to natural theology will come to be discussed
in next chapter. But we must look here at some
other sanctions which it is supposed utilitarianism
has left untouched.
&quot;The internal sanction of duty, whatever our
standard of duty may be, is one and the same, a
feeling in our own mind ; a pain more or less intense
attendant on violation of duty, which in properly
cultivated moral natures rises, in the more serious
cases, into shrinking from it as an impossibility ;
&quot;
and
&quot; the ultimate sanction, therefore, of all morality
(external motives apart) being a subjective feeling
in our own minds,&quot; he thinks that utilitarianism has
as powerful a sanction as any other theory can have,
(pp. 40, 41.) But it is not fair to represent those
who hold the opposite theory as making the ultimate








tendant on the violation of duty. It cannot be said
to consist in
&quot;
feeling,&quot; except we use the phrase inUTILITARIANISM. 395
so wide and loose a sense as to include all mental
operations, and the native principles of action from
which they spring. It should not be represented as
a mej?e
&quot;
subjective feeling,&quot; for it points to and im
plies an objective reality, a real good and evil in the
voluntary acts of intelligent beings, independent of
our sense of it, being in fact the object to which the





it has been shown again
and again, by moralists, that the feeling of pain rises
in consequence of a prior perception of the evil of
sin. According to our most esteemed moralists, the
mind, in looking at moral good and evil, is exercis
ing a higher attribute than mere feeling or emotion.
By some it is represented as a Sense looking to and
discerning a moral quality as the eye discerns
color and surface. More frequently it is described
as Reason, or as analogous to Reason, and the Moral
Reason, which perceives at once the good and the evil,
and distinguishes between them, declaring the doing
of the one and the avoiding of the other to be obliga
tory on all intelligent beings, and the one to be
of good desert and rewardable, and the other of evil
desert and punishable ; and the feeling of pleasure
or pain is the consequent and not the essence of the
conviction.
But then the feeling, which is the essence of con
science, is
&quot; all encrusted over with collateral associa
tions, derived from sympathy, from love, and still
more from fear ; from all the forms of religious feel-396 UTILITARIANISM.
ing; from the recollections of childhood and of all
our past life
; from self-esteem, desire of the esteem
of others, and occasionally even self-abasement.&quot;
&quot;Its binding force consists in the existence .of a
mass of feeling, which must be broken through in
order to do what violates our standard of right, and
which, if we do nevertheless violate that standard,
will probably have to be encountered afterwards in
the form of remorse.&quot; (p. 41.) He reckons this com
plicated feeling as furnishing quite as strong a sanc
tion, and one quite as likely not to be violated, as
that which might be awakened by a distinct moral
faculty. Now, I concede at once, that other and
secondary motives may and should gather and cling
round our primary conviction of duty, to aid and
strengthen
it. But meanwhile, as the centre, and in
the last resort, as the support of them, there should
be recognized obligations of morality. -The intelli
gent youth, when he comes to rise beyond his educa
tional beliefs, and to think for himself, will not be
satisfied with the mere existence of the mass of
feeling ; he will ask, Is it justifiable, is it binding ?
If satisfied on this point, then he will feel himself
called on to encourage all these associations, and to
live under their influence. But if not satisfied, if
taught they have no obligation in reason or the
nature of things, then why should he not uncoil
them, as he does some other hereditary preposses
sions; or even if he should be inclined to retain
them, will they not be apt to give way before theUTILITARIANISM. 397
strong and seductive temptations which are ever
assailing him ? Let it be observed of many of these
associations which have been gathered, and senti
ments which have been gendered, that they have
been generated in individuals, or grown up in a
state of society, entertaining and cherishing the be
lief that there is an independent rule of duty.







ment,&quot; they arise mainly from the promptings of
a conscience, which carries with it its own authority
and its own sanctions. Eemove the support which
bears them as the stake bears up the vine and
they will speedily fall, or rather will never rise to
any height. Let the school beware lest, in striving
to destroy the inborn sense and native perceptions
of good and evil, they be not doing as much as
within them lies to cut down the tree that has borne
the fruit; or, to use a still more familiar image,
to kill the hen tjiat has laid the golden eggs. And
as to the
&quot; recollections of childhood and of our past
lives,&quot; and the feelings of &quot;sympathy&quot; and &quot;self-
esteem,&quot; and &quot;the desire* of the esteem of others,&quot;
these can foster virtuous sentiment and lead to vir
tuous conduct only where there is a high moral and
religious standard in the family, and in the commu
nity, and may tend the opposite way in other states
of society; as, for instance, that which existed in
ancient Home in the decline of the empire, or among
the educated classes in France in the age before the398 UTILITARIANISM.
Kevolution, or which may be found in certain circles
in Paris at this present time. The vessel, which
is sailing along gracefully with its present structure,
may be speedily dissolved and its crew wrecked,
when a magnet (to refer to a well-known fable) has
been applied, which draws out the bolts that kept
the parts together.
I deny that the two kinds of sanction are on the
same footing and of equal strength. The one sort
is derived from a mere agglomeration of feelings,
which are generated by associations created inde
pendently of our choice, and mainly by outward con
tiguities. Some of these, such as those mentioned
by Mr. Mill, may be laudable, and may tend to
promote virtuous conduct. But others, though aris
ing from like associations, produced by the same cir
cumstances, may be of an opposite character. Such
are the fears which spring from a degraded super
stition with its horrid ceremonials; such are the
animal lusts that may grow up along with a purer
love,; such are the jealousy, malice, and envy gen
dered by the rivalries of trade and fashion; such
are the expectations excited when large pleasure
and profit to ourselves or others may be had by one
bold deed of selfishness; and such is the despair
awakened when there has been a failure in the
favorite ends of a man s life. These feelings, grow
ing from the same root of associations and circum
stances, will tend to moral evil as the others do
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moral obligation above either, and calling on us
while we allow the one to disallow the other. How
vastly inferior must be the sanction supplied by this
conglomeration of associations to that which the
higher moral theory furnishes, when it declares that
certain affections, such as gratitude, and love, and
justice, are themselves good, and that certain other
affections, such as ingratitude and malice and deceit,
are evil in their very nature ; that the mind is or
ganized to discern the distinction between good and
evil, just as it discovers the difference between truth
and error
; that the moral power by which it does
this is not only in the mind, but claims to be su
preme there; that it implies and points to a God
who is the guardian of the law, and will call every
man to account for the deeds done in the body,
wnether they have been good or evil.
III. Does utilitarianism furnish a sufficient test of
virtuous acts and of virtuous motives ? It tells us
that a good deed is one tending to promote the
greatest happiness of the greatest number. But in
the complicated affairs of this world, the most far-
sighted cannot know for certain what may be the
total consequences of any one act; and the great
body of mankind feel as if they were looking out on
a tangled forest, and need a guide to direct them.
Utilitarian moralists, like Bentham, may draw out
schemes of tendencies for us
; but the specific rules
have no obliging authority, and, even when under
stood and appreciated, are difficult of application,400 UTILITARIANISM.
and are ever bringing us into cross avenues into
which we may be led by self-deceit. With no other
standard than ultimate tendency, the timid will ever
be afraid to act as never clearly seeing their way,
while the bold will ever be tempted at critical junc
tures, and in order to gain ends which are dear to
them, and which they have identified with the good
of their country, as when Julius Caesar crossed
the Kubicpn, and Louis Napoleon ventured on his
coup d etat, to commit crimes in the name of
virtue. I am aware that on any theoretical system
men will commit sin but on this system they will
commit crimes of the highest order, and justify
themselves as they do so, on the ground of the
great advantages to be secured by themselves and
others.
Mr. Mill s defence of the theory proceeds on the
principle, that there may be a distinction drawn be
tween the virtuousness of the act and the virtuous-
ness of the agent.
&quot; He who saves a fellow-creature
from drowning does what is morally right, whether
his motive be duty, or the hope of being paid for
his trouble
; he who betrays the friend that trusts
him is guilty of a crime, even if his object be to
serve another friend to whom he is under greater
obligations.&quot; (p. 26.) The test of a virtuous act is
beneficial tendency, but what is the test of the vir
tuous motive ? Is it, too, beneficial tendency ? Is
the agriculturist who improves the soil, so as to
make it feed more men and cattle than it did before,UTILITARIANISM. 401
or the master manufacturer who sets up a large
public work which gives food to thousands, necessa
rily virtuous, and this in proportion to the good
done, and though in the depths of his heart he may
be influenced by no other consideration than the
love of gain ? We do run a considerable risk in
these times of the prevalence of a cosmopolitanism,
originating in a deeper selfishness, and prosecuted in
a spirit of self-righteousness, and going on to over
whelm and supersede the gentler and the humbler
private and domestic virtues, which our fathers so
valued before utilitarianism was heard of. But Mr.
Mill is too wise a man to make beneficial tendency
a test of excellence in the agent.
&quot;The motive has
nothing to do with the morality of the action,
though much with the worth of the
agent.&quot; He
tells us that it is a misapprehension of the utilitarian
mode of thought to conceive it as implying so wide
a generality as the world or morality at large, and
he says of M. Comte^that^he committed the error
which is often, but falsely, charged against the whole
class of utilitarian moralists : he required that the
test of conduct should also be the exclusive motive
to
it.&quot;~J (Comte and Posit, p. 138.) It is not very
clear what constitutes a virtuous agent, according to
our author. The following statement is sufficiently
vague, and yet it is the clearest I can find on a
point which should not be left in uncertainty for a
moment: &quot;The great majority of good actions are
intended not for the benefit of the world, but for402 UTILITARIANISM.
that of individuals, of which the good of the world
is made up
: and the thoughts of the most virtuous
man need not on these occasions travel beyond the
particular persons concerned, except so far as is
necessary to assure himself that in benefiting them
he is not violating the rights, that is, the legitimate
and authorized expectations, of any one else.&quot; (p.
27.) There is some truth here, but it is surely far
from being the full truth. The impelling motive of
an action entitled to be called virtuous is love, lead
ing us to perform that which is right ; that is, ac
cording to moral law, the law of God. The love
is a well-spring ready to burst forth, and the law
is the channel provided in which the stream may
flow. Without the love, there is no virtue; and
without the love regulated by law, there is no
virtue in the agent. It is to the credit of M.
Comte that, separating himself from cold utilita
rianism, he reckoned love as of the essence of ex
cellence: but it is an evidence of the narrowness
and bigotry which so distinguished him, that he
does not see that he has derived this principle from
Christianity, which he represents as deriving all
its motives from the selfish fear of hell and hope
of heaven.
And what nmkes an action sinful according to
this philosophy? It is still more difficult to find
what is the answer to that question. Sin is quite
as much a fact of consciousness and of our moral
nature as even virtue. &quot;Thou shalt not kill;&quot;UTILITARIANISM. 403
&quot; Thou shalt not commit adultery ;
&quot;




&quot; Thou shalt not bear false witness/ these
laws are clear, and the violation of them is sin ac
cording to Scripture, and according to conscience.
But what is sin according to utilitarianism ? It is
acknowledged not to be the mere omission to look
to the general good. What then does it consist in ?
Mr. Mill speaks of
&quot;reproach&quot; being one of the
checks on evil; but when is reproach justifiable?
Not knowing what to make of sin, the system pro
vides no place for repentance. The boundary line
between moral good and evil is drawn so uncertainly,
that persons will ever be tempted to cross it without
allowing that they have done so, the more so that
they are not told what they should do when they
have crossed it.
IY. Does utilitarianism embrace all the virtues ?
In answering this question, it should at once be
allowed that the system contains an important body
of truth
; it errs only so far as it professes to embrace
and unfold the whole of morals. It is a duty devolv
ing on all to promote the happiness of their fel
lows. So far as the system recommends this, it can
have nothing erroneous, it should be added that
it has nothing original. But even at this point,
where it is supposed to be strongest, it is found to
fail when we narrowly examine it. For whence can
utilitarianism draw its motive and obligation to con
strain us to look after the general happiness
? He
says,
&quot; No reason can be given why the general hap-404 UTILITARIANISM.
piness is desirable, except that each person, so far as
he believes it to be attainable, desires his own hap
piness.&quot; (p. 52.) But it would need more acuteness
than even Mr. Mill is possessed of to show that this
principle requires us to promote the best interests
of others. It is proper to refer to this here
; but
I need not dwell upon it, as I have urged it under
another head.
Utilitarianism has a special merit in all questions
of jurisprudence. The reason can be given. The
end of legislation is not the maintenance of the law
of God, but the promotion of the interests of the
nation. But even in this department a higher
morality has a place, though only a negative one.
The governing power is not entitled to enact what
is in itself sinful, on the pretence of adding to the
pleasures of the community. The people of this
country are right in their religious and moral in
stincts when they declare that on no pretence what
ever should the Government take upon itself the
licensing of places of prostitution, even on the pre
tence of regulating them, and restraining the evils
that flow from them. Nor is the magistrate at lib
erty to punish an act unless it be sinful
; for example,
he would not be justified in punishing a person, who,
without meaning it, had brought infectious disease
into a city, whereby ten thousand inhabitants had
perished ; whereas he would be required to inflict
a penalty for the theft of a very small sum from a
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ence ? Plainly because the former act is not a sin,
that is, implied no evil disposition, whereas the other
does. But while the civil government should punish
only when sin has been committed, and has thus to
look to the moral law, it does not punish sin as sin,
but as inflicting injustice on others, and injurious to
the best interests of society. The utilitarian theory,
as developed by Bentham, has, consequentially and
historically, been the means of alleviating the harsh
ness of our penal code, and giving a more benignant
aspect to legislation generally.
Mr. Mill has given a contribution to public ethics
in his treatise on Liberty. The work is stimulating
in its spirit, but at the same time far from being
satisfactory in its results. It might have been ex
pected in a renewed discussion on such a subject,
after all that has been written during the last two
centuries, that we should have had some principles
laid down to guide us as to the moral limits to be
set to the expression of sentiment, and the attempt
to create a public feeling against what we believe to
be evil. A gentleman, let me suppose, settles in my
neighborhood, of polite manners, of cultivated mind,
and apparently of general beneficence. But he has
a wife and a mistress, and maintains that he is justi
fied in having both, and might allowably have more.
What is to be my demeanor towards him ? Am I
to ask him to my house, and introduce him to my
sons andmy daughters? Am I never to speak against
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being influenced by his example ? Am I to hasten
to elect him to places of honor and trust in the par
ish or in the town ? Or, if I decline thus to coun
tenance him, am I to be declared intolerant ? Eising
beyond such personal to public questions, am I not
to protest against a public evil, and seek to create a
public sentiment against it ? If I am not at liberty
to do this, Mr. Mill is laying down a doctrine of lib
erty which is interfering with my liberty. Such
questions as these start points, on which many anx
ious to cultivate a spirit, not only of toleration, but
what is far higher, of charity, are anxious to have
light, which is not vouchsafed in this treatise.
The spirit which it is fitted to engender is that of
u individualism
;
&quot; and when it has had time to pro
duce its proper fruits, it will be found to have raised
up a body of young men who reckon it a virtue to
be peculiar in their opinions, and rather commenda
ble to be eccentric. The spirit of hero-worship pro
duced indirectly by German pantheism, and directly
by the writings of Carlyle, has happily lost its sway
over our young men, and is now to be found, in some
of the remains of it, only among literary gentlemen
of respectable middle age. But we are sure to be
flooded in the coming generation with something
still more intolerable, in ambitious youths each af
fecting to strike out a path of his own, in opinion
and sentiment, speculative, practical, and religious.
This spirit, as it runs to excess, will be quite as de
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the old habit &amp;gt;f subjection to authority or reverence
for the great. The genuine temper is not a prostra
tion before antiquity or before genius on the one
hand
; but just as little is it a love of novelty or a
love of change on the other : it is a love of inde
pendence, which, believing that truth in all impor
tant matters is attainable, sets out earnestly in
search of it
; not rejecting the old because it is old,
or accepting the new because it is new, but willing
to take light from whatever quarter it may come.
While giving to utility an important place, I deny
that it is the only thing to be looked at as a good,
as a test, or as a standard. Take the duties we owe
to God, the love and reverence we should cherish
towards Him, and the worship we should pay Him
in private and in public. Surely man s moral nature
justifies him in holding that there are such duties:
but on what foundation can utilitarianism rest them ?
Is it on beneficial tendency to the individual or
to society? So far as the individual is concerned,
the salutary influence is produced on his spirit only
when he pays the service, because it is right. If he
is constrained to render it from any other motive,
it will rather chafe and irritate, and end in unbelief
and rebellion. And as to worship paid to God
merely for the good of the community, it is the
very consummation of public hypocrisy which in
the end would deceive no one. The defenders of
the utilitarian theory, in the form given to it by
Bentham, have never attempted to build upon it408 UTILITARIANISM.
a code of religious duties. I believe that any at
tempt of this description would only show that
the foundation was not broad or deep enough to
bear such a superstructure. The same may be said
of not a few of the duties we owe to our fellow-
men. Take gratitude for undeserved favors. I
would not choose to found it on the mere desire
to promote our own happiness or that of the person
from whom the benefit has come : in order to be
a virtue, it must spring from a sense of the duty
we owe to the benefactor.
There are symptoms of a renewed attempt being
made in our age to construct a morality without
a godliness. I speak of it as a renewed attempt, for
it has been tried before. In the second century,
when Paganism was losing its hold of educated
minds, and young Christianity was advancing with
such rapid strides, an attempt was made by the Neo-
Platoiiic School of Alexandria to construct a the
ology, and, by the Stoic School of Eome a morality,
higher than that of the Bible. Every student of
history knows how these schemes were soon seen to
terminate in a humiliating failure. The Neo-Platonic
ecstasy evaporated into empty air, and the Stoic
self-sufficiency hardened into offensive pride ; and
neither offered any effectual resistance to the tri
umphant march of a religion suited in every way to
the wants of man s nature. Analogous projects have
been devised and are being recommended in our day.
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represented as not sufficiently pure as being too
anthropomorphic; and mystic thinkers have sought
to picture to us a God of a more spiritual and ethe
real character. This style of thinking in Germany
has issued from, or culminated in, a shadowy panthe
ism, which, followed to its logical and practical con
sequences as it will be in this country must
identify God with the evil as well as with the good,
or in fact make evil only a form of good. And now
it looks as if we are to have persons presenting
to us a morality higher and broader than that of the
New Testament.
After speaking in very exalted terms of the doc
trines and precepts of Christ, Mr. Mill asserts
&quot; that
many essential elements of the highest morality are
among the things which are not provided for, nor in
tended to be provided for, in the recorded deliver
ances of the Founder of Christianity, and which
have been entirely thrown aside in the system of
ethics erected on the basis of those deliverances by
the Christian church. And this being so, I think it
a great error to persist in attempting to find in
the Christian doctrine that complete rule for our
guidance, which its author intended to sanction and
enforce, but only partially to provide.&quot;
&quot;I believe
that other ethics than any which can be evolved
from exclusively Christian sources, must exist side
by side with Christian ethics to produce the moral re
generation of mankind.&quot; (Liberty, pp. 91-92.) Now,
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of God do not contain specific directions as to what
mankind should do in the infinitely varied positions
in which they may be placed. The Christian system
first shows the sinner how he may be delivered from
the burden of past sin, which so weighs him down
in his efforts after regeneration. It then furnishes
motives to induce him to perform the duties which
devolve upon him. It enjoins, as the regulating
principle of our conduct, love to God and love to
man. It lays down many and varied precepts as to
how we should feel and what we should do, in very
many and varied situations, and supplies numerous
warnings against evil, and examples of good. Speak
ing as unto wise men, it leaves the rest to ourselves,
to the motives which it has called forth, and the
royal law of love, which is its grand moving and
ruling principle.
Mr. Mill is not very specific as to what he sup
poses the code of Christian morality to be deficient
in. He complains of our
&quot;
discarding those secular
standards (as, for want of a better name, they may
be called) which heretofore co-existed with and
supplemented the Christian ethics.&quot; But I believe
this has been provided for in such passages as these,
scattered everywhere
:
&quot; Whatsoever things are true,
whatsoever things are honest, whatsoever things are
just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things
are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report ; if
there be any virtue, and if there be any praise, think
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looked some of these graces and virtues ; but in
order to correct them, we do not require to go be
yond the Scriptures themselves. He fixes on one
department of duty which he supposes to be neglect
ed in the Word of God, and that is the duty we owe
to the State :
&quot; In the purely Christian ethics, that
grand department of duty is scarcely noticed or ac
knowledged.&quot; I am amazed, I confess, at this charge.
The history of ancient Israel, recorded in the Old
Testament, exhibits the most fervent patriotism in
every page. How nobly does it burst forth in the
exclamation of the Psalmist,
&quot;If I forget thee,
Jerusalem,&quot; etc. Paul has caught the same spirit:
&quot;
Brethren, my heart s desire and prayer for Israel is,
that they might be saved.&quot; We find it burning and
flaming in the bosom of our Lord himself: &quot;0 Jeru
salem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered
thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her
chickens under her wings, but ye would not.&quot; The
Word of God requires obedience from the subject
:
&quot; Bender therefore to all their dues
; tribute to whom
tribute is due, custom to whom custom, fear to whom
fear, honor to whom honor.&quot; But he adds,
u It is
essentially a doctrine of passive obedience
; it incul
cates submission to all authorities thought estab
lished, who indeed are not to be actively obeyed
when they command what religion forbids, but who
are not to be resented, far less rebelled against, for any
amount of wrong to ourselves.&quot; I admit that the
Bible does not give minute rules as to when subjects412 UTILITARIANISM.
may claim the right to refuse obedience, nor do I
know of any moral code that does. But it prescribes
the function of governors
: uA minister of God to
thee for good, sent for the punishment of evil-doers,
and for the praise of them that do well.&quot; I do be
lieve that Christians are not at liberty to rebel
merely because of wrong done to themselves per
sonally. But when the governor commands what is
evil in itselfj when the government ceases to fulfil
its proper office, Christians have thought themselves
entitled, always with excessive reluctance, to resist,
and have drawn their warrant from the Word of
God. So at least thought the Huguenots of France,
and the Puritans of England, and the Covenanters of
Scotland, and the Bishops at the Eevolution Settle
ment
; and their descendants, who have inherited
the blessings secured through them, have been
proud of the example they set.
Mr. Mill and his school have, unfortunately, not
drawn out this code of morality, which is to be purer
and nobler than the Christian. But we may gather
what it would be from occasional statements. With
perhaps some few additions, it would probably be
such as we find in the Meditations of Marcus Aure-
lius Antoninus, the Roman emperor who so rigorously
opposed the progress of Christianity. Mr. Mill says
of his writings, that
&quot;they are the highest ethical
product of the ancient mind,&quot; and that they
&quot; differ
scarcely perceptibly, if they differ at all, from the
most characteristic teachings of Christ.&quot; (Ib. p. 49.)UTILITAEIANISM. 413
Surely Mr. Mill forgets that Jesus began his public
teaching by
&quot;
preaching the gospel of the kingdom
of God, and saying, The time is fulfilled, and the
kingdom of God is at hand : repent ye, and believe
the gospel&quot; (Mark
i. 14, 15); that the first beati
tude and the second beatitude in the Sermon on the
Mount are,
&quot;Blessed are the poor in
spirit;&quot; &quot;Blessed
are they that mourn ;
&quot; and the prayer commanded
is that of the publican,
&quot;
God, be merciful to me a
sinner.&quot; I have met with no such injunctions, no
such spirit, in the Meditations of Antoninus. This
work of the heathen emperor was much read by the
moral school of divines last century; and the pre
cepts enjoined were those they recommended. We
know the result. The self-righteous system, whether
recommended by the stoic moralists in ancient times,
or by the rationalists of last century, was favorably
regarded by a few persons belonging to the middle
class, mostly in comfortable worldly circumstances,
and not in a position to be much in fear of poverty,
or the deeper trials of life. In them it produced or
favored a spirit of self-sufficiency and pride, which
tended to make their characters hard and unlovely,
and exposed them often to grievous falls, from which
it could not lift them. And as to the great body of
the people of all classes, but especially the poor, the
tried and the unfortunate, they turned away from it
with loathing, as not adapted to their wants and cir
cumstances, pretending, as it did, to keep up by their
own strength those who felt that they needed higher414 UTILITARIANISM.
support, and providing no means of raising the
lapsed or comforting the mourner. I do not allow
that it would be an elevation of morality to set aside
the peculiar Christian graces of penitence, meekness,
and humility, and to substitute for them a sense of




School of M. Comte, both in its French and
British departments, is essentially a Sect, sepa
rated from other philosophies, and with very narrow
sympathies. It has been made so partly by the cir
cumstance that its adherents were at first few, and
had to meet not only with opposition but with con
tempt from the leading metaphysicians of the age ;
but it is so essentially, because it has cut itself off
from the streams which flow down from the past,
and, like a pool, it has no connection with anything
beyond itseE Though no longer a small body, and
though by their intellectual power and perseverance
they have compelled their opponents to respect
them, the disciples have still the exclusiveness of a
sect : they read one another, they quote one another,
and they criticise one another ; they are incapable
of appreciating any other philosophy. The two arti
cles of their creed, and the two points that unite
them, are the theory of nescience, and that of the
steps by which knowledge has made progress. I
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have been examining the first all throughout this
work. Before I close I must notice the other.
The famous law of sociology, as developed by M.
Comte, is about as rash a generalization as was ever
made by a Presocratic physiologist, a mediaeval
schoolman, or a modern German speculator. It
realizes the description given by Bacon of empiri
cists, who are represented as rising at once from
a limited observation of facts to the highest and
widest generalizations. The theory contains a small
amount of truth which it has misunderstood and
perverted. In the early ages of the world, and in
simple states of society at all times, mankind are in
clined to see God or the gods as acting without any
secondary instrumentality, in operations which are
found subsequently to take place according to natu
ral law. The reason of this is very simple and very
obvious, and has often been noticed : it is that man
kind are prompted by the native principle of causa
tion to seek for a cause to every event, while they
have not so large an experience as to enable them
to discover the uniformity in the cosmos. This state
of society constitutes what M. Comte calls the Theo
logical Era
; which, however, does not imply that
men are more disposed to see God in his works, and
to worship, love, and obey him, than in other ages ;
but simply that they believe him to act or interpose
by a free operation, independent of all physical
causation.
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men learn to abstract and generalize upon the phe
nomena of nature. They are apt to do so in the
first instance as being the easiest method by
mere mental force or inward cogitation. Not hav
ing learned to perform experiments, they cannot dis
tinguish between the various subtle powers and ele
ments which operate in nature, nor to make what
Bacon calls the necessary &quot;rejections and exclu
sions.&quot; Generalizing the obvious facts, they repre
sent the sun and stars as moving daily round the
earth, and, as they find they cannot thus explain the
whole phenomena, they give a special motion to the
moon and planets, and call in eccentrics and epicy
cles. Or, abstracting what seems common in the
obvious operations of earthly agents, they represent
the components of the universe as being the fiery,
the aerial, the aqueous, and the solid powers ; and
speak of certain bodies being in their very nature
light and others heavy. This is what is called the
Metaphysical Era. Not that mankind are then in
clined to cultivate metaphysics in any proper sense
of the term, or more than any other department of
inquiry ; but simply that they hasten to grasp the
operations of nature within and without them by
mental acts, and have not learned what it required
a Bacon to tell us that investigation must proceed
gradually, and by means of enlarged observation
and careful experiment. So far from being in any
peculiar sense a metaphysical age, it sought to pene
trate into all the departments of nature, and inquired
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into the origin and structure of the universe, and the
movements of the celestial bodies. It did enter upon
metaphysical subjects, but it was as it rushed into
physiological and astrological speculations ; and it
discussed them all in the same spirit. The Presocratic
schools, for example, did inquire into the nature of
knowing and being, and the human soul
; but it was
as they inquired into the primary principle or ele
ments of the universe. They satisfied themselves
with a few common observations, and then proceed
ed to apply thought to them. In pure metaphysical
questions they distinguished in a rude way between
Sensation and Reason, and when this division was
found insufficient, they called in a vague intermedi
ate principle called Opinion or Faith. Such ages
have no special title to be called the Metaphysical
Era : they treat physics and metaphysics in the same
undistinguishing and uncertain manner. Nor are
they to be regarded as necessarily non-theological
ages. No doubt there were curious questions started,
which could not be settled, as to the relation be
tween these rapidly generalized and abstract powers,
and the gods who ruled in heaven. There were thus
stirred theological questions which tended to under
mine the old superstitions, and to prepare the way
for a better era. It was at this time
&quot; the fulness
of time
&quot; that Christianity was introduced as a
seed into a soil ploughed to receive it.
In the natural advancement of intelligence, es
pecially after the great awakening of thought in theNATUEAL THEOLOGY. 419
sixteenth century, it was felt that the old methods
were waxing old, and must soon vanish away. These











&quot; which made religion accom
plish what could be done only by science. At this
time there appeared such men as Galileo practising
careful experiment, and Bacon himself to expound
the general principles of the true mode of pro
cedure of which method the Positive Philosophy
is merely a monstrous outgrowth. This Era should
be called the Inductive. It may be quite as meta
physical as the previous ones, only it will conduct
the investigations in a new spirit and mode, that is,
according to the Method of Induction. This new
spirit (though the method was not yet properly un
derstood) sprang up in the seventeenth century, and
was fostered by such men as Descartes, who taught
us to look into the mind to discover its operations,
and by Locke, who appealed to experience. Since
that time an inductive mental science, distracted
from time to time by an ambitious a priori, or by
a narrow empirical philosophy, has run parallel to
physical science. Nor is this era necessarily an un-
theological one. Never were questions of divinity
discussed so keenly as in the ages when the induc
tive spirit sprang up, and was applied to the study
of the human mind. And I believe that there is as
much, and as intense, religious feeling in our country
at this present time as there ever was in any country420 NATURAL THEOLOGY.
since man appeared on the earth; and sooner or
later there will be a tremendous reaction against the
present attempt to deaden the religious instincts
among our young men by a cold unbelief. No doubt
educated men cannot now see the constant interpo
sitions of God which were noticed in early ages ;
but it is because they take an enlarged and enlight
ened view of the course of nature, which they re
gard as ordered by God in infinite wisdom, and as
the expression of His will, and not requiring to
be interfered with. It is all true that men with a
proud and self-dependent spirit may now find it
easier to disbelieve in a personal God, and to hand
over the universe to unconscious natural law. But
the truth is, persons who do not like to retain a pure
and holy God in their hearts, had at all times an
outlet. That outlet was furnished in ancient times
by superstition, which degraded the Divine character,
and in modern times by infidelity, which denies His
existence or His constant operation.
It is a pleasant circumstance to reflect upon, that
nearly all the great philosophers of ancient and
modern times have been anxious to show that their
systems favor religion. There is every reason to be
lieve that the Ionian physiologists recognized the
Divine existence and the Divine agency
: certainly
Anaxagoras, who seems to have been the greatest
of them, allotted the all-important place in his
system to the Divine Intelligence. The founder of
the Eleatic School, Xenophanes. while he ridiculedNATURAL THEOLOGY. 421
the popular mythology, represented God as the es
sential existence. &quot;We know little of the Pythago
rean system, but it is clear that it had a Zeus as the
centre of the order which it delighted to unfold.
The two great truths which Socrates held by firmly,
amidst his doubts and his love of dialectic, were the
providence of God, and the tendency of virtue in
the government of God to promote happiness.
When Plato rises above the intellectual gymnastic
which he is so delighted to exercise, it is to merge
his philosophy in a theology in which the God is
represented as forever contemplating eternal ideas,
and developing all things according to them. Even
Aristotle, cold though he be in his references to
divine subjects, falls back on God as the principle
and ground of all things. In the Stoic system there
was a fiery deity, who pervaded all nature, and con
tinued unchanged amidst the periodical conflagra
tion of all things. Cicero wishes everywhere to be
thought a pure theist
; and the later Latin Stoics,
such as the philosophic emperor, were more religious
than the Greek founders of the school. Mediaeval
scholasticism consisted essentially in the application
of Logic to Theology. In the reaction of the six
teenth and seventeenth centuries, philosophic think
ers delighted to show that their systems could bear
up and confirm true religion. Bacon excluded final
causes from physics, but gave them and formal
causes a place in the higher field of metaphysics,
which stand next to and support theology at the422 NATURAL THEOLOGY.
apex of the pyramid. Descartes maintained that
the mind has an idea of the infinite and perfect,
which implies the existence of an infinitely perfect
Being. Locke wrote much on religious subjects, and
in the Fourth Book of his Essay, he shows that his
system leads to a reasonable belief in the existence
of a spiritual Being. The founders of the German
School, Leibnitz and Kant, embraced the existence
of God as essential parts of their philosophies, and
in this they were followed by the ideal pantheists,
Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel. The Scottish School,
from Hutcheson to Hamilton, including Brown, has
been at great pains to expound and defend the great
truths of natural religion.
It is surely an ominous circumstance, that in this
the nineteenth century there should arise a system
of philosophy, supported by very able men, and with
very extensive ramifications and applications, espe
cially in social science, but which contains within it
no argument for the Divine existence, or sanctions
to religion. The founder of the school was an
avowed, indeed a rabid, atheist ; and 1 am not aware
that any of his French followers have made any pro
fession of religion, most of them are favorers of
a materialism, which does not admit of a spiritual
God.
1 The British branch of the school seems, with
one accord, and evidently on a system, to decline
uttering any certain sound on the subject; they cer-
1 A vigorous opposition is being of- M. Cousin, M. Eemusat, and M.
fered to the prevailing Materialism by Janet (see his Materialisme Contem-
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tainly do not pretend that their philosophy, em
bracing though it does, all mental, moral, and social
problems, requires us to believe in the existence of
God, in the immortality of the soul, or a day of
judgment. Mr. Mill s method of dealing with the
subject is uniform, and evidently designed. Though
fond of uttering opinions on most other topics, he
declines saying what are his convictions, or whether
he has any convictions, in regard to religious truth.
He satisfies himself with declaring, that if you believe
in the existence of God, or in Christianity, I do not
interfere with you. He does not pretend that his
philosophy does of itself give any aid or sanction to
religion ; but if we can get evidence otherwise, he
assures us that he does not disturb us.
Without saying that it has convinced him, he
speaks with great respect of the argument from de
sign in favor of the Divine existence, and advises us
to stick by it, rather than resort to a priori proof.
The advice is a sound one. The greater number,
even of metaphysicians, are in doubts whether there
has ever been an a priori argument constructed by
Anselm, by Descartes, by Leibnitz, or by Clarke,
which can of itself prove the existence of God, apart
from the observation of the traces of wisdom and
goodness in the Divine workmanship. The reaction
against the argument from final cause, which has
been fostered by the German metaphysics for the
last age, is far from being a wise or a healthy spirit
and sentiment. The proof from design is that which424 NATURAL THEOLOGY.
ever comes home with most force to the unsophisti
cated mind.
But the important question is not about our au
thor s personal predilections and convictions, but is,
Does his philosophy undermine the arguments for
the existence of Deity, and the immortality of the
soul, and a day of accounts ? It is clear that many
of the old proofs cannot be advanced by those who
accept his theory. The argument from catholic con
sent can have no value on such a system. That
derived from the moral faculty in man, so much in
sisted on by Kant and Chalmers, is no longer avail
able when it is allowed that the moral law has no
place in our constitution, and that our moral senti
ments are generated by inferior feelings and associ
ated circumstances. But then, he tells us, that the
Design argument &quot;would stand exactly where it
does.&quot; (p. 210.) I doubt much whether this is the
case. I see no principles left by Mr. Mill sufficient
to enable us to answer the objections which have
been urged against it by Hume. Kant is usually
reckoned as having been successful in showing, that
the argument from design involves the principle of
cause and effect. We see an order and an adapta
tion in nature, which are evidently effects, and we
look for a cause. Has Mr. Mill s doctrine of causa
tion left this proof untouched ? Suppose that we
allow to him that there is nothing in an effect which
of itself implies a cause
; that even when we know
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the nature of that cause ; that the causal relation is
simply that of invariable antecedence within the
limits of our experience ; and that beyond our ex
perience there may be events without a cause, I
fear that the argument is left without a foundation.
And there are other questions pressing on our notice,
and demanding an answer. Can God be shown to
be infinite on the principles of this philosophy ? If
so, what are these principles ? If God exists as a
designer, is He also a moral governor? Will He
call His creatures to account, and reward those who
do good, and punish those who do evil ? Is this
world the only world to us, or is there another ? It
is clear that the argument drawn from the abiding,
the substantial, and spiritual nature of the soul is
entirely cut off by a philosophy which makes mind
a mere series of feelings. The more convincing ar
gument from God s justice calling His
t responsible
creatures to account, can have little or no force in a
system which admits no independent morality.
I should like, I confess, to have the proof and the
doctrine of natural religion drawn out according to
this philosophy. The argument for the being of a
God founded on any native principles is unavailable,
but we are allowed to weigh the a posteriori evi
dence. It is conceivable that the adherents of the
system may thread their way through the series of
feelings and possibilities t)f sensations, and as they
do so discover traces of what, if done by man, would
be reckoned design and beneficence : but whether426 NATUEAL THEOLOGY.
these phenomena within our experience entitle us to
argue that there is a Being beyond who has caused
them, is a question in regard to which some are wait
ing for light to come from the head of the school or
some other quarter. Those who believe that an
effect of itself implies a cause, have no hesitation in
concluding that the design in nature implies a de
signer -, and those who look on man as having a
moral nature, and constrained by inward principles
to believe in infinity, can clothe the designer with
moral and infinite perfections. But there are not a
few, both of those who oppose and those who sup
port Mr. Mill, who cannot see that his system war
rants us in reaching any such result. And there is
the more puzzling inquiry, whether there is proof
that the thread or prolonged throb of consciousness
exists after its external bodily conditions or possibili
ties have been evidently dissolved by death. These
are questions which some of our youths, who have
committed themselves to this philosophy, are sporting
with in utter levity, and which are wringing the
hearts of others till feelings more bitter than tears
burst from them : and what are they to do, in this
transition state, with the old undermined and the
new not yet constructed ?
I have carefully refrained throughout this work
from urging any argument from consequences, or
from religious considerations, against the philosophy
I am examining. I have, to the best of my ability,
and with an anxious desire to reason fairly, met myNATURAL THEOLOGY. 427
distinguished opponent on the ground of conscious
ness, and of legitimate inference from it. But neither
he nor I, neither those who follow nor those who op
pose him, can avoid looking at the results. Scepti
cism, as Hume delights to show, can produce no mis
chief in the common secular affairs of life, because
there man is ever meeting with circumstances which
keep him right in spite of his principles or want of
principles. But it is very different in those questions
which fall to be discussed in higher ethics and theol
ogy. A man will not be tempted by any sophistry to
doubt the connection of cause and effect when he is
thirsty and sees a cup of water before him
; in such a
case he will at once put forth his hand and take it,
knowing that the beverage will refresh him. But he
may be led by a wretched sophistry to deny the neces
sary relation of cause and effect when it would lead
him upward from God s works to God himself, or to
seek assurance and peace in him. Hence the import
ance of not allowing fundamental truth to be assailed :
not because the attack will sway any one in the
common business of life, but because it may hold
back and damp our higher aspirations, moral and
religious. I put no question as to the religious con
victions of its supporters ; but I may surely ask
What is the religion left us by the new philosophy
?
M. Comte provided a religion and a worship for
his followers. He had no God, but he had a
&quot; Grand
Etre,&quot; in Collective Humanity, or &quot;the continuous
resultant of all the forces capable of voluntarily con-428 NATURAL THEOLOGY.
curring in the universal perfectioning of the world/
being in fact a deification of his system of science
and sociology. In the worship he enjoined he has
nine sacraments, and a priesthood, and public honors
to be paid to the Collective Humanity but with no
public liberty of conscience, or of education, in sacred
or indeed in any subjects. The religious observances
were to occupy two hours every day. Mr. Mill tells
us, &quot;Private adoration is to be addressed to Col
lective Humanity in the persons of worthy individual
representatives, who may be either living or dead,
but must in all cases be women ; for women, be
ing the sexe aimant, represent the best attribute of
humanity, that which ought to regulate all human
life, nor can Humanity possibly be symbolized in any
form but that of a woman. The objects of private
adoration are the mother, the wife, and the daughter,
representing severally the past, the present, and the
future, and calling into active exercise the three so
cial sentiments, veneration, attachment, and kind
ness. We are to regard them, whether dead or alive,
as our guardian angels, les vrais anges gardiens. If
the last two have never existed, or if, in the particu
lar case, any of the three types is too faulty for the
office assigned to it, their place may be supplied by
some other type of womanly excellence, even by one
merely historical. (Comte and Posit, p. 150.) The
Christian religion surely does not suffer by being
placed alongside this system, which is one of the
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the other being Mormonism. The author clung
more and more fondly to this faith and ceremonial
as he advanced in years. His English followers are
ashamed of it, and ascribe it to his lunacy, as if
he had not been tinged with madness (as his poor
wife knew, all his life), and as if his whole system
had not been the product of a powerful but constitu
tionally diseased intellect.
He denounces his English followers, because they
did not adopt his moral and social system ; he char
acterizes the conversion of those who have adopted
his positivity and rejected his religion as an abor
tion; and declares that it must proceed from im
potence of intellect, or insufficiency of heart, com
monly from both ! (Polit. Posit, tome i. pref. p. xv. ;
m. p. xxiv.) There is a basis of wisdom in this com
plaint. All history shows that man is a religious,
quite as certainly as he is a feeling, and a rational
being. But what has the British School provided
to meet man s religious wants ? As yet they have
furnished nothing. But Mr. Mill, who always weighs
his words, and who is too skilful a dialectician to say
more than he means, evidently points to something
which is being hatched, and may some day burst
forth. While he has the strongest objection to the
system of politics and morals set forth in the Poll-
tique Positive, he thinks &quot;it has superabundantly
shown the possibility of giving to the service of hu
manity, even without the belief in a Providence,
both the psychological power and the social efficacy430 NATURAL THEOLOGY.
of a religion
: making it take hold of human life,
and color all thought, feeling, and action, in a
manner of which the greatest ascendency ever ex
ercised by any religion may be but a type and fore
taste.&quot; ( Utily p. 48.) More specifically in his latest
work he says, that
&quot;
though conscious of being in an
extremely small minority,&quot; a circumstance which
is sure to catch those
&quot; individualists
&quot; who are bent
on appearing original
&quot; we venture to think that
a religion may exist without belief in a God, and
that a religion without a God may be, even to Chris
tians, an instructive and profitable object of contem
plation.&quot; (Comte and Posit., p. 133.) He tells us,
that in order to constitute a religion, there must
be &quot;a creed or conviction,&quot;
&quot;a belief or set of be
liefs,&quot;
&quot; a sentiment connected with this creed,&quot; and
a &quot;cultus.&quot; I confess I should like excessively to
see this new religion, with its creed and its cultus,
fully developed. It would match the theologies,
with their ceremonial observances, projected by doc
trinaires in the heat of the French Eevolution.
There is no risk of the British School setting up
a religion and a worship so superbly ridiculous as
that of M. Comte, but I venture to predict that
when it comes, it will be so scientifically cold, and
so emotionally blank} as to be incapable of gathering
any interest around it, of accomplishing any good
or, I may add, inflicting any evil.
Leaving the religion to develop itself in the future,
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osophic system. Within, we have a prolonged series
of feelings ; without, we have a possibility of sensa
tions ; both regulated by the most unbending laws
of necessity, within the limits of experience and a
reasonable distance beyond ; and beyond that beyond,
if there be such, a land of darkness and eternal
silence. This is the cold region into which thought,
as it moves on in its orbit, has brought us, in the
third quarter of the nineteenth century. And is
this, then, what is left us after all the dialectic con
flicts, and as the result of all the scientific discoveries
of the last two thousand five hundred years that
have elapsed since reflective thought was awakened ?
We know how keenly some patriotic and high-minded
Frenchmen feel when they are obliged to contem
plate the present state of their country, and to con
fess how great the humiliation implied in the bloody
revolutions through which they have passed, ending
in a military despotism, which restrains on all hands
liberty of thought and action. I am sure that a like
feeling will rise up in many noble and hopeful minds
when they are made to see that all these discussions,
philosophic and religious, in the past, that all these
throes and convulsions of opinion and sentiment
have left us only a series of feelings and a possibility
of sensations, beginning we know not with what,
and carrying us we know not whither, all that we
are sure of being, that the sensations and feelings
are conveyed along pleasantly or unpleasantly, and
ranged into companies suitably or unsuitably, and432 NATURAL THEOLOGY.
our very beliefs generated, by a fatalistic law of con
tiguity and resemblance. Some may be content
with this lot, as being caught in the toils and despair
ing of an escape
: but there will be others, I ven
ture to say nobler and better, who feel that they
must be delivered from this mental bondage at all
hazards, and will hasten to attempt it even at the
risk of new conflicts and new revolutions. It should
not after all be so difficult for humble and sincere
men to escape from this net which sophistry would
weave around them. Let them follow those intui
tions and ultimate beliefs, the existence and the
veracity of which Mr. Mill has acknowledged,
while he has declined to pursue them to their con
sequences ; let them gather around them a body of
acquired observations with their appropriate senti
ments
; and, as they do so, they will reach a body
of truth, practical, scientific, and religious, sufficient
to stay the intellect and satisfy the heart, while
what still remains unknown will only incite to fur
ther explorations, and lead to new discoveries.APPENDIX.
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357.
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REPLY TO MR. MILL S STRICTURES IN HIS THIRD EDITION.
ARTICLE I. Mr. Mitt s Philosophic Predecessors, (p. 14.)
I REQUIRE, before entering on the discussion, to refer to
one or two personal matters, these fortunately not involving
any offensive personal feeling. I had spoken of Hobbes,
Hartley, Hume, and Brown as Mr. Mill s philosophic ances
tors, and of Mr. James Mill and M. Comte as having had o
influence on the young thinker, and of M. Comte as having
led him to regard it as
&quot;
impossible for the mind to rise to
first or final causes, or to know the nature of
things&quot; (Ex
amination of MilVs Philosophy, p. 8). I did so, because
M. Comte, the great defender of that doctrine, had ex
pounded his views before Mr. Mill had published anything.
But Mr. Mill tells us :
&quot; The larger half of my System of
Logic, including all its fundamental doctrines, was written
before I had seen the Le Cours de Philosophic Positive.
That work was indebted to M. Comte for many valuable
thoughts, but a short list would exhaust the chapters, and
even the pages which contain them
&quot;(p. 267). I suppose he
means to include not merely his System of Logic, but the
fuller exposition which we have in some of his other works,
in which he has expounded doctrines identical with those
held by M. Comte, and usually fathered upon him. He as
sures us, however, in regard to the general doctrine of Nesci
ence, as I call it, he was familiar with it
&quot; before I was out
of my boyhood, from the teachings of my father. Ever since
the days of Hume, that doctrine has been the general property
of the philosophic world. From the time of Brown, it has
entered into popular philosophy.&quot; This statement does not
differ essentially from mine, only it ascribes less to M. Comte,436 APPENDIX.
and more to Mr. James Mill, who is represented as teaching
the doctrine to his son from boyhood. I leave this statement
without comment, except that I must protest against repre
senting Brown, who argued for the existence of God from
the traces of design, as discarding either first or final
causes.
Mr. Mill admits (p. 319)
&quot;Dr. M Cosh s work is unim
peachable in respect of candor and fairness.&quot; I accept the
compliment. I did intend to act fairly towards my distin
guished opponent ; and carefully abstained from quibbling
and captiousness, when strongly tempted to indulge in it by
what seemed the severe criticism of Mr. Hamilton. Esteem
ing moral higher than intellectual qualities (so deified by
Buckle and others of the school), I value this testimony
higher than I would have done a laudation of my abilities.
But the compliment is followed by a charge, that
&quot; he can
not be relied on for correctly apprehending the maxims and
tendencies of a philosophy different from his own,&quot; and he
complains that &quot;he has not been able, even a little way, into
the mode of thought he is combating&quot; (p. 250). All I
have to say here is, that if I have not been able to do so, it
must be owing to some hebetude of intellect ; for I was
reared in favorable circumstances for understanding the sys
tem and its tendencies. Albeit some years younger than
Mr. Mill, I was brought up intellectually in a position not
so widely different from those in which he was trained. The
first professor of mental science who impressed me favorably,
which he did by his cool intellectual power, was Mr. James
Mylne of Glasgow University, who following Destutt de
Tracey, derived all our ideas from sensation, memory, and
judgment. The first metaphysical work I read with admi
ration, was the Lectures of Thomas Brown. At a prema
turely early age, I had perused the philosophic works of
Hume. I read James Mill s Analysis at the time it came
out, and also Sir James Mackintosh s Dissertation, in which
he attempts to resolve conscience into the association of ideas.
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of these writers was far too subtile, and that they must be
overlooking some of the deepest and most characteristic
phenomena of the mind. Still, these were the men (not
to speak of ancient philosophers) for whom, in my juvenile
years, I had an admiration, rather than towards Reid, or
even Stewart or Locke ; and I believe I entered a good way
into their modes of thought and their systems. But on ma
ture and independent reflection, I had found my way out
of their subtilties, and this before I knew anything of Ham
ilton, who turned the tide in public sentiment. At a time
when the Philosophic, Positive was known to few in this
country, I read it with care, and I saw at once that it would
come to be a power in this century, quite equal to Hobbes
in the seventeenth and of Hume in the eighteenth centuries ;
and I noticed it in my first published work (Method of Di
vine Government, B. II. c. ii., Note D). On my first
reading Mill s Logic, which was not for some time after its
publication, I saw that the philosophy in which I had been
brought up was involved throughout. The literary work on
which I was engaged at the time when Mill s Examination
of Hamilton came out, was an expository and critical ac
count of Hume s philosophy for this Review, and intended to
find a place in a contemplated work on the Scottish philoso
phy ; and the book came out in time to enable me to bring
out in a set of foot-notes, the curious correspondence between
the philosophy of Hume and that of Mill. I mention these
things, to show that I should be quite prepared to enter a
considerable way into Mr. Mill s mode of thought. But by
painful cogitation I had wrought myself out of it, and be
lieved I had discovered the fundamental fallacies of the whole
philosophy. The one qualification which I possessed for the
task of examining Mr. Mill, lay in my having been trained
in much the same school, and having risen above it ; and I
thought it right to give to the world, with an application to
the very able work which appeared, the arguments which had
convinced myself, and which I had expounded for years to
my college classes.438 APPENDIX.
Mr. Mill is often alleging against those who oppose him,
that they are not able to place themselves
&quot;
at the point of
view of a theory different
&quot; from their own. But has Mr. Mill
never put to himself the question,
&quot;
May I not have fallen into
the sin I have laid to the charge of my opponents ? Have I
ever thoroughly entered into and sympathized with that high-
souled philosophy which was introduced by Plato, which was
continued by men like Augustine, Anselm, Descartes, Cud-
worth, Leibnitz, Jacobi, and Kant, and Cousin ; and in a
lower key, by Aristotle, Buffier, Reid, Stewart, and Hamil
ton?&quot; I admire greatly the ability, dialectic and deductive,
of Mr. Mill. It is peculiarly a clear, a penetrating under
standing ; but it is not distinguished by wide sympathies and
philosophic comprehensiveness. He does admire Plato and
Coleridge ; but it is because the former had so much of the
search-spirit and the undermining dialectic ; and because the
latter was dissolving the old philosophy and theology of Brit
ain. I am convinced that he has seen so many contradic
tions in Hamilton, because he could not always take into
view the full sweep of his massive, but at times ill-constructed
system. When he commends an opponent, as he does Ham
ilton often and Mansel at times, it is when he. sees they are
travelling towards the point which he himself has reached.
It is surely conceivable that he may have been so filled with
his own system, inherited from a beloved father, and cher
ished resolutely at the time when the tide was all against him,
and that it may now bulk so largely before his eyes, as to
make him to some extent incapable of appreciating, or even
thoroughly comprehending, those who look on things from
a different point of view.
I do believe, that, because of my philosophic experience,
I am able, at least, to look at both sides of the question. I
claim to understand the
&quot; maxims
&quot; of this philosophy, ex
cept, indeed, that I confess to a difficulty in apprehending
how, on his principles, he reaches the idea of extension, or
a reasonable conviction of the existence of his fellow-men.
Possibly I may be able to judge of the
&quot; tendencies
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as coolly and impartially as those who have constructed it.
He has himself characterized the Sensational philosophy of
France, as
&quot; the shallowest set of doctrines which were ever
passed off upon a cultivated age as a complete psychological
system, the ideology of Condillac and his school ; a system
which affected to resolve all the phenomena of the human
mind into sensation, by a process which essentially consisted
in merely calling all states of mind however heterogeneous
by that name&quot; (Discuss, vol. i. p. 410). But Condillac,
as a philosophic thinker, a scholar, and a writer, was equal
to Mr. Mill, and was quite as acute in arguing against
Descartes and Malebranche, as Mill is against Whewell
and Hamilton, and had much the same kind of influence
in France a hundred years ago that Mr. Mill is now ex
ercising in England. I am convinced that Condillac had no
idea that any evil consequences would follow from his phil
osophic theories. Most of his works were written for the
purpose of training a prince of Parma : he believes that
there is a God; &quot;that the laws which reason prescribes to
us are the laws which God has imposed on us ; and that it
is here that the morality of actions is completed. There is,
therefore, a natural law ; that is to say, a law which has its
foundation on the will of God&quot; (Traite des Animaux,
c. vii.). I admit that the two systems, that of Condillac and
that of Mill, are not the same; but it could be shown that
they have a much closer correspondence in themselves, and
in their logical and practical consequences, than Mr. Mill
will be disposed to allow. Both derive our ideas from
sensation ; but Mr. Mill takes credit for adding association,
and says we get our ideas from sensation by association. But
it can be shown that Condillac had not overlooked associa
tion. I find Dugald Stewart remarking,
&quot; Condillac s earliest
work appeared three years before the publication of Hart
ley s Theory. It is entitled *Essai sur VOrigine des Con-
naissances Humaine, Ouvrage oil Von reduit a un seul
principe tout ce qui concerne Ventendement humain. This
seul principe is the association of ideas. The account which440 APPENDIX.
both authors give of the transformation of sensations into
ideas is substantially the same&quot; (Dissert., P. ii., S. 6).
But the truth is, both had been anticipated by Hutcheson,
who had expounded the general doctrine, and by Hume, who
had used the doctrine of associations to account for beliefs
supposed to be innate. Certain it is, that Condillac speaks




Celles-la sont souvent si bien cimentees, qu il
nous est impossible de les de truire.&quot; &quot;En ge*ne*ral les im
pressions que nous e*prouvons dans differentes circonstances
nous font Her des ide*es que nous ne sommes plus maitres de
se*parer.&quot; Mr. Mill will, I believe, be astonished to find
here his father s law of Inseparable Association. Not only
so, but he accounts by this law, like Mr. Mill, for what is
supposed to be inne ou naturel (see
&quot; Connaissances Hum.,&quot;
c. ix.). I doubt much whether Mr. Mill is entitled to as
sume such airs in denouncing the sensational school of
France. His ideas, generated out of sensation by associa




of Condillac. Both philosophies, when we trace
them sufficiently far down, are found to rest on nothing more
solid than sensations with their associations ; only Mr.
Mill is driven at times to bring in something inexplicable, of
which nothing can be known. Let Mr. Mill s philosophy
have as long time to work as that of Condillac had, from
the middle of last century to the French Revolution, and
through the imperial sway of Bonaparte, and I believe that
&quot; sensation plus association
&quot;
will not be found to have any
more elevating effect on prevailing thought and sentiment
than
&quot; transformed sensations
&quot; had ; only I cherish the
hope that in this country the tendency will be counteracted
by the higher philosophy and theology still abiding among
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ARTICLE II. Mr. Mitts Theory of Mind. (pp. 88-111.)
It falls in with the order of my examination to begin with
his account of mind, which he had resolved into
&quot; a series of
feelings with a background of possibilities of
feeling,&quot; re
quiring the farther statement that it is
&quot; a series aware of
itself as past and future.&quot; He had acknowledged that this
&quot;reduces us to the alternative of believing that the Mind,
or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings or
possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that some
thing which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be
aware of itself as a series ;
&quot;
that his theory on this subject
has &quot;intrinsic difficulties, and that he is here face to face
with a final inexplicability.&quot; Now he has told us (Logic,
III. iv. 1), that &quot;the question, What are the laws of na
ture ? may be stated thus : what are the fewest and simplest
assumptions which, being granted, the whole existing order
of nature would result ?
&quot; Now I believe that the single and
simple assumption to be made on this subject is, that in
every conscious act there is a knowledge of self as acting,
and in every remembrance of a past experience of self, as
having had the experience. Here we are face to face with
a final fact, which needs no explicability. But Mr. Mill
will not state it thus, and he is flitting round and round the
point without alighting on it. He affirms that there
&quot;
is no
ground for believing that the Ego is an original presenta
tion of consciousness.&quot; Now I admit that an abstract Ego
is not given in self-consciousness ; but the concrete Ego is ;
that is, the Ego as thinking, feeling, or in some other act.
He allows, in his new edition, that he does not profess to
have adequately accounted for the belief in mind. Let us
see how he seeks to bear up his theory in the Appendix
which he has added :
&quot; The fact of recognizing a sensation, of being reminded of it,
and, as we say, remembering that it has been felt before, is the
simplest and most elementary fact of memory ; and the inexplicable442 APPENDIX.
tie or law, the organic union (as Professor Masson calls it), which
connects the present consciousness with the past one, of which it
reminds me, is as near, I think, as we can get to a positive con
ception of Self. That there is something real in this tie, real as
the sensations themselves, and not a mere product of the laws of
thought, without any fact corresponding to it, I hold to be un-
dubitable.&quot;
&quot; Whether we are directly conscious of it in the act
of remembrance, as we are of succession in the fact of having
successive sensations, or whether, according to the opinion of Kant,
we are not conscious of self at all, but are compelled to assume it
as a necessary condition of memory, I do not undertake to decide.
But this original element, which has no community of nature with
any of the things answering to our names, and to which we cannot
give any name but its own peculiar one without implying some
false or ungrounded theory, is the Ego or Self. As such, I ascribe
a reality to the Ego to my own mind different from that real
existence as a Permanent Possibility, which is the only reality I
acknowledge in matter.&quot;
&quot; We are forced to apprehend every part
of the series as linked with the other parts by something in com
mon, which is not the feelings themselves any more than the succes
sion of the feelings is the feelings themselves ; and as that which is
the same in the first as in the second, in the second as in the third,
in the third as in the fourth, and so on, must be the same in the
first and in the fiftieth, this common element is a permanent ele
ment. But beyond this, we can affirm nothing of it except the
states of consciousness themselves.&quot; (pp. 256, 257.)
There are plenty of assumptions and admissions in this pas
sage, far more than the defender of intuitive psychology is
obliged to make. There is an &quot;original element,&quot; to which
he ascribes a
&quot;
reality,&quot; and a real existence ; a
&quot;
permanent
element,&quot; something common to the feelings, &quot;which is not
the feelings themselves ;
&quot; the same in the first and fiftieth
state of consciousness, and to which we can give no other
name than the Ego, or Self. Now what is this but the per
manent mind or Ego of the metaphysicians, with its various
modifications, revealed by consciousness? I certainly do not
stand up for the doctrine of Kant, according to whom we are
not conscious of self, but are required to assume it as a con
dition. I prefer a much simpler doctrine, that we areHIS THEORY OF MIND. 443
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conscious of self in every mental act, conscious of self griev
ing in every feeling of grief, of self remembering in every
act of memory. Admit this clearly and frankly, and I am
satisfied. But I am satisfied because in this we have two
great truths, that man knows, and that he knows real exist
ence, that is, self, as existing. But the disciple of the doc
trine of Nescience that is, of the doctrine that we can know
nothing of the nature of things ever draws back from such
a plain statement, as inconsistent with his favorite theory;
and he talks instead of an &quot;inexplicable tie,&quot; or &quot;law,&quot; or
&quot;organic union,&quot; or &quot;link to connect the facts,&quot; language
which is metaphorical at the best, and never does express the
fact, which is a very simple one, though full of meaning.
We are here at the place where Mr. Mill is in greatest
difficulties, and feels himself to be so. He tells us that &quot;the
one fact which the Psychological Theory cannot explain, is
the fact of Memory (for Expectation I hold to be, psycho
logically and logically, a consequence of Memory).&quot; I have
shown, I think, that he is for ever assuming, without per
ceiving it, other primordial facts ; and that there are other
facts equally entitled to be regarded as primordial, and, on
the same ground,
&quot; no reason can be given for it which does
not presuppose the belief, and assume it to be well grounded.&quot;
But let us specially inquire, What is involved in the assump
tion of memory? I had objected, that Mr. Mill was not
able to give an account of the genesis of the idea which, as
consciousness attests, we have of Time. Let us look at the
account he now gives of the idea (p. 247), and then we shall
be prepared to look at the way in which he generates it. He
tells us that by Time is to be
&quot; understood an indefinite suc
cession of successions.&quot; This does not make the matter
clearer ; the more so, as he has no things to succeed each
other except sensations, which are only for the moment.
&quot; The only ultimate facts or primitive elements in Time are
Before and After, which (the knowledge of opposites being
one) involve the notion of Neither before nor after i.e.,
simultaneous.&quot; I do not look on this account as a correct oneAPPENDIX.
of the facts of our experience. We get the idea of Time as a
primitive fact in memory
: we remember every event as hap
pening in time past, and can then abstract the time from the
event. I certainly do not give in to the principle that
&quot;the knowledge of opposites is one,&quot; for I hold that the
knowledge of opposites is the knowledge of opposites,
that is, of things opposed ; and I do not allow that Before
and After are opposites
: they are rather continuous. But
we are more interested to inquire, What account does he
give of our idea and conviction as to this infinite Succes
sion of Successions ; this Before, and After, and Simul
taneous? His answering is hesitating, and it is unsatis
factory. It brings out the weak points of the theory, and
the awkwardness of the attempt made to bolster it up. He
admits,
&quot; I have never pretended to account by association
for the idea of Time.&quot; &quot;Neither do I decide whether that
inseparable attribute of our sensations is annexed to them by
the laws of the mind or given in the sensations ; nor whether,
at this great height of abstraction, the distinction does not
disappear.&quot; He admits that Time is the inseparable attribute
of our sensations. He admits that we have the idea. We
ask, Whence it comes? Let us look at the alternatives be
tween which he hesitates. Our idea of Time
&quot;
may be given
in the sensations themselves.&quot; Observe how he is giving to
the sensations a new and a totally diverse element, in the
very manner of the school of Condillac. An idea implying
indefinite successiveness, a Before and an After, all given
in sensations, which we thought were confined to the pres
ent ! ! Surely this beats anything found in the
&quot; shallowest
set of doctrines ever passed off upon a cultivated
age,&quot; and
&quot; which consisted in merely calling all states of mind, how
ever heterogeneous, by that name,&quot; that is, the name of
sensations. If he take the other alternative, then he is giv
ing to the mind the power of generating in the course of its
exercise, a totally new idea a view utterly inconsistent with
his own empirical theory, and the very view of Leibnitz, who
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seems unwilling to be fixed on either horn, and would fain
mount up into some height of abstraction, where the distinc
tion may disappear. But the facts do not lie in any great
height of abstraction, but in the low level of our every-day
consciousness, and can be expressed only by giving sensation
its proper place, and time its proper place, both being
equally primordial facts.
ARTICLE III. Mr. MiWs Theory of Body. (pp. 112-158.)
I now come to a more perplexing subject, in which I admit
there is room for difference of opinion, though no room for
that of Mr. Mill ; that is, the idea and the conviction which
we have in regard to Body. As the conclusion of his subtile
disquisitions, he had defined Matter as the Permanent Possi
bility of Sensation. In the added Appendix, he declares
clearly that there is no proof that we perceive it by our
senses, or that the notion and belief of it come to us by an
original law of our nature ; and that
&quot;
all we are conscious
of, may be accounted for without supposing that we perceive
Matter by our senses, and that the notion and belief may
have come to us by the laws of our constitution, without
being a revelation of any objective reality.&quot;
He admits (p. 245) that his opponents have referred his
theory to the right test, in aiming to show that &quot;its attempt
to account for the belief in matter implies or requires that the
belief should always exist as a condition of its own produc
tion. The objection is true, if conclusive.&quot; But he adds,
&quot;
They are not very particular about the proof of its truth ;
they one and all think their case made out, if I employ in
any part of the exposition the language of common life.&quot; I
deny for myself that I have tried to make out my case by such
an argument. I have indeed expressed a wish that he would
&quot;
employ language consistent with his theory, and we should
then be in a position to judge whether he is building it up
fairly.&quot; I believe that any plausibility possessed by it is de
rived from his expressing
it in common language, which446 APPENDIX.
enables him to introduce, surreptitiously and unconsciously,
the ideas wrapt up in it. When he and Mr. Bain speak of
&quot;a sweep of the arm,&quot; and &quot;a movement of the
eye,&quot; it is
difficult for others, perhaps even for themselves, to think of
the arm and the eye as mere momentary sensations, as unex-
tended, and as not moving in space. I was convinced that
if the theory were only expressed in language not implying
extension in the original sensation, its insufficiency would at
once be seen. He has now, in a long appendix, labored to
construct his theory in language consistent with it. and the
baldness of it at once appears.
My objection proceeded on a far deeper principle than the
language employed by Mr. Mill. I appealed to conscious
ness, riot as Hamilton would have done, to settle the whole
question at once, but to testify to a matter of fact, which Mr.
Mill would admit to fall immediately under its cognizance.
Consciousness declares that we have now an idea of some
thing extended; extended on three dimensions, length,
breadth, and depth ; and, I may add, of extended objects
moving in space. It is admitted, then, that we have this
idea, and I defy Mr. Mill to revolve this idea into any ele
ment allowed by him, in fact, into any element not involv
ing extension. He tells us that the whole variety of the facts
of nature, as we know it, is given in the mere existence of
our sensations, and in the laws or order of their succession.
But from which of these does he get extension ? Surely not
from mere sensation, which, as not being extended, cannot
give what it does not possess. As certainly not from laws
or order in successive sensations, which, as they do not pos
sess it individually, cannot have it in their cumulation, any
more than an addition of zeros could give us a positive num
ber. We have one more primordial fact, not only not ac
counted for by his theory, but utterly inconsistent with it.
We must examine his account of matter a little more
narrowly. It is a possibility of sensations. Whence this
dark background of possibilities which he cannot get rid of,
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up? To account for the phenomena, he says, they come in
groups, and by rigid laws of causation. Whence these co
existing groups and unvariable successions ? Do they come
in obedience to mental laws, say, to the laws of association ?
These laws are represented by him as being contiguity and
resemblance. Do these create the groups and successions?
I scarcely think that Mr. Mill will assert that they do. I
remember when travelling in the midst of a group of sensa
tions called the Alps, thinking only of my wretchedly wet
condition, I was suddenly startled by a group and succession
of sensations such as I had never experienced before, and
which I referred to an avalanche falling a mile off. Whence
this effect? It was not produced by any volition of mine.
Surely, Mr. Mill will not argue that it was produced by con
tiguity or resemblance, or any of the known laws of associa
tion. Whence, then? If he says something within me,
then I say we have here a set of laws of a very curious and
complex character, unnoticed by the theorist. But it can be
shown that the facts cannot be explained by laws within me.
The law of cause and effect is, that the same co-existing
agencies are followed by the same consequences. But I
might be under the same group of sensations as I was when
the avalanche fell, without the sounds which I heard follow
ing. Does not- this require us to posit something out of the
series of sensations to account for the phenomena in the
series ; and this something obeying laws independent alto
gether of our sensations and associations. If we once posit
such an external, extra serial agency, we cannot withdraw it
when it becomes inconvenient ; we must go on with it, we
must inquire into all that is involved in it by the laws of in
duction. This was the argument that convinced Brown,
who, however, called in to guarantee
it an intuitive convic
tion of cause and effect, that there must be an external world.
Whether the argument
is convincing, on the supposition that
the belief in causation is not intuitive, I will not take it upon
myself to say. I am not sure that the infant mind could
arrive, in the midst of such complications, at a knowledge of448 APPENDIX.
the law of cause and effect. Finding many sensations not
following from any law in the mind, it could not, I believe,
reach a law of invariable succession. But then, it is said, it
would refer them to something out of the mind. But with
an experience only of something in the mind, how could it
argue any thing out of the mind, of which outness it has as
yet no idea in the sensations or order of sensations ? Would
it not, in fact, be shut up in the shell of the Ego, and find in
that Ego most of its sensations without a cause ? Or rather,
would not an infant mind, endowed with only the powers
allowed by Mr. Mill, speedily become extinguished? But if
it could live, and discover the law of cause and effect, as Mr.
Mill thinks, that law seems to require us to believe in an
external something, obeying laws of co-existence and succes
sion independent of the series of sensations, and we should
have to take this with all its logical consequences. This
gives us Matter not as a possibility of sensations, but an ex
ternal something obeying laws of co-existence and succession,
and the cause of sensations in us.
The theory would, after all, be utterly inadequate, for it
would not account for the most prominent thing in our con
ception of matter ; namely, that it is extended, which we could
never argue, or apprehend, or even imagine, if we knew it
merely as the cause of unextended sensations. I therefore
reject it entirely. But the consequences I have sketched in
last paragraph follow, if we adopt the theory. Under this
view, I was entitled to point out an oversight in Mr. Mill s
account of the properties of matter, which he represents as
being resistance, extension, and figure ; thus omitting, I said,
those powers mentioned by Locke, by which one body oper
ates upon another.
&quot; Thus the sun has a power to make wax
white, and fire to make lead fluid.&quot; When I said so, I had
entered a good way, notwithstanding his insinuation to the
contrary, into the cloud of Mr. Mill s mode of thought,
farther, perhaps, than I was welcome. He now, in replying
to me (p. 248), is obliged to talk of one group of possibili
ties of sensations, &quot;destroying or modifying another suchHIS THEORY OF BODY. 449
group ;
&quot; and this certainly not by laws of sensation or asso
ciation, but by laws acting independently of any discoverable
cause in the series which constitutes mind. We have now
got, by logical consequence, from Mr. Mill s theory, a con
siderably complicated view of Matter, as a group of causes
obeying laws of co-existence and unconditional succession,
and one group influencing another, or destroying it, and all
independent of any volitions of mine, or laws in my mind.
The idea is, after all, inadequate, as it does not include exten
sion ; but it is certainly utterly inconsistent with his theory,
that the notion and belief of Matter
&quot;
may have come unto us
by the laws of our constitution, without being a revelation of
any objective reality.&quot;
This is confirmed by the language he uses in answering
Mr. O. Hanlon. He admits &quot;that there is a sphere beyond
my consciousness ;
&quot; and
&quot; the laws which obtain in my con
sciousness also obtain in the sphere beyond
it.&quot; This, of
course, refers to our conviction as to there being other minds
as well as our own (p. 253). I am not sure that his argu
ment for the existence of such minds is conclusive.
&quot; I am aware, by experience, of a group of Permanent Possi
bilities of Sensation, which I call my body, and which my expe
rience shows to be an universal condition of every part of my thread
of consciousness. I am also aware of a great number of other
groups, resembling the one that I call my body, but which have no
connection, such as that has, with the remainder of my thread of
consciousness. This disposes me to draw an inductive inference,
that those other groups are connected with other threads of con
sciousness, as mine is with my own. If the evidence stopped here,
the inference would be but an hypothesis, reaching only to the
inferior degree of inductive evidence called Analogy. The evidence,
however, does not stop here ; for, having made the supposition that
real feelings, though not experienced by myself, lie behind these
phenomena
3
of my own consciousness, which, from the resemblance
to my body, I call other human bodies, I find that my subsequent
consciousness presents those very sensations, of speech heard, of
movements and other outward demeanor seen, and so forth, which,
being the effects or consequents of actual feelings in my own case,
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I should expect to follow upon those other hypothetical feelings, if
they really exist : and thus the hypothesis is verified. It is thus
proved inductively, that there is a sphere beyond my consciousness :
i.e., that there are other consciousnesses beyond it ; for there exists
no parallel evidence in regard to matter.&quot;
Now, I am not sure that an infant mind, with only the
furniture allowed by Mr. Mill, and without a knowledge
direct or by legitimate inference of body, and apart from an
intuitive law of cause and effect, could conduct such a pro
cess. The actual attainments of every mature mind show,
by a legitimate inference, that there must be more capacities
and inlets of ideas than Mr. Mill supposes. But, passing
this, let us examine the legitimacy of the process. There is
first the difficulty, already urged, of getting out of the sensa
tions which have no outness, to the conception of an
&quot; outer
sphere.&quot; Then, is it not conceivable that the notion and
belief in regard to other people s mind may have come to us
by the laws of our constitution, without implying any objec
tive reality ? And if so, are we not, by the law of parcimony,
shut up to a solitary egoism as the more philosophical theory ?
that is, I may look on myself as a series of sensations aware
of itself, with possibilities of sensation in groups and succes
sions, among which I place what would be called, in the lan
guage I employ, my fellow-creatures. No doubt, another
hypothesis may be made, and seems to have its verifications ;
but the simple hypothesis, which explains all by the laws of
my constitution, is to be preferred, if it explains the phe
nomena of other people s minds, as I believe it to do quite as
satisfactorily as it does our notion ot and belief in Matter.
If we draw back from this, and stand upon the hypothesis
and verification, then I urge that a like process requires me
to postulate, that these groups of possibilities in my body
and beyond it have an objective reality independent of me,
and obeying laws of their own, and not laws of my constitu
tion. Of the conceivable conclusions reached, Mr. Mill s
seem to me the most hesitating and incongruous. He must,
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of the Ego, with possibilities he knows not what ; or, if he
once go beyond it, he must include not only other minds,
but material objects following laws independent of our sub
jective constitution or perceptions.
ARTICLE IV. Experimental Physiological Cases, (pp. 152-180.)
We have now to look at the attempts which Mr. Mill has
made to turn aside the force of the reported experimental
cases which I had urged against him. To prove that the eye
is immediately cognizant, not merely of color, but of surface,
I had adduced the case reported by Dr. Franz, of Leipsic,
which Mr. Mill seems never to have heard of before, though
it was given in the Transactions of the Royal Society for
1841. A youth born blind had his sight restored at the age
of seventeen ; and when a sheet of paper, on which two strong
black lines had been drawn, the one horizontal and the other
vertical, was placed before him at the distance of about three
feet, on opening his eye,
&quot;after attentive examination, he
called the lines by their right denominations.&quot; What? asks
Mr. Mill. It is clear he called them horizontal and vertical,
having got the terms by his mathematical education, and
knowing what were the things by the sense of touch. Mr.
Mill allows (pp. 287-290) that this case, if fairly reported,
would require a considerable modification of his doctrine, and
that it looks like an experimental proof, that something which
admits of being called extension
&quot;
may be perceived by sight
at the very first use of the
eyes.&quot; But he tries to throw
doubts on the accuracy of the report, evidently because it runs
counter to his theory. It is a suspicious circumstance, he says,
that the youth knew a cube and a sphere placed before him
not to be drawings, of which he could have no idea, as if
he could not have had some idea of what persons seeing meant
by drawings, through the descriptions which they had given.
And if there be any truth in the case at all, it is clear that
the youth perceived at once vertical and horizontal lines,
squares, circles, triangles, and the difference between the452 APPENDIX.
cube and the sphere. Mr. Nunneley s case proves the same
thing
: the boy could at once perceive
&quot; the differences in the
shape of
objects,&quot; though he could not tell, as to the cube and
the sphere, which was which. It appears that, in this case, it
was some time before the boy could identify his perceptions
of touch with those of sight. This is in accordance with what
I have stated. The youth in Dr. Franz s case could do it
more rapidly than the boy in Nunneley s case, because the
former had a mathematical training ; but even he required
examination and consideration, so that the two cases exactly
correspond. There is nothing odd in the circumstance that
Franz s youth could not form, from what he saw,
&quot; the idea
of a square and disc, until he perceived a sensation of what he
saw in the points of his fingers, as if he really touched the
object ;
&quot;
for it was thus he identified the perceptions which
he was now receiving with those which he formerly had. Mr.
Mill will only admit after all, that, though the youth is re
ported as seeing lines, circles, triangles, yet this &quot;does not
prove that we perceive extension by sight, but only that we
have discriminative sensations of sight corresponding to all
the diversities of superficial extension ;
&quot;
as if Hamilton
had not demonstrated that discriminate sensations of color
imply the perception of bounding lines, and therefore of
figure. I do not know if the history of speculative philosophy
affords a more startling case of the determination of a theorist
not to found his theory on facts, but to twist the facts to suit
his theory, which he is determined to adhere to at all hazards.
This may be the proper place for referring to the now
famous case of Platner, which both Hamilton and Mill have
been using, but which in fact helps neither, and perplexes
both. Platner, without giving a detail of the facts, comes to
the conclusion that
&quot; touch is altogether incompetent to afford
us the representation of extension and space, and is not even
cognizant of local
exteriority,&quot; and that a person born blind
could have no idea of extension. These observations do not
agree with those of any other person I am acquainted with.
Mr. Mill was obliged to say, that Platner
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color on the matter, when he says his patient had no percep
tion of extension.&quot; He now tells us that he does not agree
with Platner, that
&quot;
the notions of figure and distance come
originally from
sight&quot; (p. 280). But if Platner s case does
not prove this, it proves nothing. I believe it does prove
nothing. It is quite inconsistent with the simple experiments,
which, with the aid of Mr. Kinghan, I wrought on young
children born blind. I have an idea that Platner was led
astray by not distinguishing between the idea of extension,
which is original both to sight and touch, with the power of
measuring it, which is acquired. Mr. Mill admits all that I
claim, and all that Platner denies, &quot;that a person born blind
can acquire, by a mere gradual process, all that is in our
notion of space, except the visible picture,&quot; that is, the color
in the picture.
To show that we intuitively know our bodily frame as
extended, by the sense of touch, I had quoted at length from
the cases adduced by Miiller. According to that illustrious
physiologist, we localize our affections received by the senses ;
and the law of our nature is, that, in touch or feeling, we
place the sensation at the spot where the nerve normally ter
minates. It is thus, I believe, that we acquire a knowledge
of our frame as having one part out of another, and as ex
tended. All this I hold to be original and intuitive, so
strongly so, that persons who have their limbs cut off, have,
ten or twenty years after, a sense of the integrity of the limb.
Mr. Mill says he can explain this by association of ideas. I
deny that he can ; for surely such a length of time was suffi
cient to destroy the old association, which had nothing to
keep it alive, and to create a new one. He tells me, that,
according to my theory, the pain should have been felt in the
stump. I believe, on the contrary, that, after so long an
experience without a limb, this should have been the case,
according to Mr. Mill s theory. My theory no, not my
theory, but Miiller s is, that there is an original law which
leads us to localize the affection at the spot where the nerve
in its healthy and proper action terminates. When, in the454 APPENDIX.
restoration of a nose, a flap of skin is turned down from the
forehead, and made to unite with the stump of the nose, the
new nose thus formed has, as long as the isthmus of skin by
which it maintains its connections remains undivided, the same
sensations as if it were still in the forehead. This, Mr. Mill
says, should not be, according to my theory ; and there is a
good deal of self-complacent chuckling over me, as if my
facts overthrew my theory. This implies a misunderstanding
of the facts. According to the law, as I have expounded it,
as long as the nerve is imbedded in the isthmus of skin taken
from the forehead, it should be felt in the forehead. Mr. Mill
takes care not to quote the further fact, that is,
&quot; when the
communication of the nervous fibres of the new nose with
those of the forehead is cut off by the division of the isthmus
of skin, the sensations are of course no longer referred to the
forehead ; the sensibility of the nose is at first absent, but is
gradually developed.&quot; According to the association theory,
the affection should have been felt in the forehead, not till
the isthmus was cut, but till the old association was gone ; and
this, according to Mr. Mill, might not have been for twenty
years. Be it observed, that, when the flesh is cut off from the
forehead, and the nerve comes to have its normal position in
the nose, the sensation is felt there. My theory is thus sim
ply the expression of the facts. But whatever doubt there
may be about these phenomena, there can be none about
other facts which I have adduced. Whatever dispute there
may be as to cases in which there has been an association
formed between a limb once existing but now lost, there can
be none as to persons who never had the limb, and in whose
case the association could not have been formed, but who are
reported as having a sense of it. Professor Valentin men
tions cases which I have quoted, which show, &quot;that individu
als who are the subjects of congenital imperfection, or the
absence of the extremities, have, nevertheless, the internal
sensations of such limbs in their perfect
state.&quot; It is curious
that Mr. Mill has taken no notice of these decisive cases
which I have adduced as setting the whole question at rest.EXPERIMENTAL CASES. 455
Mr. Mill dilates on two cases, to which I have referred with
out attaching much importance to them. The shrinking of
the frame when boiling liquid is poured down the throat,
seems to show that we localize the pain at a spot of which
we cannot know the site by touch or experience. Mr. Mill
thinks the action purely automatic (p. 303). Now I am
disposed to think that there may be an action of the will di
rected to the seat of sensation. I believe that at a very early
age, and long before they have any acquired perceptions of
locality, they will indicate vaguely the seat of the pain. My




is wounded in the arm, it will not hold out the foot.&quot; This
should not be construed as meaning that the infant will sys
tematically hold out its foot ; for this would suppose that it
has much more knowledge than it can yet have of mother or
doctor watching it. But at an early age, there are apparently
voluntary movements which enable the mother and doctor
to discover the seat of the pain. I agree with Mr. Mill,
&quot;
there are some difficulties, not yet completely resolved, re
specting the localization of our internal pains, for the solution
of which we need more careful and intelligent observation of
infants.&quot; The question is set at rest, not by such a case,
which I am prepared to abandon, if disproven, without
the least injury to my argument, but by the fact reported
by Professor Valentin, which Mr. Mill has declined to
notice.*
* In a foot-note I had uttered a sentence in regard to a case quoted by Mill from
Hamilton, who gets it from Maine de Biran, who takes it from a report of Key Regis
in regard to a patient, who, though he retained a sense of pain, had lost the power
of localizing the feeling. I pronounced the case
&quot;
valueless, as evidently the functions
of the nervous apparatus were deranged.&quot; Mr. Mill allows that this single case is
not conclusive (p. 295) ; and with this I would have heen satisfied, had he not gone
on to argue from it that
&quot; localization does not depend on the same conditions with
the sensations themselves.&quot; Be it so; in the normal state, the nerves localize the
feeling.
&quot; The patient, as he gradually recovered the use of his limbs, gradually also
recovered the power of localizing his sensations.&quot; I do not attach much importance
to the following reports of the experience of insane persons; but they are worthy
Of being mentioned, as showing how intimately our abiding perception of our
bodily frame is bound up with the skin sense and its localizing tendency.
&quot;A woman,&quot;
whose case Esquirol tells, &quot;had complete anaesthesia of the surface of the skin: she
believed that the devil had carried off her body. A soldier who was severely456 APPENDIX.
Mr. Mill thinks that the eye originally gives us only color
and not extension. He does rfot allow though the cases
now adduced seem to prove it that we have original per
ceptions of our bodily frame as affected. How, then, ac
cording to him, do we get the idea of extension? Following
Dr. Brown, he thinks that we get it by the sweep of the
arm in space; and he quotes, with approbation, Professor
Bain s method of working out this hypothesis. In my Exam
ination of Mill, I endeavored to meet this by psychological
considerations, and showed that a sweep of the arm or leg,
considered merely as a group of sensations without exten
sion, could not give us the idea of extension. I was not
aware then that a German metaphysician, in examining the
theory of Brown, had entirely disproved it by an experi
mental case. According to this theory, a person born without
arms or legs could have no idea of space ; but Schopen
hauer has brought forward the case of Eva Lauk, an
Esthonian girl fourteen years old, born without arms or legs,
but who, according to her mother, had developed herself
intellectually quite as rapidly as her brothers and sisters, and
without the use of limbs had reached a correct judgment con
cerning the magnitude and distance of visible objects quite
as quickly as they.* Such a fact as this, undermines the
theory of the mode in which we gain our idea of extension,
and with it the whole philosophic superstructure which Mill
and Bain have been rearing with such labored and ill-spent
ingenuity. The cases adduced by Miiller, and that reported
by Franz, show how it is we get our idea of extension ;
we get it by the immediate perception of our bodily frame in
wounded at the battle of Austerlitz considered himself dead from that time; if he
were asked how he was, he invariably replied, that Lambert no longer lives ; a
cannon-ball carried him away at Austerlitz. What you see here is not Lambert,
but a badly imitated machine, which he failed not to speak of as it. The
sensibility of his skin was lost.&quot; MAUDSLEY: Physiology and Pathology of the
Mind, p. 242.
* My attention was called to this case by Mr. Bleeck, in his Mr. J. S. Mill s
Psychological Theory. It is quoted by Schopenhauer in his Die Welt als Wille, vol.
ii. c. 4, and is taken from Frorieps Neue Notizen aus dem Gebiete der Natur, July
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feeling, and, by means of the eye perceiving the colored and
extended surface before it. There is an impression among
many that somehow Mr. Mill and Mr. Bain have physiology
on their side. I confidently affirm that their peculiar philoso
phy is not supported by a single reported case, and that most
of the reported cases are entirely against them.
ARTICLE V. Can Association generate New Ideas ? (pp. 190-207,
218-224.)
I now turn to the discussion of a point of perhaps greater
importance than any other started by Mr. Mill s philosophy.
It relates to the power of association to generate new ideas,
and to produce belief, in fact, to take the place of judg
ment or the comparison of things. It is, perhaps, the most
fatal of all the errors in Mr. Mill s speculations. It was on
this account I dwelt so much on it, more than any other
of Mr. Mill s critics.
The two principal elements out of which Mr. Mill gen-
crates all our ideas, are sensation and association. I have
found fault with him for never telling us what is involved in
sensation. We have seen in this paper that he is not sure
whether time may not be involved in it, a view which
would entirely change its nature. He never sees what is
really involved in sensation, which is never felt except a sen
sation of self. But I have a still greater complaint against
him for never telling us precisely what association can do,
and what it cannot do. He everywhere ascribes to it, in lan
guage derived from material action, a chemical power
: two
ideas coming together may generate a third, different from
either of the original ones. This is making association a source
of new ideas. In other words, he gives to mere association
a power which the a priori philosophers have given to the
intellect ; and surely with much more justice, for even on the
supposition that association is the occasion of the new idea,
the new idea must proceed from some mental capacity joined
with association. Mr. Mill does not render anv account of458 APPENDIX.
the law, and the limit of this power, supposed to be in asso
ciation. It is a chemical power, but then the chemist can tell
us what is the nature and the law of the chemical power ;
he says, Put one proportion of oxygen and another proportion
of hydrogen in a certain relation, and water is the product.
But Mr. Mill never ventures to express any such definite law ;
he leaves every thing vague and loose. He finds certain pecul
iar ideas in the mind, such as those we have in regard to beauty
and moral good ; and he satisfies himself with saying that they
are generated by sensations and ideas, which have in them
selves no such qualities. I see no reason which he has for
claiming for his system of generalizing ideas out of sensation
by associations, such a superiority over Condillac s &quot;trans
formed sensations.&quot;
I have denied that association is ever a source of new ideas.
I have admitted that as the issue of
&quot;
long and repeated con
junction, ideas, each it may be with its own peculiar feeling,
succeed each other with incalculable rapidity, so that we can
not distinguish between them, and that they may coalesce in
a result.&quot;
&quot; But in the agglomeration there seems to be
nothing but the ideas, the feelings, and their appropriate im
pressions coalescing ; there is no new generation no gen
eration of an idea, nor in the separate parts of the collection.&quot;
At this point Mr. Mill meets me (pp. 342-3). He is obliged
to concede that
&quot;
facts in the case of ideas cannot be appealed
to, for they are the very matter disputed.&quot; It clears the
ground very much to have this admission. It is implied that
there are new ideas generated by the action of the mind ; and
Mr. Mill ascribes to association what our profounder philoso
phers have ascribed to the intellect, making their case more
parallel to that of the chemists, who give to their elements a
chemical power quite different from the mechanical. Not
able to get proof from ideas, he says,
&quot; There are abundant
instances in sensation.&quot;
&quot;I had thought,&quot; he says,
&quot;that such an experiment as
that of the wheel with seven colors, in which seven sensa
tions following one another very rapidly, become, or at leastASSOCIATION NOT A SOURCE OF IDEAS. 459
generate one sensation, and that one totally different from
any of the seven sufficiently proved the possibility of what
Dr. M Cosh denies ; but he writes as if he had never heard
of the experiment ;
&quot; and he refers to the ribbon of light pro
duced by waving rapidly a luminous body. Now, it so hap
pens that I had produced the ring when a boy, by a lighted
piece of paper ; in my college days, I had seen the experi
ment of the seven colors ; and in my mature life, I have
seen a wheel in rapid motion appearing stationary when
made visible by instantaneous electric light. But I looked
on these as experiments, not in regard to mental states, but
simply about light, and the way in which it affects our bodily
organs. The wheel under electric light looks stationary, not
as the result of successive sensations of motion, for we have
not been percipient of the motion, but because we see it only
for the instant. In the ribbon of flaming color, the impres
sion produced by each of the rays lingers for a certain short
time, till the impression produced by those that rapidly fol
low mixes with it, and the figure on the retina becomes a
continuous circle. In the same way with the seven colors,
the organic affections mingle and become one, and are trans
mitted as one to the mind, which ceases to have a sensation
of the seven colors, and has the sensation of one. This is
not a case of seven separate mental sensations generating a
new one. As long as the wheel with the seven colors ro
tates slowly, so that there is time for the one set of rays to
disappear from the retina before the other overtakes them,
there are seven sensations, but no eighth generated by the
seven. If the wheel is seen by instantaneous light, seven
colors are seen, but no eighth. Mr. Mill has stated the
facts precisely in an analogous case furnished by the sense
of hearing (p. 618)
:
&quot; When a number of sounds in per
fect harmony strike the ear simultaneously, we have but a
single impression, w
re perceive but one mass of sound.&quot;
Mr. Mill was bound to produce a case of two or more sep
arate mental affections producing a new one never before ex
perienced
; and he has produced simply a case of the blending460 APPENDIX.
of rays of light in retinal or nervous action. Again facta
fail him, and he is left with a baseless hypothesis.
ARTICLE VI. Impossibility of reaching Positive Truth.
(pp. 224-230.)
This brings us to the consideration of the now notorious
examples which he adduces of the most certain principles of
arithmetic and geometry being believable in other circum
stances : that is, in the possibility of our believing that 2 -f- 2
may be 5 ; that parallel lines may meet ; that any two right
lines being produced will meet at two points ; and that two
or more bodies may exist in the same place. These cases are
taken from JEssays by a Barrister , who did not profess to be
a metaphysician, who did not know what to make of them,
except that he thought they were fitted to lessen our assurance
of the certainty of objective truth. Mr. Mill now makes the
following singular addition to his statement of the two first of
these cases :
&quot;
Hardly any part of the present volume has been
so maltreated by so great a number of critics, as the illustra
tions here quoted from an able and highly instructed contem
porary thinker ; which, as they were neither designed by their
author, nor cited by me, as any thing more than illustrations,
I do not deem it necessary to take up space by defending.
When a selection must be made, one is obliged to consider
what one can best
spare&quot; (p. 87). This is surely far from
satisfactory. Does, or does he not, give up the cases? If
he does, he should have said so in all honesty, and nobody
would have thought the less of him. But he seems still in
clined to retain them as illustrations, but does not think it
necessary to defend them. I do hold, that Mr. Mill s prin
ciples do lead to these consequences, which have staggered so
many, and made them review^ the principles which lead to
such results, implying that man can reach no truth which
might not be falsehood in other circumstances. But as Mr.
Mill does not care to defend them, I do not feel that I am
called to continue my assault.HIS DOCTRINE OF RELATIVITY. 401
&quot; The geometry of visibles has been noticed only by Dr.
M Cosh, who rejects it as founded on the erroneous doctrine
(as he considers it) , that we cannot perceive by sight the
third dimension of
space.&quot; This is not a full statement of
the ground of my rejection. My language is, &quot;These infer
ences can be deduced only by denying to vision functions
which belong to it, and ascribing to it others which are not
intuitive or
original.&quot; I hold it to be one of the functions of
sight to give us a right line and a curved line. Such cases
as those of Franz clearly show, that by sight alone we can
perceive two straight lines ; and, having once seen them, we
never could be made to believe that they could meet at two
points and enclose a space ; or that a straight line being con
tinued could return itself again. Those who see colors must
perceive the boundaries of colors, and these being often curved,
would give us the idea of a curved line ; and I am sure they
would be obliged to look on a straight line returning into
itself as a curve, and not a right line. So much for his deny
ing to vision functions which belong to it, which was my main
argument. But again, he ascribes to it functions which are
not intuitive or original
: for I hold that it is not the function
of vision, but of touch, to reveal to us impenetrability; and
a creature with sight, but not touch (even if it could live or
reason at all) , could argue nothing as to bodies either pene
trating, or not penetrating, each other, or passing through
each other,
&quot; without having undergone any change by this
penetration.&quot;
In looking at these acknowledged consequences, I had ven
tured to point out the dangerous tendency of a doctrine which
strips man of the power of reaching positive truth, and of
pronouncing judgment on the reality of things. Because I
have done so, he represents me as &quot;preaching ;
&quot; but preach
ing to one who is &quot;already converted,&quot; &quot;an actual missionary
of the same doctrine.&quot; I am here tempted to remark, that
Mr. Mill himself &quot;preaches&quot; at times, as in those passages in
which he charges Dr. Mansel s doctrines as being &quot;simply
the most morally pernicious doctrine now current,&quot; and hurls462 APPENDIX.
at him that tremendous passage,
&quot;I will call no being good
who is not what I mean when I apply that epithet to my fel
low-creatures ; and if such a being can sentence me to hell,
for not so calling him, to hell I will
go.&quot; My preaching on
this occasion has evidently had some effect ; it has hit a point
in which Mr. Mill seems to be sensitively tender. I am con
vinced that he has never seriously weighed the logical and
practical tendency of his doctrine of nescience ; it looks as if
there are times when he is unwilling to look at the conse
quences. He tells us that, in his Logic, he has been instruct
ing his readers to form their belief exclusively on evidence.
But did he never hear a preacher waxing longest and loudest
on the points of his doctrine which he felt to be the weakest
and most vulnerable? In regard to ordinary mundane mat
ters, Mr. Mill is very careful to bid us look for evidence ; but
the evidence, in the last resort, is found to be baseless, thus
rendering the whole superstructure insecure in the estimation
of all who are bent on looking beneath the surface. He cor
rects Mr. Grote when he seems to say, that truth is to every
man what seems truth to him ; but his own doctrine is equally
unsatisfactory when we follow it to its foundation. &quot;We
grant,&quot; he says, &quot;that, according to the philosophy which we
hold in common with Mr. Grote, the fact itself, if knowable
to us, is relative -to our perceptions, to our senses, or our
internal consciousness ; and our opinion about the fact is so
too : but the truth of the opinion is a question of relation
between these two relatives, one of which is an objective stan
dard for the other&quot; (Dissert., vol. ii. art. Grote s Plato).
That is, we are to have witnesses ; but our conviction, nay,
truth itself, leans on the deposition of witnesses, each of which
supports the other, but each of which may be a liar. The
earnest and logical mind is made to feel that in all matters
bearing on the depths of philosophy, and the heights of reli
gion, and fitted to bear it up above this cold earth, it has
nothing left on which to lean.AMBIGUITY OF THE WORD CONCEIVE. 463
ARTICLE VII. Ambiguity of the word Conceive, (pp. 251-258.)
In my Examination I had been at great pains to point out
the ambiguity in the word
&quot;
conceive,&quot; and the paronymous
words
&quot;conception,&quot; &quot;conceivable,&quot; and &quot;inconceivable.&quot; It
is of essential importance, if we would avoid senseless logo
machy, to determine the meaning in which we employ the
phrase when we use man s power of conception as a test of
necessary truth, or his incapacity of conception as a test
of error. I distinguished three senses of the word : (1) image
in the phantasy, as when we picture Mont Blanc; (2) the
generalized notion, as &quot;mountain;&quot; (3) native cognition,
belief, or judgment, in regard to objects ; and I showed that
it is only when used in the third sense that it can be legiti
mately employed as a test of truth. I showed that it was not
in this sense that Antipodes were supposed by our fathers to
be inconceivable, but because they seemed to be contrary
to experience, a prepossession which gave way before far
ther experience. I am not aware that any one ever objected
to Antipodes on the ground of a native cognition, belief, or
judgment. I charged Mr. Mill with taking advantage, of
course unconsciously, of the ambiguity of the phrase. Any
apparent success which he may have had, in explaining neces
sity of conception by association, arises solely from his show
ing how one image suggests another, how, for instance,
darkness suggests ghosts, or a precipice the danger of falling.
I was quite aware that Mr. Mill, in answering Hamilton, had
shown that the phrase had several meanings; but then, I
asserted, that he himself was led astray, and was leading
astray his readers, by the ambiguity. As -my work was
passing through the press, I observed that, in the sixth
edition of his Logic (I. pp. 303-306), lately published, he
had charged Mr. Spencer as deriving
&quot; no little advantage
&quot;
from the ambiguity, and alleges that the popular use of the
word
&quot; sometimes creeps in with its associations, and prevent
him from maintaining a clear separation between the two.&quot;
I simply noticed this in a foot-note, and added, that Mr. Mill464 APPENDIX.
&quot; continues to take advantage of the ambiguity, which is
greater than he yet




(p. 88). The note was hastily written, and I admit my
meaning was not so clear as I have now endeavored to make
it.
AKTICLE VIII. Mr. Mill s Logical Views, (pp. 286-371.)
The only subject remaining to be discussed is his defence
of his own logical views, and his criticism of mine. He is
pleased to say (p. 388), that &quot;the chapter of Dr. M Cosh,
headed the Logical Notion, contains much sound philoso
phy.&quot; But he complains of &quot;the persistent impression which
the author keeps up, that I do disagree with him.&quot; Now, I
believe that our views do disagree, and I was anxious to point
out the mistakes in a work which is of such value and influ
ence as Mr. Mill s Logic. Mr. Mill is a nominalist, and
looks at the name, its denotation, and connotation, instead of
the mental exercise ; whereas, I am a conceptualist (though,
certainly, not in the sense in which many are), and have
labored to bring out the process of mind involved in the
notion, judgment, and reasoning.
We differ in regard to the General Notion, or Common
Term. I hold, that every such notion or term has both exten
sion and comprehension, or intension, that is, both objects
and attributes, whereas, he looks solely at the comprehen
sion, or the attributes. I had said, that I think it desirable
to have a phrase to denote the class of things comprised in
the general notion, and that the best word I can think of is
Concept. In opposition to this, he says the word &quot;class&quot;
is sufficient. But the word class is rather significant of an
objective arrangement, existing independent of my notice of
it, say, of the class Rosacea3, which had an existence in
nature before naturalists had observed it, or given a name to
it. He admits, that, in order to belief,
&quot;a previous mental
conception of the facts is an indispensable condition,&quot; and
M
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the word Concept stands with me, not for the class, but for
the class conceived, and is the best I can think of. He has a
glimpse of the truth when he speaks of extension (p. 421)
&quot; as a name for the aggregate of objects possessing the attri
butes included in the concept.&quot; He tells us (p. 372),
&quot;that
concepts cannot be thought as being universal, but only as
being part of the thought of an individual.&quot; Here, again,
conceive, or &quot;think,&quot; used in the sense of image; whereas,
it should be employed in the sense of judge. A concept is
a notion of an indefinite number of objects (extension) pos
sessing common properties (comprehension) , the notion being
such as to include all objects possessing the common proper
ties. It is thus emphatically universal.
We differ, also, in regard to Abstract Notions. &quot;It is
evident that the existence of abstract ideas the conception
of the class qualities by themselves, and not as embodied in
an individual is effectually precluded by the law of insepa
rable association.&quot; I acknowledge, that, in the sense of
&quot;
imaging,&quot; we cannot have a conception of an attribute apart
from a concrete object. But, in the sense of &quot;think of,&quot; we
can apprehend a part as a part, an attribute as an attribute ;
and this is what I mean by abstraction. I think it of great
moment to distinguish between the abstract and general
notions, which the Kantian logicians, German and British,
departing from certain older logicians, everywhere con
found. &quot;Rationality&quot; is an abstract term, denoting an attri
bute, and is different from
&quot;
man,&quot; which is a general notion
connecting objects. By drawing this distinction, and carry
ing it out consequentially, we throw light on logical judg
ment, and settle some of the questions discussed in the present
day. There are, I hold, judgments in which we compare
mere abstracts, and in which there is no general notion in
volved. Such judgments are always convertible or substitu-
tive (called equipollent by certain older logicians), that is,
we can turn the subject into the predicate, and the predicate
into the subject, without any change, which we cannot do
in comparing universal notions. Because
&quot; men are mortals,&quot;466 APPENDIX.
we cannot say, therefore, &quot;mortals are men ;
&quot; but if
&quot;honesty
is the best policy,&quot; we can say,
&quot; the best policy is
honesty,&quot;
because both terms are abstract.
I have represented Numbers as Abstract Notions, and the
judgments involving them as being convertible in conse
quence. Thus 3X3 being 9, we can say, 9 is 3 X 3. But
Mr. Mill says that the terms are general. &quot;The objects em
braced in 9 are nine apples, nine marbles, nine hours, nine
miles, and all the other aggregations of which 9 can be predi
cated. Every numeral is the name of a class, and a most
comprehensive class, consisting of things of all imaginable
qualities.&quot; Now, it was a disadvantage under which I la
bored in criticising Mr. Mill s
&quot; Formal
Logic,&quot; that I was
not able to expound my own views with sufficient fulness.
But I have all along explained to my college classes that the
same phrase may stand for an abstract and a general notion.
I hold, that numerals, 1, 2, 3, are primarily abstract qualities
of things, a quality of that one thing, of these two things,
or three things. It is because they are so that the propo
sitions comparing them are convertible. But, then, we very
often turn abstract names into general ones (as we also do
general ones into abstract ones), and we do speak of 1, 2, 3
as standing for a class. We so employ them when we say,
&quot;3X3 make 9,&quot; which we can only convert by saying,
&quot; some things making 9 are 3X3,&quot; for 6 -f- 3 also make 9.
There is surely a profound distinction here, with far-reaching
consequences ; but this is not the place for the further devel
opment of it.
As not seeing that Extension, as well as Comprehension,
is involved in all our general notions, and so in all our judg
ments involving general notions, Mr. Mill has not been able
to give a clear account of the Proposition. He says (p. 420) ,
&quot;all men,&quot; and the &quot;class men,&quot; are &quot;expressions which
point to nothing but attributes ; they cannot be interpreted
except in comprehension.&quot; Now, I have admitted that in the
greater number of propositions the uppermost thought and
sense are in comprehension, and I am represented as
&quot;
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partially just conceptions on the
subject.&quot; But I hold that,
in all judgments of the kind he is speaking of, there is thought
in extension, and that they can be interpreted in extension,
and have a meaning in extension. When I say,
&quot;
Gorillas
are not men,&quot; I mean, are not included in the class men;
and in many other propositions the uppermost thought is in
extension. Of course, as the one implies the other, the prop
osition has also a meaning in comprehension.
This is the proper place for correcting a misapprehension
of Mr. Mill s, as to what constitutes the principle of identity,
which, he thinks, should be expressed thus (p. 466)
: &quot;What
ever is true in one form of words, is true in every other form
of words which convey the same meaning.&quot; He applies this
to what
&quot; Kant terms Conclusions of the Understanding, and
Dr. M Cosh, Implied or Transposed Judgments.&quot; &quot;They
are not conclusions, nor fresh acts of judgment, but the
original expressed in other words.&quot; But this is not an ade
quate account. The law of identity requires that the relation
of the things compared should be considered the same, not
merely under different expressions, but in different circum
stances, positions, and forms. It being given us that &quot;all
men have a conscience,&quot; we are sure it cannot be true that
&quot; no man has a conscience,&quot; or that
&quot; some men have not a
conscience.&quot; These are not the same propositions expressed
in other words ; they would be felt to be true and implied.,
though not expressed in words at all.
There is one other logical point in which Mr. Mill and I
differ theoretically. I hold that in reasoning there is always
thought in Extension ; always a general principle involved,
constituting the major premises when the argument is fully
unfolded. In his own Formula, there is a major premise
:
&quot;Attribute A is a mark of attribute B,&quot; which means, when
properly interpreted,
&quot; Whatever object possesses attribute A
has* also attribute B,&quot; clearly a proposition involving Exten
sion ; nay, actually thought of in Extension. It is only
when we have such a generalized rnaxim that the particular
case constituting the minor premise warrants the conclusion.468 APPENDIX.
w The gorilla cannot speak ;
&quot;
this cannot give us the conclu
sion, &quot;the gorilla is not a man,&quot; unless we proceed on the
general principle that
&quot;
all beings placed in the class man are
possessed of speech.&quot; So far as our views bear on the prac
tical evolution of logical formulae, I believe Mr. Mill and I
are at one. We both think that the old logical formulae,
which are in Extension, may be allowed to keep the place
which they have had for ages ; and we both think that Sir W.
Hamilton has done good service to logic by showing us how,
when any good purpose is to be served by it, we may turn
reasoning in Extension into the form of reasoning in Com
prehension. I cannot agree with him, however, when he
gives as a reason for allowing the reasoning in Extension to
remain, that
&quot; concrete language, requiring for its formation a
lower degree of abstraction, was earliest formed, took posses
sion of the field, and is still the most familiar&quot; (p. 484). I
am not sure that thought in Extension is more concrete than
thought in Comprehension. I hold that reasoning is sponta
neously in Extension, and that it is thus that the forms
assumed this shape, took possession of the field, and are still
most familiar. When we argue that
&quot; the Red Indians are
responsible because they are human beings,&quot; we put the major
in the form, &quot;human beings are responsible,&quot; not because
&quot;responsible&quot; is more concrete than &quot;possessing responsi
bility,&quot; but because we must have a general law, and put
&quot;
all
human beings in the class of beings possessing responsibility.&quot;
The premises as propositions may be thought of primarily in
Comprehension, the Extension, however, being always in
volved ; but in reasoning, the Extension involved must be
actually thought of in order to give us the major proposition.
The formula in Extension, in the ordinary syllogistic analysis,
is thus the expression, not of artificial, but of spontaneous
reasoning.MR. MILUS OMISSIONS. 469
ARTICLE IX. Mr. Mill s Omissions.
I have now faced Mr. Mill at all the points in which he has
seen fit to meet me.* But I cannot close the discussion with
out referring to the points at which he has not deigned to
meet me, I had said a good deal about his mode of pro
cedure, and criticised his &quot;Psychological Method,&quot; showing
how it should be adopted only with important explanations
and modifications ; in particular, that we are at liberty to
proceed on this method only on the condition that we care
fully look at all that is in the idea, and that we explain it all
by the theory. Again, I had shown that Mr. Mill, while
seeming to ex-plain all our ideas by sensation and association,
had been obliged to call in as many assumed metaphysical
principles as Reid and Hamilton. I had collected his admis
sions into heads ; I had shown that they are utterly inconsis
tent with his apparently association theory ; and that, if
logically followed out, they must carry him much farther
than he is disposed to go. On none of these points does he
offer a word of explanation. I had criticised his doctrine of
causation, showing that what he explains by experience is not
our conviction as to cause and effect, but in the uniformity of
nature. I had reviewed with considerable care his very
defective account of mathematical axioms and definitions,
and of demonstration. I had examined his genesis of our
idea of moral good, and his whole utilitarian theory. I had
invited him to say whether he thinks a conclusive argument
for the existence of God could be constructed on his prin
ciples. It is curious that, while he has seen fit to meet me
* 1 am glad he has called attention (p. 76) to my complaint of the vagueness of
the distinction between knowledge and faith. He acknowledges that the distinction,
as dr.iwu by me, agrees with the cases to which I have applied it, and says that
every definition of belief must include these cases. But, then, he sees a difficulty in
carrying
it. through the entire region of thought. I am satisfied, if it holds good
in the region in which I have employed it, that is, in regard to primitive cognitions in
which the objects are present, and primitive beliefs, in which we are convinced of
their existence, though they are not present. But even in other regions, it calls
attention to the circumstance that in our very scientific knowledge there is belief
involved, Always, however, with other mental exercises, such as judgment.672115
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on other points, some of them in no way essential to my argu
ment, he has not noticed these all-important criticisms. I
am perhaps not justified in arguing that my positions must
therefore be unassailable ; but it will, at least, be allowed
that, since no attack has been made upon them by my acute
opponent, I am not required, for the present, to offer any
further defence.McCosh B
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